ktg-plugin-marketplace/plugins/llm-security/scanners/lib/vsix-sandbox.mjs
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 9f893c3858 feat(llm-security): OS sandbox for /security ide-scan <url> (v6.5.0)
VSIX fetch + extract for URL targets now runs in a sub-process wrapped by
sandbox-exec (macOS) or bwrap (Linux), reusing the same primitives proven
by the v5.1 git-clone sandbox. Defense-in-depth — even if our own
zip-extract.mjs ever has a bypass, the kernel refuses any write outside
the per-scan temp directory.

New files:
- scanners/lib/vsix-fetch-worker.mjs — sub-process worker. Argv: --url
  --tmpdir; emits one JSON line on stdout (ok/sha256/size/source/extRoot
  or ok:false/error/code). Silent on stderr. Exit 0/1.
- scanners/lib/vsix-sandbox.mjs — wrapper. Exports buildSandboxProfile,
  buildBwrapArgs, buildSandboxedWorker, runVsixWorker. 35s timeout, 1 MB
  stdout cap.

Changes:
- scanners/ide-extension-scanner.mjs: fetchAndExtractVsixUrl is now
  sandbox-aware (useSandbox option, default true). In-process logic
  preserved as fallback. New meta.source.sandbox field:
  'sandbox-exec' | 'bwrap' | 'none' | 'in-process'.
- scan(target, { useSandbox }) defaults to true; tests pass false because
  globalThis.fetch mocks do not cross process boundaries.
- Windows fallback: in-process with meta.warnings advisory.

Tests:
- 8 new tests in tests/scanners/vsix-sandbox.test.mjs (per-platform
  profile generation, worker arg construction, live worker exit
  behavior on invalid URLs — no network).
- Existing URL tests updated to opt out of sandbox (useSandbox: false).
- 1344 → 1352 tests, all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 17:28:57 +02:00

