feat(llm-security-copilot): port llm-security v5.1.0 to GitHub Copilot CLI

Full port of llm-security plugin for internal use on Windows with GitHub
Copilot CLI. Protocol translation layer (copilot-hook-runner.mjs)
normalizes Copilot camelCase I/O to Claude Code snake_case format — all
original hook scripts run unmodified.

- 8 hooks with protocol translation (stdin/stdout/exit code)
- 18 SKILL.md skills (Agent Skills Open Standard)
- 6 .agent.md agent definitions
- 20 scanners + 14 scanner lib modules (unchanged)
- 14 knowledge files (unchanged)
- 39 test files including copilot-port-verify.mjs (17 tests)
- Windows-ready: node:path, os.tmpdir(), process.execPath, no bash

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-04-09 21:56:10 +02:00
commit f418a8fe08
169 changed files with 37631 additions and 0 deletions

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---
name: security-audit
description: Full project security audit with OWASP LLM Top 10 assessment, scoring, and remediation plan
---
# Security Audit
Full project audit combining deterministic scanning with threat analysis.
## Step 1: Run Posture Scanner
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/posture-scanner.mjs
```
Parse JSON: grade A-F, risk score, categories, findings, counts.
## Step 2: Gather Context
Glob for project structure: commands, agents, hooks, skills, MCP configs, CLAUDE.md, settings files. Record what exists.
## Step 3: Skill/Command Analysis
Read `<plugin-root>/knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md` and `<plugin-root>/knowledge/secrets-patterns.md`.
Scan all command, agent, hook, and skill files for the 7 threat categories (injection, exfiltration, privilege escalation, scope creep, hidden instructions, toolchain manipulation, persistence). Apply frontmatter analysis, content analysis, and cross-reference checks.
## Step 4: MCP Analysis (if MCP configs found)
Read `<plugin-root>/knowledge/mcp-threat-patterns.md`.
Scan MCP server configs for: tool poisoning, hidden instructions, rug pull signals, supply chain risks, permission surface.
## Step 5: Merge and Report
Merge posture scanner findings with threat analysis findings. Recalculate:
`risk_score = min(100, critical*25 + high*10 + medium*4 + low*1)`
Output:
1. **Risk Dashboard** — Grade, risk score, verdict, finding counts
2. **Executive Summary** — Key risks, posture overview
3. **10 Category Sections** — One per OWASP/posture category with PASS/PARTIAL/FAIL and findings
4. **Summary Table** — All findings sorted by severity
5. **Action Items** — Grouped by urgency: IMMEDIATE (critical), HIGH (high), MEDIUM (medium)
If grade C or lower: suggest running `threat-model` for deeper analysis.

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---
name: security-clean
description: Scan and remediate security findings — auto-fixes deterministic issues, confirms semi-auto with user, reports manual findings
---
# Security Clean
Scan, classify, and remediate security findings with user confirmation.
## Step 1: Parse Arguments
- Target path = `$ARGUMENTS` or current working directory
- `--dry-run` flag = report only, no changes
## Step 2: Create Backup
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs backup "<target>"
```
## Step 3: Run Scan
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs tmppath clean-findings.json
node <plugin-root>/scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs "<target>" --output-file "<findings_file>"
```
Show banner with verdict, risk score, finding counts.
## Step 4: Auto-fix Deterministic Issues
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/auto-cleaner.mjs "<target>" --findings "<findings_file>" [--dry-run]
```
Report: Applied, Skipped, Failed counts.
## Step 5: Semi-auto Remediation
For findings classified as semi-auto (entropy strings, permission mismatches, typosquatted deps, ghost hooks, suspicious URLs, credential access, hidden MCP directives, homoglyphs):
1. Read the referenced files and understand the surrounding context
2. Propose specific, minimal changes grouped by fix type
3. Present each proposal to the user for confirmation before applying
4. Apply confirmed changes via Edit tool
## Step 6: LLM Threat Scan
Read `<plugin-root>/knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md`. Scan modified files for remaining threats. Report manual findings that require human judgment.
