feat(ci): add CI/CD integration — --fail-on, --compact, pipeline templates

Add threshold-based exit codes (--fail-on <severity>) and compact
output mode (--compact) to scan-orchestrator and CLI. Pipeline
templates for GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps, GitLab CI with SARIF
upload. CI/CD guide with Schrems II/NSM compliance documentation.
npm publish preparation (files whitelist, .npmignore). Policy ci
section for distributable CI defaults. Version 6.1.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-04-10 14:59:05 +02:00
commit 2c33e9cc64
15 changed files with 599 additions and 17 deletions

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{
"name": "llm-security",
"description": "Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. Detects secrets, validates MCP servers, assesses security posture, and generates threat models aligned with OWASP LLM Top 10.",
"version": "6.0.0"
"version": "6.1.0"
}

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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
tests/
scripts/
examples/
.claude/
.claude-plugin/
agents/
commands/
hooks/
knowledge/
templates/
test-fixtures/
reports/
ci/
docs/
*.local.md
REMEMBER.md
TODO.md
ROADMAP.md
CHANGELOG.md
CLAUDE.md
SECURITY.md
V3-ANNOUNCEMENT.md
V3-UPGRADE.md
.editorconfig
.llm-security-ignore
.orphaned_at
.DS_Store

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@ -4,6 +4,19 @@ All notable changes to the LLM Security Plugin are documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
## [6.1.0] - 2026-04-10
### Added
- **`--fail-on <severity>` flag** — CI-friendly exit codes: exit 1 when any finding at or above the specified severity exists (critical/high/medium/low). Configurable via `policy.json` `ci.failOn`
- **`--compact` output mode** — One-liner per finding format (`[SEVERITY] scanner: title (file:line)`), reduces CI log noise. Configurable via `policy.json` `ci.compact`
- **CI/CD pipeline templates** — Ready-to-use templates in `ci/`: GitHub Actions (`github-action.yml`), Azure DevOps (`azure-pipelines.yml`), GitLab CI (`gitlab-ci.yml`) with SARIF upload, Node 18 setup
- **CI/CD integration guide**`docs/ci-cd-guide.md` with 5-minute setup per platform, Schrems II/NSM compliance documentation, exit code reference
- **npm publish preparation**`files` whitelist in `package.json` (only `bin/` + `scanners/`), `.npmignore` safety net, `homepage` field
- **Policy `ci` section** — New `ci: { failOn, compact }` section in `.llm-security/policy.json` for distributable CI configuration
### Changed
- Version bump: 6.0.0 → 6.1.0 across all files
## [6.0.0] - 2026-04-10
### Added

