config-audit/scanners/disabled-in-schema-scanner.mjs

/**
 * DIS Scanner — Disabled-Tools-Still-In-Schema Detector (v5 N4)
 *
 * Detects tools that appear in BOTH `permissions.deny` and `permissions.allow`
 * within the same settings.json file. The deny list wins, so the allow entry
 * is dead config — but it still loads on every turn and signals confused
 * intent. Often arises from copy-paste edits where one list was updated and
 * the other was forgotten.
 *
 * Compares rule identity param-aware (CC 2.1.178 `Tool(param:value)`,
 * 2.1.172 `domain:` rules). An allow entry is dead only when some deny entry
 * fully COVERS it: a bare `Bash` deny blocks all `Bash(...)` allows, but
 * `Agent(model:opus)` deny does NOT kill an `Agent(model:sonnet)` allow.
 * Coverage logic lives in `lib/permission-rules.mjs` (shared with CNF).
 *
 * Finding ID: CA-DIS-NNN. Severity: low.
 *
 * Zero external dependencies.
 */

import { readTextFile } from './lib/file-discovery.mjs';
import { finding, scannerResult } from './lib/output.mjs';
import { SEVERITY } from './lib/severity.mjs';
import { parseJson } from './lib/yaml-parser.mjs';
import { dominates, parseRule, isIneffectiveAllowGlob, forbiddenParamRule } from './lib/permission-rules.mjs';

const SCANNER = 'DIS';

/**
 * Find allow entries that are dead config because some deny entry fully covers
 * them. Returns array of { tool, allowEntry, denyEntry }.
 */
function findDenyAllowOverlaps(settings) {
  if (!settings || typeof settings !== 'object') return [];
  const perms = settings.permissions;
  if (!perms || typeof perms !== 'object') return [];

  const allowList = Array.isArray(perms.allow) ? perms.allow : [];
  const denyList = Array.isArray(perms.deny) ? perms.deny : [];
  if (allowList.length === 0 || denyList.length === 0) return [];

  const overlaps = [];
  const seen = new Set();
  for (const a of allowList) {
    if (typeof a !== 'string' || seen.has(a)) continue;
    const dominator = denyList.find(d => dominates(d, a));
    if (dominator) {
      overlaps.push({ tool: parseRule(a).tool, allowEntry: a, denyEntry: dominator });
      seen.add(a);
    }
  }
  return overlaps;
}

/**
 * Find `permissions.allow` entries that are unanchored tool-name globs Claude
 * Code silently skips (e.g. `mcp__*`, `B*`, `*`). They auto-approve nothing but
 * the author usually believes they grant access. Returns array of entry strings.
 */
function findIneffectiveAllowGlobs(settings) {
  if (!settings || typeof settings !== 'object') return [];
  const perms = settings.permissions;
  if (!perms || typeof perms !== 'object') return [];
  const allowList = Array.isArray(perms.allow) ? perms.allow : [];
  return allowList.filter(e => isIneffectiveAllowGlob(e));
}

/**
 * Find permission rules CC silently ignores because their `Tool(param:value)`
 * key is the tool's own canonicalizing field (`command`, `file_path`, `path`,
 * `notebook_path`, `url`). Scans allow + deny + ask so severity can split:
 * deny/ask hits are false security, allow hits are dead config. Returns array
 * of { list, entry, tool, key, hint }.
 */
function findForbiddenParamRules(settings) {
  if (!settings || typeof settings !== 'object') return [];
  const perms = settings.permissions;
  if (!perms || typeof perms !== 'object') return [];
  const results = [];
  for (const list of ['allow', 'deny', 'ask']) {
    const arr = Array.isArray(perms[list]) ? perms[list] : [];
    for (const entry of arr) {
      const hit = forbiddenParamRule(entry);
      if (hit) results.push({ list, entry, ...hit });
    }
  }
  return results;
}

/**
 * Main scanner entry point.
 *
 * @param {string} targetPath
 * @param {{files: Array<{absPath:string, relPath:string, type:string}>}} discovery
 */
export async function scan(targetPath, discovery) {
  const start = Date.now();
  const findings = [];
  let filesScanned = 0;

  for (const f of discovery.files) {
    if (f.type !== 'settings-json') continue;
    filesScanned++;
    const content = await readTextFile(f.absPath);
    if (!content) continue;
    const parsed = parseJson(content);
    if (!parsed) continue;