## Step 7: Validate and Report
Re-scan to verify fixes didn't introduce new issues. If validation fails, offer to restore from backup:
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs restore "<target>"
```
Final report: pre/post comparison, fix summaries, remaining manual findings, rollback instructions.

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---
name: security-dashboard
description: Cross-project security dashboard — machine-wide posture overview with per-project grades
---
# Security Dashboard
Machine-wide posture overview. Scans all detected projects, aggregates to a single machine grade (weakest link).
## Step 1: Run Aggregator
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/dashboard-aggregator.mjs [--no-cache]
```
Uses 24h cache by default. Pass `--no-cache` to force fresh scan.
## Step 2: Format Dashboard
Parse JSON: `meta`, `machine.grade` (weakest link), `projects[]`, `errors[]`.
```
# Security Dashboard
| Machine Grade | [A-F] (weakest link) |
| Projects Scanned | N |
| Cached | Yes/No |
## Per-Project Grades
| Project | Grade | Risk Score | Verdict | Last Scan |
|---------|-------|------------|---------|-----------|
[sorted by grade, worst first]
## Errors (if any)
[List projects that failed to scan]
```
## Step 3: Recommendations
- Grade A/B: "Machine posture is strong."
- Grade C: "Review projects with grade C or below."
- Grade D/F: "Significant exposure. Run audit on failing projects."

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---
name: security-deep-scan
description: Run deterministic deep-scan — 10 Node.js scanners for Unicode attacks, entropy analysis, permission mapping, dependency auditing, taint tracing, git forensics, network mapping, memory poisoning, supply chain recheck, and toxic flow analysis
---
# Deep Scan
10 deterministic Node.js scanners — entropy, Unicode, typosquatting, git forensics, taint tracing, dep audit, network mapping, memory poisoning, supply chain recheck, toxic flow analysis.
## Step 1: Setup
- If `$ARGUMENTS` is empty, target = current working directory. Otherwise target = `$ARGUMENTS` (strip `--deep` if present).
- Create a temporary file path for results (e.g. using `node -p "require('path').join(require('os').tmpdir(), 'deep-scan-results.json')"`).
## Step 2: Run Orchestrator
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs "<target>" --output-file "<results_file>"
```
Exit codes: 0=ALLOW, 1=WARNING, 2=BLOCK. Stdout = compact aggregate JSON. Full results in file.
## Step 3: Show Banner
```
## Deep Scan: [VERDICT]
Risk Score: X/100 | Findings: XC XH XM XL XI
Scanners: X ok, X error, X skipped
```
## Step 4: Synthesize Report
Read the full results from `<results_file>`. Also read `<plugin-root>/knowledge/mitigation-matrix.md` for remediation context.
Produce a complete report with:
1. **Executive Summary** — 3-5 sentences: posture assessment, dominant issue themes, intent assessment
2. **Per-Scanner Details** — Group findings by severity (CRITICAL first). Highlight important findings, explain implications.
3. **Toxic Flow Analysis** — If toxic-flow findings exist, show the trifecta chain legs (Input, Access, Exfil) with evidence
4. **Recommendations** — Prioritized by urgency. Include finding IDs and actionable fix steps.
5. **OWASP Coverage** — Map findings to OWASP LLM Top 10 and Agentic AI Top 10 categories.
Do NOT invent findings. Do NOT downplay CRITICAL or HIGH severity issues.

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---
name: security-diff
description: Compare scan results against a stored baseline — shows new, resolved, unchanged, and moved findings
---
# Security Diff
Compare current scan against a stored baseline to track security changes over time.
## Step 1: Check Baseline
Check if a baseline exists:
```bash
ls <plugin-root>/reports/baselines/
```
If no baselines exist, this is a first run — the scan will create the initial baseline.
## Step 2: Run Scan with Baseline
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs "<target>" --baseline --save-baseline
```
Target = `$ARGUMENTS` or current working directory.