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# LLM Security Plugin (v6.0.0)
# LLM Security Plugin (v6.1.0)
Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 frameworks: OWASP LLM Top 10, Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI), Skills Top 10 (AST), MCP Top 10, AI Agent Traps (DeepMind). 1242+ tests.
Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 frameworks: OWASP LLM Top 10, Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI), Skills Top 10 (AST), MCP Top 10, AI Agent Traps (DeepMind). 1264 tests.
## Commands
@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ Post-clone: size check (100MB max), cleanup guarantee (temp dir + evidence file
## Scanners
**Orchestrated (10):** Run via `node scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs <target> [--output-file <path>] [--baseline] [--save-baseline]`.
**Orchestrated (10):** Run via `node scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs <target> [--fail-on <severity>] [--compact] [--output-file <path>] [--baseline] [--save-baseline]`.
`--fail-on <critical|high|medium|low>`: exit 1 if findings at/above severity, exit 0 otherwise. `--compact`: one-liner per finding format. Both configurable via `policy.json` `ci` section.
With `--output-file`: full JSON to file, compact aggregate to stdout. `--baseline` diffs against stored baseline. `--save-baseline` saves results for future diffs. Baselines stored in `reports/baselines/<target-hash>.json`.
10 scanners: unicode, entropy, permission, dep-audit, taint, git-forensics, network, memory-poisoning, supply-chain-recheck, toxic-flow.
@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ Utility: `node scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs <backup|restore|cleanup|tmppath> [args]
Lib: `sarif-formatter.mjs` — converts scan output to OASIS SARIF 2.1.0 format. Used by `--format sarif` flag.
Lib: `audit-trail.mjs` — writes structured JSONL audit events (ISO 8601, OWASP tags, SIEM-ready). Env: `LLM_SECURITY_AUDIT_*`.
Lib: `policy-loader.mjs` — reads `.llm-security/policy.json` for distributable hook configuration. Defaults match hardcoded values.
Lib: `policy-loader.mjs` — reads `.llm-security/policy.json` for distributable hook configuration. Includes `ci` section (`failOn`, `compact`) for CI/CD defaults. Defaults match hardcoded values.
**Standalone (7):** `posture-scanner.mjs` — deterministic posture assessment, 16 categories (incl. EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001), <50ms. NOT in scan-orchestrator (meta-level, not code-level).
Run: `node scanners/posture-scanner.mjs [path]` → JSON stdout. Scanner prefix: PST. Used by `/security posture` and `/security audit`.
@ -108,7 +109,13 @@ All commands total ~600 lines. All commands use registered subagent types.
`bin/llm-security.mjs` — standalone CLI entry point. Works without Claude Code via `npx llm-security` or `node bin/llm-security.mjs`.
Subcommands: `scan`, `deep-scan`, `posture`, `audit-bom`, `benchmark`. Dispatches to scanner scripts via `child_process.spawn`.
`package.json` `bin` field: `"llm-security": "./bin/llm-security.mjs"`.
`package.json` `bin` field: `"llm-security": "./bin/llm-security.mjs"`. `files` whitelist: only `bin/` + `scanners/` published to npm.
## CI/CD Integration
Pipeline templates in `ci/`: `github-action.yml`, `azure-pipelines.yml`, `gitlab-ci.yml`. Documentation: `docs/ci-cd-guide.md`.
All templates use `--fail-on high --format sarif --output-file results.sarif` with SARIF upload per platform.
Standalone CLI makes zero network calls (except opt-in OSV.dev in supply-chain-recheck). Fully Schrems II compatible.
## Knowledge Files (15)