    const overlaps = findDenyAllowOverlaps(parsed);
    if (overlaps.length > 0) {
      const evidence = overlaps.slice(0, 5)
        .map(o => `${o.tool}: allow="${o.allowEntry}" + deny="${o.denyEntry}"`)
        .join('; ');
      findings.push(finding({
        scanner: SCANNER,
        code: 'deny-and-allow',
        severity: SEVERITY.low,
        title: 'Tool listed in both permissions.deny and permissions.allow',
        description:
          `${f.relPath || f.absPath} contains ${overlaps.length} tool` +
          `${overlaps.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} present in both deny and allow lists. ` +
          'The deny list wins — the allow entries are dead config but still load on ' +
          'every turn and may confuse future readers about intent.',
        file: f.absPath,
        evidence,
        recommendation:
          'Remove the redundant allow entries. If you actually want this tool enabled, ' +
          'remove it from the deny list instead. Settings should express intent clearly.',
        category: 'permissions-hygiene',
      }));
    }

    const ineffective = findIneffectiveAllowGlobs(parsed);
    if (ineffective.length > 0) {
      const evidence = `allow: ${ineffective.slice(0, 5).map(e => `"${e}"`).join(', ')}`;
      findings.push(finding({
        scanner: SCANNER,
        code: 'ineffective-allow-wildcard',
        severity: SEVERITY.low,
        title: 'Ineffective allow wildcard — Claude Code ignores this rule',
        description:
          `${f.relPath || f.absPath} has ${ineffective.length} permissions.allow ` +
          `entr${ineffective.length === 1 ? 'y' : 'ies'} that Claude Code skips: an ` +
          'unanchored tool-name wildcard auto-approves nothing. CC accepts allow ' +
          'wildcards only after a literal `mcp__<server>__` prefix.',
        file: f.absPath,
        evidence,
        recommendation:
          'Replace `*`/`mcp__*` with explicit tool names, or anchor MCP wildcards to ' +
          'a server (`mcp__<server>__*`). As written these entries grant nothing.',
        category: 'permissions-hygiene',
      }));
    }

    const forbidden = findForbiddenParamRules(parsed);
    const falseSecurity = forbidden.filter(x => x.list === 'deny' || x.list === 'ask');
    const deadAllow = forbidden.filter(x => x.list === 'allow');

    if (falseSecurity.length > 0) {
      const evidence = falseSecurity.slice(0, 5)
        .map(x => `${x.list}: "${x.entry}" → use ${x.hint}`)
        .join('; ');
      findings.push(finding({
        scanner: SCANNER,
        code: 'forbidden-param-deny',
        severity: SEVERITY.medium,
        title: 'Permission rule silently ignored — deny/ask uses a forbidden param key',
        description:
          `${f.relPath || f.absPath} has ${falseSecurity.length} deny/ask ` +
          `rule${falseSecurity.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} whose \`Tool(param:value)\` key is ` +
          'the tool\'s own canonicalizing field (`command`/`file_path`/`path`/`notebook_path`/' +
          '`url`). Claude Code ignores these and emits a startup warning, so the guard you ' +
          'intended does NOT apply — the action you meant to block or gate is effectively ' +
          'unrestricted.',
        file: f.absPath,
        evidence,
        recommendation:
          'Rewrite each rule with the tool\'s own specifier syntax (e.g. `Bash(rm *)`, ' +
          '`Read(./path)`, `WebFetch(domain:host)`). As written these rules block nothing.',
        category: 'permissions-hygiene',
      }));
    }

    if (deadAllow.length > 0) {
      const evidence = deadAllow.slice(0, 5)
        .map(x => `allow: "${x.entry}" → use ${x.hint}`)
        .join('; ');
      findings.push(finding({
        scanner: SCANNER,
        code: 'forbidden-param-allow',
        severity: SEVERITY.low,
        title: 'Permission rule silently ignored — allow uses a forbidden param key (dead config)',
        description:
          `${f.relPath || f.absPath} has ${deadAllow.length} permissions.allow ` +
          `rule${deadAllow.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} using \`Tool(param:value)\` on the tool's ` +
          'own canonicalizing field. `param:value` matching applies only to deny/ask rules; ' +
          'allow rules use each tool\'s own specifier syntax. Claude Code ignores these and ' +
          'emits a startup warning — they grant nothing.',
        file: f.absPath,
        evidence,
        recommendation:
          'Replace with the tool\'s specifier syntax (e.g. `Read(./path)`), or remove the ' +
          'entry. As written it auto-approves nothing.',
        category: 'permissions-hygiene',
      }));
    }
  }

  return scannerResult(SCANNER, 'ok', findings, filesScanned, Date.now() - start);
}