Dogfooding `campaign` + `knowledge-refresh` against a throwaway ledger. Seven
defects, all found by running the commands as written and measuring, not by
reading them.
The headline pair only existed together. `knowledge-refresh` built
`STALE_AFTER="--stale-after 30"` and expanded it unquoted, trusting the shell to
split it in two. bash does; zsh — the macOS default, and what the Bash tool runs
here — does not. The CLI got one argv entry, matched no flag, and because it had
no unknown-flag branch, silently kept the 90-day default and reported "✓ All 14
register entries were re-verified within the last 90 days": a true-sounding
sentence about a threshold the user had just overridden. Fixing either half alone
leaves a silent wrong answer or a loud one; both are fixed, and a guard now
rejects any template that packs a flag and its value into one variable.
`knowledge-refresh` also read one register and wrote another: step 6 named an
unanchored `knowledge/best-practices.json` while the CLI reads
`${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/…`, which for an installed plugin is the cache. The
validation gate then ran the cached test against the cached register — green no
matter what was written. The two copies were byte-identical that day, which is
exactly why it was invisible.
`campaign` vouched for repos it could not read. `add /finnes/ikke` returned
`added` + exit 0; `refresh-tokens` then put the phantom in `swept[]` with a
0-token delta and left `skipped[]` empty, so the machine-wide bill claimed
coverage of three repos on a machine with two. Paths stay tracked — an unmounted
volume is a legitimate absence — but are reported as `addedUnverified`, and the
command names them.
Two class sweeps, both measured rather than assumed. `posture` was the single
scanner (1 of 14) whose fatal catch exited 1, which ux-rules defines as a normal
WARNING grade — a crash indistinguishable from a result. And all 13 payload
writers failed on a `--output-file` whose parent did not exist, which on a fresh
machine turned `campaign`'s first run into "the ledger may be corrupt"; they now
share `scanners/lib/write-output.mjs`.
Predicted breadth was too wide for the first time in five sessions: 6 of 8 CLIs
predicted to lack unknown-flag rejection, 4 measured. `drift` and `fix` already
reject them, via a construct the grep did not recognise — a grep matches an
implementation, the invariant is a behaviour. The sweep was rewritten to run each
CLI with a bogus flag and read the exit code.
Suite 1453 → 1469/0. Frozen snapshots untouched. `optimize-lens-cli` and
`token-hotspots-cli` share the unknown-flag defect and are deferred to the v5.14
argument-handling chunk with their positional-swallow arm; the count is recorded
in the guard rather than rounded down to zero.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012NHWjN8EnoxSqRvMTLK2NE
252 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
252 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
/**
|
|
* Session #49 — command-template shell-state shape tests.
|
|
*
|
|
* Dogfooding the `plan` + `implement` chunk surfaced one root defect with
|
|
* several arms: **command templates assume shell state survives between
|
|
* fenced blocks.** It does not. Every ```bash fence is executed as its own
|
|
* Bash tool call, in its own process:
|
|
*
|
|
* - A variable assigned in block N is empty in block N+1.
|
|
* - `$$` (the PID) differs between calls, so a `/tmp/foo-$$.json` path
|
|
* created in one block can never be reconstructed in a later one.
|
|
* - The Read tool expands neither shell variables nor `$$` nor globs; it
|
|
* takes one literal path.
|
|
*
|
|
* Measured arms at the time of writing (all fixed by the accompanying commit):
|
|
* - `$RAW_FLAG` referenced inside a (non-bash) agent-prompt fence in
|
|
* analyze.md, plan.md, implement.md — the agent received the literal
|
|
* string `$RAW_FLAG`, confirmed at runtime by the planner-agent itself.
|
|
* - `$TMPFILE` referenced across blocks in manifest.md, tokens.md,
|
|
* whats-active.md, plugin-health.md.
|
|
* - `$GLOBAL_FLAG` across blocks in fix.md.
|
|
* - `$TODAY` across blocks in campaign.md (6 sites).
|
|
* - `$$` temp paths referenced outside their creating fence in fix.md.
|
|
* - plan.md asked the Read tool to expand
|
|
* `~/.claude/config-audit/sessions/*_/state.yaml`.
|
|
*
|
|
* The hardened pattern already present in drift.md is the target shape: a
|
|
* fixed literal temp path, repeated literally in every block that needs it.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
import { test } from 'node:test';
|
|
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
|
|
import { readFile, readdir } from 'node:fs/promises';
|
|
import { resolve, dirname } from 'node:path';
|
|
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
|
|
|
|
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
|
|
const COMMANDS_DIR = resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'commands');
|
|
|
|
/** Shell variables supplied by the environment, not by a prior block. */
|
|
const AMBIENT = new Set([
|
|
'CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT', 'ARGUMENTS', 'HOME', 'PATH', 'PWD', 'USER', 'TMPDIR',
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
async function commandFiles() {
|
|
const entries = await readdir(COMMANDS_DIR);
|
|
return entries.filter((e) => e.endsWith('.md')).sort();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Parse fenced blocks. Returns { lines, blockIndexOf(lineIdx) } where
|
|
* blockIndexOf returns -1 for prose outside any fence.