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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
*Built for my own Claude Code workflow and shared openly for anyone who finds it useful. This is a solo project — bug reports and feature requests are welcome, but pull requests are not accepted.*
![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-6.0.0-blue)
![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-6.1.0-blue)
![Platform](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-Claude_Code_Plugin-purple)
![Agents](https://img.shields.io/badge/agents-6-orange)
![Scanners](https://img.shields.io/badge/scanners-16-cyan)
@ -442,6 +442,7 @@ v6.0.0 adds an enterprise governance layer for standards-aware security operatio
| **AI-BOM** | CycloneDX 1.6 Bill of Materials for AI components — models, MCP servers, plugins, knowledge files, hooks. `llm-security audit-bom <target>`. |
| **Policy-as-Code** | `.llm-security/policy.json` for distributable hook configuration. Teams can enforce consistent security thresholds without per-developer env var setup. |
| **Standalone CLI** | `npx llm-security scan <target>` — runs scanners without Claude Code. Subcommands: `scan`, `posture`, `audit-bom`, `benchmark`. |
| **CI/CD Integration** | `--fail-on <severity>` for threshold-based exit codes, `--compact` for one-liner output. Pipeline templates for GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps, GitLab CI in `ci/`. Guide: `docs/ci-cd-guide.md`. |
### Benchmarks
@ -756,6 +757,7 @@ This plugin provides full-stack security hardening (static analysis + supply cha
| Version | Date | Highlights |
|---------|------|------------|
| **6.1.0** | 2026-04-10 | **CI/CD integration.** `--fail-on <severity>` flag for threshold-based exit codes (exit 1 if findings at/above level). `--compact` output mode (one-liner per finding). Policy `ci` section in `policy.json`. Pipeline templates: GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps, GitLab CI with SARIF upload. CI/CD guide (`docs/ci-cd-guide.md`) with Schrems II/NSM compliance docs. npm publish preparation (`files` whitelist). 1261+ tests. |
| **6.0.0** | 2026-04-10 | **CAISS-readiness release.** Enterprise compliance and governance layer: compliance mapping (EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001, MITRE ATLAS), Norwegian regulatory context (Datatilsynet, NSM, Digitaliseringsdirektoratet), SARIF 2.1.0 output format (`--format sarif`), structured JSONL audit trail (`audit-trail.mjs`), AI-BOM generator (CycloneDX 1.6), policy-as-code (`.llm-security/policy.json`), standalone CLI (`bin/llm-security.mjs``npx llm-security scan`). Posture scanner expanded to 16 categories (+EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001). Attack simulator benchmark mode (`--benchmark`). 15 knowledge docs, 16 scanners, 1242+ tests. |
| **5.1.0** | 2026-04-07 | **Sandboxed remote cloning.** Defense-in-depth for `git clone` attack surface: (1) 8 git config flags disable hooks, symlinks, filter/smudge drivers, fsmonitor, local file protocol; 4 env vars isolate from system/user config. (2) OS sandbox: macOS `sandbox-exec` + Linux `bubblewrap` restrict file writes to only the clone temp dir. Graceful fallback on Windows (git config only). Post-clone size check (100MB max). UUID-unique evidence filenames prevent race conditions. Cleanup guarantee in scan/plugin-audit commands. 1147 tests (was 1115). |
| **5.0.0** | 2026-04-06 | **Prompt Injection Hardening (v5.0).** 8-session defense-in-depth overhaul driven by 7 research papers (2025-2026). MEDIUM advisory for obfuscation signals (leetspeak, homoglyphs, zero-width, multi-language). Unicode Tag steganography detection (U+E0000-E007F). Bash expansion normalization (`bash-normalize.mjs`). Rule of Two enforcement (configurable `LLM_SECURITY_TRIFECTA_MODE=block\|warn\|off`). 100-call long-horizon monitoring window with slow-burn trifecta detection. Behavioral drift via Jensen-Shannon divergence. HITL trap detection (approval urgency, summary suppression, scope minimization). Sub-agent delegation tracking (escalation-after-input advisory). NL indirection patterns. Hybrid attacks (P2SQL, recursive injection, XSS-in-agent). CaMeL-inspired data flow tagging (SHA-256 provenance, output-to-input linking). Adaptive red-team (5 mutation rounds per scenario: homoglyph, encoding, zero-width, case alternation, synonym). Knowledge base expanded: `prompt-injection-research-2025-2026.md`, `deepmind-agent-traps.md`, `attack-mutations.json`. Posture scanner expanded to 13 categories (+Prompt Injection Hardening, Rule of Two, Long-Horizon Monitoring). Defense Philosophy section documenting honest limitations. 1115 tests. |

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@ -17,9 +17,10 @@ const USAGE = `llm-security v${PKG.version} — AI security scanning for Claude
Usage: llm-security <command> [options]
Commands:
scan <target> [--format sarif] [--baseline] [--save-baseline]
scan <target> [--fail-on <critical|high|medium|low>] [--compact]
[--format sarif] [--output-file <path>] [--baseline] [--save-baseline]
Run deterministic deep-scan (10 scanners)
deep-scan <target> [--format sarif] [--baseline] [--save-baseline]
deep-scan <target>
Alias for scan
posture <target>
Quick security posture assessment (16 categories)

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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# llm-security — Azure DevOps pipeline
# Deterministic security scanning for AI/LLM projects.
# No LLM calls. No data leaves your pipeline. Fully Schrems II compatible.
#
# See docs/ci-cd-guide.md for configuration options and detailed setup.
#
# Alternative (without npx): replace the scan script with:
# script: node bin/llm-security.mjs scan . --fail-on high --format sarif --output-file $(Build.ArtifactStagingDirectory)/results.sarif
trigger:
branches:
include:
- main
pool:
vmImage: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- task: NodeTool@0
displayName: Install Node.js 18
inputs:
versionSpec: '18.x'
- script: npx llm-security scan . --fail-on high --format sarif --output-file $(Build.ArtifactStagingDirectory)/results.sarif
displayName: Run llm-security scan
- task: PublishBuildArtifacts@1
condition: always()
displayName: Publish SARIF results
inputs:
pathToPublish: $(Build.ArtifactStagingDirectory)/results.sarif
artifactName: llm-security-scan
# For Azure DevOps Advanced Security (if enabled):
# Replace PublishBuildArtifacts with:
# - task: AdvancedSecurity-Publish@1
# condition: always()
# displayName: Publish to Advanced Security
#
# Configuration:
# --fail-on <critical|high|medium|low> Exit 1 if findings at or above severity
# --compact One-liner per finding (reduced log noise)
# --format sarif OASIS SARIF 2.1.0 output
#
# Or configure via .llm-security/policy.json:
# { "ci": { "failOn": "high", "compact": true } }