## Step 3: Display Results
**First run (no prior baseline):** Show baseline created summary with finding counts.
**Subsequent runs:** Parse diff output showing:
- **New** findings (not in baseline)
- **Resolved** findings (in baseline but not current)
- **Moved** findings (same finding, different location)
- **Unchanged** findings (same as baseline)
Format as tables for each category.
## Step 4: Advisory
- All resolved, no new: "Security improving."
- New findings detected: "Regression detected. Review new findings."
- No changes: "Stable. No security changes since last baseline."

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---
name: security-harden
description: Generate Grade A security configuration — settings, instructions, .gitignore additions
---
# Security Harden
Generate reference security configuration based on current posture gaps.
## Step 1: Generate Recommendations
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/reference-config-generator.mjs $ARGUMENTS
```
If `$ARGUMENTS` is empty, scan current working directory. Parse JSON output: `projectType`, `posture`, `recommendations[]`, `summary`.
## Step 2: Present Recommendations
Show table of recommended changes with: file, change description, current state, recommended state.
## Step 3: Apply (if confirmed)
If user confirms (or `--apply` flag is set):
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/reference-config-generator.mjs $ARGUMENTS --apply
```
## Step 4: Verify
Re-run posture scanner to verify grade improvement:
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/posture-scanner.mjs $ARGUMENTS
```
Report: Grade before → Grade after. If still below A, explain remaining gaps that require manual configuration (hooks, custom settings).

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---
name: security-mcp-audit
description: Audit all installed MCP server configurations for security risks, trust verification, and permission analysis
---
# MCP Audit
Comprehensive audit of all installed MCP server configurations.
## Step 1: Parse Arguments
Check for `--live` flag in `$ARGUMENTS`.
## Step 2: Discover MCP Configs
Search these locations for MCP server configurations:
- `.mcp.json` in project root
- `.vscode/mcp.json`
- Settings files with `mcpServers` sections
- Global MCP configuration files
## Step 3: Analyze Each Server
Read `<plugin-root>/knowledge/mcp-threat-patterns.md`.
For each discovered MCP server, perform 5-phase analysis:
1. **Tool Description Analysis** — Check for hidden instructions, excessive length (>500 chars), Unicode anomalies, dynamic description loading
2. **Source Code Analysis** — Code execution (eval/exec), network calls, file system access, credential access, time-conditional behavior
3. **Dependency Analysis** — Run `npm audit` or `pip audit` as appropriate. Check for typosquatting, suspicious packages
4. **Configuration Analysis** — Permission surface, declared vs actual scope, auth configuration
5. **Rug Pull Detection** — Dynamic tool metadata, config self-modification, remote flag control, self-update mechanisms
Trust rating per server: Trusted / Cautious / Untrusted / Dangerous.
## Step 4: Live Inspection (if --live)
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/mcp-live-inspect.mjs
```
Connect to running MCP servers, scan live tool descriptions, detect injection and shadowing.
## Step 5: Report
Output: MCP Landscape Summary table, per-server trust rating, findings grouped by severity. Group servers into: Keep (Trusted) / Review (Cautious) / Remove (Untrusted/Dangerous).
If static finding + live injection on same server = CRITICAL escalation.

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---
name: security-mcp-inspect
description: Connect to running MCP servers and scan live tool descriptions for injection, shadowing, and drift
---
# MCP Inspect
Live MCP server inspection — connect to running servers, scan tool descriptions.
## Step 1: Run Inspector
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/mcp-live-inspect.mjs $ARGUMENTS
```
Supports `--timeout <ms>` and `--skip-global` flags.
## Step 2: Format Results
Parse JSON output. Display:
```
# MCP Live Inspection: [VERDICT]
Servers: N discovered, N contacted, N timed-out, N failed
## Server Details
| Server | Transport | Status | Tools | Findings |
|--------|-----------|--------|-------|----------|
[per-server row]
## Findings
[Findings table: severity, server, tool, description, evidence]
```
## Step 3: Advisory
- Timeouts: "Server did not respond within timeout. May be SSE-based (unsupported for live inspection) or not running."
- No servers found: "No MCP servers detected. Check configuration."
