feat(sanitize,fence,neutralize): reject oversize input instead of half-transforming it

The scanners cap by truncating: they return findings, so reading a prefix costs
detection in the tail and nothing else. The three transform surfaces return
*content*, where the same move is not available — a shortened document is silent
data loss, and a transformed prefix followed by an untransformed tail is a
bypass, since the attacker chooses where in the document the payload sits.

So they fail secure instead. Above MAX_INPUT_CHARS (1 000 000) sanitize, fence
and neutralize raise OversizeInputError. sanitize is step 1 of prepare_input and
only ever removes, so that one refusal bounds the whole input path.

OversizeInputError subclasses ContractViolation: a pipeline already bracketing
its quarantined stage keeps failing closed rather than meeting a type it has
never heard of. It inherits the alert-routable property too — sizes in the
message, refusing surface in details, no input in either.

Invariant now pinned across all three: returned text is always fully
transformed, or not returned at all.

Still uncapped and recorded in LIMITATIONS: scan_active_content called directly
(through scan_output it inherits that cap) and the okf link graph. Both are
detection-shaped, so truncate-and-flag transfers unchanged — mechanical, not
policy.

699 tests (+23), coverage 128/128 + 6/6, ReDoS sweep 0 candidates / 150.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,47 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+> **Behaviour change, not a pure fix.** The three transform surfaces gain a
+> refusal path they did not have. A caller that today passes a document larger
+> than 1 000 000 characters gets an exception where it previously got a result.
+> Both pinned consumers were measured against this before it was written; git
+> pins are exact, so nobody picks it up without re-pinning.
+
+### Added — input-size cap on the transform surfaces (OWASP LLM10)
+
+`sanitize`, `fence` and `neutralize` now raise `OversizeInputError` above
+`MAX_INPUT_CHARS` (1 000 000) instead of accepting text of any length. Since
+`sanitize` is step 1 of `prepare_input` and only ever *removes*, that single
+refusal bounds the whole input path.
+
+They **reject** where the scanners **truncate**, and the asymmetry is the point:
+
+- `scan_lexicon` / `scan_output` return findings. Reading a prefix costs
+  detection in the tail and nothing else — a lossy answer, but an answer.
+- `sanitize` / `fence` / `neutralize` return *content*. Truncating would return
+  a shortened document (silent data loss for anything that persists the result)
+  or a transformed prefix followed by an untransformed tail — a bypass, since an
+  attacker chooses where in the document the payload sits.
+
+The invariant the three now keep: **returned text is always fully transformed,
+or not returned at all.**
+
+`OversizeInputError` subclasses `ContractViolation`, so a pipeline already
+bracketing its quarantined stage in `except ContractViolation` keeps failing
+closed. Like its parent it is alert-routable: the message carries the size and
+the cap, `details` names the refusing surface, and neither carries input.
+`max_input_chars` is a per-call parameter, defaulting to the single calibrated
+constant.
+
+### Still uncapped, and deliberately
+
+`scan_active_content` **called directly** and the okf link graph. Reached through
+`scan_output`, `scan_active_content` inherits that function's cap. Both are
+detection-shaped, so the truncate-and-flag mechanism transfers to them unchanged
+— mechanical follow-up work, not a policy question. Recorded in
+`docs/LIMITATIONS.md`.
+
+
 ## [0.3.4] — 2026-08-01
 
 > **Denial-of-service fix on the INPUT path. Upgrade from 0.3.3.** 0.3.3 swept

README.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 ![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-0.3.4-blue)
 ![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-alpha-orange)
 ![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10%2B-purple)
-![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-676_passing-green)
+![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-699_passing-green)
 ![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-lightgrey)
 
 **Write-time ingestion is the trust boundary that query-time guardrails
@@ -90,6 +90,15 @@ the disposition is `FAIL_SECURE`, never a silent persist. Pass
 together with a transform failure is treated as a probable forced-fallback attack
 and halts regardless of trust tier.
 
