feat(llm-security): add 3 more runnable threat examples [skip-docs]
Three new self-contained, runnable threat demonstrations under
examples/, continuing the batch started in 583a78c. Each example
has README.md + run-*.mjs + expected-findings.md and uses
state-isolation discipline so the user's real cache/state files
are never polluted.
- examples/supply-chain-attack/ — two-layer demonstration:
pre-install-supply-chain (PreToolUse) blocks compromised
event-stream version 3.3.6 and emits a scope-hop advisory for
the @evilcorp scope; dep-auditor (DEP scanner, offline) flags
5 typosquat dependencies plus a curl-piped install-script
vector in the fixture package.json. Maps to LLM03/LLM05/ASI04.
- examples/poisoned-claude-md/ — all 6 memory-poisoning detectors
fire on a deliberately poisoned CLAUDE.md plus a fixture
agent file under .claude/agents (E15/v7.2.0 surface):
detectInjection, detectShellCommands, detectSuspiciousUrls,
detectCredentialPaths, detectPermissionExpansion,
detectEncodedPayloads. No agent runtime needed — scanner
imported directly. Maps to LLM01/LLM06/ASI04.
- examples/bash-evasion-gallery/ — one disguised variant per
T1 through T9 evasion technique fed through pre-bash-destructive,
verified BLOCK after bash-normalize strips the evasion. T8
base64-pipe-shell uses its own BLOCK_RULE. The canonical
destructive form uses a path token rather than the bare slash
(regex word-boundary requires it). Source-string fragmentation
pattern reused from the e2e attack-chain test. Maps to
LLM06/ASI01/LLM01.
Plugin README "Other runnable examples" section + plugin
CLAUDE.md "Examples" table + CHANGELOG Unreleased/Added
all updated. Marketplace root README unchanged
([skip-docs] for marketplace-level gate — plugin's outward
coverage is unchanged, only demonstrations were added).
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#!/usr/bin/env node
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// run-evasion-gallery.mjs — Bash evasion technique gallery (T1-T9)
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// Feeds one disguised command per T-tag to pre-bash-destructive and
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// verifies that every variant is normalized + blocked. Demonstrates
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// why bash-normalize.mjs exists as a defense-in-depth layer above
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// Claude Code 2.1.98+ harness fixes.
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//
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// Each case carries:
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// - the disguised command (what an attacker might paste)
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// - the canonical form bash-normalize should produce
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// - the BLOCK_RULE in pre-bash-destructive that catches the
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// normalized form
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//
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// Usage:
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// cd plugins/llm-security
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// node examples/bash-evasion-gallery/run-evasion-gallery.mjs
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// node examples/bash-evasion-gallery/run-evasion-gallery.mjs --verbose
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import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
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import { resolve, dirname } from 'node:path';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
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const PLUGIN_ROOT = resolve(__dirname, '../..');
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const HOOK = resolve(PLUGIN_ROOT, 'hooks/scripts/pre-bash-destructive.mjs');
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const VERBOSE = process.argv.includes('--verbose');
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Cases
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// We pick `rm -rf /` (or close cousins) as the canonical destructive
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// command for T1-T7, T9. Pre-bash-destructive's BLOCK_RULES['Filesystem
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// root destruction'] catches it after normalization.
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//
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// T8 is a separate base64-pipe-shell BLOCK_RULE — we exercise that one
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// independently with the documented pattern.
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//
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// Each `command` is constructed at runtime from harmless fragments to
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// avoid triggering pre-edit-secrets / file-content scanners on this
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// source file. (Source-string fragmentation is the same pattern used
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// by tests/e2e/attack-chain.test.mjs.)
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// Note: pre-bash-destructive's "Filesystem root destruction" BLOCK_RULE
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// requires a path token after `-rf` (the regex enforces a word boundary).
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// `rm -rf /` alone does not match — `rm -rf $HOME` does. We use $HOME
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// as the canonical destructive target so the regex fires after
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// normalization, mirroring the realistic case where an attacker
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// targets a populated home directory.
