diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 3aa5ad4..b668cfc 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Then open Claude Code and type `/plugin` to browse and install plugins from the
 
 ## Plugins
 
-### [LLM Security](plugins/llm-security/) `v7.3.1`
+### [LLM Security](plugins/llm-security/) `v7.4.0`
 
 Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for agentic AI projects.
 
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ Built on OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025), OWASP Agentic AI Top 10, and the AI Agent Trap
 - **Deterministic scanning** — 23 Node.js scanners (10 orchestrated + 13 standalone) for byte-level analysis: Shannon entropy, Unicode codepoints, typosquatting detection, taint flow, DNS resolution, git forensics, AI-BOM, attack simulation, IDE extension prescan (VS Code + JetBrains — URL fetch from Marketplace / OpenVSX / direct VSIX / JetBrains Marketplace, hardened ZIP extractor for zip-slip / symlinks / bombs, plus OS sandbox via `sandbox-exec` / `bwrap` so the kernel enforces FS confinement), MCP cumulative-drift baseline reset (E14 — sticky baseline catches slow-burn rug-pulls). Bash-normalize T1-T6 for obfuscation-resistant denylists
 - **Advisory analysis** — 20 commands that scan, audit, and model threats with structured reports, letter grades, and actionable remediation
 - **Enterprise governance** — Compliance mapping (EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001), SARIF 2.1.0 output, structured audit trail, policy-as-code, standalone CLI
+- **v7.4.0 examples + e2e suite (2026-05-05)** — 9 runnable demonstration walkthroughs under `examples/` (lethal-trifecta, mcp-rug-pull, supply-chain-attack, poisoned-claude-md, bash-evasion-gallery, prompt-injection-showcase, malicious-skill-demo, toxic-agent-demo, pre-compact-poisoning) plus three new test suites under `tests/e2e/` (attack-chain, multi-session, scan-pipeline) that prove the framework works as a coordinated system. +45 tests (1777 → 1822), no scanner or hook behavior changes — purely additive surface
 - **v8.0.0 env-var deprecation runway (D3, v7.3.0)** — Hook configuration has historically been split between process env-vars and the team-distributable `.llm-security/policy.json` file. Until v7.3.0 the two surfaces could disagree silently. The new `getPolicyValueWithEnvWarn()` helper in `scanners/lib/policy-loader.mjs` now emits a one-time-per-process stderr line whenever both surfaces are explicitly set:
   - Affected pairs: `LLM_SECURITY_INJECTION_MODE`↔`injection.mode`, `LLM_SECURITY_TRIFECTA_MODE`↔`trifecta.mode`, `LLM_SECURITY_ESCALATION_WINDOW`↔`trifecta.escalation_window` (new key in `DEFAULT_POLICY`), `LLM_SECURITY_AUDIT_LOG`↔`audit.log_path`
   - Env still wins through the v7.x window — no behaviour change today, only a runway signal
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ Built on OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025), OWASP Agentic AI Top 10, and the AI Agent Trap
 
 Key commands: `/security posture`, `/security audit`, `/security scan`, `/security ide-scan`, `/security threat-model`, `/security plugin-audit`
 
-6 specialized agents · 23 scanners · 9 hooks · 20 knowledge docs · 1768 tests
+6 specialized agents · 23 scanners · 9 hooks · 20 knowledge docs · 9 runnable examples · 1822 tests
 
 → [Full documentation](plugins/llm-security/README.md)