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docs(llm-security): A3 honesty-sweep — 7 sitater nedtonet (critical-review §9)

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Closes A3 of v7.1.0 critical-review patch. Each rewrite preserves the underlying
claim where it is accurate but removes hype/overreach language. Historical
CHANGELOG/README version-table rows are intentionally left as-is (they document
what was claimed at the time of release, not what is true today).

Changes (CLAUDE.md, commands/ide-scan.md, knowledge/mitigation-matrix.md,
docs/security-hardening-guide.md):

- "Trustworthy scoring (BREAKING)" → "Severity-dominated risk scoring
  (v2 model, BREAKING)". Removes hype framing; describes the actual mechanism.
- "Context-aware entropy scanner" → "Rule-based entropy scanner with
  file-extension skip, 8 line-level suppression rules, and configurable policy".
  No ML/context inference; just rules.
- "1487 tests" → "1511 unit and integration tests; mutation-testing coverage
  not published". Updated count after A1+A2 (+24) and added qualifier.
- "Fully Schrems II compatible" → "Schrems II compatible in default offline
  mode. Optional OSV.dev enrichment (`supply-chain-recheck --online`)
  transmits package identifiers to a Google-operated API and is a separate
  compliance consideration." Acknowledges the OSV.dev opt-in caveat.
- "Rule of Two enforcement" → "Rule of Two detection (configurable; default
  warn; blocks on high-confidence trifectas in opt-in `block` mode; distributed
  trifectas detected but not blocked by default)". "Enforcement" implied
  block; default is warn.
- "Hardened ZIP extractor" → suffix " — no fuzz-testing results published
  to date". Caps and class-of-attacks rejected are accurate; absence of
  formal fuzz coverage now stated.
- "defense-in-depth" — preserved as framing, but quantified in
  security-hardening-guide §4: "three independent detection layers with
  documented bypass classes". Each layer named, each layer's known bypasses
  pointed to (critical-review §4 evasion arsenal).

Tests: 1511/1511 green (no behavioural change).
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-04-29 11:52:55 +02:00
commit a46308b1e9
4 changed files with 17 additions and 8 deletions
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2
plugins/llm-security/commands/ide-scan.md
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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Arguments (pass through as provided by the user):
- `--fail-on <severity>` — exit 1 if findings at/above severity
URL mode notes:
- Hardened ZIP extractor with caps: 50MB compressed, 500MB uncompressed, 100x expansion ratio, 10 000 entries, depth 20.
- Hardened ZIP extractor with caps: 50MB compressed, 500MB uncompressed, 100x expansion ratio, 10 000 entries, depth 20. No fuzz-testing results published to date.
- Rejects: zip-slip paths, symlink entries, absolute paths, drive letters, encrypted entries, ZIP64.
- TLS verified, HTTPS only, 30s timeout. Cross-host redirects rejected.
- Temp directory always cleaned up (success, error, abort).