`KNOWN_OPEN` in cli-unknown-flag-rejection.test.mjs named two CLIs as still carrying the argument-swallow defect. That number was the previous session's field of view, not a measurement. Measuring all fourteen found **7** open on the unknown-flag arm and **10** on a second arm the deferral note never described. Arm 1 — unknown flag: with no `else` branch, `--zzz` leaves no trace. exit 0, full payload, a confident answer to a question the caller did not ask. Arm 2 — the sharper one: `a === '--output-file' && args[i + 1]` asks only whether a next token EXISTS, never whether it is a value. `manifest`, `campaign-cli` and `knowledge-refresh-cli` each wrote a file literally named `--json` into the caller's working directory when handed `--output-file --json`, exit 0, with `--json` mode silently dropped. A wrong answer is bad; an unintended file on disk is worse. Two of the CLIs this catches were already in GUARDED and green on arm 1 while arm 2 stood open a few lines away — the guard asserted one relation instead of the invariant. Fixed with a shared gate (`lib/cli-args.mjs`) that runs BEFORE each CLI's own parse loop rather than replacing it: valid argv reaches the existing parser byte-for-byte unchanged, so the byte-stability argument is structural rather than empirical. `drift-cli`, `fix-cli` and `plugin-health-scanner` were already correct on both arms and were moved into GUARDED instead of rewritten. The three CLIs with a bespoke unknown-flag branch had it removed once the gate made it unreachable. Suite 1488 → 1531. Frozen v5.0.0 snapshots untouched; `self-audit --check-readme` passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014P6Rh59Mtj4uYrdYMCYZJE
167 lines
7.5 KiB
JavaScript
167 lines
7.5 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* Session #51 — CLIs must reject an unknown flag, never ignore it.
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*
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* Third arm of the argument-handling class first measured in #44/#47/#50. The
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* earlier arms were about a flag's VALUE being swallowed as the scan target
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* (`else if (!args[i].startsWith('-')) targetPath = args[i]`). This arm is
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* quieter and worse: several CLIs have no `else` branch at all, so an
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* unrecognised flag falls out of the parse loop leaving no trace — exit 0, a
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* full payload, and an answer to a question the caller did not ask.
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*
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* Measured cost, live, in the same session that wrote this test: the
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* `knowledge-refresh` command's only user-facing knob (`--stale-after N`)
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* reached the CLI as one malformed argv entry (see
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* command-flag-value-portability.test.mjs). Because the CLI ignored it, the
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* command reported "✓ All 14 register entries were re-verified within the last
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* 90 days" — a true-sounding sentence about a threshold the user had just
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* overridden. Had the CLI failed loudly, the shell bug would have been a
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* one-line exit-3 message instead of a silent wrong answer.
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*
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* Scope of this guard: the CLIs whose commands were dogfooded in this chunk.
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* `optimize-lens-cli.mjs` and `token-hotspots-cli.mjs` share the defect but
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* also carry the still-open positional-swallow arm; both are fixed together in
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* the v5.14 arg-handling chunk, where every call site's flags can be audited at
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* once. They are listed in KNOWN_OPEN so the number stays visible rather than
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* being quietly rounded down to zero.
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*/
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import { test } from 'node:test';
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import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
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import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
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import { readFile, mkdtemp, readdir, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
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import { resolve, dirname, join } from 'node:path';
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
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const SCANNERS_DIR = resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scanners');
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/**
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* Every CLI in `scanners/` that reads `process.argv`, with the argv it needs to
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* get past required-arg checks and — where it has one — a value-taking flag.
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*
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* KNOWN_OPEN is gone. It named two CLIs; measuring all fourteen (#57) found
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* **seven** open on the unknown-flag arm and **ten** on the value arm, including
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* two CLIs that were already in GUARDED and passing. The deferral list was a
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* prediction from the previous session's field of view, never a measurement.