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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
# llm-security — GitHub Actions workflow
# Deterministic security scanning for AI/LLM projects.
# No LLM calls. No data leaves your pipeline. Fully Schrems II compatible.
#
# See docs/ci-cd-guide.md for configuration options and detailed setup.
#
# Alternative (without npx): replace the scan step with:
# run: node bin/llm-security.mjs scan . --fail-on high --format sarif --output-file results.sarif
name: LLM Security Scan
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
branches: [main]
jobs:
security-scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
security-events: write # Required for SARIF upload
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: '18'
- name: Run llm-security scan
run: npx llm-security scan . --fail-on high --format sarif --output-file results.sarif
- name: Upload SARIF to GitHub Advanced Security
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: results.sarif
# Configuration:
# --fail-on <critical|high|medium|low> Exit 1 if findings at or above severity
# --compact One-liner per finding (reduced log noise)
# --format sarif OASIS SARIF 2.1.0 output
# --output-file <path> Write full results to file
# --baseline Diff against stored baseline
#
# Or configure via .llm-security/policy.json:
# { "ci": { "failOn": "high", "compact": true } }

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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
# llm-security — GitLab CI template
# Deterministic security scanning for AI/LLM projects.
# No LLM calls. No data leaves your pipeline. Fully Schrems II compatible.
#
# Include in your .gitlab-ci.yml:
# include:
# - local: ci/gitlab-ci.yml
#
# See docs/ci-cd-guide.md for configuration options and detailed setup.
#
# Alternative (without npx): replace the script with:
# script: node bin/llm-security.mjs scan . --fail-on high --format sarif --output-file results.sarif
llm-security-scan:
image: node:18-alpine
stage: test
script:
- npx llm-security scan . --fail-on high --format sarif --output-file results.sarif
artifacts:
paths:
- results.sarif
reports:
sast: results.sarif
when: always
# Notes:
# - GitLab SAST report parsing of SARIF requires GitLab Ultimate
# - The artifact is always available regardless of license tier
# - For GitLab Free/Premium, results are in the downloadable artifact only
#
# Configuration:
# --fail-on <critical|high|medium|low> Exit 1 if findings at or above severity
# --compact One-liner per finding (reduced log noise)
# --format sarif OASIS SARIF 2.1.0 output
#
# Or configure via .llm-security/policy.json:
# { "ci": { "failOn": "high", "compact": true } }

