Commit graph

5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
7a794b47eb fix(scanners)!: a finding ID names the check, not the emission (M-BUG-28)
BREAKING CHANGE: the {NNN} in CA-{SCANNER}-{NNN} identifies the check that
produced the finding. It used to be the finding's position in that scanner's
output for that run, which made it unstable across CONFIGURATIONS, not just
across releases as STATE framed it. Measured on two fixtures: "No custom
subagents" was CA-GAP-007 on minimal-project and CA-GAP-004 on healthy-project.
A user who fixed an unrelated earlier gap silently renumbered every later one,
so a .config-audit-ignore pin retargeted to a neighbouring finding with no
version change at all.

Second measured arm: README already documented the opposite scheme. It and the
scanner headers describe ~20 numbers as check codes (CA-SKL-003 = oversized
body, CA-PLH-015 = folder shadowing, CA-TOK-006 = schema deferral), and the
counter could only produce those in the all-fire case -- source-order positions
are 4, 3 and 8. The documentation described the scheme; the implementation was
what was wrong. Every published number is preserved by construction and pinned
exhaustively in tests/lib/finding-codes.test.mjs.

scanners/lib/finding-codes.mjs is the single authority. Every finding() call
passes a `code`; an undeclared or missing one THROWS. No counter fallback --
that would reproduce D1's findGapId -> 'unknown' silent degradation and let a
half-converted scanner ship IDs that look valid. findingCounter/resetCounter
are deleted outright, not left as no-ops. Retirement is now a mechanism:
RETIRED_CODES tombstones a withdrawn key so its number is never reissued,
seeded with GAP t3_8 -- the D1 removal that opened this chunk.

IDs are consequently NOT unique per finding: one check failing in three files
emits three findings sharing an ID. That inverts which consumer is correct, so
every f.id/findingId site was classified before the change. diff-engine and
most of fix-engine already keyed on scanner+title+file (drift was never lying);
fix-engine's verification did not, and keyed on the ID alone -- fixing one of
two sibling instances marked both fixed, and the untouched one, still present
in the re-scan, was reported as a REGRESSION. Red test first, then keyed on
(findingId, file), which both planFixes and applyFixes already carry.
plugin-health's crossIds Set was measured and is a clean negative: cross
findings are allFindings.slice(crossPluginStart) and codes 18/19 are emitted
only in that tail, so the partition holds by construction.

unknownSuppressions() reports a pin that names no declared check, in the
--output-file payload (ux-rules rule 2 -- a stderr-only warning is invisible to
the commands) and only when one exists, so a clean config is byte-identical.
That is what makes the break safe: a stale pin goes loud instead of dying quiet.

Frozen tests/snapshots/v5.0.0/ untouched on disk. IDs are masked out of that
comparison (mask-finding-ids.mjs) rather than re-derived -- re-deriving
positional IDs would assert the retired scheme against itself, and #58's
isGapEntry off-by-one is the measured example of that misfiring. The dead
re-derivation is removed from strip-retired-gap.mjs. default-output snapshots
re-approved after confirming the diff is IDs and nothing else.

Guards, each seen red against its own defect: a missing code (scanner errors
out mid-sweep), an orphan declaration, a resurrected retired key, and a
documented ID naming no check. The sweep asserts the union across all 16
scanners, never per scanner -- a per-scanner assertion goes green on a partial
conversion.

Fasit written before implementation: docs/mbug28-id-semantics-fasit.local.md,
including one correction made before running (CML has 12 checks over 13 call
sites -- the anchored and calibrated char-budget arms are one check, which a
repeated-title sweep found and my call-site count had missed).

Suite 1535 -> 1573, 0 failing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MyqCQKK2ornJ1jFWwqx17E
2026-08-09 23:26:36 +02:00
d678765fad feat(dis): flag forbidden-param permission rules CC silently ignores
Extends the DIS scanner and its shared permission-rules lib with a third
documented Claude Code permission footgun. Verified verbatim against
code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions (fetched 2026-06-19).

CC's Tool(param:value) matching (2.1.178) is off-limits for a tool's own
canonicalizing field — CC ignores such a rule and emits a startup warning,
because e.g. Bash(command:rm *) is bypassable by a compound command. The
forbidden fields: command (Bash/PowerShell), file_path (Read/Edit/Write),
path (Grep/Glob), notebook_path (NotebookEdit), url (WebFetch).