- Clean: "All servers passed live inspection."
- Findings: "Review findings. Combine with `mcp-audit` for static analysis."

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---
name: security-plugin-audit
description: Audit a plugin for security risks, permission analysis, and trust assessment before installation
---
# Plugin Audit
Dedicated plugin security audit with trust verdict. Accepts local paths or repository URLs.
## Step 1: Resolve Target
- If `$ARGUMENTS` starts with `https://` → clone the repo:
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs clone "<url>" [--branch <branch>]
```
Set `clone_path` and `target`.
- Otherwise → `target = $ARGUMENTS` or current directory
## IMPORTANT: Cleanup Guarantee (remote)
If cloned, cleanup MUST run regardless of outcome:
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs cleanup "<clone_path>"
```
## Step 2: Pre-extraction (remote only)
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs tmppath "plugin-extract.json"
node <plugin-root>/scanners/content-extractor.mjs "<target>" --output-file "<evidence_file>"
```
## Step 3: Inventory
Read plugin manifest (plugin.json). Glob for all components: commands, agents, hooks, skills, MCP configs. Build permission matrix: what tools each component can access.
## Step 4: Security Analysis
Read `<plugin-root>/knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md` and `<plugin-root>/knowledge/secrets-patterns.md`.
Analyze all files for 7 threat categories. If remote, analyze from evidence package (never read untrusted files directly). Check hook registration vs scripts (ghost hooks). Cross-reference description vs tools permissions.
## Step 5: Report
Output: Plugin metadata, component inventory, permission matrix, hook analysis, all findings by severity.
**Trust Verdict:**
- **Install** — No critical or high findings, permissions appropriate
- **Review** — High findings present but potentially justified, manual review recommended
- **Do Not Install** — Critical findings, active exfiltration, or injection detected
## Step 6: Cleanup
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs cleanup "<clone_path>"
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs cleanup "<evidence_file>"
```

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---
name: security-posture
description: Quick security posture assessment — scorecard with grade, coverage status, and top recommendations
---
# Security Posture
Quick security scorecard — grade, coverage, top recommendations. Deterministic scanner, <2 sec.
## Step 1: Resolve Plugin Root
Plugin root = the directory containing `plugin.json`, found by searching up from this file's location.
## Step 2: Run Scanner
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/posture-scanner.mjs $ARGUMENTS
```
If `$ARGUMENTS` is empty, scan the current working directory.
Parse the JSON output: `scoring.grade` (A-F), `scoring.pass_rate`, `risk.score` (0-100), `risk.band`, `risk.verdict`, `categories[]`, `findings[]`, `counts`.
## Step 3: Format Scorecard
```
# Security Posture — [project name]
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Grade** | [A-F] |
| **Risk Score** | [N]/100 ([band]) |
| **Verdict** | [verdict] |
## Category Scorecard
| # | Category | Status | Findings |
|---|----------|--------|----------|
[one row per category, status as PASS/PARTIAL/FAIL/N-A]
## Top Findings
[List critical and high findings with title and recommendation]
## Quick Wins
[List low-effort fixes from findings]
```
## Step 4: Closing
- Grade A/B: "Posture solid. Re-run after major changes."
- Grade C: "Run the audit skill for detailed findings."
- Grade D/F: "Significant exposure. Run audit before production use."

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---
name: security-pre-deploy
description: Pre-deployment security checklist — verify controls, compliance, and production readiness
---
# Pre-Deploy Checklist
10 automated checks + 3 manual verification questions.
## Automated Checks (PASS/FAIL/WARN/N-A)
Perform these checks using Read, Glob, and Grep:
1. **Deny-first permissions** — Settings contain restrictive default permissions
2. **Secrets hook active** — pre-edit-secrets hook is registered and script exists
3. **Path guard active** — pre-write-pathguard hook is registered and script exists
4. **Destructive command guard** — pre-bash-destructive hook registered and script exists
5. **MCP servers verified** — All configured MCP servers have been audited
6. **No hardcoded secrets** — Grep for API keys, tokens, passwords in source files
7. **Gitignore covers secrets** — .gitignore includes .env, credentials, keys
8. **Security instructions present** — CLAUDE.md or copilot-instructions.md has security section
9. **Sandbox enabled** — No `dangerouslySkipPermissions` or bypass flags
10. **Audit logging** — Post-tool hooks are active for monitoring
## Manual Verification
Ask the user these questions:
1. "Is this running on an Enterprise plan with audit logging?"