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@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
# CI/CD Integration Guide
Integrate llm-security into your CI/CD pipeline for automated security scanning of AI/LLM projects. The standalone CLI runs 10 deterministic Node.js scanners — no AI models, no external API calls, no data leaves your pipeline environment.
## Data Sovereignty
**The standalone CLI makes zero network calls by default.** All 10 scanners operate locally on your source code using Shannon entropy analysis, regex pattern matching, AST traversal, and git log parsing. No data is transmitted to any external service.
**Exception: supply-chain-recheck** — When scanning lockfiles for known vulnerabilities, this scanner optionally queries the [OSV.dev](https://osv.dev/) batch API. This sends only package names and versions (not source code) over HTTPS. To disable: set `LLM_SECURITY_SCR_OFFLINE=1`.
**What about Claude Code integration?** The Claude Code plugin (hooks, agents, commands) uses AI models and sends data to Anthropic. These components are **not included** in the standalone CLI. When you run `npx llm-security scan`, only deterministic scanners execute.
### Schrems II / NSM Compliance
- Standalone CLI: **fully compliant** — no cross-border data transfer
- OSV.dev queries (opt-in): sends package metadata to Google-operated API — evaluate per your organization's data classification
- Claude Code plugin: sends code context to Anthropic (US) — requires data processing agreement for regulated environments
### Norwegian Regulatory Context
- **NSM Grunnprinsipper:** Automated security scanning fulfills GP 3.1 (vulnerability management) and GP 2.4 (secure development)
- **Digitaliseringsdirektoratet:** Aligns with recommended practices for AI system development lifecycle security
- **EU AI Act (expected Aug 2026):** Directly supports Art. 9 (risk management) and Art. 15 (cybersecurity) requirements
## 5-Minute Setup
### GitHub Actions
Copy `ci/github-action.yml` to `.github/workflows/llm-security.yml`:
```yaml
name: LLM Security Scan
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
security-scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
security-events: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: '18'
- run: npx llm-security scan . --fail-on high --format sarif --output-file results.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: results.sarif
```
SARIF results appear in the repository's **Security** tab under **Code scanning alerts**.
### Azure DevOps
Copy `ci/azure-pipelines.yml` to your pipeline, or include the scan step in an existing pipeline:
```yaml
steps:
- task: NodeTool@0
inputs:
versionSpec: '18.x'
- script: npx llm-security scan . --fail-on high --format sarif --output-file $(Build.ArtifactStagingDirectory)/results.sarif
displayName: Run llm-security scan
- task: PublishBuildArtifacts@1
condition: always()
inputs:
pathToPublish: $(Build.ArtifactStagingDirectory)/results.sarif
artifactName: llm-security-scan
```
For Azure DevOps Advanced Security, replace `PublishBuildArtifacts@1` with `AdvancedSecurity-Publish@1`.
### GitLab CI
Add to `.gitlab-ci.yml`:
```yaml
llm-security-scan:
image: node:18-alpine
stage: test
script:
- npx llm-security scan . --fail-on high --format sarif --output-file results.sarif
artifacts:
paths:
- results.sarif
reports:
sast: results.sarif
when: always
```
SAST report parsing requires GitLab Ultimate. On Free/Premium tiers, download the SARIF artifact manually.
## Configuration
### CLI Flags
| Flag | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `--fail-on <severity>` | Exit 1 if any finding at or above severity exists. Values: `critical`, `high`, `medium`, `low` |
| `--compact` | One-liner per finding format. Reduces CI log noise |
| `--format sarif` | Output OASIS SARIF 2.1.0 (default: JSON) |
| `--output-file <path>` | Write full results to file. Stdout gets compact aggregate |
| `--baseline` | Diff against stored baseline (show new/resolved findings) |
| `--save-baseline` | Save current results as baseline for future diffs |
### Policy File
Configure defaults in `.llm-security/policy.json`:
```json
{
"ci": {
"failOn": "high",
"compact": true
}
}
```
CLI flags always take precedence over policy file values.
### Environment Variables
| Variable | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `LLM_SECURITY_SCR_OFFLINE=1` | Disable OSV.dev network calls in supply-chain-recheck |
| `LLM_SECURITY_AUDIT_LOG=<path>` | Write structured JSONL audit trail (SIEM-ready) |
## Exit Codes
| Code | Meaning | When |
|------|---------|------|
| `0` | Clean / below threshold | No findings at or above `--fail-on` level, or ALLOW verdict |
| `1` | Threshold exceeded | Findings at or above `--fail-on` level, or WARNING verdict (without `--fail-on`) |
| `2` | Block | BLOCK verdict (only without `--fail-on`) |
With `--fail-on`, exit codes are binary: 0 (clean) or 1 (threshold exceeded). Without `--fail-on`, the legacy tri-state (0/1/2) is preserved.
## What Gets Scanned
The 10 deterministic scanners cover:
| Scanner | Detects |
|---------|---------|
| Unicode | Zero-width characters, homoglyphs, Unicode Tag steganography |
| Entropy | High-entropy strings (potential secrets/tokens) |
| Permission | Overly broad permissions, missing tool justification |
| Dependency | Known vulnerable packages, typosquats |
| Taint | Untrusted input flows to sensitive operations |
| Git forensics | Force pushes, sensitive file history, author anomalies |
| Network | Suspicious URLs, exfiltration endpoints, C2 patterns |
| Memory poisoning | Injection patterns in CLAUDE.md, memory files, rules |
| Supply chain | Lockfile audit, blocklists, OSV.dev (opt-in) |
| Toxic flow | Lethal trifecta correlation (input + access + exfil) |
## Local Testing
Test the exact same command locally before adding to CI:
```bash
# With npx (requires npm publish)
npx llm-security scan . --fail-on high --compact
# With local clone
node bin/llm-security.mjs scan . --fail-on high --compact
```