+`prepare_input` fails **closed** on size too: above `MAX_INPUT_CHARS`
+(1 000 000) it raises `OversizeInputError`, a `ContractViolation` subclass, rather
+than returning a half-sanitized document. The scanners bound their work by
+reading a prefix and flagging, which costs only detection in the tail; a
+transform returns *content*, where the same move would either drop your data
+silently or hand back an untransformed tail — the exact place an attacker would
+put the payload. Catch it where you catch your other ingest refusals; the
+exception carries sizes and the refusing surface, never any of the input.
+
 Every primitive is also exported for pipelines that compose the checklist
 themselves — `sanitize`, `scan_lexicon`, `scan_entropy`, `scan_output`,
 `scan_active_content`, `neutralize`, the `decide` / `guard` disposition

docs/LIMITATIONS.md

@@ -302,19 +302,20 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
   *closes* around a long body, and a run of plain characters carrying no anchor
   at all.
 
-- **Only `scan_lexicon` and `scan_output` cap their input; the input-side entry
-  points do not.** `MAX_SCAN_CHARS` (1 000 000) is applied in those two functions
-  only. `sanitize`, `fence`, `neutralize`, `scan_active_content` and the okf link
-  graph accept text of any length, so their cost is bounded by the caller's
-  input, not by this library. Every *known* quadratic run on those paths is
-  fixed, and the residual above states what the sweep can and cannot claim — but
-  where an output-path residual is capped at ~23 s, the same residual on the
-  input path has no ceiling. A caller that ingests untrusted documents of
-  unbounded size should impose its own limit before `prepare_input`. Extending
-  the cap into the input path is deliberately **not** done as part of a ReDoS
-  patch: it changes the contract for existing callers (what happens to the
-  truncated remainder is a policy question), and that deserves its own decision
-  rather than being smuggled in.
+- **Two detection surfaces still accept unbounded input; the transform surfaces
+  no longer do.** Since 0.3.5 `sanitize`, `fence` and `neutralize` raise
+  `OversizeInputError` above `MAX_INPUT_CHARS` (1 000 000) rather than returning
+  a partially transformed document, which bounds the whole input path — `sanitize`
+  is step 1 of `prepare_input`, and it only ever removes, so everything after it
+  is already under the cap. They reject rather than truncate because they return
+  *content*: a shortened document is silent data loss, and a transformed prefix
+  followed by an untransformed tail is a bypass an attacker positions the payload
+  into. The scanners keep truncating, which costs only detection in the tail.
+  What remains uncapped is `scan_active_content` **called directly** (reached
+  through `scan_output` it inherits that cap) and the okf link graph, whose cost
+  is a bundle-wide `findall` over every document body. Both are detection-shaped,
+  so the scanners' truncate-and-flag mechanism transfers to them unchanged — that
+  is a mechanical follow-up, not a policy question, and it is not yet done.
 
 ## The six documented gaps (tracked by the coverage matrix)
 

src/llm_ingestion_guard/__init__.py

@@ -48,9 +48,11 @@ from .disposition import (
 from .contract import (
     assert_tool_less,
     assert_credential_allowlist,
+    assert_within_input_cap,
     credential_env_names,
     scoped_env,
     ContractViolation,
+    OversizeInputError,
 )
 from .grounding import (
     SourceGroundingCheck,
@@ -140,6 +142,7 @@ __all__ = [
     # contract asserters
     "assert_tool_less", "assert_credential_allowlist",
     "credential_env_names", "scoped_env", "ContractViolation",
+    "assert_within_input_cap", "OversizeInputError",
     # grounding seam
     "SourceGroundingCheck", "no_grounding_check", "DEFAULT_GROUNDING_CHECK",
     # §6 bookends

src/llm_ingestion_guard/calibration.py

@@ -47,6 +47,17 @@ ENTROPY_HEX_FLOOR_LEN = 64
 # measured to do before the ReDoS fix (see active_content's pattern-table note).
 MAX_SCAN_CHARS = 1_000_000
 
