feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local

plugins/llm-security/.llm-security-ignore

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+# .llm-security-ignore — Suppress expected findings when scanning this plugin
+#
+# Why 150 suppressed findings? A security plugin that documents attack patterns,
+# ships a malicious demo fixture, and tests against deliberately evil code will
+# trigger its own scanners. This is the "scanning the scanner" paradox:
+#
+# - examples/ contains an intentionally malicious plugin (the demo)
+# - knowledge/ documents real attack regex patterns and example URLs
+# - tests/ contain deliberate taint flows and suspicious URLs as test input
+# - hooks/ and scanners/ contain high-entropy regex for secret detection
+#
+# Every suppression below is explained. Run without this file to see all 150.
+#
+# Format: SCANNER:glob or just glob (applies to all scanners)
+# Scanners: UNI, ENT, PRM, DEP, TNT, GIT, NET, TFA
+
+# Demo fixture: intentionally malicious (the whole point of the demo)
+examples/**
+
+# Test files contain deliberate malicious patterns as test input
+TNT:tests/**
+NET:tests/**
+
+# Knowledge base documents attack patterns with example URLs and regex
+ENT:knowledge/**
+NET:knowledge/**
+
+# Hook scripts contain high-entropy regex patterns and log strings
+ENT:hooks/**
+
+# Scanner code contains regex patterns that trigger entropy detection
+ENT:scanners/**
+
+# Injection patterns module contains injection keywords (by design)
+TNT:scanners/lib/injection-patterns.mjs
+
+# Command files contain long prompt strings
+ENT:commands/**
+
+# Permission findings: clean needs write tools (by design), deep-scan uses Bash
+PRM:commands/**
+PRM:agents/**
+
+# Git findings: subtree split artifacts and commit message heuristics
+GIT:**
+
+# Network: README references to OWASP, Anthropic, research papers
+NET:README.md
+
+# Network: agent docs reference example domains for documentation
+NET:agents/**
+
+# Network: supply-chain hook legitimately contacts osv.dev and socket.dev
+NET:hooks/**
+
+# Orchestrator legitimately writes log file from argv path
+TNT:scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs
+
+# Toxic flow: plugin commands/agents have Read+Bash access by design (it's a security scanner)
+TFA:commands/**
+TFA:agents/**
+
+# Network: CLAUDE.md references public repo URL
+NET:CLAUDE.md
+
+# Baseline files: generated JSON with scan results (high entropy expected)
+reports/baselines/**