ktg-plugin-marketplace/plugins/voyage/lib/exporters/endpoint-validator.mjs
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 9e01ce30b5 feat(voyage): add lib/exporters/{path,endpoint,field-allowlist}-validators — CWE-22, CWE-918, CWE-212 mitigering
Step 11 av v4.1-execute (Wave 2, Session 3).

3 sikkerhets-validatorer for OTel-eksporten:

path-validator.mjs (CWE-22 Path Traversal):
- Reject `..` segmenter, `~`-shorthand
- realpathSync symlink-resolution (med macOS quirk: /etc, /var, /tmp er
  symlinks til /private/etc, /private/var, /private/tmp — begge former
  i FORBIDDEN_PREFIXES)
- Allowlist-først evaluering: hvis allowedRoots gitt, det er primary defense
  (caller's threat model). Forbidden-prefix-denylist er FALLBACK når
  allowedRoots ikke spesifisert.

endpoint-validator.mjs (CWE-918 SSRF):
- Reject loopback (127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost, 0.0.0.0) UNLESS VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1
- Reject RFC-1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16) UNLESS opt-in
- Reject link-local (169.254.x.x cloud metadata, fe80:* IPv6) UNLESS opt-in
- Krev https:// for non-private endpoints
- node:url-parsing, ingen runtime DNS-resolusjon (defense-in-depth)

field-allowlist.mjs (CWE-212 Improper Cross-boundary Removal of Sensitive Data):
- INLINE static const Object.freeze på modul-scope (IKKE runtime read fra fixtures)
- Per-schema allowlist for alle 8 schema-id (trekbrief, trekresearch, trekplan,
  trekexecute, event-emit, post-bash-stats, trekreview, trekcontinue)
- Source-comment per allowlist refererer tests/fixtures/jsonl-schemas.md
- post-bash-stats DROPPER eksplisitt command_excerpt + session_id (CWE-212)
- event-emit applies sub-allowlist på payload-objekt (recursive)
- Unknown schema-type returnerer conservative {_schema_id, ts}

Tester (19 nye, baseline 413 → 432):
- path-validator x6 (CWE-22 traversal, forbidden-system, ~, allowedRoots accept/reject, drift-pin)
- endpoint-validator x7 (CWE-918 link-local, RFC-1918, loopback, https-required, opt-in, public-accept, empty-input)
- field-allowlist x6 (CWE-212 post-bash-stats, trekplan-PII, event-emit-payload, unknown-schema, Object.freeze, null-safe)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 09:36:00 +02:00

91 lines
3 KiB
JavaScript

// lib/exporters/endpoint-validator.mjs
// Validate OTLP/HTTP endpoint URLs for the OTel exporter.
//
// CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery) mitigation: reject loopback, RFC-1918,
// link-local (cloud metadata 169.254.169.254), and require HTTPS for non-loopback.
// Operator opt-in for private endpoints via VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1
// (legitimate home-lab / docker-compose operator scenario).
import { ok, fail, issue } from '../util/result.mjs';
const LOOPBACK_HOSTS = new Set(['127.0.0.1', '::1', 'localhost', '0.0.0.0']);
const LINK_LOCAL_PREFIXES = ['169.254.', 'fe80:'];
function isRfc1918(host) {
// 10.0.0.0/8
if (/^10\./.test(host)) return true;
// 172.16.0.0/12
if (/^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[0-1])\./.test(host)) return true;
// 192.168.0.0/16
if (/^192\.168\./.test(host)) return true;
return false;
}
function isLoopback(host) {
return LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(host);
}
function isLinkLocal(host) {
return LINK_LOCAL_PREFIXES.some(p => host.startsWith(p));
}
/**
* Validate an OTLP/HTTP endpoint URL.
*
* @param {string} url
* @param {{env?: object}} [opts]
* @returns {import('../util/result.mjs').Result}
*/
export function validateOtlpEndpoint(url, opts = {}) {
const env = opts.env || process.env;
const allowPrivate = env.VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE === '1';
if (typeof url !== 'string' || url.length === 0) {
return fail(issue('ENDPOINT_EMPTY', 'Endpoint must be a non-empty string'));
}
let parsed;
try { parsed = new URL(url); }
catch (e) {
return fail(issue('ENDPOINT_PARSE_ERROR', `Invalid URL: ${e.message}`));
}
if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
return fail(issue('ENDPOINT_BAD_PROTOCOL',
`Endpoint protocol must be http or https, got ${parsed.protocol}`));
}
// Strip brackets from IPv6
const host = parsed.hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
// Cloud metadata IP (link-local) — always rejected unless explicit opt-in
if (isLinkLocal(host) && !allowPrivate) {
return fail(issue('ENDPOINT_LINK_LOCAL_REJECTED',
`Link-local endpoint ${host} rejected (potential cloud-metadata access). ` +
`Set VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1 to allow.`));
}
// Loopback / RFC-1918 — rejected unless opt-in
if (isLoopback(host) && !allowPrivate) {
return fail(issue('ENDPOINT_LOOPBACK_REJECTED',
`Loopback endpoint ${host} rejected. Set VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1 for ` +
`home-lab / docker-compose scenarios.`));
}
if (isRfc1918(host) && !allowPrivate) {
return fail(issue('ENDPOINT_RFC1918_REJECTED',
`RFC-1918 private endpoint ${host} rejected. ` +
`Set VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1 for home-lab scenarios.`));
}
// For non-loopback, non-private endpoints: require HTTPS
const isPrivate = isLoopback(host) || isRfc1918(host) || isLinkLocal(host);
if (!isPrivate && parsed.protocol === 'http:') {
return fail(issue('ENDPOINT_HTTPS_REQUIRED',
`Public endpoint ${host} requires https:// (got http://)`));
}
return ok({ url: parsed.href, host, isPrivate });
}
export { LOOPBACK_HOSTS, LINK_LOCAL_PREFIXES };