feat(guard): wire Doors B and C to the real guard (Phase 2 step 4)
Adds llm_ingestion_guard>=0.2,<0.3 as this library's first and only runtime dependency, and guard_adapter.py -- the one module that imports it. The flows themselves are unchanged: they still take an injected gate, and importing the package still does not import the guard, so a Door A consumer is unaffected by the dependency's state. Door B screens the exact bytes it persists. The guard's §6 bookends (prepare_input -> model -> screen_output) assume a model call in between; this library makes none, and prepare_input returns prompt-shaped text (sanitized AND spotlight-fenced with a per-call nonce) that must never reach disk. So the adapter calls screen_output alone, on the extracted text as it stands, and hands that same text back -- the verdict is then a statement about the bytes actually written. This supersedes the plan's "bookends" wording, recorded there under "Settled during implementation (step 4)". It follows that the gate refuses rather than repairs: a file carrying an invisible carrier is rejected, not stripped and persisted. Sanitizing first would write a document differing invisibly from the operator's file while source_sha256 still points at the original bytes. Operator decision; the policy is PRESET_USER_UPLOAD, so any finding at all is held back. Door C hands the bundle over whole to okf.import_bundle, which resolves the cross-link graph across concepts. Per-concept reasons are derived from the scan findings (severity:label) because stamp_concept keeps the disposition and drops the reason strings behind it. Assumption B1 closes as a signature smoke test over what the adapters actually call -- screen_output and okf.import_bundle signatures, the Disposition values both doors compare by value, the Origin/Channel vocabularies Door C validates, the result fields read, and the upload preset's shape. prepare_input is not pinned: drift there cannot reach this library. Behaviour is pinned against the real scanner too, including the persist-gate proof that a fail-secure fixture leaves the bundle byte-identical. B2 closes with it: git+https tag install over anonymously readable HTTPS, no credential. A direct reference is an install-time channel, not the pin -- the range stays in pyproject, is satisfied by the tag install today, and resolves normally once the package index exists. A packaging test enforces that the guard remains the only runtime dependency (verified by hand-mutation).
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@ -79,9 +79,12 @@ Phase 4 preconditions (coordination, not unilateral moves):
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## Stack
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Python 3.10+. Package `llm_ingestion_okf` (src layout, hatchling).
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**Zero runtime dependencies in the core** (stdlib only, like the guard).
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The only permitted future runtime dependency is `llm-ingestion-guard`
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(itself zero-dep), added when the first persist gate is implemented.
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**Exactly one runtime dependency, ever:** `llm-ingestion-guard>=0.2,<0.3`
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(itself zero-dep), landed with the Door B/C persist gates. Everything else is
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stdlib, and a packaging test enforces it. Only `guard_adapter.py` imports the
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guard; importing the package does not. Install channel until the package
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index exists (a direct reference is a channel, not the pin):
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`pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v0.2.0"`.
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Binary extraction parsers live behind the `[extract]` extra only.
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Phase 4 adds a `node/` half: Node/ESM with zero npm dependencies
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