chore(release): v6.2.0 — bash-normalize T5/T6, PreCompact hook, hardening guide
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Kjell Tore Guttormsen
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5 changed files with 18 additions and 5 deletions
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{
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{
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"name": "llm-security",
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"name": "llm-security",
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"description": "Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. Detects secrets, validates MCP servers, assesses security posture, and generates threat models aligned with OWASP LLM Top 10.",
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"description": "Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. Detects secrets, validates MCP servers, assesses security posture, and generates threat models aligned with OWASP LLM Top 10.",
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"version": "6.1.0"
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"version": "6.2.0"
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}
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}
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@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ All notable changes to the LLM Security Plugin are documented in this file.
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The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
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The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
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## [6.2.0] - 2026-04-17
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### Added
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- **Bash-normalize T5 + T6** — `scanners/lib/bash-normalize.mjs` now collapses `${IFS}` word-splitting (T5) and ANSI-C hex quoting `$'\xHH'` (T6) before the denylist gate runs. Defense-in-depth layer complementing the Claude Code 2.1.98+ harness fixes. 4 new unit tests in `tests/scanners/bash-normalize.test.mjs`
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- **PreCompact hook** — `hooks/scripts/pre-compact-scan.mjs` scans the transcript tail (default 500 KB) for injection patterns before Claude Code compacts context. Prevents poisoned summaries from surviving into the next turn. Modes: `block` / `warn` / `off` via `LLM_SECURITY_PRECOMPACT_MODE`. 6 new tests in `tests/hooks/pre-compact-scan.test.mjs`. Brings total hooks to 9
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- **Security hardening guide** — `docs/security-hardening-guide.md` documents environment variables (`CLAUDE_CODE_EFFORT_LEVEL`, `ENABLE_PROMPT_CACHING_1H`, `CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS`, all `LLM_SECURITY_*` modes), sandboxing (`sandbox-exec` / `bwrap` / fallback), T1-T6 normalization table, Opus 4.7 system card §5.2.1 + §6.3.1.1 alignment, baseline production recommendations
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### Changed
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- **Agent refactor for Opus 4.7 literal instruction following** — `agents/skill-scanner-agent.md` and `agents/mcp-scanner-agent.md` reframe stacked CANNOT/MUST NOT imperatives in favor of tool-level enforcement via `tools:` frontmatter. New Step 0 "Generaliseringsgrense" blocks (cite evidence path:line, mark speculation as speculation) and "Parallell Read-strategi" notes (prefer parallel Read calls for independent file reads)
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- **Defense Philosophy linked to Opus 4.7 system card** — `CLAUDE.md` §Defense Philosophy now cites Opus 4.7 system card §5.2.1 (multi-layer defenses) and §6.3.1.1 (instruction hierarchy → tool-level enforcement)
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- Version bump: 6.1.0 → 6.2.0 across all files
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## [6.1.0] - 2026-04-10
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## [6.1.0] - 2026-04-10
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### Added
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### Added
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# LLM Security Plugin (v6.1.0)
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# LLM Security Plugin (v6.2.0)
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Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 frameworks: OWASP LLM Top 10, Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI), Skills Top 10 (AST), MCP Top 10, AI Agent Traps (DeepMind). 1264 tests.
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Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 frameworks: OWASP LLM Top 10, Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI), Skills Top 10 (AST), MCP Top 10, AI Agent Traps (DeepMind). 1264 tests.