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*/
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const GUARDED = [
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{ cli: 'campaign-cli.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'knowledge-refresh-cli.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'campaign-write-cli.mjs', argv: ['init'], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'campaign-export-cli.mjs', argv: ['--repo', '.'], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'drift-cli.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--baseline' },
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{ cli: 'fix-cli.mjs', argv: ['--dry-run'], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'plugin-health-scanner.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'manifest.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'optimize-lens-cli.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'posture.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--context-window' },
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{ cli: 'scan-orchestrator.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'token-hotspots-cli.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'whats-active.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: '--output-file' },
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{ cli: 'self-audit.mjs', argv: [], valueFlag: null }, // no value-taking flag
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];
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function run(cli, argv, cwd = resolve(__dirname, '..', '..')) {
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return new Promise((res) => {
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const child = spawn(process.execPath, [resolve(SCANNERS_DIR, cli), ...argv], { cwd });
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let stderr = '';
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child.stderr.on('data', (d) => { stderr += d; });
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child.stdout.on('data', () => {});
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child.on('close', (code) => res({ code, stderr }));
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});
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}
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for (const { cli, argv } of GUARDED) {
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test(`${cli} rejects an unknown flag with exit 3`, async () => {
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const { code, stderr } = await run(cli, [...argv, '--zzz-not-a-real-flag']);
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assert.equal(
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code,
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3,
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`${cli} accepted an unknown flag (exit ${code}). A flag the CLI does not understand\n` +
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'must fail loudly — silently ignoring it turns a caller-side bug into a confident\n' +
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'wrong answer. stderr was: ' + JSON.stringify(stderr),
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);
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assert.match(
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stderr,
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/--zzz-not-a-real-flag/,
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`${cli} must name the offending flag so the caller can find it.`,
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);
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});
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}
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/**
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* Arm 2 — the value arm, and the sharper of the two.
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*
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* `else if (a === '--output-file' && args[i + 1])` only asks whether a next token
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* EXISTS, never whether it is a value. So `--output-file --json` takes `--json`
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* as the filename: measured live (#57), `manifest`, `campaign-cli` and
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* `knowledge-refresh-cli` each wrote a file literally named `--json` into the
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* caller's working directory, exit 0, with `--json` mode silently dropped. A
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* wrong answer is bad; writing an unintended file is worse.
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*
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* Two of the CLIs this catches were already in GUARDED and green on arm 1 — the
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* guard was passing on one arm while the other stood open a few lines away
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* ([[guard-can-be-green-on-its-own-defect]]).
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*/
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for (const { cli, argv, valueFlag } of GUARDED) {
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if (!valueFlag) continue;
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test(`${cli} rejects ${valueFlag} followed by another flag instead of a value`, async () => {
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const scratch = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'config-audit-argsluk-'));
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try {
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const { code, stderr } = await run(cli, [...argv, valueFlag, '--json'], scratch);
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assert.equal(
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code,
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3,
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`${cli} treated "--json" as the value of ${valueFlag} (exit ${code}). The flag needs a\n` +
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'value; the next flag is not one. stderr was: ' + JSON.stringify(stderr),
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);
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assert.deepEqual(
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await readdir(scratch),
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[],
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`${cli} wrote a file into the caller's working directory named after a FLAG. A CLI that\n` +
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'misreads its own argv must not leave anything on disk.',
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);
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} finally {
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await rm(scratch, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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test(`${cli} rejects ${valueFlag} with no value at all`, async () => {
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const { code } = await run(cli, [...argv, valueFlag]);
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assert.equal(
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code,
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3,
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`${cli} ignored a trailing ${valueFlag} (exit ${code}). Under the ux-rule every command\n` +
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'invokes these CLIs as `--output-file <path> 2>/dev/null` — an empty <path> must fail\n' +
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'loudly, not fall through to stdout the command has been told to discard.',
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);
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});
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}
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/**
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* The caller arm. #45/#46/#47 all taught the same lesson: fixing a CLI does not fix the
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* command that reads its payload. `addedUnverified` and the `skipped` reasons only reach the
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* user if the command template is told to report them — otherwise the CLI is honest into a
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* void, and the phantom repo is just as invisible as before.
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*/
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const CAMPAIGN_MD = resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'commands', 'campaign.md');
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test('campaign.md reports the fields the write-CLI added for honest coverage', async () => {
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const content = await readFile(CAMPAIGN_MD, 'utf-8');
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assert.match(
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content,
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/addedUnverified/,
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'campaign.md must report `addedUnverified` after an add — a tracked path the CLI could\n' +
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'not read is exactly the row that silently pollutes the backlog and the token bill.',
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);
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assert.match(
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content,
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/skipped/,
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'campaign.md must report `skipped[]` after a token sweep so the bill\'s coverage is honest.',
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);
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});
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