+# --- transform surfaces: input cap ------------------------------------------
+# The same size, and deliberately NOT the same constant, because the two caps
+# buy different things and may need to move apart. MAX_SCAN_CHARS truncates: a
+# scanner returns findings, so reading the prefix costs *detection* on the tail
+# and nothing else. `sanitize` / `fence` / `neutralize` return content, so the
+# equivalent move would hand back either a shortened document (silent data loss)
+# or an untransformed tail (a bypass an attacker positions the payload into).
+# They reject instead — see contract.OversizeInputError. Held at 1M so a
+# document accepted by the input path is one the scanners can also read whole.
+MAX_INPUT_CHARS = 1_000_000
+
 # --- output: secret-egress self-safety --------------------------------------
 # Longest password a connection-string pattern will match. A bound is required
 # (not merely nice) because the run sits in front of a mandatory `@`: unbounded,

src/llm_ingestion_guard/contract.py

@@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ Three asserts, matching the reusable-contract checklist (BRIEF §6, steps 3-4):
   env so a hijacked stage cannot even read a credential it was never granted;
   the assert then passes by construction.
 
+A fourth asserter lives here for the same reason — it enforces rather than
+reports — though it belongs to the transform path rather than the quarantine
+checklist: **(d) bounded transform input**, :func:`assert_within_input_cap`,
+which the three content-returning surfaces call so an oversize document is
+refused instead of half-transformed.
+
 Reference: ``claude-code-llm-wiki`` ``tools/wiki_ingest/enrich.py``
 ``assert_quarantine`` — a pipeline-specific quarantine gate, generalized here
 into framework-agnostic, reusable pieces.
@@ -51,6 +57,40 @@ class ContractViolation(Exception):
         self.details = details
 
 
+class OversizeInputError(ContractViolation):
+    """A transform surface was handed more text than it will transform.
+
+    A *subclass*, not a sibling: a pipeline that already brackets its quarantined
+    stage in ``except ContractViolation`` keeps failing closed rather than
+    meeting an exception type it has never heard of. :attr:`details` names the
+    surface that refused; the sizes go in the message, and neither carries any
+    of the input, so the exception stays alert-routable like its parent.
+    """
+
+
+def assert_within_input_cap(text: str, *, surface: str, max_input_chars: int) -> None:
+    """Raise :class:`OversizeInputError` unless ``text`` fits the transform cap.
+
+    The write-time asserter for the *transform* surfaces (d). Where the scanners
+    bound their work by truncating — findings are lossy in the tail and nothing
+    else — a transform returns content, so a prefix-only result is either silent
+    data loss or an untransformed tail the payload can be positioned into. The
+    invariant these three keep instead is: returned text is always fully
+    transformed, or not returned at all.
+
+    ``max_input_chars`` is the largest accepted size, not the smallest rejected
+    one.
+    """
+    size = len(text)
+    if size > max_input_chars:
+        raise OversizeInputError(
+            f"{surface}: input {size} chars exceeds cap {max_input_chars}; "
+            "refused rather than partially transformed",
+            code="oversize-input",
+            details=(surface,),
+        )
+
+
 # --- (a) tool-less transform -----------------------------------------------
 
 # Populated tool surface across Anthropic + OpenAI request shapes. An empty

src/llm_ingestion_guard/fence.py

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ import re
 import secrets
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 
+from .calibration import MAX_INPUT_CHARS
+from .contract import assert_within_input_cap
 from .report import Finding, Report, Severity, Source
 
 # Static delimiter skeleton. The per-call nonce is the security boundary; this
@@ -59,9 +61,21 @@ def _redact(s: str, show_start: int = 16, show_end: int = 5) -> str:
     return f"{s[:show_start]}...{s[-show_end:]}"
 
 
-def fence(text: str, source: Source = Source.INPUT) -> FenceResult:
+def fence(
+    text: str,
+    source: Source = Source.INPUT,
+    max_input_chars: int = MAX_INPUT_CHARS,
+) -> FenceResult:
     """Strip fabricated fence markers from ``text``, then wrap it in a
-    randomized, unspoofable delimiter."""
+    randomized, unspoofable delimiter.
+
+    Raises :class:`~llm_ingestion_guard.contract.OversizeInputError` above
+    ``max_input_chars``. Reached through :func:`prepare_input` the text is
+    already bounded (``sanitize`` only ever removes), so the guard matters for
+    direct callers — and there it is load-bearing: a fence whose *body* was
+    truncated would present unstripped attacker markers as fenced data.
+    """
+    assert_within_input_cap(text, surface="fence", max_input_chars=max_input_chars)
     report = Report()
 
