Four-layer security model for ultraexecute-local and headless sessions: Layer 1 — Plugin hooks: pre-bash-executor.mjs (13 BLOCK + 8 WARN rules with bash evasion normalization) and pre-write-executor.mjs (8 path guard rules blocking .git/hooks, .claude/settings, shell configs, .env, SSH/AWS). Layer 2 — Prompt-level security rules: denylist in ultraexecute-local.md Sub-step D and session-spec-template.md Security Constraints section. These are the only rules that work in headless child sessions. Layer 3 — Pre-execution plan validation: new Phase 2.4 scans all Verify and Checkpoint commands against denylist before execution begins. Layer 4 — Replace --dangerously-skip-permissions with scoped --allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob,Grep" --permission-mode bypassPermissions in ultraexecute-local.md, headless-launch-template.md, and session-decomposer.md. Blocks Agent, MCP, WebSearch in child sessions. Also adds Hard Rules 14-16: verify command security check, no writing outside repository root, no writing to security-sensitive paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
125 lines
3.8 KiB
JavaScript
125 lines
3.8 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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// Hook: pre-write-executor.mjs
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// Event: PreToolUse (Write)
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// Purpose: Block writes to security-sensitive paths during plan execution.
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//
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// Protocol:
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// - Read JSON from stdin: { tool_name, tool_input }
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// - tool_input.file_path — the target path for Write tool
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// - BLOCK (exit 2): writes to security infrastructure, shell configs, secrets
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// - Allow (exit 0): everything else
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import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { resolve } from 'node:path';
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const HOME = process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE || '/tmp';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// BLOCK rules — path patterns that must never be written during execution.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const BLOCK_RULES = [
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{
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name: 'Git hook injection (.git/hooks/)',
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test: (p) => /\/\.git\/hooks\//.test(p),
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description:
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'Writing to .git/hooks/ could inject malicious git hooks that execute ' +
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'on every commit, push, or checkout. Blocked.',
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},
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{
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name: 'Claude settings self-modification',
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test: (p) => /\/\.claude\/settings[^/]*\.json$/.test(p),
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description:
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'Writing to .claude/settings.json could disable security hooks or ' +
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'change permission modes. Blocked.',
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},
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{
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name: 'Claude hooks self-modification',
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test: (p) => /\/\.claude\/hooks\//.test(p) || /\/\.claude-plugin\//.test(p),
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description:
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'Writing to .claude/hooks/ or .claude-plugin/ could modify security ' +
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'hook configuration. Blocked.',
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},
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{
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name: 'Shell configuration files',
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test: (p) => {
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const sensitive = [
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`${HOME}/.zshrc`,
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`${HOME}/.bashrc`,
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`${HOME}/.bash_profile`,
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`${HOME}/.profile`,
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`${HOME}/.zshenv`,
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`${HOME}/.zprofile`,
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];
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const resolved = resolve(p);
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return sensitive.some((s) => resolved === s || resolved.startsWith(s + '.'));
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},
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description:
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'Writing to shell config files (~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc, etc.) could inject ' +
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'persistent commands. Blocked.',
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},
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{
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name: 'SSH directory',
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test: (p) => {
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const resolved = resolve(p);
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return resolved.startsWith(`${HOME}/.ssh/`) || resolved === `${HOME}/.ssh`;
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},
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description: 'Writing to ~/.ssh/ could compromise SSH keys or config. Blocked.',
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},
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{
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name: 'AWS credentials',
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test: (p) => {
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const resolved = resolve(p);
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return resolved.startsWith(`${HOME}/.aws/`) || resolved === `${HOME}/.aws`;
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},
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description: 'Writing to ~/.aws/ could compromise cloud credentials. Blocked.',
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},
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{
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name: 'GnuPG directory',
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test: (p) => {
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const resolved = resolve(p);
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return resolved.startsWith(`${HOME}/.gnupg/`) || resolved === `${HOME}/.gnupg`;
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},
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description: 'Writing to ~/.gnupg/ could compromise GPG keys. Blocked.',
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},
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{
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name: 'Environment files (.env)',
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test: (p) => /\/\.env(?:\.[a-zA-Z0-9]+)?$/.test(p),
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description:
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'Writing to .env files could expose or modify secrets. Blocked. ' +
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'Use .env.template instead.',
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},
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];
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Main
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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let input;
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try {
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const raw = readFileSync(0, 'utf-8');
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input = JSON.parse(raw);
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} catch {
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// Cannot parse stdin — fail open.
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process.exit(0);
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}
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const filePath = input?.tool_input?.file_path;
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if (!filePath || typeof filePath !== 'string') {
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process.exit(0);
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}
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const resolved = resolve(filePath);
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for (const rule of BLOCK_RULES) {
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if (rule.test(resolved)) {
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process.stderr.write(
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`[ultraplan] BLOCKED: ${rule.name}\n` +
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` Path: ${resolved}\n` +
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` ${rule.description}\n`
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);
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process.exit(2);
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}
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}
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// Allow
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process.exit(0);
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