2. "Has a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) been completed?"
3. "Is there an incident response plan for AI security events?"
## Report
Present as checklist table. Verdict by pass count:
- 10/10: Low risk — Ready to deploy
- 7-9: Medium risk — Address gaps first
- 4-6: High risk — Significant exposure
- 0-3: Extreme risk — Do not deploy

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---
name: security-red-team
description: Attack simulation — test hook defenses with crafted payloads across 12 categories
---
# Red Team
Attack simulation testing hook defenses with crafted payloads. 64 scenarios across 12 categories.
## Step 1: Parse Arguments
- `--category <name>` — Run only one category
- `--verbose` — Show individual scenario results
- `--adaptive` — Enable mutation-based evasion testing (5 rounds per passing scenario)
- `--json` — Raw JSON output
## Step 2: Run Simulator
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/attack-simulator.mjs [--category <name>] [--verbose] [--adaptive] [--json]
```
## Step 3: Narrative Report
For each category, explain: what was tested, how many scenarios passed (blocked correctly), what gaps exist.
**Categories (12):**
| Category | Hook Tested | Scenarios |
|----------|------------|-----------|
| secrets | pre-edit-secrets | Multiple |
| destructive | pre-bash-destructive | Multiple |
| supply-chain | pre-install-supply-chain | Multiple |
| prompt-injection | pre-prompt-inject-scan | Multiple |
| pathguard | pre-write-pathguard | Multiple |
| mcp-output | post-mcp-verify | Multiple |
| session-trifecta | post-session-guard | Multiple |
| hybrid | Multiple hooks | Multiple |
| unicode-evasion | pre-prompt-inject-scan | Multiple |
| bash-evasion | pre-bash-destructive | Multiple |
| hitl-traps | post-mcp-verify | Multiple |
| long-horizon | post-session-guard | Multiple |
## Step 4: Defense Score
- 100%: All scenarios correctly blocked
- 90-99%: Minor gaps, review failing scenarios
- <90%: Significant gaps, prioritize fixes
## Step 5: Adaptive Results (if --adaptive)
Mutation types: homoglyph substitution, encoding variants, zero-width insertion, case alternation, synonym replacement. Expected bypass rate varies by category.
**Safety:** No real exploits executed. No network calls. No file modifications. All payloads are synthetic test data.

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---
name: security-registry
description: Skill signature registry — view stats, scan and register skills, search known fingerprints
---
# Skill Registry
Track scanned skills by fingerprint. Three sub-commands.
## Sub-command: Stats (default)
```bash
node -e "
import { getStats, listEntries } from '<plugin-root>/scanners/lib/skill-registry.mjs';
const stats = getStats('<plugin-root>');
const entries = listEntries('<plugin-root>', 5);
console.log(JSON.stringify({ stats, entries }));
" --input-type=module
```
Show: total entries, last scan date, 5 most recent entries.
## Sub-command: Scan
```bash
node -e "
import { fingerprintSkill, checkRegistry } from '<plugin-root>/scanners/lib/skill-registry.mjs';
const r = fingerprintSkill('<target>');
const c = checkRegistry(r.fingerprint, '<plugin-root>');
console.log(JSON.stringify({ fingerprint: r.fingerprint, name: r.name, files: r.files, ...c }));
" --input-type=module
```
If cached and not stale: show cached result. If miss or stale: run full scan, then register:
```bash
node -e "
import { registerScan } from '<plugin-root>/scanners/lib/skill-registry.mjs';
registerScan({ skillPath: '<target>', fingerprint: '<fp>', name: '<name>', files: <files>, verdict: '<v>', risk_score: <n>, counts: <counts>, files_scanned: <n> }, '<plugin-root>');
" --input-type=module
```
## Sub-command: Search
```bash
node -e "
import { searchRegistry } from '<plugin-root>/scanners/lib/skill-registry.mjs';
const results = searchRegistry('<pattern>', '<plugin-root>');
console.log(JSON.stringify(results));
" --input-type=module
```
Show matching entries with verdict, risk score, last scanned date.