     # 1. Strip attacker fence markers FIRST — otherwise a lucky guess of the

src/llm_ingestion_guard/neutralize.py

@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ from .active_content import (
     is_active_tag,
     redact,
 )
+from .calibration import MAX_INPUT_CHARS
+from .contract import assert_within_input_cap
 from .report import Finding, Report, Severity, Source
 
 
@@ -64,13 +66,23 @@ class NeutralizeResult:
     report: Report
 
 
-def neutralize(text: str, source: Source = Source.OUTPUT) -> NeutralizeResult:
+def neutralize(
+    text: str,
+    source: Source = Source.OUTPUT,
+    max_input_chars: int = MAX_INPUT_CHARS,
+) -> NeutralizeResult:
     """Defang active-content constructs in ``text`` and report each class.
 
     Rewrites markdown images/links, reference-link definitions, angle-bracket
     autolinks, raw active HTML, and ``data:`` URIs into inert forms. Text with no
     such construct is returned byte-identical with an empty report.
+
+    Raises :class:`~llm_ingestion_guard.contract.OversizeInputError` above
+    ``max_input_chars``. A partially defanged artifact is the worst outcome
+    available here: it *looks* neutralized, and the live constructs are all in
+    the tail nobody re-reads.
     """
+    assert_within_input_cap(text, surface="neutralize", max_input_chars=max_input_chars)
     report = Report()
     out = text
 

src/llm_ingestion_guard/sanitize.py

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import re
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 
+from .calibration import MAX_INPUT_CHARS
+from .contract import assert_within_input_cap
 from .report import Finding, Report, Severity, Source
 
 # Invisible / steganographic character classes (codepoints).
@@ -29,8 +31,10 @@ _TAG_LO, _TAG_HI = 0xE0000, 0xE007F  # Unicode Tags block (U+E0000–U+E007F)
 # was wrong in the same way `output`'s was: a lazy run in front of a REQUIRED
 # literal costs a full tail rescan at *every* start position when the literal
 # never arrives, so `<!--` repeated to 100_000 chars measured 20.1s (exponent
-# 1.96–2.14 over four doublings) — and this module, unlike `scan_lexicon` /
-# `scan_output`, applies no input cap, so nothing bounds that above.
+# 1.96–2.14 over four doublings) — and at the time this module, unlike
+# `scan_lexicon` / `scan_output`, applied no input cap, so nothing bounded that
+# above. MAX_INPUT_CHARS now does, but as a second line only: the cap bounds a
+# *future* quadratic pattern's damage, it does not make a quadratic one safe.
 #
 # Neither of the two fixes used elsewhere fits here. Excluding the opener (`<`)
 # from the run would drop every comment containing markup — `<!-- <b>x</b> -->`
@@ -94,8 +98,19 @@ def _decode_tags(codepoints: list[int]) -> str:
     return "".join(out)
 
 
-def sanitize(text: str, source: Source = Source.INPUT) -> SanitizeResult:
-    """Strip carrier classes from ``text`` and report per-class counts."""
+def sanitize(
+    text: str,
+    source: Source = Source.INPUT,
+    max_input_chars: int = MAX_INPUT_CHARS,
+) -> SanitizeResult:
+    """Strip carrier classes from ``text`` and report per-class counts.
+
+    Raises :class:`~llm_ingestion_guard.contract.OversizeInputError` above
+    ``max_input_chars``: this is step 1 of the input path, so the refusal bounds
+    the whole path, and a *partially* sanitized document is worse than none —
+    the unstripped tail is where a carrier would be placed.
+    """
+    assert_within_input_cap(text, surface="sanitize", max_input_chars=max_input_chars)
     report = Report()
 