|
|
*/
|
|
function parseFences(content) {
|
|
const lines = content.split('\n');
|
|
const blocks = [];
|
|
let open = null;
|
|
lines.forEach((line, i) => {
|
|
const m = line.match(/^\s*```(\w*)/);
|
|
if (!m) return;
|
|
if (open === null) open = { lang: m[1], start: i };
|
|
else {
|
|
blocks.push({ lang: open.lang, start: open.start, end: i });
|
|
open = null;
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
const blockIndexOf = (i) => blocks.findIndex((b) => i > b.start && i < b.end);
|
|
return { lines, blocks, blockIndexOf };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Strip `#` comments from a bash line so the test never matches its own prose. */
|
|
function stripComment(line) {
|
|
const h = line.indexOf('#');
|
|
return h === -1 ? line : line.slice(0, h);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
test('Shell state: no variable is referenced outside the block that assigned it', async () => {
|
|
const violations = [];
|
|
for (const name of await commandFiles()) {
|
|
const content = await readFile(resolve(COMMANDS_DIR, name), 'utf-8');
|
|
const { lines, blocks, blockIndexOf } = parseFences(content);
|
|
|
|
const assignedIn = new Map();
|
|
lines.forEach((raw, i) => {
|
|
const m = stripComment(raw).match(/^\s*([A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*)=/);
|
|
if (!m) return;
|
|
const bi = blockIndexOf(i);
|
|
if (bi < 0) return;
|
|
if (!assignedIn.has(m[1])) assignedIn.set(m[1], new Set());
|
|
assignedIn.get(m[1]).add(bi);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
lines.forEach((raw, i) => {
|
|
const line = stripComment(raw);
|
|
const bi = blockIndexOf(i);
|
|
const re = /\$\{?([A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*)\}?/g;
|
|
let m;
|
|
while ((m = re.exec(line)) !== null) {
|
|
const v = m[1];
|
|
if (AMBIENT.has(v)) continue;
|
|
// Skip the assignment site itself (`FOO=$FOO...` right-hand side is fine).
|
|
const eq = line.indexOf('=');
|
|
if (/^\s*[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=/.test(line) && line.indexOf(m[0]) < eq) continue;
|
|
const where = assignedIn.get(v);
|
|
if (!where) {
|
|
violations.push(`${name}:${i + 1} $${v} is never assigned in any block`);
|
|
} else if (bi < 0) {
|
|
violations.push(
|
|
`${name}:${i + 1} $${v} referenced in prose/agent-prompt — no shell expands it there`,
|
|
);
|
|
} else if (!where.has(bi)) {
|
|
const lang = blocks[bi].lang || 'none';
|
|
violations.push(
|
|
`${name}:${i + 1} $${v} referenced in block ${bi} (lang=${lang}) but assigned only in block(s) ${[...where].join(', ')} — separate Bash calls, separate processes`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
assert.deepEqual(violations, [], `Cross-block shell-variable references:\n${violations.join('\n')}`);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('Shell state: no $$ temp path is referenced outside the block that created it', async () => {
|
|
const violations = [];
|
|
for (const name of await commandFiles()) {
|
|
const content = await readFile(resolve(COMMANDS_DIR, name), 'utf-8');
|
|
const { lines, blockIndexOf } = parseFences(content);
|
|
|
|
const firstSeen = new Map();
|
|
const scan = (raw, i, cb) => {
|
|
const re = /(\/tmp\/[A-Za-z0-9._-]*\$\$[A-Za-z0-9._-]*)/g;
|
|
let m;
|
|
while ((m = re.exec(stripComment(raw))) !== null) cb(m[1], i);
|
|
};
|
|
lines.forEach((raw, i) => scan(raw, i, (p) => {
|
|
if (!firstSeen.has(p)) firstSeen.set(p, { blk: blockIndexOf(i), line: i + 1 });
|
|
}));
|
|
lines.forEach((raw, i) => scan(raw, i, (p) => {
|
|
const origin = firstSeen.get(p);
|
|
if (origin.line === i + 1) return;
|
|
const bi = blockIndexOf(i);
|
|
if (bi < 0) {
|
|
violations.push(`${name}:${i + 1} ${p} referenced in prose — the Read tool cannot expand $$`);
|
|
} else if (bi !== origin.blk) {
|
|
violations.push(
|
|
`${name}:${i + 1} ${p} referenced in block ${bi} but created in block ${origin.blk} — $$ is a different PID there`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}));
|
|
}
|
|
assert.deepEqual(violations, [], `Unresolvable $$ temp paths:\n${violations.join('\n')}`);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('Shell state: no $$ appears in any temp path at all', async () => {
|
|
// Session #50 closed a blind spot in the test above: it only flags a `$$`
|
|
// path that is *referenced twice*, because it compares each occurrence to
|
|
// the block that created it. A path written once and then read via prose
|
|
// ("Read the JSON output file using the Read tool") has no second
|
|
// occurrence — so posture.md sat green through #49 while being unreadable
|
|
// by construction: the PID is never printed, so no later step can name the
|
|
// file. Measured live: written by PID 21614, read attempted from PID 23772.
