docs(severity): B3 — document info as scoring-inert (v7.2.0 prep)

Critical-review §2 B3 finding: `riskScore({info: N}) = 0` silently masks
info-volume findings. The behavior was correct (info is scoring-inert by
design) but undocumented. Operators reading a report with N info findings
had no way to know they contribute zero to verdict/band.

Three coordinated edits:
- scanners/lib/severity.mjs JSDoc — explicit "Info severity" subsection
  spelling out: scoring-inert, surfaced in owaspCategorize aggregates,
  treat as observability telemetry not verdict input. @param updated to
  mark info as accepted but ignored.
- CLAUDE.md v7.0.0 risk-score-v2 line — one-sentence anchor pointing to
  severity.mjs JSDoc.
- tests/lib/severity.test.mjs — anchor test alongside the existing
  4-critical=93 anchor: asserts riskScore({info: 50}) === 0,
  riskScore({info: 1000}) === 0, verdict({info: 100}) === 'ALLOW',
  riskBand(riskScore({info: 500})) === 'Low'.

Decision: skip the optional `infoScore()` helper from the brief. No
current consumer would use it; doc-only fix keeps API surface minimal.
Revisit if a consumer emerges.

Tests: 1522 → 1523 (+1 anchor block, 4 assertions). All green.
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-04-29 13:56:11 +02:00
commit 3cd68dc9fb
3 changed files with 23 additions and 2 deletions

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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 fra
**v7.0.0 — Severity-dominated risk scoring (v2 model, BREAKING).** Three changes target the false-positive cascade on real codebases (hyperframes.com gave `BLOCK / Extreme / 100`, ~70% noise):
1. **Risk-score v2 formula** (`scanners/lib/severity.mjs`) — severity-dominated, log-scaled within tier. Replaces v1 sum-and-cap that collapsed every non-trivial scan to 100/Extreme. Tiers: critical → 7095, high only → 4065, medium only → 1535, low only → 111. Verdict cutoffs realigned to new bands (BLOCK ≥65, WARNING ≥15).
1. **Risk-score v2 formula** (`scanners/lib/severity.mjs`) — severity-dominated, log-scaled within tier. Replaces v1 sum-and-cap that collapsed every non-trivial scan to 100/Extreme. Tiers: critical → 7095, high only → 4065, medium only → 1535, low only → 111. Verdict cutoffs realigned to new bands (BLOCK ≥65, WARNING ≥15). `info` findings are observability-only — counted in OWASP aggregates but contribute zero to risk_score, verdict, and riskBand (B3, v7.2.0 — was undocumented pre-7.2.0). See `severity.mjs` JSDoc for full contract.
2. **Rule-based entropy scanner with file-extension skip, 8 line-level suppression rules, and configurable policy** — extensions skipped (`.glsl/.frag/.vert/.shader/.wgsl/.css/.scss/.sass/.less/.svg/.min.*/.map`); line-suppression rules (GLSL keywords, CSS-in-JS, inline SVG, ffmpeg `filter_complex`, User-Agent strings, SQL DDL, `throw new Error(\`...\`)`, markdown image URLs). Configurable via `.llm-security/policy.json` `entropy` section (thresholds, `suppress_extensions`, `suppress_line_patterns`, `suppress_paths`). Envelope `calibration` block reports skip counters + effective thresholds + policy source.
3. **DEP typosquat allowlist expansion** — 22 npm + 5 PyPI entries for short-name tools that tripped Levenshtein detection on every modern codebase (`knip`, `oxlint`, `tsx`, `nx`, `rimraf`, `uv`, `ruff`, etc.).