--- name: llm-security:red-team description: Attack simulation — test hook defenses with crafted payloads allowed-tools: Bash, Read model: sonnet --- # Red Team — Attack Simulation Run crafted attack payloads against the plugin's own hooks to verify defenses. ## What was requested The user ran `/security red-team` to test their hook defenses. ## Arguments Parse `$ARGUMENTS` for: - `--category ` — filter: secrets, destructive, supply-chain, prompt-injection, pathguard, mcp-output, session-trifecta, hybrid, unicode-evasion, bash-evasion, hitl-traps, long-horizon, all - `--json` — raw JSON output - `--adaptive` — mutation-based evasion testing (5 mutation rounds per passing scenario) Default: all categories, fixed mode. ## Steps 1. **Run the attack simulator:** ``` node scanners/attack-simulator.mjs [--category ] [--verbose] [--adaptive] ``` The simulator runs 64 attack scenarios across 12 categories against the plugin's hooks. Each scenario sends a crafted payload and verifies the hook blocks or detects it. In **adaptive mode** (`--adaptive`), for each scenario that passes (attack blocked), the simulator applies 5 mutation rounds: 1. Homoglyph substitution (Latin chars replaced with Cyrillic lookalikes) 2. Encoding wrapping (URL-encoded keywords) 3. Zero-width character injection (ZW chars inserted between keyword letters) 4. Case alternation (aLtErNaTiNg case) 5. Synonym substitution (keyword replacement from synonym table) Bypasses are reported as findings but not auto-fixed. 2. **Present the results as a narrative report:** For each category, explain: - What was tested (the attack type) - How many attacks were blocked - Whether defenses are adequate If any scenarios fail, explain the gap and what hook needs attention. In adaptive mode, also explain: - How many mutations were tested - Which mutations found bypasses - That bypasses are expected for synonym and encoding mutations (deterministic hooks cannot catch all evasions) 3. **Defense Score interpretation:** - **100%** — All hooks functioning correctly. No defense gaps. - **90-99%** — Minor gaps. Review failed scenarios. - **Below 90%** — Significant gaps. Hooks may be misconfigured or missing. ## Categories | Category | Hook Tested | Scenarios | |----------|------------|-----------| | secrets | pre-edit-secrets.mjs | 7 secret types (AWS, GitHub, PEM, DB, Bearer, Azure, Slack) | | destructive | pre-bash-destructive.mjs | 8 commands (rm -rf, chmod 777, curl\|bash, fork bomb, mkfs, dd, eval) | | supply-chain | pre-install-supply-chain.mjs | 4 managers (npm, pip, cargo, gem) | | prompt-injection | pre-prompt-inject-scan.mjs | 6 patterns (override, spoofed headers, identity, evasion) | | pathguard | pre-write-pathguard.mjs | 6 paths (.env, .ssh, .aws, .npmrc, /etc, hooks) | | mcp-output | post-mcp-verify.mjs | 4 threats (injection, secrets, HTML traps, MCP injection) | | session-trifecta | post-session-guard.mjs | 3 patterns (classic trifecta, MCP-concentrated, volume) | | hybrid | post-mcp-verify.mjs | 8 patterns (P2SQL, recursive injection, XSS variants) | | unicode-evasion | pre-prompt-inject-scan.mjs | 6 patterns (Unicode Tags, ZW chars, homoglyphs, BIDI, HTML entities, multi-lang) | | bash-evasion | pre-bash-destructive.mjs | 5 patterns (empty quotes, dollar expansion, backslash splitting, supply chain) | | hitl-traps | post-mcp-verify.mjs | 4 patterns (approval urgency, summary suppression, scope minimization, cognitive load) | | long-horizon | post-session-guard.mjs | 3 patterns (delegation-after-input, sensitive path, MCP-concentrated trifecta) | ## Mutation Types (Adaptive Mode) | Mutation | Technique | Expected Bypass Rate | |----------|-----------|---------------------| | homoglyph | Cyrillic/Latin lookalike substitution | Low (MEDIUM patterns detect) | | encoding | URL-encode keywords | High (hooks normalize some, not all) | | zero_width | Insert zero-width chars in keywords | Low (normalizer strips these) | | case_alternation | aLtErNaTiNg case | Low (regex uses /i flag) | | synonym | Replace with semantic equivalents | Medium (novel synonyms evade patterns) | ## Important - This tests the plugin's OWN hooks — it does not perform real exploits - No network calls, no file modifications, no LLM invocations - Safe to run repeatedly — all state is cleaned up after each run - Adaptive mode bypasses are **expected** — they document evasion resistance limits