|
|
//
|
|
// The invariant is therefore blanket, not relational: a command template
|
|
// must not put `$$` in a temp path at all. The hardened pattern from
|
|
// drift.md — one fixed literal path, repeated literally — is the only
|
|
// shape that survives the fence boundary.
|
|
const violations = [];
|
|
for (const name of await commandFiles()) {
|
|
const content = await readFile(resolve(COMMANDS_DIR, name), 'utf-8');
|
|
content.split('\n').forEach((raw, i) => {
|
|
const re = /(\/tmp\/[A-Za-z0-9._-]*\$\$[A-Za-z0-9._-]*)/g;
|
|
let m;
|
|
while ((m = re.exec(stripComment(raw))) !== null) {
|
|
violations.push(
|
|
`${name}:${i + 1} ${m[1]} — $$ differs per Bash call; no later step can name this file`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
assert.deepEqual(violations, [], `Unresolvable $$ temp paths:\n${violations.join('\n')}`);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('Read tool: never asked to expand a glob', async () => {
|
|
const violations = [];
|
|
for (const name of await commandFiles()) {
|
|
const content = await readFile(resolve(COMMANDS_DIR, name), 'utf-8');
|
|
content.split('\n').forEach((raw, i) => {
|
|
// Only flag when the glob is the *object* of a Read instruction, i.e.
|
|
// "Read tool on `<glob>`" / "Read `<glob>`". Prose that merely explains
|
|
// that Read cannot expand a glob is the fix, not the defect — matching
|
|
// any co-occurrence on the line would flag this repo's own warning text.
|
|
const m = raw.match(/\bRead(?:\s+the)?(?:\s+tool)?\s+(?:tool\s+)?on\s+`([~/][^`]*)`|\bRead\s+`([~/][^`]*)`/);
|
|
if (!m) return;
|
|
const path = m[1] ?? m[2];
|
|
if (!path.includes('*')) return;
|
|
violations.push(`${name}:${i + 1} Read tool pointed at a glob \`${path}\` — use Glob`);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
assert.deepEqual(violations, [], `Read-tool glob misuse:\n${violations.join('\n')}`);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('state.yaml: phase commands name all four fields the rule requires', async () => {
|
|
// .claude/rules/state-management.md mandates current_phase, completed_phases,
|
|
// next_phase, updated_at after EVERY phase. A command that writes the file
|
|
// while naming only two fields silently drops the other two.
|
|
const REQUIRED = ['current_phase', 'completed_phases', 'next_phase', 'updated_at'];
|
|
const violations = [];
|
|
for (const name of await commandFiles()) {
|
|
const content = await readFile(resolve(COMMANDS_DIR, name), 'utf-8');
|
|
if (!/Update\s+`?state\.yaml`?|Update state/i.test(content)) continue;
|
|
const missing = REQUIRED.filter((f) => !content.includes(f));
|
|
if (missing.length) {
|
|
violations.push(`${name} updates state.yaml but never names: ${missing.join(', ')}`);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
assert.deepEqual(violations, [], `Incomplete state.yaml contracts:\n${violations.join('\n')}`);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Session #51 — the instruction that CAUSED the $TODAY defect must not outlive its fix.
|
|
*
|
|
* #49 fixed campaign.md by re-deriving `TODAY=$(date +%F)` inside each of the six write
|
|
* blocks. But step 1 still carried the original prose — "Set a shared date stamp for any
|
|
* write: `TODAY=$(date +%F)`" — which is not in a fence, cannot set anything, and directly
|
|
* contradicts the six comments added below it. A template that argues with itself is not a
|
|
* contract, and the next edit is the one that believes the wrong half.
|
|
*
|
|
* The guard above asserts fences; this one asserts that no PROSE line instructs the reader
|
|
* to establish shell state for later blocks.
|
|
*/
|
|
test('no command template instructs shell state to be set outside a fence', async () => {
|
|
const offenders = [];
|
|
|
|
for (const file of await commandFiles()) {
|
|
const content = await readFile(resolve(COMMANDS_DIR, file), 'utf-8');
|
|
const { lines, blockIndexOf } = parseFences(content);
|
|
lines.forEach((line, i) => {
|
|
if (blockIndexOf(i) !== -1) return; // inside a fence: that is where state belongs
|
|
if (/`[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=\$\(/.test(line) || /^\s*[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=\$\(/.test(line)) {
|
|
offenders.push(`${file}:${i + 1} ${line.trim()}`);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert.deepEqual(
|
|
offenders,
|
|
[],
|
|
'Prose that tells the reader to set a shell variable implies it survives to a later\n' +
|
|
'block. It does not — every fence is its own process. Delete the instruction; the\n' +
|
|
'blocks that need the value derive it themselves:\n ' + offenders.join('\n '),
|
|
);
|
|
});
|