feat(llm-security): OS sandbox for /security ide-scan <url> (v6.5.0)

VSIX fetch + extract for URL targets now runs in a sub-process wrapped by
sandbox-exec (macOS) or bwrap (Linux), reusing the same primitives proven
by the v5.1 git-clone sandbox. Defense-in-depth — even if our own
zip-extract.mjs ever has a bypass, the kernel refuses any write outside
the per-scan temp directory.

New files:
- scanners/lib/vsix-fetch-worker.mjs — sub-process worker. Argv: --url
  --tmpdir; emits one JSON line on stdout (ok/sha256/size/source/extRoot
  or ok:false/error/code). Silent on stderr. Exit 0/1.
- scanners/lib/vsix-sandbox.mjs — wrapper. Exports buildSandboxProfile,
  buildBwrapArgs, buildSandboxedWorker, runVsixWorker. 35s timeout, 1 MB
  stdout cap.

Changes:
- scanners/ide-extension-scanner.mjs: fetchAndExtractVsixUrl is now
  sandbox-aware (useSandbox option, default true). In-process logic
  preserved as fallback. New meta.source.sandbox field:
  'sandbox-exec' | 'bwrap' | 'none' | 'in-process'.
- scan(target, { useSandbox }) defaults to true; tests pass false because
  globalThis.fetch mocks do not cross process boundaries.
- Windows fallback: in-process with meta.warnings advisory.

Tests:
- 8 new tests in tests/scanners/vsix-sandbox.test.mjs (per-platform
  profile generation, worker arg construction, live worker exit
  behavior on invalid URLs — no network).
- Existing URL tests updated to opt out of sandbox (useSandbox: false).
- 1344 → 1352 tests, all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-04-17 17:28:57 +02:00
commit 9f893c3858
11 changed files with 434 additions and 24 deletions

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# LLM Security Plugin (v6.4.0)
# LLM Security Plugin (v6.5.0)
Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 frameworks: OWASP LLM Top 10, Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI), Skills Top 10 (AST), MCP Top 10, AI Agent Traps (DeepMind). 1344 tests.
Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 frameworks: OWASP LLM Top 10, Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI), Skills Top 10 (AST), MCP Top 10, AI Agent Traps (DeepMind). 1352 tests.
## Commands
@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ Scanner prefix: MCI. OWASP: MCP03, MCP06, MCP09. Invoked by `mcp-inspect` and `m
**v6.4.0 — URL support.** Targets can be Marketplace, OpenVSX, or direct `.vsix` URLs. Pipeline: `lib/vsix-fetch.mjs` (HTTPS-only fetch with 50MB cap, 30s timeout, SHA-256, manual redirect host whitelist) → `lib/zip-extract.mjs` (zero-dep ZIP parser, rejects zip-slip/symlink/absolute/drive-letter/encrypted/ZIP64, caps: 10 000 entries, 500MB uncomp, 100x ratio, depth 20) → existing scan pipeline against extracted `extension/` subdir → temp dir always cleaned in `try/finally`. Envelope.meta.source = `{ type: "url", kind, url, finalUrl, sha256, size, publisher?, name?, version? }`.
**v6.5.0 — OS sandbox.** Fetch + extract for URL targets now spawns `lib/vsix-fetch-worker.mjs` in a sub-process wrapped by `sandbox-exec` (macOS) or `bwrap` (Linux) — same primitives reused from `git-clone.mjs`. Helper: `lib/vsix-sandbox.mjs` exports `buildSandboxProfile`, `buildBwrapArgs`, `buildSandboxedWorker`, `runVsixWorker`. Worker IPC: argv `--url <url> --tmpdir <dir>` → single JSON line on stdout (`{ok, sha256, size, finalUrl, source, extRoot}` or `{ok:false, error, code?}`). Defense-in-depth — if the in-process ZIP parser ever has a bypass, the kernel still refuses writes outside `<tmpdir>`. `scan(target, { useSandbox })` defaults to `true`; tests pass `false` since `globalThis.fetch` mocks do not cross process boundaries. Windows fallback: in-process with `meta.warnings` advisory. Envelope `meta.source.sandbox`: `'sandbox-exec' | 'bwrap' | 'none' | 'in-process'`.
Run: `node scanners/ide-extension-scanner.mjs [target|url] [--vscode-only] [--intellij-only] [--include-builtin] [--online] [--format json|compact] [--fail-on <sev>] [--output-file <path>]`. Invoked by `/security ide-scan`.
## Token Budget (ENFORCED)