169 lines
6.2 KiB
JavaScript

// vsix-sandbox.mjs — Spawn vsix-fetch-worker.mjs under an OS sandbox so any
// filesystem writes the ZIP extractor performs are restricted to a single
// temp directory.
//
// Reuses the same sandbox primitives proven by `git-clone.mjs`:
// - macOS: sandbox-exec with a deny-file-write profile + subpath allow
// - Linux: bwrap with --ro-bind / --bind / --unshare-all
// - Windows / fallback: spawn directly + WARN to stderr (no OS sandbox)
//
// Defense-in-depth: even if our own zip-extract.mjs has a zip-slip / symlink
// bypass we did not foresee, the OS will refuse the write. The in-process
// validation in zip-extract.mjs remains the first line of defense.
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { dirname, resolve as resolvePath } from 'node:path';
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const WORKER_PATH = resolvePath(__dirname, 'vsix-fetch-worker.mjs');
const WORKER_TIMEOUT_MS = 35_000; // fetch is 30s, give worker 5s of slack
const MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB JSON cap (output is tiny in practice)
/**
* Build the sandbox-exec profile that allows writes only to `allowedWritePath`.
* Mirrors `buildSandboxProfile` in git-clone.mjs.
* @returns {string|null} null if not on macOS or sandbox-exec missing
*/
export function buildSandboxProfile(allowedWritePath) {
if (process.platform !== 'darwin') return null;
const check = spawnSync('which', ['sandbox-exec'], { encoding: 'utf8' });
if (check.status !== 0) return null;
const realPath = realpathSync(allowedWritePath);
return [
'(version 1)',
'(allow default)',
'(deny file-write*)',
`(allow file-write* (subpath "${realPath}"))`,
'(allow file-write* (literal "/dev/null"))',
'(allow file-write* (literal "/dev/tty"))',
].join('');
}
/**
* Build bwrap arguments that allow writes only to `allowedWritePath`.
* Mirrors `buildBwrapArgs` in git-clone.mjs.
* @returns {string[]|null} null if not on Linux or bwrap unusable
*/
export function buildBwrapArgs(allowedWritePath, innerArgs) {
if (process.platform !== 'linux') return null;
const check = spawnSync('which', ['bwrap'], { encoding: 'utf8' });
if (check.status !== 0) return null;
// Probe — bwrap is shipped on Ubuntu 24.04+ but may need admin AppArmor config.
const probe = spawnSync(
'bwrap',
['--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--dev', '/dev', '/bin/true'],
{ stdio: 'ignore', timeout: 5000 },
);
if (probe.status !== 0) return null;
return [
'--ro-bind', '/', '/',
'--bind', allowedWritePath, allowedWritePath,
'--dev', '/dev',
'--unshare-all',
'--new-session',
'--die-with-parent',
...innerArgs,
];
}
/**
* Resolve the spawn command for a worker invocation. Returns the OS sandbox
* if available; otherwise plain `node` with a `sandbox: null` flag so the
* caller can WARN. Identical pattern to `buildSandboxedClone`.
*
* @param {string} tmpDir writable temp dir for the worker
* @param {string[]} workerArgs argv for the worker (after `node <worker>`)
* @returns {{cmd:string, args:string[], sandbox: 'sandbox-exec'|'bwrap'|null}}
*/
export function buildSandboxedWorker(tmpDir, workerArgs) {
const innerArgs = ['node', WORKER_PATH, ...workerArgs];
const profile = buildSandboxProfile(tmpDir);
if (profile) {
return { cmd: 'sandbox-exec', args: ['-p', profile, ...innerArgs], sandbox: 'sandbox-exec' };
}
const bwrapArgs = buildBwrapArgs(tmpDir, innerArgs);
if (bwrapArgs) {
return { cmd: 'bwrap', args: bwrapArgs, sandbox: 'bwrap' };
}
// Fallback — Windows or sandbox tools missing. Worker still runs, just not boxed.
return { cmd: innerArgs[0], args: innerArgs.slice(1), sandbox: null };
}
/**
* Spawn the VSIX worker and parse its single JSON line of output.
*
* @param {string} url URL to fetch (passed via argv to worker)
* @param {string} tmpDir writable directory for extracted files
* @param {object} [opts]
* @param {boolean} [opts.allowFallback=true] if false, throw when no OS sandbox
* @returns {Promise<{ok:boolean, sandbox:'sandbox-exec'|'bwrap'|null, payload:object}>}
*/
export function runVsixWorker(url, tmpDir, opts = {}) {
const { allowFallback = true } = opts;
const { cmd, args, sandbox } = buildSandboxedWorker(tmpDir, ['--url', url, '--tmpdir', tmpDir]);
if (!sandbox && !allowFallback) {
return Promise.reject(new Error('no OS sandbox available and fallback disabled'));
}
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const child = spawn(cmd, args, {
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
timeout: WORKER_TIMEOUT_MS,
env: { ...process.env },
});
let stdout = '';
let stdoutBytes = 0;
let truncated = false;
child.stdout.on('data', (chunk) => {
stdoutBytes += chunk.length;
if (stdoutBytes > MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES) {
truncated = true;
try { child.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch {}
return;
}
stdout += chunk.toString('utf8');
});
let stderr = '';
child.stderr.on('data', (chunk) => { stderr += chunk.toString('utf8'); });
child.on('error', (err) => reject(new Error(`worker spawn failed: ${err.message}`)));
child.on('close', (code, signal) => {
if (truncated) {
return reject(new Error('worker output exceeded 1MB cap'));
}
if (signal === 'SIGTERM' && code === null) {
return reject(new Error(`worker timed out after ${WORKER_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`));
}
// Parse the last non-empty line as JSON (worker writes one line on success/failure).
const lines = stdout.split('\n').map((l) => l.trim()).filter(Boolean);
const last = lines[lines.length - 1];
if (!last) {
const tail = stderr.trim().slice(0, 200);
return reject(new Error(`worker produced no output${tail ? ` (stderr: ${tail})` : ''}`));
}
let payload;
try {
payload = JSON.parse(last);
} catch {
return reject(new Error(`worker emitted non-JSON: ${last.slice(0, 120)}`));
}
resolve({ ok: payload.ok === true, sandbox, payload });
});
});
}
export const __testing = {
WORKER_PATH,
WORKER_TIMEOUT_MS,
MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES,
};