     # Character-class carriers: single pass, keep everything else verbatim.

tests/test_input_cap.py

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+"""Tests for the input-size cap on the TRANSFORM surfaces (OWASP LLM10).
+
+The scan surfaces (``scan_lexicon`` / ``scan_output``) cap by *truncating*: they
+read the prefix, emit an ``oversize-input`` finding, and return findings only.
+That trade does not transfer here. ``sanitize`` / ``fence`` / ``neutralize``
+return **content**, so truncating would either drop user data silently or hand
+back a tail that never went through the transform — a one-line bypass, since an
+attacker controls where in the document the payload sits.
+
+So these three fail *secure* instead. The invariant under test:
+
+    returned text is ALWAYS fully transformed, or not returned at all.
+"""
+import inspect
+
+import pytest
+
+from llm_ingestion_guard import prepare_input
+from llm_ingestion_guard.calibration import MAX_INPUT_CHARS
+from llm_ingestion_guard.contract import ContractViolation, OversizeInputError
+from llm_ingestion_guard.fence import fence
+from llm_ingestion_guard.neutralize import neutralize
+from llm_ingestion_guard.sanitize import sanitize
+
+# Every transform surface, called through a uniform (text, max) shim so the
+# invariant is asserted once per surface rather than restated three times.
+TRANSFORMS = (
+    ("sanitize", lambda text, cap: sanitize(text, max_input_chars=cap)),
+    ("fence", lambda text, cap: fence(text, max_input_chars=cap)),
+    ("neutralize", lambda text, cap: neutralize(text, max_input_chars=cap)),
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name,call", TRANSFORMS, ids=[n for n, _ in TRANSFORMS])
+def test_oversize_input_is_rejected(name, call):
+    with pytest.raises(OversizeInputError):
+        call("a" * 101, 100)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name,call", TRANSFORMS, ids=[n for n, _ in TRANSFORMS])
+def test_input_exactly_at_the_cap_is_accepted(name, call):
+    # The cap is the largest accepted size, not the smallest rejected one.
+    result = call("a" * 100, 100)
+    assert result.text is not None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name,call", TRANSFORMS, ids=[n for n, _ in TRANSFORMS])
+def test_rejection_is_a_contract_violation(name, call):
+    # Subclass, so a pipeline with a broad `except ContractViolation` around its
+    # quarantined stage keeps failing closed instead of meeting a new exception
+    # type it has never heard of.
+    with pytest.raises(ContractViolation) as exc:
+        call("a" * 101, 100)
+    assert exc.value.code == "oversize-input"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name,call", TRANSFORMS, ids=[n for n, _ in TRANSFORMS])
+def test_error_carries_sizes_never_content(name, call):
+    # Same alert-safety property ContractViolation already promises: the raised
+    # object must be routable to an alert channel without leaking the payload.
+    secret = "CANARYVALUE"
+    with pytest.raises(OversizeInputError) as exc:
+        call(secret * 100, 100)
+    assert secret not in str(exc.value)
+    assert not any(secret in d for d in exc.value.details)
+    assert "101" not in exc.value.details  # details name the surface, not sizes
+    assert name in exc.value.details
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name,call", TRANSFORMS, ids=[n for n, _ in TRANSFORMS])
+def test_error_reports_both_the_size_and_the_cap(name, call):
+    with pytest.raises(OversizeInputError) as exc:
+        call("a" * 101, 100)
+    message = str(exc.value)
+    assert "101" in message and "100" in message
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name,call", TRANSFORMS, ids=[n for n, _ in TRANSFORMS])
+def test_under_cap_is_unchanged_by_the_guard(name, call):
+    # The cap must not perturb the ordinary path: clean prose still round-trips
+    # the way each surface's own tests already pin.
+    result = call("ordinary prose", 100)
+    assert "ordinary prose" in result.text
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "func", [sanitize, fence, neutralize], ids=["sanitize", "fence", "neutralize"]
+)
+def test_default_cap_comes_from_calibration(func):
+    # Calibration numbers live in ONE module; a literal re-typed at a call site
+    # is the drift this pins against.
+    default = inspect.signature(func).parameters["max_input_chars"].default
+    assert default == MAX_INPUT_CHARS
+
+
+def test_prepare_input_inherits_the_cap():
+    # The input path is sanitize -> fence, and step 1 is where the document
+    # arrives, so the whole path is bounded by sanitize's guard alone.
+    with pytest.raises(OversizeInputError):
+        prepare_input("a" * (MAX_INPUT_CHARS + 1))
+
+
+def test_prepare_input_accepts_a_document_at_the_cap():
+    result = prepare_input("a" * MAX_INPUT_CHARS)
+    assert result.fenced