chore(release): bump to v7.3.0
Batch C release. Closes 12 implementation tasks (E3, E8-E14, 8.4, 8.6, 8.7, 8.10) across four execution waves: A (bash + decoder), B (supply chain + workflow scanner), C (MCP cumulative drift), D (code quality). Wave E (9 new attack-simulator scenarios for the new defenses) deferred to v7.3.1 — defenses are unit-tested per wave; the deferred work adds attack-simulator regression coverage on top, not the primary safety net. Tests: 1665+ → 1777 (Wave A-D cumulative, +112). Version sync targets touched: - package.json - .claude-plugin/plugin.json - CLAUDE.md (header) - README.md (badge + new release-history row) - scanners/ide-extension-scanner.mjs (VERSION constant) - ../../README.md (marketplace root plugin entry) - CHANGELOG.md (new [7.3.0] section per Keep a Changelog, all 12 task IDs covered individually under Added/Changed/Documentation/Tests/Notes) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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*AI-generated: all code produced by Claude Code through dialog-driven development. [Full disclosure →](../../README.md#ai-generated-code-disclosure)*
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@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ This plugin provides full-stack security hardening (static analysis + supply cha
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| Version | Date | Highlights |
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| **7.3.0** | 2026-05-01 | **Batch C release.** Closes 12 implementation tasks (E3, E8-E14, 8.4, 8.6, 8.7, 8.10) across four execution waves. **Added (Wave A — bash + decoder):** T7 process-substitution and T9 eval-via-variable normalizations in `scanners/lib/bash-normalize.mjs`; T8 base64-pipe-shell BLOCK rule in `pre-bash-destructive.mjs`; rot13 layer for hidden-imperative comment-block detection in `injection-patterns.mjs`. **Added (Wave B — supply chain + workflow scanner):** `scanGitAttributes()` post-clone advisory for filter/diff/merge driver directives in `scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs` (E12); npm scope-hop typosquat detection with allowlist in `pre-install-supply-chain.mjs` and shared `NPM_OFFICIAL_SCOPES` in `scanners/lib/supply-chain-data.mjs` (E13); new `scanners/workflow-scanner.mjs` for GitHub Actions and Forgejo Actions injection (`${{ <dangerous-field> }}` inside `run:` blocks, with re-interpolation tracking and Synacktiv-class `actor == bot[bot]` auth-bypass detection); state machine extracted to `scanners/lib/workflow-yaml-state.mjs`; `WFL` prefix added to `severity.mjs` OWASP map; orchestrator registration. **Added (Wave C — MCP cumulative drift, E14):** sticky baseline slot per tool plus 10-event rolling history in `scanners/lib/mcp-description-cache.mjs`; cumulative-drift advisory (MEDIUM, `mcp-cumulative-drift`) when Levenshtein ratio between current and baseline ≥ `mcp.cumulative_drift_threshold` (default 0.25); baseline survives 7-day TTL purge so slow-burn rug-pulls are caught; `clearBaseline()` exposed; new `/security mcp-baseline-reset` slash command + `scanners/mcp-baseline-reset.mjs` CLI; `LLM_SECURITY_MCP_CACHE_FILE` env var for end-to-end testing. **Changed (Wave D — code quality):** `riskScoreV1` annotated `@deprecated` with v8.0.0 removal target (8.4); `docs/security-hardening-guide.md` §7 documents the sandbox-architecture rationale (8.6 — descoped to documentation only, no code consolidation); new `getPolicyValueWithEnvWarn()` helper in `policy-loader.mjs` emits a one-time-per-process stderr deprecation line when both an env-var AND its `policy.json` equivalent are explicitly set (8.7) — wired through `pre-prompt-inject-scan` (`LLM_SECURITY_INJECTION_MODE`), `post-session-guard` (`LLM_SECURITY_TRIFECTA_MODE`, `LLM_SECURITY_ESCALATION_WINDOW`), and `audit-trail` (`LLM_SECURITY_AUDIT_LOG`); `DEFAULT_POLICY` gains `trifecta.escalation_window: 5`; CLAUDE.md hooks count corrected to 9 with `pre-compact-scan` row added, plus a new `Hooks count consistency` test in `doc-consistency.test.mjs` (8.10). **Notes:** Wave E (9 new attack-simulator scenarios for E3/E8/E9/E10/E11/E12/E13/E14) deferred to v7.3.1 — defenses are unit-tested per wave; the deferred work adds attack-simulator regression coverage on top. **Tests:** 1665+ → 1777 (Wave A-D cumulative). |
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| **7.2.0** | 2026-04-29 | **Batch B release.** Closes the remaining critical-review B-tier scanner defects (B3, B5, B6, B7) and lands the v7.2.0 evasion-arsenal hardening patches (E1, E4, E5, E7, E15, E16, E17, E18). **Added:** B6 destructuring/spread taint propagation in `taint-tracer.mjs`; B7 token-overlap typosquat fallback in `string-utils.mjs`/`dep-auditor`/`supply-chain-recheck`; E15 `.claude/agents/*.md` glob in `memory-poisoning-scanner`; E1 PUA-A/PUA-B coverage in `containsUnicodeTags`; E16 `foldHomoglyphs` (Cyrillic/Greek → Latin via NFKC) before every pattern match in `scanForInjection` (with ASCII fast-path); E17 `LLM_SECURITY_ESCALATION_WINDOW` env-var + 20-call MEDIUM secondary advisory in `post-session-guard`; E4 markdown link-title scan, E5 SVG `<desc>/<title>/<metadata>/<foreignObject>` extractor, E7 generalized HTML comment scan in `post-mcp-verify`. **Changed:** B5 entropy two-stage pipeline — new `classifyFileContext` in `entropy-scanner.mjs` gates rules 11-13 (GLSL/CSS-in-JS/inline-markup line-proximity) on `context !