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*Built for my own Claude Code workflow and shared openly for anyone who finds it useful. This is a solo project — bug reports and feature requests are welcome, but pull requests are not accepted.*
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*Built for my own Claude Code workflow and shared openly for anyone who finds it useful. This is a solo project — bug reports and feature requests are welcome, but pull requests are not accepted.*
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@ -817,6 +817,7 @@ This plugin provides full-stack security hardening (static analysis + supply cha
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| Version | Date | Highlights |
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| Version | Date | Highlights |
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|---------|------|------------|
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|---------|------|------------|
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| **6.2.0** | 2026-04-17 | **Opus 4.7 + Claude Code 2.1.112 alignment.** Bash-normalize extended with T5 (`${IFS}` word-splitting) and T6 (ANSI-C `$'\xHH'` hex quoting) layers. New `pre-compact-scan.mjs` PreCompact hook — scans transcript tail (500 KB cap, <500 ms) for injection + credentials before context compaction. Modes: `block` / `warn` / `off` via `LLM_SECURITY_PRECOMPACT_MODE`. Agent files reframed for Opus 4.7's more literal instruction-following (Step 0 generaliseringsgrense + parallell Read-hint in skill-scanner + mcp-scanner). New `docs/security-hardening-guide.md` with env-var reference, sandboxing notes, system-card §5.2.1 / §6.3.1.1 mapping. CLAUDE.md Defense Philosophy links to system card. 1274 tests (was 1264). |
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| **6.1.0** | 2026-04-10 | **CI/CD integration.** `--fail-on <severity>` flag for threshold-based exit codes (exit 1 if findings at/above level). `--compact` output mode (one-liner per finding). Policy `ci` section in `policy.json`. Pipeline templates: GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps, GitLab CI with SARIF upload. CI/CD guide (`docs/ci-cd-guide.md`) with Schrems II/NSM compliance docs. npm publish preparation (`files` whitelist). 1264 tests. |
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| **6.1.0** | 2026-04-10 | **CI/CD integration.** `--fail-on <severity>` flag for threshold-based exit codes (exit 1 if findings at/above level). `--compact` output mode (one-liner per finding). Policy `ci` section in `policy.json`. Pipeline templates: GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps, GitLab CI with SARIF upload. CI/CD guide (`docs/ci-cd-guide.md`) with Schrems II/NSM compliance docs. npm publish preparation (`files` whitelist). 1264 tests. |
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| **6.0.0** | 2026-04-10 | **CAISS-readiness release.** Enterprise compliance and governance layer: compliance mapping (EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001, MITRE ATLAS), Norwegian regulatory context (Datatilsynet, NSM, Digitaliseringsdirektoratet), SARIF 2.1.0 output format (`--format sarif`), structured JSONL audit trail (`audit-trail.mjs`), AI-BOM generator (CycloneDX 1.6), policy-as-code (`.llm-security/policy.json`), standalone CLI (`bin/llm-security.mjs` — `node bin/llm-security.mjs scan`). Posture scanner expanded to 16 categories (+EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001). Attack simulator benchmark mode (`--benchmark`). 15 knowledge docs, 16 scanners, 1242+ tests. |
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| **6.0.0** | 2026-04-10 | **CAISS-readiness release.** Enterprise compliance and governance layer: compliance mapping (EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001, MITRE ATLAS), Norwegian regulatory context (Datatilsynet, NSM, Digitaliseringsdirektoratet), SARIF 2.1.0 output format (`--format sarif`), structured JSONL audit trail (`audit-trail.mjs`), AI-BOM generator (CycloneDX 1.6), policy-as-code (`.llm-security/policy.json`), standalone CLI (`bin/llm-security.mjs` — `node bin/llm-security.mjs scan`). Posture scanner expanded to 16 categories (+EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001). Attack simulator benchmark mode (`--benchmark`). 15 knowledge docs, 16 scanners, 1242+ tests. |
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| **5.1.0** | 2026-04-07 | **Sandboxed remote cloning.** Defense-in-depth for `git clone` attack surface: (1) 8 git config flags disable hooks, symlinks, filter/smudge drivers, fsmonitor, local file protocol; 4 env vars isolate from system/user config. (2) OS sandbox: macOS `sandbox-exec` + Linux `bubblewrap` restrict file writes to only the clone temp dir. Graceful fallback on Windows (git config only). Post-clone size check (100MB max). UUID-unique evidence filenames prevent race conditions. Cleanup guarantee in scan/plugin-audit commands. 1147 tests (was 1115). |
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| **5.1.0** | 2026-04-07 | **Sandboxed remote cloning.** Defense-in-depth for `git clone` attack surface: (1) 8 git config flags disable hooks, symlinks, filter/smudge drivers, fsmonitor, local file protocol; 4 env vars isolate from system/user config. (2) OS sandbox: macOS `sandbox-exec` + Linux `bubblewrap` restrict file writes to only the clone temp dir. Graceful fallback on Windows (git config only). Post-clone size check (100MB max). UUID-unique evidence filenames prevent race conditions. Cleanup guarantee in scan/plugin-audit commands. 1147 tests (was 1115). |
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{
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{
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"name": "llm-security",
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"name": "llm-security",
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"version": "6.1.0",
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"version": "6.2.0",
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"description": "Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects",
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"description": "Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects",
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"type": "module",
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"type": "module",
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"bin": {
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"bin": {
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