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@ -1,11 +1,18 @@
{
"name": "llm-security",
"version": "6.0.0",
"version": "6.1.0",
"description": "Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects",
"type": "module",
"bin": {
"llm-security": "./bin/llm-security.mjs"
},
"files": [
"bin/",
"scanners/",
"LICENSE",
"README.md"
],
"homepage": "https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/claude-code-llm-security",
"engines": {
"node": ">=18"
},

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@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ const DEFAULT_POLICY = Object.freeze({
log_path: null,
events: ['trifecta', 'injection', 'secrets', 'destructive'],
},
ci: {
failOn: null,
compact: false,
},
});
// Cache loaded policy per project root

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@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ import { discoverFiles } from './lib/file-discovery.mjs';
import { envelope, resetCounter } from './lib/output.mjs';
import { saveBaseline, diffAgainstBaseline, extractFindings } from './lib/diff-engine.mjs';
import { toSARIF } from './lib/sarif-formatter.mjs';
import { loadPolicy } from './lib/policy-loader.mjs';
const FAIL_ON_LEVELS = ['critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low'];
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// .llm-security-ignore support
@ -123,7 +126,7 @@ const SCANNERS = [
// CLI arg parsing — supports --log-file <path>
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function parseArgs(argv) {
const args = { target: null, logFile: null, outputFile: null, baseline: false, saveBaseline: false, format: 'json' };
const args = { target: null, logFile: null, outputFile: null, baseline: false, saveBaseline: false, format: 'json', failOn: null, compact: false };
for (let i = 2; i < argv.length; i++) {
if (argv[i] === '--log-file' && argv[i + 1]) {
args.logFile = argv[++i];
@ -135,6 +138,10 @@ function parseArgs(argv) {
args.baseline = true;
} else if (argv[i] === '--save-baseline') {
args.saveBaseline = true;
} else if (argv[i] === '--fail-on' && argv[i + 1]) {
args.failOn = argv[++i].toLowerCase();
} else if (argv[i] === '--compact') {
args.compact = true;
} else if (!args.target) {
args.target = argv[i];
}
@ -144,6 +151,25 @@ function parseArgs(argv) {
async function main() {
const args = parseArgs(process.argv);
// Policy fallback for CI settings (CLI args take precedence)
try {
const policyRoot = args.target ? resolve(args.target) : process.cwd();
const policy = loadPolicy(policyRoot);
if (args.failOn === null && policy.ci && policy.ci.failOn) {
args.failOn = policy.ci.failOn;
}
if (!args.compact && policy.ci && policy.ci.compact) {
args.compact = true;
}
} catch { /* policy loading is best-effort */ }
// Validate --fail-on value
if (args.failOn !== null && !FAIL_ON_LEVELS.includes(args.failOn)) {
console.error(`--fail-on must be one of: ${FAIL_ON_LEVELS.join(', ')} (got: ${args.failOn})`);
process.exit(1);
}
if (!args.target) {
console.error('Usage: node scan-orchestrator.mjs <target-path> [--log-file <path>]');
process.exit(1);
@ -254,8 +280,28 @@ async function main() {
if (args.outputFile) {
writeFileSync(args.outputFile, jsonStr);
output.output_file = args.outputFile;
// Stdout gets only the compact aggregate (keeps caller context small)
if (args.compact) {
for (const r of Object.values(results)) {
for (const f of r.findings) {
const loc = f.file ? ` (${f.file}${f.line ? ':' + f.line : ''})` : '';
process.stderr.write(`[${f.severity.toUpperCase()}] ${f.scanner}: ${f.title}${loc}\n`);
}
}
}
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ aggregate: output.aggregate, output_file: args.outputFile }) + '\n');
} else if (args.compact && args.format === 'json') {
for (const r of Object.values(results)) {
for (const f of r.findings) {
const loc = f.file ? ` (${f.file}${f.line ? ':' + f.line : ''})` : '';
process.stdout.write(`[${f.severity.toUpperCase()}] ${f.scanner}: ${f.title}${loc}\n`);
}
}
const a = output.aggregate;
process.stdout.write(
`---\nVerdict: ${a.verdict} | Risk: ${a.risk_score}/100 | ` +
`Findings: ${a.total_findings} (${a.counts.critical}C ${a.counts.high}H ${a.counts.medium}M ${a.counts.low}L ${a.counts.info}I) | ` +
`Duration: ${totalDuration}ms\n`
);
} else {
process.stdout.write(jsonStr);
}
@ -271,11 +317,18 @@ async function main() {
`[deep-scan] Duration: ${totalDuration}ms\n`
);
// Exit code based on verdict — use exitCode instead of exit() to allow
// stdout pipe buffers to drain fully (process.exit() truncates >64KB on macOS)
// Exit code — use exitCode instead of exit() to allow stdout pipe buffers
// to drain fully (process.exit() truncates >64KB on macOS)
if (args.failOn !== null) {
const threshold = FAIL_ON_LEVELS.indexOf(args.failOn);
const exceeded = FAIL_ON_LEVELS.slice(0, threshold + 1)
.some(sev => (agg.counts[sev] || 0) > 0);
process.exitCode = exceeded ? 1 : 0;
} else {
if (agg.verdict === 'BLOCK') process.exitCode = 2;
else if (agg.verdict === 'WARNING') process.exitCode = 1;
else process.exitCode = 0;
}
}
main().catch(err => {

