feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local

plugins/llm-security/templates/archive/threat-model-report.md

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+# Threat Model: [System Name]
+
+<!--
+TEMPLATE USAGE
+This is the output template for `/security threat-model`.
+The threat-modeler-agent uses this as a formatting guide — fill every section with real findings
+from the 5-phase interview workflow. Do NOT output placeholder text. If a section is not
+applicable, write "Not applicable — [brief reason]."
+-->
+
+**Date:** [today's date]
+**Scope:** [brief system description from Phase 1]
+**Frameworks:** STRIDE + MAESTRO 7-Layer + OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) + OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
+**Status:** Advisory — AI-generated. Requires review by a qualified security practitioner.
+
+---
+
+## 1. System Description
+
+[2-4 sentence description of what the system does, who uses it, and how it is deployed.
+Derived from Phase 1 interview answers.]
+
+---
+
+## 2. Architecture Overview
+
+[Text-based architecture diagram from Phase 2 component mapping, with trust boundaries marked.]
+
+---
+
+## 3. MAESTRO Layer Mapping
+
+| Layer | Components Present | Attack Surface Rating |
+|-------|-------------------|----------------------|
+| L1 Foundation Models | [models used] | [Low/Medium/High] |
+| L2 Data and Knowledge | [knowledge files, state files] | [...] |
+| L3 Agent Frameworks | [hooks active, permission model] | [...] |
+| L4 Tool Integration | [MCP servers, Bash, filesystem] | [...] |
+| L5 Agent Capabilities | [commands, agents, skills] | [...] |
+| L6 Multi-Agent Systems | [pipelines, delegation patterns] | [...] |
+| L7 Ecosystem | [plugins, integrations, CI/CD] | [...] |
+
+---
+
+## 4. Threat Catalog
+
+### Layer [X] — [Layer Name]
+
+#### Threat [X.1]: [Short threat title]
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| STRIDE | [S/T/R/I/D/E] |
+| OWASP | [LLM0X or ASI0X] |
+| Likelihood | [1-5] — [rationale] |
+| Impact | [1-5] — [rationale] |
+| Risk Score | [L×I] — [Critical/High/Medium/Low] |
+| Wild Exploitation | [Yes/PoC/No] — [cite source if yes] |
+
+**Attack scenario:** [Concrete description of how this threat plays out in this system.]
+
+**Current control status:** [Already mitigated / Can be mitigated / Accepted / External]
+
+**Recommendation:** [Specific, actionable mitigation. Reference the mitigation matrix
+control type: Automated / Configured / Advisory.]
+
+---
+[Repeat for each threat, grouped by MAESTRO layer]
+
+---
+
+## 5. Risk Matrix
+
+| Threat | Layer | STRIDE | OWASP | Score | Priority |
+|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------|----------|
+| [Threat title] | L[X] | [category] | [ID] | [score] | [Critical/High/Medium/Low] |
+
+[Sorted by score descending]
+
+---
+
+## 6. Mitigation Plan
+
+### Critical and High Priority Actions
+
+| # | Threat | Action | Control Type | Effort |
+|---|--------|--------|-------------|--------|
+| 1 | [Threat] | [Specific action] | Automated/Configured/Advisory | Low/Med/High |
+
+[Sorted by risk priority]
+
+### Already Mitigated
+
+| Threat | Control | Evidence |
+|--------|---------|---------|
+| [Threat] | [What control] | [File or config that confirms it] |
+
+### Accepted Risks
+
+| Threat | Rationale | Owner |
+|--------|-----------|-------|
+| [Threat] | [Why accepted] | [Who owns this decision] |
+
+---
+
+## 7. Residual Risk Summary
+
+[2-4 sentences summarizing the overall risk posture after applying recommended mitigations.
+Identify the highest-impact residual risk and what it would take to address it.]
+
+**Threat model coverage:** [X] threats identified across [Y] MAESTRO layers.
+**Critical:** [n] | **High:** [n] | **Medium:** [n] | **Low:** [n]
+
+---
+
+## 8. Assumptions and Limitations
+
+- This threat model is based on information provided in the interview session and file
+  analysis at the time of generation. System changes may invalidate findings.
+- Threat likelihood ratings reflect the analyst's assessment; actual exploitation depends
+  on attacker capability and motivation not fully modeled here.
+- External controls (IAM, network policy, model provider security) are noted as dependencies
+  but not verified.
+- This document is advisory. It does not constitute a security audit or penetration test.
+  Engage a qualified security practitioner before production deployment of high-risk systems.
+
+---
+
+*Generated by threat-modeler-agent (llm-security plugin)*
+*Frameworks: STRIDE · MAESTRO · OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) · OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)*
+
+<!--
+RISK SCORING LOGIC
+
+Risk Score = Likelihood × Impact (both on a 1-5 scale)
+
+| Score | Priority | Action |
+|-------|----------|--------|
+| 20-25 | Critical | Address before deployment |
+| 12-19 | High     | Address in current sprint |
+| 6-11  | Medium   | Schedule for remediation |
+| 1-5   | Low      | Monitor, accept, or defer |
+
+Likelihood scale (1-5):
+1 — Theoretical, no known exploitation path
+2 — Unlikely, requires unusual attacker access
+3 — Plausible, standard attacker capability
+4 — Likely, low-cost exploitation
+5 — Near-certain, trivial or already exploited in wild
+
+Impact scale (1-5):
+1 — Minimal — inconvenience, no data loss, easily reversible
+2 — Low — minor data exposure or disruption, limited blast radius
+3 — Medium — credential leakage, significant disruption, or reputational harm
+4 — High — production system compromise, mass credential theft, persistent backdoor
+5 — Critical — complete system compromise, irreversible data loss, regulatory breach
+
+CONTROL STATUS CATEGORIES
+
+- Already mitigated    — Evidence exists in the project (hook present, tool restriction in
+                         frontmatter, CLAUDE.md scope-guard, gitignore excludes secrets).
+                         Cite the specific file.
+- Can be mitigated     — A specific, actionable control exists. State exactly what to do.
+- Partially mitigated  — A control exists but has gaps. Describe what the gap is.
+- Accepted risk        — The threat is real, but the system's constraints make mitigation
+                         impractical. Document the decision and the reasoning.
+- External dependency  — Mitigation requires organizational controls outside Claude Code
+                         scope (IAM, network policy, vendor security). Note the dependency.
+
+THREAT COUNT QUALITY GUIDANCE
+
+5-10 well-described threats with concrete attack scenarios and specific recommendations
+are more useful than 25 thin entries with generic rationale. Prioritize depth over breadth.
+Group threats tightly by MAESTRO layer — avoid repeating the same threat class across layers
+unless the attack vector genuinely differs.
+-->