- lib/permission-rules.mjs: new forbiddenParamRule(entry) returning
  { tool, key, hint } or null. Only the param:value form (colon present)
  whose key equals the tool's forbidden field is flagged; Bash(npm:*),
  WebFetch(domain:host), Agent(model:opus), and Bash(command) (no colon)
  are left valid. FORBIDDEN_PARAMS map is the single source of truth.
- DIS: scans allow + deny + ask and splits severity by intent — deny/ask
  hits are false security (medium: the block never applies), allow hits are
  dead config (low: param:value matching is deny/ask-only). Two findings,
  permissions-hygiene, CA-DIS-NNN.
- 11 new tests (7 lib, 4 DIS) + 1 fixture forbidden-param-permissions
  (force-added past .gitignore .claude/). Suite 918 -> 929. Snapshot
  unchanged (SC-5 byte-equal), contamination grep clean, gitleaks clean.
  README/CLAUDE document the broadened DIS mandate; test badge synced.
  self-audit: PASS, configGrade A 97, pluginGrade A 100, scanners 13.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ter3E2JSi1Khgmuf2kady8
2026-06-19 14:04:25 +02:00
03949c6c98 feat(dis): flag ineffective allow wildcards; treat Tool(*) as deny-all
Extends the DIS scanner and its shared permission-rules lib with two
documented Claude Code permission footguns. Verified verbatim against
code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions (fetched 2026-06-19).

- lib/permission-rules.mjs: new isIneffectiveAllowGlob(entry) — unanchored
  tool-name globs in permissions.allow (`*`, `B*`, `mcp__*`) that CC silently
  skips ("does not auto-approve anything"); valid only as a glob-free
  `mcp__<server>__*`. Shared with CNF.
- lib/permission-rules.mjs: dominates() now treats the `Tool(*)` deny-all glob
  as equivalent to a bare deny (covers a bare allow) — CC: "Bash(*) is
  equivalent to Bash ... both forms remove the tool from Claude's context".
- DIS: new finding "Ineffective allow wildcard — Claude Code ignores this rule"
  (low, permissions-hygiene, CA-DIS-NNN); the existing dead-allow finding now
  also catches a bare allow killed by a Tool(*) deny.
- 9 new tests (5 lib, 4 DIS) + 2 fixtures (force-added past .gitignore .claude/).
  Suite 903 -> 912. Snapshot unchanged, contamination grep clean. README/CLAUDE/
  scanner-internals document the broadened DIS mandate; test badge synced.
  self-audit: PASS, configGrade A 96, pluginGrade A 100, readme gate passed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ter3E2JSi1Khgmuf2kady8
2026-06-19 06:31:18 +02:00
bec3f45329 fix(permissions): param-aware DIS dead-allow + CNF conflict matching
The DIS scanner collapsed Tool(param) rules to the bare tool name, so
Agent(model:opus) deny + Agent(model:sonnet) allow (and the same for
WebFetch(domain:...)) were flagged as dead config — a false positive now
that CC 2.1.178 matches Tool(param:value) and 2.1.172 adds domain rules.
The conflict-detector shared the blind spot from the other side: a
wildcard deny like WebFetch(domain:*) did not cover a
WebFetch(domain:good.com) allow, so a genuine cross-scope conflict was
missed (false negative).

New shared scanners/lib/permission-rules.mjs:
- parseRule / paramMatches (glob)
- dominates(deny, allow) -> DIS dead-allow (deny fully covers allow)
- rulesIntersect(a, b)   -> CNF cross-scope conflict (match sets intersect)

DIS now delegates to dominates; conflict-detector :156 delegates to
rulesIntersect. A bare deny still covers all params, so true positives
are preserved (Bash deny + Bash(npm:*) allow still flagged).

Re-seeded the marketplace-medium snapshots: the false-positive CA-DIS
finding (Read(src/**) allow + Read(./.env) deny) is correctly gone. This
changes snapshot CONTENT only — envelope schema is unchanged, so --json
and --raw stay byte-stable.

Full suite: 837/837 green (+25). self-audit PASS, A(100)/A(97).
2026-06-18 13:06:20 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
787e0d11a0 feat(config-audit): disabled-in-schema scanner DIS (v5 N4) [skip-docs]
New DIS scanner detects tools that appear in BOTH permissions.deny
and permissions.allow within the same settings.json file. The deny
list wins, so allow entries are dead config but still load on every
turn and confuse intent.

Tool identity = bare name (everything before "("). `Bash(npm:*)` and
`Bash` are treated as the same tool, so a deny on `Bash` flags any
`Bash(...)` allow entry.

Severity: low. Wired into scan-orchestrator + scoring (area: Settings).
Fixture denied-tools-in-schema has Bash in both arrays; healthy-project
serves as the negative case.

[skip-docs] reason: v5 plan fences off README/CLAUDE.md badge updates
to Session 5; Forgejo pre-commit-docs-gate hook requires this tag.

Tests: 611 → 617 (+6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-01 07:39:58 +02:00