VSIX fetch + extract for URL targets now runs in a sub-process wrapped by
sandbox-exec (macOS) or bwrap (Linux), reusing the same primitives proven
by the v5.1 git-clone sandbox. Defense-in-depth — even if our own
zip-extract.mjs ever has a bypass, the kernel refuses any write outside
the per-scan temp directory.
New files:
- scanners/lib/vsix-fetch-worker.mjs — sub-process worker. Argv: --url
--tmpdir; emits one JSON line on stdout (ok/sha256/size/source/extRoot
or ok:false/error/code). Silent on stderr. Exit 0/1.
- scanners/lib/vsix-sandbox.mjs — wrapper. Exports buildSandboxProfile,
buildBwrapArgs, buildSandboxedWorker, runVsixWorker. 35s timeout, 1 MB
stdout cap.
Changes:
- scanners/ide-extension-scanner.mjs: fetchAndExtractVsixUrl is now
sandbox-aware (useSandbox option, default true). In-process logic
preserved as fallback. New meta.source.sandbox field:
'sandbox-exec' | 'bwrap' | 'none' | 'in-process'.
- scan(target, { useSandbox }) defaults to true; tests pass false because
globalThis.fetch mocks do not cross process boundaries.
- Windows fallback: in-process with meta.warnings advisory.
Tests:
- 8 new tests in tests/scanners/vsix-sandbox.test.mjs (per-platform
profile generation, worker arg construction, live worker exit
behavior on invalid URLs — no network).
- Existing URL tests updated to opt out of sandbox (useSandbox: false).
- 1344 → 1352 tests, all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
169 lines
6.2 KiB
JavaScript
169 lines
6.2 KiB
JavaScript
// vsix-sandbox.mjs — Spawn vsix-fetch-worker.mjs under an OS sandbox so any
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// filesystem writes the ZIP extractor performs are restricted to a single
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// temp directory.
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//
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// Reuses the same sandbox primitives proven by `git-clone.mjs`:
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// - macOS: sandbox-exec with a deny-file-write profile + subpath allow
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// - Linux: bwrap with --ro-bind / --bind / --unshare-all
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// - Windows / fallback: spawn directly + WARN to stderr (no OS sandbox)
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//
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// Defense-in-depth: even if our own zip-extract.mjs has a zip-slip / symlink
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// bypass we did not foresee, the OS will refuse the write. The in-process
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// validation in zip-extract.mjs remains the first line of defense.
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import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
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import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
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import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { dirname, resolve as resolvePath } from 'node:path';
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const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
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const WORKER_PATH = resolvePath(__dirname, 'vsix-fetch-worker.mjs');
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const WORKER_TIMEOUT_MS = 35_000; // fetch is 30s, give worker 5s of slack
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const MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB JSON cap (output is tiny in practice)
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/**
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* Build the sandbox-exec profile that allows writes only to `allowedWritePath`.
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* Mirrors `buildSandboxProfile` in git-clone.mjs.
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* @returns {string|null} null if not on macOS or sandbox-exec missing
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*/
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export function buildSandboxProfile(allowedWritePath) {
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if (process.platform !== 'darwin') return null;
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const check = spawnSync('which', ['sandbox-exec'], { encoding: 'utf8' });
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if (check.status !== 0) return null;
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const realPath = realpathSync(allowedWritePath);
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return [
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'(version 1)',
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'(allow default)',
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'(deny file-write*)',
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`(allow file-write* (subpath "${realPath}"))`,
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'(allow file-write* (literal "/dev/null"))',
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'(allow file-write* (literal "/dev/tty"))',
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].join('');
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}
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/**
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* Build bwrap arguments that allow writes only to `allowedWritePath`.
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* Mirrors `buildBwrapArgs` in git-clone.mjs.
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* @returns {string[]|null} null if not on Linux or bwrap unusable
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*/
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export function buildBwrapArgs(allowedWritePath, innerArgs) {
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if (process.platform !== 'linux') return null;
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const check = spawnSync('which', ['bwrap'], { encoding: 'utf8' });
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if (check.status !== 0) return null;
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// Probe — bwrap is shipped on Ubuntu 24.04+ but may need admin AppArmor config.
