config-audit/tests/scanners/rollback-cli.test.mjs
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 44b222859e feat(scanners): the recovery path is code you can run, not prose you can read
R1+R2 as one chunk — both KRITISK rows of the Q3 severity table sit on the
restore path, and neither closes alone.

R1: rollback-engine.mjs verified every checksum before AND after each write,
resolved the legacy backup root and reported createdNotRemoved — and none of it
was reachable. Measured: 16 files under scanners/ carry a process.argv entry;
the engine was not one of them. commands/rollback.md drove the restore as model
prose: an ESM import block a template cannot execute, ad-hoc `cp` offered
underneath as the runnable path, and "(checksum verified)" pre-rendered three
times in the success output. `cp` establishes no checksum, so the verification
was a property of the template rather than of the run — on the one surface that
runs when the user is already in trouble.

R2: implement.md Step 3 hand-built its backup (mkdir, cp, a date-derived id, a
manifest typed out in the template) while parseManifest knew one frozen sample
of that format, pinned by a HAND-WRITTEN fixture instead of by the template's
own text. Rename a key and parseManifest returns zero files while rollback
reports success.

Fixing only R1 leaves the new CLI parsing a prose format; fixing only R2 leaves
a clean format with no runnable entry.

- scanners/rollback-cli.mjs — --list / --create / --restore / --delete over the
  existing engine, on the shared requireValidArgs gate. Exit 0 done, 1
  outstanding (gate refusal with nothing written, or a backup that covered fewer
  targets than given), 2 a file failed, 3 could not do the job. A gated restore
  is 1, not 3: "this write leaves your project" is a verdict about a write that
  WAS examined, and it rides in the payload where a command under 2>/dev/null
  can act on it.
- createBackup gains `created` (recorded, never copied — no backup can hold a
  file that does not exist) and `skipped`, so a backup covering fewer files than
  asked is no longer indistinguishable from a clean one.
- implement.md Step 3 and rollback.md now call the CLI. parseManifest's
  implement-format branch stays: nothing writes that shape now, but every backup
  made before this chunk is on disk in it.
- backup-restore-contract.test.mjs checks every field rollback.md renders
  against a payload produced by RUNNING the CLI. That is what replaced
  "(checksum verified)".

20 guards seen red against the original state before any production code, then
each against its own defect. Two holes that surfaced there were mine: the
implement assertion matched `--create` as a substring of `--created` and stayed
green when the call was removed; and mutating the argv gate showed
requireValidArgs sets exit 3 by itself, so a CLI can report that it could not
parse its arguments and still run the restore underneath — that case is now
asserted on the bytes.

Suite 1752 -> 1777, 0 fail. Frozen tests/snapshots/v5.0.0 untouched. Dogfooded
through the templates' own command lines against a sandboxed HOME, including the
machine-wide arm: refused with the file unchanged, then restored under
--approve-scope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Logq8GGWKhtyDem63FTEnG
2026-08-18 21:28:15 +02:00

