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docs: version-sync + SECURITY/CONTRIBUTING + honest-limits (Session E)

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- README: tests badge 275->357; status v0.1->v0.2 (repo is 0.2.0; the v1.0
  bump belongs to the Session G freeze, not this docs pass); add three
  honest-limits — lone-HIGH-in-trusted-prose->WARN, vacuous quarantine-floor,
  Cyrillic/Latin homoglyph-mix false positive.
- docs/BRIEF.md: drop "No code yet" pre-implementation framing -> implemented v0.2.
- docs/OKF-INGESTION-BRIEF.md 4: correct cross-link control language —
  absolute https / references/ targets are spec-permitted, not rejected.
- Add SECURITY.md (private Forgejo disclosure) + CONTRIBUTING.md (stdlib-only
  core, Iron-Law TDD, no trailers, Forgejo-only invariants).
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-07-15 10:08:24 +02:00
commit 1625f3893b
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docs/BRIEF.md
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@ -3,8 +3,9 @@
**A reusable, minimal, dependency-light defensive layer for LLM *ingestion*
pipelines — the write-time siblings of query-time chatbot guardrails.**
Status: brief / pre-implementation. This document defines what the repo should
contain and why. No code yet.
Status: implemented — v0.2 (alpha). This document defines what the repo contains
and why; the stdlib-only core is built and tested (see `README.md` for usage and
`docs/PLAN.md` for the build order).
---

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docs/OKF-INGESTION-BRIEF.md
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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Status column verified against the code at commit `5397ba1` on 2026-07-06 (§9).
| **Markdown body** | Prompt injection, hidden carriers (zero-width, BIDI, Unicode-tag, HTML comments, `data:` URIs) | Carrier-strip → fence → tool-less transform → output scan → fail-secure | ✅ Covered (core contract) |
| **YAML frontmatter** | Injection in `title`/`description`/`tags` + arbitrary unknown keys; `description` propagates into `index.md` (read **first** under progressive disclosure); YAML anchor/alias DoS + dangerous type coercion | Same sanitize/scan on frontmatter *values*; parse YAML with a safe loader | ⚠️ **Partial** — values are scanned **iff** the caller passes the whole document (frontmatter included) as text; the core **never parses YAML**, so the safe-loader is a genuinely new gate at an OKF-adapter boundary (§9) |
| **`resource` URL** | `data:`/`javascript:`/`file:`/SSRF target that a consumer or visualizer fetches | Scheme allowlist (`https` only), validate before commit | ❌ **New control** — `neutralize` defangs schemes for human audit but there is **no reject-gate** and no `resource`-field concept (§9) |
| **Cross-link graph** | "Dead links are valid" → *dormant* injection: plant a link to a non-existent concept-ID now, write the poisoned target later | Constrain link targets to relative in-bundle paths + scheme check; re-scan on write of a link target | ❌ **New control** (graph level) |
| **Cross-link graph** | "Dead links are valid" → *dormant* injection: plant a link to a non-existent concept-ID now, write the poisoned target later | Resolve in-bundle `.md` links to concept-IDs; flag dangling links (the dormant-injection signal); reject dangerous-scheme / bundle-escaping targets. Absolute external `https` URLs and `references/` paths are spec-permitted link targets, not rejected. Re-scan on write of a link target | ❌ **New control** (graph level) |
| **File path / reserved names** | Concept-ID = file path minus `.md`; path traversal (`../`) and shadowing of reserved `index.md`/`log.md` | Sanitize/normalize paths; reject `..` and reserved filenames as concept names | ❌ **New control** — no path validation in the core (§9) |
| **`log.md` / provenance** | No authenticity at the format level | Stamp disposition + trust tier per concept | ↔️ **Machinery exists** — `Trust` × `Provenance` × `Disposition` types are built; emission-to-`log.md` + an origin/channel stamp is new wiring on top (§9) |