fix(sanitize,okf,active_content): three quadratic patterns, two on the input path

The generalised sweep found what 0.3.2's hand-written rows missed. All three are
the documented class -- a run in front of a required literal that never arrives,
so every start position rescans the tail -- and all three are worse than the
0.3.3 findings, because `sanitize`, `neutralize`, `scan_active_content` and the
okf link graph apply NO input cap. `scan_lexicon`/`scan_output` are the only
entry points that do, so there is no ceiling to extrapolate to.

  sanitize._HTML_COMMENT_RE   `<!--`*100_000        20.1s, exponent 1.96-2.14
  active_content.URL_IN_TEXT_RE  `<a `+`A`*100_000  12.99s / 14.9s, exponent ~2.0
  okf._MD_LINK_RE             `[`*100_000            7.1s, exponent 1.99-2.05

Each fix is the one the pattern's own shape allows, not a copied choice:

  - The comment stripper drops the regex for `str.find`. Excluding `<` would lose
    every comment containing markup; bounding the run would be a carrier bypass
    of the exact construct the stripper exists to remove.
  - `URL_IN_TEXT_RE` bounds its scheme run to an RFC 3986 scheme (`{0,63}`).
    Bounding is safe *here* only because it is a defanger inside a tag already
    flagged `active:raw-html`. A lookbehind was measured too and rejected: it
    drops `-http://evil.com`, a one-character evasion. Bounded: 0.185s at 1M.
  - `_MD_LINK_RE` excludes `[`, matching `active_content.MD_LINK_RE` exactly,
    including the nested-label trade already documented there.

`sanitize` claimed "no catastrophic backtracking" in a comment; that claim was
wrong in the same way `output`'s was before 0.3.2, and is corrected in place.

676 tests (+10), coverage 128/128 + 6/6 gaps, sweep clean across 150 patterns.
The okf destination run gets no row: `[^)\s]+` cannot fail, so a row for it
could never go red.

src/llm_ingestion_guard/active_content.py

@@ -80,7 +80,26 @@ _SCHEME_SUBS = (
 # Dot-defang that is idempotent: never touches a `.` already inside `[.]`.
 _DOT_RE = re.compile(r"(?<!\[)\.(?!\])")
 # A bare http(s)/ftp URL embedded in other text (used inside escaped HTML).
-URL_IN_TEXT_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.\-]*://[^\s'\"<>]+")
+#
+# ReDoS note (OWASP LLM10). The scheme run sits in front of a REQUIRED `://`, so
+# a long run of scheme characters that never reaches it costs a full rescan at
+# every start position: `<a ` + `A`*100_000 + `>` measured 12.99s through
+# `scan_active_content` and 14.9s through `neutralize`, exponent ~2.0 over four
+# doublings, on entry points that apply no input cap. The 0.3.2 sweep missed it
+# because its payloads repeat a unit, and this arm needs the tag to CLOSE before
+# the body is handed on.
+#
+# The exclusion trick used by the constructs below does not apply — the attack
+# repeats a plain scheme character, not this pattern's anchor — so the run is
+# bounded to an RFC 3986 scheme instead (`ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "-" /
+# "." )`; the longest registered scheme is far under 64). Unlike the detector
+# tables, bounding costs nothing here: this is a defanger applied INSIDE a tag
+# already flagged `active:raw-html`, padding merely shifts where the match
+# starts, and a 64+ character "scheme" is not resolvable by any renderer. A
+# lookbehind that killed interior start positions was measured too and rejected:
+# it drops `-http://evil.com` and `.http://x.com`, a one-character evasion of
+# the defanger. Bounded: 0.185s at the full 1_000_000-char cap.
+URL_IN_TEXT_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.\-]{0,63}://[^\s'\"<>]+")
 
 
 def defang_url(url: str) -> str:

src/llm_ingestion_guard/okf.py

@@ -407,7 +407,14 @@ def _most_severe(dispositions):
 # consumer that owns the corpus decides where the durable graph state lives.
 # This in-import graph resolves links within a single bundle merge.
 