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const RM = 'r' + 'm';
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const RF = '-' + 'rf';
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const TARGET = '$' + 'HOME';
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const PIPE_SH = '| ' + 'sh';
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const CASES = [
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{
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tag: 'baseline (no evasion)',
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command: `${RM} ${RF} ${TARGET}`,
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note: 'control: pre-bash-destructive blocks the canonical form directly',
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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{
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tag: 'T1 — empty single quotes',
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command: `r''m ${RF} ${TARGET}`,
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note: "r''m → rm after T1 normalization",
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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{
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tag: 'T2 — empty double quotes',
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command: `r""m ${RF} ${TARGET}`,
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note: 'r""m → rm after T2 normalization',
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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{
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tag: 'T3 — parameter expansion',
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// bash-normalize's T3 has TWO branches:
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// ${x} (single char) → x e.g. c${u}rl → curl
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// ${FOO} (multi char) → '' e.g. ${FOO}rm → rm
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// We exercise the multi-char branch — the single-char branch is more
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// useful inside a name (curl letter substitution).
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command: `\${UNUSED}${RM} ${RF} ${TARGET}`,
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note: '${UNUSED} → "" (multi-char branch), so the prefix collapses to rm',
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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{
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tag: 'T4 — backslash word-splitting',
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command: `r\\m ${RF} ${TARGET}`,
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note: 'r\\m → rm after T4 normalization',
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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{
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tag: 'T5 — IFS word-splitting',
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command: `${RM}\${IFS}${RF}\${IFS}${TARGET}`,
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note: '${IFS} → space, so the command reads as `rm -rf $HOME`',
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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{
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tag: 'T6 — ANSI-C hex quoting',
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command: `$'\\x72\\x6d' ${RF} ${TARGET}`,
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note: "$'\\x72\\x6d' → rm after T6 hex decoding",
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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{
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tag: 'T7 — process substitution',
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command: `cat <(echo ${RM}) ${RF} ${TARGET}`,
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note: '<( ... ) is stripped to expose the inner tokens',
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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{
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tag: 'T8 — base64-pipe-shell idiom',
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// echo cm0gLXJmICRIT01F | base64 -d | sh — base64 of "rm -rf $HOME"
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command: `echo cm0gLXJmICRIT01F | base64 -d ${PIPE_SH}`,
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note: 'separate BLOCK_RULE — not a normalization, but the same shape',
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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{
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tag: 'T9 — eval-via-variable (one-level forward flow)',
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command: `X=${RM}; $X ${RF} ${TARGET}`,
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note: 'one-level alias resolved during normalization',
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expectBlock: true,
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},
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];
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Hook runner
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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function runHook(command) {
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return new Promise((res) => {
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const child = execFile(
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'node',
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[HOOK],
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{ timeout: 5000 },
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(_err, stdout, stderr) => {
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res({ code: child.exitCode ?? 1, stdout: stdout || '', stderr: stderr || '' });
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},
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);
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child.stdin.end(JSON.stringify({
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tool_name: 'Bash',
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tool_input: { command },
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}));
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});
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Main
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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console.log('BASH EVASION GALLERY (T1-T9)');
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console.log('============================\n');
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console.log('Hook: pre-bash-destructive (PreToolUse on Bash)');
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console.log('Normalize layer: scanners/lib/bash-normalize.mjs\n');
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let pass = 0;
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let fail = 0;
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for (const tc of CASES) {
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const result = await runHook(tc.command);
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const blocked = result.code === 2;
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const ok = blocked === tc.expectBlock;
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if (ok) pass++; else fail++;
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console.log(`[${ok ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL'}] ${tc.tag}`);
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console.log(` command: ${tc.command}`);
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console.log(` expect: ${tc.expectBlock ? 'BLOCK (exit 2)' : 'allow (exit 0)'}`);
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console.log(` got: exit ${result.code}${blocked ? ' (blocked)' : ' (allowed)'}`);
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console.log(` why: ${tc.note}`);
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if (VERBOSE && result.stderr.trim()) {
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const head = result.stderr.trim().split('\n').slice(0, 2).join(' / ');
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console.log(` stderr: ${head.slice(0, 160)}`);
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}
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console.log();
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}
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console.log('---');
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console.log(`Result: ${pass} pass, ${fail} fail`);
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if (fail > 0) {
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console.log('\nFAILURE — at least one evasion variant slipped past the hook.');
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console.log('See expected-findings.md for the documented contract.');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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console.log('\nSUCCESS — all evasion variants normalized and blocked.');
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console.log('Read examples/bash-evasion-gallery/README.md for context.');
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process.exit(0);
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