feat(output): decode hex-wrapped credentials at the persist gate
Gap 1 closed. The output gate finds runs of 32+ hex digits (calibration.HEX_WRAP_MIN_LEN), decodes both byte alignments, keeps text that is at least 80% printable (the base64 bar, now one shared helper in entropy) and runs the credential patterns on it. A hex-wrapped AWS key surfaces as decoded:egress:aws-access-key-id with "in hex run @ N" as evidence; the value is never in it. Credentials only: a hex-wrapped injection is not decoded. Measured before and after on the same trees: all 3583 clean documents (three FP populations and the 78 pinned OKF concepts) are identical line for line under both presets (disposition, labels, severity, count, offset); OKF import stays 47/31. They and 569 READMEs hold 2403 hex runs of 32+ digits, none of which decodes to text. scan_output CPU 122.9 s before, 123.4 s after; one solid hex run at the 1M cap 4.2 s -> 5.8 s. 14 new tests (10 red for the right reason first), 6 of 6 mutations red. Matrix 146/146 + 5/5 gaps, suite 1274 passed, ReDoS sweep 169 patterns.
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@ -623,11 +623,14 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
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the most common shape in real documentation. The residual: a *clicked* link to an
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attacker-controlled page can have its `location.hash` read by that page's script,
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so a fragment payload on a link (not an image) is uncovered.
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- **Secret egress: base64-wrapped is caught, hex-wrapped is not.** The output gate
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decodes base64 blobs and re-scans the plaintext, so a base64-*wrapped* secret
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surfaces as `decoded:egress:*`. `entropy` exposes decoded plaintext for base64
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only, so hex (and other encodings, or nested wraps) is a deliberate boundary —
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decode the transport layer first if you need it scanned.
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- **Secret egress: base64- and hex-wrapped are caught, other wraps are not.** The
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output gate decodes base64 blobs and, since 1.10.0, hex runs of 32 characters or
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more (both byte alignments, so one stray digit cannot hide the credential), and
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re-scans the plaintext, so a wrapped secret surfaces as `decoded:egress:*`. Hex
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split by separators (`41:4b`, `41 4b`, `\x41`), other encodings and nested wraps
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are a deliberate boundary — decode the transport layer first if you need it
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scanned. The hex plaintext goes to the credential patterns only: an injection
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wrapped in hex is not decoded (one wrapped in base64 is).
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- **Prose that merely mentions `<script>` fires `hybrid-xss:script-tag`.** The
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pattern matches the opening tag and no longer requires `</script>`, so a
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@ -686,7 +689,7 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
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missed; on one preset it is held for review instead of halted.
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- **The ReDoS sweep has a measured sensitivity floor, not a clean bill of
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health.** All 168 compiled patterns across all eleven regex-bearing modules are
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health.** All 169 compiled patterns across all eleven regex-bearing modules are
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swept arm by arm — payloads synthesised per run from each pattern's own
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skeleton, so `[`, `[system]` and `[system](` are each probed separately rather
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than relying on generic units, and each pattern is timed in the call mode the
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@ -816,8 +819,11 @@ today (WARN) that the rule would stop. Because those 3,583 hold no external imag
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569 package READMEs (from installed npm and PyPI packages, deduplicated by sha256)
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were measured too.
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1. **Hex-wrapped secret egress** — `entropy` decodes base64 only (above). Open.
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Measured to close without new alarms; next in line.
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1. **Hex-wrapped secret egress** — **closed in 1.10.0.** The output gate decodes
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hex runs of 32 characters or more and runs the credential patterns on the text
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(see "Secret egress" above). Measured as built: every one of the 3,583 documents
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keeps its disposition, labels and severities. They and the 569 READMEs hold
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2,403 hex runs this long (checksums and ids), and none decodes to text.
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2. **Semantic / factual poisoning** — invisible to token analysis (above).
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**Measured reason:** the cheapest rule, a factual claim of the form "is made of"
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or "was completed in", gave 0 new alarms on the 3,583 and fired on 3 of the 569
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