ktg-plugin-marketplace/plugins/llm-security/scanners
Kjell Tore Guttormsen c31d4b1718 feat(workflow-scanner): E11 part 1 — core file-walk + 23-field blacklist + sink-restriction
Adds a deterministic GitHub Actions / Forgejo Actions injection
scanner. Detects \${{ <dangerous-field> }} interpolations inside
\`run:\` step blocks under privileged or semi-privileged triggers.
Sink-restricted: \`if:\` / \`with:\` / \`env:\` (block-level) are
evaluated by the runner expression engine, not the shell, so they
are NOT injection sinks and are suppressed at parser level.

Why: workflow expression injection is the most prevalent SAST class
on GitHub (CodeQL preview: 800K+ findings across 158K repos). The
graduated severity matrix (HIGH for pull_request_target / discussion
/ workflow_run; MEDIUM for pull_request / workflow_dispatch) is the
community-converged calibration target — uniform HIGH causes alert
fatigue.

Components:
- scanners/lib/workflow-yaml-state.mjs — line-based YAML state
  machine. Tracks indentation, parent-context stack, and
  \`run: |\` / \`run: >\` block-scalar entry/exit. Zero deps.
- scanners/workflow-scanner.mjs — discoverWorkflows() probes
  .github/workflows/ and .forgejo/workflows/ directly (file-discovery
  has no glob include). 23-field blacklist (GHSL 17 + 6 GlueStack-
  class additions). Platform encoded via file path; no schema
  extension to finding(). Forgejo-specific: workflow_run advisory
  emitted to stderr; recommendation text mentions Forgejo's
  server-level token scoping (job-level permissions: is ignored).
- knowledge/workflow-injection-patterns.md — 23-field blacklist,
  trigger taxonomy, severity matrix, Forgejo divergences, NVD CVE
  corpus.

Tests (47 new):
- tests/lib/workflow-yaml-state.test.mjs (15): trigger forms
  (string / inline-list / block-list / block-mapping), single-line
  run, block-scalar | and > tracking, env/with sink-mismatch,
  multi-line, comment stripping, line-number accuracy.
- tests/scanners/workflow-scanner.test.mjs (14): TP head_ref
  pull_request_target, TP discussion.title gluestack pattern,
  TP comment.body pull_request, TP issue.body block-scalar,
  FP if-context, FP env-block, INFO numeric, Forgejo TP, Forgejo
  workflow_run advisory, envelope shape, WFL prefix.
- 9 fixtures in tests/fixtures/workflows/{.github,.forgejo}/workflows/.

Out of scope (B4 / Batch D):
- Re-interpolation detection (env.VAR after env: from blacklisted source)
- github.actor authorization-bypass category
- WFL prefix in severity.mjs OWASP maps + scan-orchestrator
  registration (B4)
- Composite-action input tracing, GITHUB_ENV poisoning (Batch D)

Test count: 1685 → 1732 (+47). Pre-compact-scan flake unchanged
(passes in isolation).
2026-04-30 15:48:48 +02:00
..
lib feat(workflow-scanner): E11 part 1 — core file-walk + 23-field blacklist + sink-restriction 2026-04-30 15:48:48 +02:00
ai-bom-generator.mjs feat(scanner): add AI-BOM generator — CycloneDX 1.6 format for AI supply chain transparency 2026-04-10 13:29:30 +02:00
attack-simulator.mjs feat(red-team): 8 new evasion-arsenal scenarios for v7.2.0 (E1/E4/E5/E7/E16/E17) 2026-04-29 15:35:32 +02:00
auto-cleaner.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
content-extractor.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
dashboard-aggregator.mjs chore(release): bump to v6.0.0 — CAISS-readiness release with compliance, governance, CLI 2026-04-10 14:03:10 +02:00
dep-auditor.mjs fix(dep): B7 — token-overlap typosquat heuristic alongside Levenshtein 2026-04-29 14:10:53 +02:00
entropy-scanner.mjs fix(entropy): E18 — rule 18 markdown-image CDN-aware + secret pre-check 2026-04-29 15:18:37 +02:00
git-forensics.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
ide-extension-scanner.mjs chore(release): bump to v7.2.0 2026-04-29 15:40:15 +02:00
mcp-live-inspect.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
memory-poisoning-scanner.mjs fix(memory-poisoning): E15 — add .claude/agents/*.md to target glob 2026-04-29 14:13:01 +02:00
network-mapper.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
permission-mapper.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
posture-scanner.mjs feat(llm-security)!: v7.0.0 commit 1 — severity-dominated log-scaled risk score 2026-04-19 22:00:29 +02:00
reference-config-generator.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
scan-orchestrator.mjs feat(ci): add CI/CD integration — --fail-on, --compact, pipeline templates 2026-04-10 14:59:05 +02:00
supply-chain-recheck-cli.mjs fix(scanners): use process.exitCode instead of process.exit() after stdout.write 2026-04-10 14:11:31 +02:00
supply-chain-recheck.mjs fix(dep): B7 — token-overlap typosquat heuristic alongside Levenshtein 2026-04-29 14:10:53 +02:00
taint-tracer.mjs fix(taint-tracer): B6 — recognize destructuring + spread + rest patterns 2026-04-29 14:05:34 +02:00
toxic-flow-analyzer.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
unicode-scanner.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
watch-cron.mjs feat: initial open marketplace with llm-security, config-audit, ultraplan-local 2026-04-06 18:47:49 +02:00
workflow-scanner.mjs feat(workflow-scanner): E11 part 1 — core file-walk + 23-field blacklist + sink-restriction 2026-04-30 15:48:48 +02:00