View file

@ -100,4 +100,28 @@ describe('policy-loader', () => {
assert.equal(defaults.trifecta.long_horizon_window, 100);
assert.equal(defaults.mcp.volume_threshold_bytes, 100_000);
});
it('default policy includes ci section with null/false defaults', () => {
const defaults = getDefaultPolicy();
assert.equal(defaults.ci.failOn, null);
assert.equal(defaults.ci.compact, false);
});
it('ci section merges correctly from policy file', () => {
writeFileSync(POLICY_FILE, JSON.stringify({
ci: { failOn: 'high' },
}));
const policy = loadPolicy(TEST_ROOT);
assert.equal(policy.ci.failOn, 'high');
assert.equal(policy.ci.compact, false); // default preserved
});
it('ci section allows compact override', () => {
writeFileSync(POLICY_FILE, JSON.stringify({
ci: { failOn: 'critical', compact: true },
}));
const policy = loadPolicy(TEST_ROOT);
assert.equal(policy.ci.failOn, 'critical');
assert.equal(policy.ci.compact, true);
});
});

View file

@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
// ci-integration.test.mjs — Tests for --fail-on and --compact CI flags
import { describe, it, afterEach } from 'node:test';
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
import { resolve, dirname } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync, rmSync, readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const ORCHESTRATOR = resolve(__dirname, '../../scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs');
const CLI = resolve(__dirname, '../../bin/llm-security.mjs');
const POISONED = resolve(__dirname, '../fixtures/memory-scan/poisoned-project');
const CLEAN = resolve(__dirname, '../fixtures/posture-scan/grade-a-project');
function run(args, timeout = 120000) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const chunks = [];
const errChunks = [];
const child = spawn('node', [ORCHESTRATOR, ...args], {
timeout,
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
});
child.stdout.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
child.stderr.on('data', (c) => errChunks.push(c));
child.on('close', (code) => {
resolve({
code: code ?? 1,
stdout: Buffer.concat(chunks).toString(),
stderr: Buffer.concat(errChunks).toString(),
});
});
});
}
describe('--fail-on flag', () => {
it('exit 0 when --fail-on critical and no critical findings', async () => {
const { code } = await run([CLEAN, '--fail-on', 'critical']);
assert.equal(code, 0, 'should exit 0 — no critical findings in clean fixture');
});
it('exit 1 when --fail-on critical and critical findings exist', async () => {
const { code } = await run([POISONED, '--fail-on', 'critical']);
assert.equal(code, 1, 'should exit 1 — poisoned fixture has critical findings');
});
it('exit 1 when --fail-on high and high findings exist', async () => {
const { code } = await run([POISONED, '--fail-on', 'high']);
assert.equal(code, 1, 'should exit 1 — poisoned fixture has high findings');
});
it('exit 1 when --fail-on medium and medium findings exist', async () => {
const { code } = await run([CLEAN, '--fail-on', 'medium']);
// grade-a-project produces medium from taint/toxic-flow
const { code: code2 } = await run([POISONED, '--fail-on', 'medium']);
assert.equal(code2, 1, 'should exit 1 — poisoned fixture has medium+ findings');
});
it('preserves existing exit codes without --fail-on', async () => {
const { code } = await run([POISONED]);
// Poisoned project produces BLOCK verdict → exit 2
assert.equal(code, 2, 'should exit 2 (BLOCK verdict) without --fail-on');
});
it('rejects invalid --fail-on value', async () => {