395 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* R1 — the restore path gets a runnable entry.
*
* `rollback-engine.mjs` has always verified checksums before AND after each
* write, resolved the legacy backup root, and reported `createdNotRemoved`.
* None of it was reachable: measured at the head of this chunk, 16 files under
* `scanners/` carry a `process.argv` entry and the engine was not one of them.
* `commands/rollback.md` drove the restore as model prose — an ESM `import`
* block a command template cannot execute, with ad-hoc `cp` offered as the
* runnable alternative and a pre-rendered "(checksum verified)" line under it.
* `cp` establishes no checksum, so the claim was rendered by the template
* rather than produced by the run.
*
* Two properties of this file are load-bearing:
*
* 1. **The unknown-flag control comes first.** `command-cli-contract.test.mjs`
* only trusts a CLI's silence about a flag once it has SEEN that CLI reject
* a flag which cannot exist. The same control is asserted here, at the
* source, so a future edit that moves argv parsing behind a required-arg
* check fails in the CLI's own test rather than silently making every flag
* pair downstream pass for the wrong reason.
*
* 2. **A refusal is asserted on the BYTES, never on the exit code alone.**
* The gate's whole job is that nothing was written; a test that reads only
* the verdict would pass against an engine that refused loudly and wrote
* anyway.
*/
import { test } from 'node:test';
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import { mkdtemp, mkdir, writeFile, readFile, readdir, rm, stat } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join, resolve, dirname } from 'node:path';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { parseManifest } from '../../scanners/lib/backup.mjs';
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const CLI = resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scanners', 'rollback-cli.mjs');
/**
* A sandbox that is a HOME as well as a backup root, so `user-scope`
* classification and backup resolution both stay inside the temp dir. The cwd
* is a third, empty directory: probing a writer runs the writer (#67), and a
* CLI that defaults a path to the working directory must be caught doing it.
*/
async function sandbox() {
const root = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'ca-rbcli-'));
const home = join(root, 'home');
const work = join(root, 'work');
const cwd = join(root, 'cwd');
await mkdir(join(home, '.claude'), { recursive: true });
await mkdir(work, { recursive: true });
await mkdir(cwd, { recursive: true });
return {
root,
home,
work,
cwd,
backupRoot: join(home, '.claude', 'config-audit', 'backups'),
cleanup: () => rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }),
};
}
async function run(sb, argv) {
const { code, stdout, stderr } = await new Promise((res) => {
const child = spawn(process.execPath, [CLI, ...argv], {
cwd: sb.cwd,
env: {
...process.env,
HOME: sb.home,
USERPROFILE: sb.home,
CONFIG_AUDIT_BACKUP_ROOT: sb.backupRoot,
CONFIG_AUDIT_LEGACY_BACKUP_ROOT: join(sb.home, '.config-audit', 'backups'),
},
});
let out = '';
let err = '';
child.stdout.on('data', (d) => { out += d; });
child.stderr.on('data', (d) => { err += d; });
child.on('close', (c) => res({ code: c, stdout: out, stderr: err }));
});
return { code, stdout, stderr, cwdEntries: await readdir(sb.cwd) };
}
/** Run and read the `--output-file` payload back. */
async function runJson(sb, argv) {
const out = join(sb.root, `payload-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)}.json`);
const r = await run(sb, [...argv, '--output-file', out]);
return { ...r, payload: JSON.parse(await readFile(out, 'utf-8')), outFile: out };
}
/** Make a backup of `files` through the CLI itself and return its id. */
async function seedBackup(sb, files, created = []) {
const argv = ['--create'];
for (const f of files) argv.push('--target', f);
for (const c of created) argv.push('--created', c);
const { code, payload } = await runJson(sb, [...argv, '--repo', sb.work]);
assert.equal(code, 0, 'seeding a backup must succeed');
return payload.backupId;
}
test('rejects a flag that cannot exist (the control every downstream probe rests on)', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const { code, stderr } = await run(sb, ['--zzz-not-a-real-flag']);
assert.equal(code, 3, 'a malformed argv is exit 3, never a verdict');
assert.match(stderr, /unknown flag "--zzz-not-a-real-flag"/i);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('a malformed argv stops the run, it does not merely colour the exit code', async () => {