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---
name: security-scan
description: Scan files, directories, or repos for security issues — secrets, injection vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, OWASP LLM patterns
---
# Security Scan
Scan target for security issues. Accepts local paths or repository URLs.
## Step 1: Resolve Target
- If `$ARGUMENTS` contains `--deep` → strip it, set `run_deep_scan = true`
- If `$ARGUMENTS` contains `--branch <name>` → strip it, set `branch = <name>`
- If `$ARGUMENTS` is empty → target = current working directory
- If `$ARGUMENTS` starts with `https://` → clone the repo:
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs clone "<url>" [--branch <branch>]
```
Set `clone_path` = stdout (trimmed), `target = clone_path`
- Otherwise → `target = $ARGUMENTS`
## IMPORTANT: Cleanup Guarantee (remote scans)
If `clone_path` is set, cleanup MUST run regardless of scan outcome:
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs cleanup "<clone_path>"
```
## Step 1.5: Pre-extraction (remote scans only)
If remote, extract evidence safely before analysis:
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/lib/fs-utils.mjs tmppath "content-extract.json"
node <plugin-root>/scanners/content-extractor.mjs "<target>" --output-file "<evidence_file>"
```
## Step 2: Detect Scan Type
- **Single .md file:** skill scan only
- **Directory:** Glob for `**/commands/*.md`, `**/agents/*.md`, `**/skills/*/SKILL.md` → skill scan. Glob for `**/.mcp.json`, `**/package.json` with mcpServers → MCP scan.
## Step 3: Skill Security Analysis
Read `<plugin-root>/knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md` and `<plugin-root>/knowledge/secrets-patterns.md`.
If remote (evidence package exists): Read the evidence JSON. Analyze sections: injection_findings, frontmatter_inventory, shell_commands, credential_references, persistence_signals, claude_md_analysis, cross_instruction_flags. `[INJECTION-PATTERN-STRIPPED]` markers are confirmed findings.
If local: Read target files directly. Apply 7 threat categories:
1. **Prompt Injection**`ignore previous`, `forget your`, identity redefinition, spoofed system headers
2. **Data Exfiltration** — curl/wget to external URLs, base64 pipe chains, credential read+send
3. **Privilege Escalation** — unjustified Bash access, Write+Bash without rationale, chmod/sudo
4. **Scope Creep** — credential file access, crypto wallet paths, SSH keys, browser stores
5. **Hidden Instructions** — Unicode Tag steganography, zero-width chars, base64 payloads, HTML comments
6. **Toolchain Manipulation** — registry redirection, post-install scripts, external requirements
7. **Persistence** — cron jobs, LaunchAgents, systemd, shell profile modification, git hooks
For each finding: severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low/Info), category, file, line, OWASP reference, evidence, remediation.
## Step 4: MCP Security Analysis (if applicable)
Read `<plugin-root>/knowledge/mcp-threat-patterns.md`. Analyze MCP configs for: tool poisoning, hidden instructions in descriptions, rug pull signals, supply chain risks, permission surface.
## Step 5: Aggregate and Report
Combine counts. `risk_score = min(100, critical*25 + high*10 + medium*4 + low*1)`.
Verdict: critical>=1 OR score>=61 → BLOCK, high>=1 OR score>=21 → WARNING, else ALLOW.
Output banner then all findings grouped by severity (critical→info).
## Step 6: Deep Scan (only if --deep)
If `run_deep_scan = true`:
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs "<target>" --output-file "<tmp>"
```
Parse results, merge with LLM findings, show "Deep Scan Findings" section.