== 'code-dominant'`, ending the v7.0.0 polyglot false-negative class while preserving existing behaviour for short single-line fixtures. E18 entropy rule 18 — `MARKDOWN_IMAGE_CDN_HOSTS` allowlist + secret-in-query pre-check; non-CDN hosts and CDN URLs carrying secret-shaped query tokens fall through to entropy classification. v1 → v2 risk-formula constants (BLOCK ≥65, WARNING ≥15) unified across `commands/scan.md`, `commands/audit.md`, `agents/mcp-scanner-agent.md`, `agents/posture-assessor-agent.md` with a `tests/lib/doc-consistency.test.mjs` drift-guard. **Documentation:** B3 `info` severity is scoring-inert — documented in `severity.mjs` JSDoc and CLAUDE.md. **Red team:** 8 new attack scenarios (UNI-007/008/009, MCP-005/006/007/008, TRI-004); attack-simulator 64 → 72, 100 % pass. **Tests:** 1522 → 1665+ (Wave 1-6 cumulative). |
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| **7.1.0** | 2026-04-29 | **Critical-review patch.** Closes the highest-impact items from the v7.0.0 adversarial review (`docs/critical-review-2026-04-20.md`, grade B-). Bug-fixes + documentation honesty-sweep, no new features. **Fixed:** (1) `pre-write-pathguard.mjs` regex hole — `.env.production.local.backup`, `.env.prod.local.bak`, etc. could be written. New regex `/[\\/]\.env(\.[A-Za-z0-9._-]+)*$/` covers arbitrary multi-segment suffixes; `.envrc` still allowed. (2) `post-session-guard.mjs` — `LLM_SECURITY_TRIFECTA_MODE=block` only blocked when trifecta was MCP-concentrated or hit a sensitive path; distributed trifectas across MCP servers were advisory-only. AND-gate removed. (3) `scanners/lib/severity.mjs` JSDoc + CHANGELOG arithmetic — `riskScore({critical: 4})` is 93, not 90 (computation always was). **Changed (honesty-sweep, critical-review §9):** "Trustworthy scoring" → "Severity-dominated risk scoring (v2 model)"; "Context-aware entropy scanner" → "Rule-based entropy scanner with file-extension skip, 8 line-level suppression rules, and configurable policy"; "1487 tests" → "1511 unit and integration tests; mutation-testing coverage not published"; "Fully Schrems II compatible" → "Schrems II compatible in default offline mode. Optional OSV.dev enrichment (`supply-chain-recheck --online`) transmits package identifiers to a Google-operated API and is a separate compliance consideration"; "Rule of Two enforcement" → "Rule of Two detection (configurable; default `warn`; blocks on high-confidence trifectas in opt-in `block` mode; distributed trifectas detected but not blocked by default)"; "Hardened ZIP extractor" → suffix " — no fuzz-testing results published to date"; "defense-in-depth" preserved but quantified in `docs/security-hardening-guide.md` §4: "three independent detection layers with documented bypass classes". **CaMeL claim toned down:** `post-session-guard.mjs:646` and `CLAUDE.md:184` now describe the implementation honestly — opportunistic byte-matching of truncated output fingerprints (first 200 bytes, SHA-256/16-hex tag); not semantic data-flow tracking; trivially bypassed by mutation, summarisation, or re-encoding. Inspired by CaMeL (DeepMind 2025) but not a CaMeL capability-tracking implementation. **Tests:** +24 (+8 pathguard multi-segment + 1 distributed-trifecta + 15 verdict/riskBand co-monotonicity sweep + 1 `riskScore({critical: 4}) === 93` anchor). 1511 tests (was 1487). All green. **Why:** the critical-review CISO perspective (§F) flagged overclaim language as a blocker for regulated environments — toning it down does not weaken the actual defenses; it lets users trust the documentation. |
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| **7.0.0** | 2026-04-19 | **Trustworthy scoring (BREAKING).** Three changes target the false-positive cascade on real codebases (scan of hyperframes.com gave `BLOCK / Extreme / 100` with ~70% noise). **1. Risk-score v2** (`scanners/lib/severity.mjs`) — severity-dominated, log-scaled within tier. Replaces sum-and-cap that collapsed every non-trivial scan to 100/Extreme. Tiers: critical → 70–95, high only → 40–65, medium only → 15–35, low only → 1–11. Verdict cutoffs realigned (BLOCK ≥65, WARNING ≥15) for band co-monotonicity. **2. Context-aware entropy scanner** — file-extension skip (`.glsl/.frag/.vert/.shader/.wgsl/.css/.scss/.sass/.less/.svg/.min.*/.map`) + 8 new line-suppression rules (GLSL keywords, CSS-in-JS templates, inline SVG, ffmpeg `filter_complex`, User-Agent strings, SQL DDL on dedicated lines, `throw new Error(\`...\`)`, markdown image URLs). Configurable via `.llm-security/policy.json` `entropy` section (thresholds, `suppress_extensions`, `suppress_line_patterns`, `suppress_paths`). Envelope `calibration` block reports skip counters + effective thresholds + policy source. **3. DEP typosquat allowlist expansion** — 22 npm + 5 PyPI entries for short-name tools that tripped Levenshtein on every modern codebase (`knip`, `oxlint`, `tsx`, `nx`, `rimraf`, `uv`, `ruff`, etc.). Synthesizer "Scan Calibration" section + "never override verdict" rule added. Legacy `riskScoreV1()` kept for reference. **CI pipelines with `--fail-on` thresholds may need recalibration.** 1487 tests (was 1461). |
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