// Found by mutating the gate: `requireValidArgs` sets exit 3 by itself, so a
// caller that drops the `return` still LOOKS rejected while the mode runs to
// completion underneath. A restore that happened is not undone by the exit
// code that says it should not have.
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const target = join(sb.work, 'CLAUDE.md');
await writeFile(target, '# original\n');
const id = await seedBackup(sb, [target]);
await writeFile(target, '# current\n');
const { code } = await run(sb, ['--restore', id, '--repo', sb.work, '--zzz-not-a-real-flag']);
assert.equal(code, 3);
assert.equal(
await readFile(target, 'utf-8'),
'# current\n',
'the CLI restored a file while reporting that it could not parse its own arguments',
);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('two modes in one argv is an argument error, not a silent winner', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const { code, stderr } = await run(sb, ['--list', '--delete', 'x']);
assert.equal(code, 3);
assert.match(stderr, /one mode/i);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('list mode on an empty backup root answers zero, and writes nothing', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const { code, payload, cwdEntries } = await runJson(sb, ['--list']);
assert.equal(code, 0);
assert.equal(payload.meta.mode, 'list');
assert.deepEqual(payload.backups, []);
assert.equal(payload.count, 0);
assert.deepEqual(cwdEntries, [], 'the CLI must not default any path to the working directory');
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('--output-file keeps the payload off stdout (ux-rules rule 1)', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const { stdout } = await runJson(sb, ['--list']);
assert.equal(stdout, '', 'a payload written to a file must not also reach the transcript');
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('create mode backs up the real bytes and round-trips through parseManifest', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const a = join(sb.work, 'CLAUDE.md');
const b = join(sb.work, '.claude', 'settings.json');
await mkdir(dirname(b), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(a, '# original A\n');
await writeFile(b, '{"a":1}\n');
const willCreate = join(sb.work, '.claude', 'rules', 'new-rule.md');
const { code, payload } = await runJson(
sb,
['--create', '--target', a, '--target', b, '--created', willCreate, '--repo', sb.work],
);
assert.equal(code, 0);
assert.equal(payload.meta.mode, 'create');
assert.match(payload.backupId, /^\d{8}_\d{6}$/);
assert.equal(payload.files.length, 2);
assert.deepEqual(payload.created, [willCreate]);
assert.deepEqual(payload.skipped, []);
// R2: the data contract is owned by the code on BOTH sides. A manifest the
// engine writes must be one the engine's own parser reads back whole —
// including `created:`, which the hand-built template format carried and
// `createBackup` did not.
const manifest = parseManifest(
await readFile(join(payload.backupPath, 'manifest.yaml'), 'utf-8'),
);
assert.equal(manifest.backup_id, payload.backupId);
assert.equal(manifest.files.length, 2);
assert.deepEqual(manifest.created, [willCreate]);
assert.equal(manifest.files[0].originalPath, a);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('create mode reports a target it could not back up instead of counting it', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const real = join(sb.work, 'CLAUDE.md');
await writeFile(real, 'x\n');
const ghost = join(sb.work, 'not-there.md');
const { code, payload } = await runJson(
sb,
['--create', '--target', real, '--target', ghost, '--repo', sb.work],
);
assert.equal(code, 1, 'a backup that covers fewer files than asked is a warning, not a pass');
assert.deepEqual(payload.skipped, [ghost]);
assert.equal(payload.files.length, 1);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('restore writes the backed-up bytes back and verifies the checksum', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const target = join(sb.work, 'CLAUDE.md');
await writeFile(target, '# original\n');
const id = await seedBackup(sb, [target]);
await writeFile(target, '# clobbered\n');
const { code, payload } = await runJson(sb, ['--restore', id, '--repo', sb.work]);
assert.equal(code, 0);
assert.equal(payload.meta.mode, 'restore');
assert.equal(payload.backupId, id);
assert.deepEqual(payload.failed, []);
assert.equal(payload.restored.length, 1);
assert.equal(payload.restored[0].status, 'restored');
assert.equal(await readFile(target, 'utf-8'), '# original\n');
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('a corrupted backup fails loudly and leaves the original alone', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const target = join(sb.work, 'CLAUDE.md');