## Step 7: Cleanup (only if remote)
Run cleanup commands from Step 1.

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---
name: security
description: LLM Security — security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for AI coding agent projects
---
# LLM Security Plugin
Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling. Based on OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025), Agentic AI Top 10, Skills Top 10, MCP Top 10, and DeepMind Agent Traps.
## Skills
| Skill | Description | When to use |
|-------|-------------|-------------|
| `scan [path\|url]` | Scan skills, MCP servers, directories, or repos | Before installing a new skill or MCP server |
| `scan [path\|url] --deep` | Enhanced scan: LLM + 10 deterministic scanners | Deep analysis with entropy, taint, git forensics |
| `deep-scan [path]` | 10 deterministic scanners only (no LLM agents) | Fast, reproducible, deterministic-only analysis |
| `audit` | Full project security audit with A-F grading | Periodic review (monthly recommended) |
| `plugin-audit [path\|url]` | Plugin security audit with trust verdict | Before installing a third-party plugin |
| `mcp-audit [--live]` | MCP server config audit | After adding MCP servers or on suspicion |
| `mcp-inspect` | Live MCP server inspection | Verify running servers have safe tool descriptions |
| `posture` | Quick security posture scorecard | Daily/weekly health check |
| `threat-model` | Interactive STRIDE/MAESTRO threat modeling | When designing new architecture |
| `diff [path]` | Compare scan against stored baseline | Track security changes over time |
| `watch [path] [--interval 6h]` | Continuous monitoring — diff on interval | Ongoing security monitoring |
| `clean [path]` | Scan and remediate findings | Sanitizing third-party plugin before install |
| `supply-check [path]` | Re-audit installed deps | Periodic dependency audit |
| `dashboard` | Cross-project security dashboard | Machine-wide health check |
| `harden [path]` | Generate Grade A security config | Hardening a new or existing project |
| `red-team [--category]` | Attack simulation against hooks | Verify hooks block what they claim |
| `pre-deploy` | Pre-deployment security checklist | Before pushing to production |
| `registry [scan\|search]` | Skill signature registry | Track scanned skills |
## What's Protected (Hooks)
This plugin includes automated security hooks that run on every operation:
| Hook | Protects Against |
|------|-----------------|
| Secret detection | API keys, tokens, passwords in code |
| Path guarding | Writes to .env, .ssh, credentials files |
| Destructive command blocking | rm -rf, force push, pipe-to-shell |
| Supply chain protection | Compromised packages, typosquats |
| Prompt injection scanning | Injection attempts in user prompts |
| MCP output verification | Data leakage in tool outputs |
| Session monitoring | Lethal trifecta detection (untrusted input + sensitive data + exfil) |
## Quick Start
- **New to security?** Start with `posture` for a quick health check
- **Evaluating a plugin?** Run `plugin-audit path/to/plugin`
- **Full analysis?** Run `scan . --deep` to combine LLM + deterministic scanners
- **Machine-wide overview?** Run `dashboard`

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---
name: security-supply-check
description: Re-audit installed dependencies — check lockfiles against blocklists, OSV.dev CVEs, and typosquat detection
---
# Supply Chain Check
Re-audit installed dependencies from lockfiles.
## Step 1: Run Scanner
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/supply-chain-recheck-cli.mjs $ARGUMENTS
```
Target = `$ARGUMENTS` or current working directory. Checks: package-lock.json, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, Pipfile.lock against blocklists, OSV.dev batch API, and Levenshtein typosquat detection.
## Step 2: Format Results
Parse JSON output. Show:
```
# Supply Chain Check: [STATUS]
Findings: XC XH XM XL | Lockfiles: N scanned
[If osv_offline: "OSV.dev unreachable — blocklist and typosquat checks ran, CVE checks skipped"]
## Findings
[Table: severity, package, ecosystem, type (blocklist/CVE/typosquat), description]
```
If zero findings: "All dependencies pass supply chain checks."

