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chore(release): 1.4.2

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Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-10-29 08:31:59 +01:00
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Write-time defensive layer for Python pipelines that persist LLM output: sanitize, fence, tool-less quarantined transform, capability isolation, scan before persist, fail-secure.
![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-1.4.1-blue)
![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-1.4.2-blue)
![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-stable-brightgreen)
![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10%2B-purple)
![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-lightgrey)
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ at write time, never assumed from the format. Any pipeline ingesting external da
into an agent-read store has this shape; an OKF wiki is its canonical form — which
is why the guard ships a first-class OKF adapter (below).
**Status:** `v1.4.1`. The stdlib-only core — its detector, contract, and
**Status:** `v1.4.2`. The stdlib-only core — its detector, contract, and
OKF-adapter modules plus the top-level wiring — is built and tested, exercised by
an end-to-end showcase and adversarial + false-positive corpora. The exported
Python surface is now frozen under semver: nothing exported is removed, renamed or
@ -58,14 +58,14 @@ are real limitations, stated plainly below; read them.
Not on PyPI. The guard is distributed from its Forgejo origin — pin a release tag:
```bash
pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v1.4.1"
pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v1.4.2"
```
Or take a version range from the Forgejo package index, which carries `1.4.1`
(and `1.1.0`; `1.2.0`–`1.4.0` were never published there):
Or take a version range from the Forgejo package index, which carries `1.4.2`,
`1.4.1` and `1.1.0` (`1.2.0`–`1.4.0` were never published there):
```bash
pip install --index-url https://git.fromaitochitta.com/api/packages/open/pypi/simple/ "llm-ingestion-guard>=1.4.1,<2"
pip install --index-url https://git.fromaitochitta.com/api/packages/open/pypi/simple/ "llm-ingestion-guard>=1.4.2,<2"
```
The `open/` mirror is anonymously readable, so CI needs no deploy key, token, or
@ -204,16 +204,16 @@ tier + disposition, emitted to `log.md`).
## What it protects against
Concrete attack classes, grouped by OWASP LLM Top-10 (2025) anchor. Every row is
driven by a **live payload** in the coverage matrix — run it to watch all 134 pass
driven by a **live payload** in the coverage matrix — run it to watch all 142 pass
in your own environment:
```bash
python -m llm_ingestion_guard.coverage # 130/130 classes; exit 0 = all as documented
python -m llm_ingestion_guard.coverage # 136/136 classes; exit 0 = all as documented
```
| Anchor | Attack classes it stops (representative) |
|---|---|
| **LLM01 · prompt injection** | 83 instruction-override lexicon classes (ignore / forget / disregard / suspend-constraints, role-play, jailbreak, …); hidden carriers — zero-width stego, BIDI override, Unicode-tag stego, HTML-comment, `data:` URI — stripped on input **and** re-checked at the persist gate; high-entropy base64/hex blobs; an injection hidden inside a base64 blob (decoded, then re-scanned) |
| **LLM01 · prompt injection** | 83 instruction-override lexicon classes (ignore / forget / disregard / suspend-constraints, role-play, jailbreak, …); hidden carriers — every invisible codepoint in Unicode 18.0 (zero-width, BIDI override, Unicode-tag, variation-selector and Sneaky-Bits smuggling, private use; legitimate emoji, CJK, Arabic-script, Indic and right-to-left uses exempt on context), HTML-comment, `data:` URI — stripped on input **and** re-checked at the persist gate; high-entropy base64/hex blobs; an injection hidden inside a base64 blob (decoded, then re-scanned) |
| **LLM02 · sensitive-info disclosure** | Secret egress in output — AWS keys, tokens, private keys, the credential set; a base64-*wrapped* secret (decoded → `decoded:egress:*`) |
| **LLM05 · improper output handling** | Zero-click exfil carriers (EchoLeak, CVE-2025-32711) — markdown-image auto-fetch, inline / reference / autolink links, raw active HTML, standalone `data:` URIs; non-`https` `resource` URLs |
| **LLM06 · excessive agency** | A tool surface on the quarantined transform; credential use beyond the per-stage allowlist; capability isolation (`scoped_env`) |
@ -233,8 +233,8 @@ out in [Known limitations](#known-limitations).
The actual product is this checklist, encoded as code you wire in order:
1. **Sanitize before fence.** Strip carrier classes (zero-width, BIDI,
Unicode-tag, HTML comment, `data:`) from untrusted input first.
1. **Sanitize before fence.** Strip carrier classes (every invisible codepoint
not exempt on its context, HTML comment, `data:`) from untrusted input first.
2. **Fence untrusted input.** Spotlight-mark it in a randomized per-call
delimiter; strip attacker fence markers from the payload.
3. **Tool-less transform.** Call the model with zero tools. A successful
@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ a green scan means safe content. The highest-impact items:
two of the three corpora are living, so the cells are not rewritten in place.
Method and before/after: [`docs/rawhtml-census.py`](docs/rawhtml-census.py).
**Full list — 45 items, each with the mechanism, plus the out-of-scope boundary:**
**Full list — 46 items, each with the mechanism, plus the out-of-scope boundary:**
[`docs/LIMITATIONS.md`](docs/LIMITATIONS.md). Several carry field measurements from
consumer corpora, including the false positives the URL-shape rule actually produces.