await writeFile(target, '# original\n');
const id = await seedBackup(sb, [target]);
await writeFile(target, '# current\n');
// Corrupt the stored copy: the checksum in the manifest no longer matches.
const files = join(sb.backupRoot, id, 'files');
const [stored] = await readdir(files);
await writeFile(join(files, stored), '# tampered\n');
const { code, payload } = await runJson(sb, ['--restore', id, '--repo', sb.work]);
assert.equal(code, 2, 'a failed restore is a FAIL verdict, not a pass');
assert.deepEqual(payload.restored, []);
assert.equal(payload.failed[0].status, 'checksum-mismatch');
assert.equal(
await readFile(target, 'utf-8'),
'# current\n',
'a checksum mismatch must stop the write, not land tampered bytes on the original',
);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('a restore that leaves this project is refused until --approve-scope', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const target = join(sb.home, '.claude', 'CLAUDE.md');
await writeFile(target, '# machine-wide original\n');
const id = await seedBackup(sb, [target]);
await writeFile(target, '# machine-wide current\n');
const refused = await runJson(sb, ['--restore', id, '--repo', sb.work]);
assert.equal(refused.code, 1, 'approval owed is a warning verdict, not a tool error');
assert.equal(refused.payload.requiresApproval, true);
assert.equal(refused.payload.gate, 'require-ok');
assert.ok(refused.payload.disclosures.length > 0, 'the refusal must carry words to render');
assert.deepEqual(refused.payload.restored, []);
assert.equal(refused.payload.refused[0].reason, 'scope-gate');
assert.equal(
await readFile(target, 'utf-8'),
'# machine-wide current\n',
'the gate refused and must therefore have written nothing',
);
const ok = await runJson(sb, ['--restore', id, '--repo', sb.work, '--approve-scope']);
assert.equal(ok.code, 0);
assert.equal(await readFile(target, 'utf-8'), '# machine-wide original\n');
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('--dry-run reports what would happen and touches nothing', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const target = join(sb.work, 'CLAUDE.md');
await writeFile(target, '# original\n');
const id = await seedBackup(sb, [target]);
await writeFile(target, '# current\n');
const { code, payload } = await runJson(sb, ['--restore', id, '--repo', sb.work, '--dry-run']);
assert.equal(code, 0);
assert.equal(payload.dryRun, true);
assert.equal(payload.restored[0].status, 'dry-run');
assert.equal(await readFile(target, 'utf-8'), '# current\n', 'a dry run is not a write');
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('restore reports the files it cannot undo', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const target = join(sb.work, 'CLAUDE.md');
await writeFile(target, '# original\n');
const madeByImplement = join(sb.work, '.claude', 'rules', 'post-quality.md');
const id = await seedBackup(sb, [target], [madeByImplement]);
const { payload } = await runJson(sb, ['--restore', id, '--repo', sb.work]);
assert.deepEqual(
payload.createdNotRemoved,
[madeByImplement],
'a half-restored target is only dangerous when it is also silent',
);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('an unknown backup id is a tool error, never an empty success', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const { code, stderr } = await run(sb, ['--restore', '19700101_000000', '--repo', sb.work]);
assert.equal(code, 3);
assert.match(stderr, /not found/i);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('delete removes the backup directory, and refuses an id it cannot find', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const target = join(sb.work, 'CLAUDE.md');
await writeFile(target, '# original\n');
const id = await seedBackup(sb, [target]);
const { code, payload } = await runJson(sb, ['--delete', id]);
assert.equal(code, 0);
assert.equal(payload.deleted, true);
await assert.rejects(() => stat(join(sb.backupRoot, id)));
const missing = await run(sb, ['--delete', '19700101_000000']);
assert.equal(missing.code, 3);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});
test('list mode sees a backup the CLI itself created', async () => {
const sb = await sandbox();
try {
const target = join(sb.work, 'CLAUDE.md');
await writeFile(target, '# original\n');
const id = await seedBackup(sb, [target]);
const { payload } = await runJson(sb, ['--list']);
assert.equal(payload.count, 1);
assert.equal(payload.backups[0].id, id);
assert.equal(payload.backups[0].files[0].originalPath, target);
} finally {
await sb.cleanup();
}
});