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const probe = spawnSync(
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'bwrap',
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['--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--dev', '/dev', '/bin/true'],
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{ stdio: 'ignore', timeout: 5000 },
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);
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if (probe.status !== 0) return null;
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return [
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'--ro-bind', '/', '/',
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'--bind', allowedWritePath, allowedWritePath,
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'--dev', '/dev',
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'--unshare-all',
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'--new-session',
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'--die-with-parent',
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...innerArgs,
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];
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}
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/**
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* Resolve the spawn command for a worker invocation. Returns the OS sandbox
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* if available; otherwise plain `node` with a `sandbox: null` flag so the
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* caller can WARN. Identical pattern to `buildSandboxedClone`.
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*
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* @param {string} tmpDir writable temp dir for the worker
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* @param {string[]} workerArgs argv for the worker (after `node <worker>`)
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* @returns {{cmd:string, args:string[], sandbox: 'sandbox-exec'|'bwrap'|null}}
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*/
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export function buildSandboxedWorker(tmpDir, workerArgs) {
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const innerArgs = ['node', WORKER_PATH, ...workerArgs];
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const profile = buildSandboxProfile(tmpDir);
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if (profile) {
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return { cmd: 'sandbox-exec', args: ['-p', profile, ...innerArgs], sandbox: 'sandbox-exec' };
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}
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const bwrapArgs = buildBwrapArgs(tmpDir, innerArgs);
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if (bwrapArgs) {
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return { cmd: 'bwrap', args: bwrapArgs, sandbox: 'bwrap' };
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}
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// Fallback — Windows or sandbox tools missing. Worker still runs, just not boxed.
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return { cmd: innerArgs[0], args: innerArgs.slice(1), sandbox: null };
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}
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/**
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* Spawn the VSIX worker and parse its single JSON line of output.
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*
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* @param {string} url URL to fetch (passed via argv to worker)
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* @param {string} tmpDir writable directory for extracted files
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* @param {object} [opts]
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* @param {boolean} [opts.allowFallback=true] if false, throw when no OS sandbox
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* @returns {Promise<{ok:boolean, sandbox:'sandbox-exec'|'bwrap'|null, payload:object}>}
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*/
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export function runVsixWorker(url, tmpDir, opts = {}) {
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const { allowFallback = true } = opts;
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const { cmd, args, sandbox } = buildSandboxedWorker(tmpDir, ['--url', url, '--tmpdir', tmpDir]);
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if (!sandbox && !allowFallback) {
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return Promise.reject(new Error('no OS sandbox available and fallback disabled'));
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}
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const child = spawn(cmd, args, {
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stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
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timeout: WORKER_TIMEOUT_MS,
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env: { ...process.env },
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});
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let stdout = '';
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let stdoutBytes = 0;
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let truncated = false;
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child.stdout.on('data', (chunk) => {
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stdoutBytes += chunk.length;
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if (stdoutBytes > MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES) {
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truncated = true;
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try { child.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch {}
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return;
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}
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stdout += chunk.toString('utf8');
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});
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let stderr = '';
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child.stderr.on('data', (chunk) => { stderr += chunk.toString('utf8'); });
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child.on('error', (err) => reject(new Error(`worker spawn failed: ${err.message}`)));
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child.on('close', (code, signal) => {
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if (truncated) {
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return reject(new Error('worker output exceeded 1MB cap'));
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}
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if (signal === 'SIGTERM' && code === null) {
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return reject(new Error(`worker timed out after ${WORKER_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`));
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}
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// Parse the last non-empty line as JSON (worker writes one line on success/failure).
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const lines = stdout.split('\n').map((l) => l.trim()).filter(Boolean);
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const last = lines[lines.length - 1];
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if (!last) {
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const tail = stderr.trim().slice(0, 200);
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return reject(new Error(`worker produced no output${tail ? ` (stderr: ${tail})` : ''}`));
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}
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let payload;
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try {
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payload = JSON.parse(last);
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} catch {
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return reject(new Error(`worker emitted non-JSON: ${last.slice(0, 120)}`));
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}
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resolve({ ok: payload.ok === true, sandbox, payload });
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});
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});
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}
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export const __testing = {
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WORKER_PATH,
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WORKER_TIMEOUT_MS,
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MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES,
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};
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