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---
name: security-threat-model
description: Interactive threat modeling using STRIDE and MAESTRO frameworks — guides architecture analysis and generates threat model document
---
# Threat Model
Interactive STRIDE/MAESTRO threat modeling session. 15-30 minutes → complete threat model document.
## Principles
- Ask one question at a time
- Not a rubber stamp — challenge assumptions
- Cite OWASP IDs (LLM01-LLM10, ASI01-ASI10)
- Distinguish theoretical threats from actively exploited ones
- Advisory output only — no file modifications
## Phase 1: Architecture Discovery
Read knowledge files:
- `<plugin-root>/knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md`
- `<plugin-root>/knowledge/mcp-threat-patterns.md`
- `<plugin-root>/knowledge/mitigation-matrix.md`
Ask the user these questions (one at a time):
1. What type of system is this? (plugin, MCP server, standalone agent, API service)
2. What tools/MCP servers does the agent have access to? (file system, network, databases, external APIs)
3. What data does the system handle? (credentials, PII, source code, business data)
4. Who are the users and what's the trust model? (single developer, team, external users)
5. How is it deployed? (local CLI, VS Code extension, cloud agent, CI/CD)
## Phase 2: Component Mapping
Map identified components to MAESTRO 7-Layer Model:
- L1 Foundation Models — Base LLM capabilities
- L2 Data Operations — RAG, embeddings, knowledge bases
- L3 Agent Frameworks — Orchestration, tool routing
- L4 Tool Ecosystem — MCP servers, API integrations
- L5 Deployment — Runtime environment, containers
- L6 Interaction — User interfaces, chat, CLI
- L7 Ecosystem — Plugin marketplace, supply chain
Present the mapping for user confirmation.
## Phase 3: Threat Identification
Apply STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) to each relevant MAESTRO layer.
For each threat: state actor, method, asset at risk, impact, OWASP ID, whether it's known to be exploited in the wild.
## Phase 4: Risk Assessment
Rate each threat: Likelihood (1-5) x Impact (1-5) = Risk Score.
- 20-25: Critical — Immediate action required
- 12-19: High — Address within current sprint
- 6-11: Medium — Plan remediation
- 1-5: Low — Accept or monitor
Present the risk matrix for user validation.
## Phase 5: Mitigation Mapping
Read `<plugin-root>/knowledge/mitigation-matrix.md`. For each threat, classify the control status:
- Already mitigated (existing hooks, settings)
- Can be mitigated (configuration change or code fix)
- Partially mitigated
- Accepted risk (documented rationale)
- External dependency
## Output: Threat Model Document
Produce an 8-section document:
1. System Description
2. Architecture Overview
3. MAESTRO Layer Mapping
4. Threat Catalog (per layer, with STRIDE/OWASP/likelihood/impact/scenario/control/recommendation)
5. Risk Matrix
6. Mitigation Plan (Critical+High actions, Already Mitigated, Accepted Risks)
7. Residual Risk Summary
8. Assumptions and Limitations

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---
name: security-watch
description: Continuous security monitoring — runs diff on a recurring interval
---
# Security Watch
Set up continuous monitoring that runs security diffs on an interval.
## Step 1: Parse Arguments
- Target path = first positional argument or current directory
- `--interval <value>` — monitoring interval (default: 6h). Supports: 30m, 1h, 6h, 12h, 24h.
## Step 2: Create Initial Baseline
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs "<target>" --save-baseline
```
Display baseline summary: verdict, risk score, finding counts.
## Step 3: Start Monitoring
For continuous monitoring, use the watch-cron scanner:
```bash
node <plugin-root>/scanners/watch-cron.mjs [--config <plugin-root>/reports/watch/config.json]
```
Or set up a system cron job / scheduled task:
- **Linux/macOS cron:** `0 */6 * * * node <plugin-root>/scanners/watch-cron.mjs`
- **Windows Task Scheduler:** Create a task that runs the same command on your preferred interval
## Step 4: Advisory
- Results stored in `<plugin-root>/reports/watch/latest.json`
- Use `security-diff` to manually compare against baseline at any time
- Watch-cron overwrites latest.json on each run