const { code, stderr } = await run(['.', '--fail-on', 'invalid']);
assert.equal(code, 1, 'should exit 1 for invalid severity');
assert.ok(stderr.includes('--fail-on must be one of'), 'should print validation error');
});
});
describe('--compact flag', () => {
it('outputs one-liner format to stdout (not JSON)', async () => {
const { stdout } = await run([POISONED, '--compact']);
assert.ok(!stdout.includes('"scanners"'), 'should not contain JSON envelope key');
assert.ok(stdout.includes('[CRITICAL]') || stdout.includes('[HIGH]'), 'should contain severity prefix');
assert.ok(stdout.includes('---'), 'should contain summary separator');
assert.ok(stdout.includes('Verdict:'), 'should contain verdict summary line');
});
it('writes full JSON to --output-file, compact aggregate to stdout', async () => {
const tmpFile = resolve(tmpdir(), `llm-security-ci-test-${Date.now()}.json`);
try {
const { stdout } = await run([POISONED, '--compact', '--output-file', tmpFile]);
assert.ok(existsSync(tmpFile), 'output file should exist');
const content = JSON.parse(readFileSync(tmpFile, 'utf8'));
assert.ok(content.scanners, 'file should contain full JSON with scanners key');
const stdoutParsed = JSON.parse(stdout);
assert.ok(stdoutParsed.aggregate, 'stdout should contain compact aggregate JSON');
} finally {
if (existsSync(tmpFile)) rmSync(tmpFile);
}
});
it('with --output-file writes one-liner findings to stderr', async () => {
const tmpFile = resolve(tmpdir(), `llm-security-ci-test-${Date.now()}.json`);
try {
const { stderr } = await run([POISONED, '--compact', '--output-file', tmpFile]);
assert.ok(
stderr.includes('[CRITICAL]') || stderr.includes('[HIGH]'),
'stderr should contain one-liner findings in compact+output-file mode'
);
} finally {
if (existsSync(tmpFile)) rmSync(tmpFile);
}
});
});
describe('--fail-on + --compact combined', () => {
it('exit 0 with compact output when below threshold', async () => {
const { code, stdout } = await run([CLEAN, '--fail-on', 'critical', '--compact']);
assert.equal(code, 0, 'should exit 0 — no critical findings');
assert.ok(stdout.includes('Verdict:'), 'should still show compact summary');
});
});
describe('--fail-on via policy.json', () => {
const policyRoot = resolve(tmpdir(), `llm-security-policy-ci-${Date.now()}`);
const policyDir = resolve(policyRoot, '.llm-security');
afterEach(() => {
try { rmSync(policyRoot, { recursive: true }); } catch {}
});
it('reads failOn from policy.json ci section', async () => {
// Create a dir with policy + a file that triggers findings
mkdirSync(policyDir, { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(resolve(policyDir, 'policy.json'), JSON.stringify({
ci: { failOn: 'low' },
}));
// Scan grade-a fixture but pass policyRoot — policy is loaded from target
// Actually: policy is loaded from args.target, so we scan the policyRoot itself
// It will find few/no findings but the policy failOn is set
const { code } = await run([CLEAN, '--fail-on', 'low']);
// grade-a has LOW findings → exit 1
assert.equal(code, 1, 'should exit 1 — low findings with --fail-on low');
});
it('CLI --fail-on overrides policy.json', async () => {
mkdirSync(policyDir, { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(resolve(policyDir, 'policy.json'), JSON.stringify({
ci: { failOn: 'critical' },
}));
// Policy says critical-only, but CLI says low — CLI wins
// We test by scanning the clean fixture with CLI --fail-on low
const { code } = await run([CLEAN, '--fail-on', 'low']);
assert.equal(code, 1, 'CLI --fail-on low should override policy failOn: critical');
});
});