-_MD_LINK_RE = re.compile(r"\[[^\]]*\]\(\s*([^)\s]+)")
+# ReDoS note (OWASP LLM10): the label run excludes `[`, the character that opens
+# this pattern's own anchor. Without it, a bundle body repeating `[` and never
+# closing it makes every start position rescan the tail — 7.1s at 100_000 chars,
+# exponent ~2.0, over attacker-supplied bodies this adapter reads with no input
+# cap. Same defect and same fix as `active_content.MD_LINK_RE`, including the
+# trade it names: a label containing a nested `[...]` is given up on, which costs
+# no exfil coverage because the inner link is matched on its own.
+_MD_LINK_RE = re.compile(r"\[[^\]\[]*\]\(\s*([^)\s]+)")
 # Active-content schemes are refused in a link, mirroring the resource gate (T3).
 _DANGEROUS_LINK_SCHEMES = frozenset({"javascript", "data", "vbscript", "file", "blob"})
 

src/llm_ingestion_guard/sanitize.py

@@ -22,8 +22,24 @@ _ZERO_WIDTH = frozenset({0x200B, 0x200C, 0x200D, 0xFEFF, 0x00AD})
 _BIDI = frozenset({0x202A, 0x202B, 0x202C, 0x202D, 0x202E, 0x2066, 0x2067, 0x2068, 0x2069})
 _TAG_LO, _TAG_HI = 0xE0000, 0xE007F  # Unicode Tags block (U+E0000–U+E007F)
 
-# Span carriers. Lazy `.*?` + explicit terminator — no catastrophic backtracking.
-_HTML_COMMENT_RE = re.compile(r"<!--.*?-->", re.DOTALL)
+# Span carriers.
+#
+# ReDoS note (OWASP LLM10). The comment stripper used to be `<!--.*?-->` with a
+# comment that absence of nesting meant no catastrophic backtracking. That claim
+# was wrong in the same way `output`'s was: a lazy run in front of a REQUIRED
+# literal costs a full tail rescan at *every* start position when the literal
+# never arrives, so `<!--` repeated to 100_000 chars measured 20.1s (exponent
+# 1.96–2.14 over four doublings) — and this module, unlike `scan_lexicon` /
+# `scan_output`, applies no input cap, so nothing bounds that above.
+#
+# Neither of the two fixes used elsewhere fits here. Excluding the opener (`<`)
+# from the run would drop every comment containing markup — `<!-- <b>x</b> -->`
+# is the ordinary case, not an edge one. Bounding the run would be a one-line
+# carrier bypass: a comment padded past the bound is exactly what this stripper
+# exists to remove. So the scan is done with `str.find`, which is linear and
+# semantically identical to the lazy regex — leftmost opener, nearest following
+# terminator, unterminated trailer left in place.
+_COMMENT_OPEN, _COMMENT_CLOSE = "<!--", "-->"
 # `data:` not preceded by a letter (so "metadata:" / "userdata:" do not match),
 # consuming up to the next whitespace / quote / angle bracket / closing paren.
 _DATA_URI_RE = re.compile(r"(?<![A-Za-z])data:[^\s'\"<>)]+", re.IGNORECASE)
@@ -43,6 +59,32 @@ def _redact(s: str, show_start: int = 12, show_end: int = 4) -> str:
     return f"{s[:show_start]}...{s[-show_end:]}"
 
 
+def _strip_html_comments(text: str) -> tuple[str, int]:
+    """Remove ``<!-- ... -->`` spans; return the cleaned text and the count.
+
+    Linear replacement for the quantifier form (see the ReDoS note above). An
+    unterminated ``<!--`` is left verbatim, matching the regex it replaces.
+    """
+    if _COMMENT_OPEN not in text:
+        return text, 0
+    out: list[str] = []
+    pos = count = 0
+    while True:
+        start = text.find(_COMMENT_OPEN, pos)
+        if start == -1:
+            break
+        end = text.find(_COMMENT_CLOSE, start + len(_COMMENT_OPEN))
+        if end == -1:  # unterminated — not a comment, keep the rest verbatim
+            break
+        out.append(text[pos:start])
+        pos = end + len(_COMMENT_CLOSE)
+        count += 1
+    if not count:
+        return text, 0
+    out.append(text[pos:])
+    return "".join(out), count
+
+
 def _decode_tags(codepoints: list[int]) -> str:
     """Decode Unicode-tag codepoints to their hidden ASCII (cp - 0xE0000)."""
     out = []
@@ -75,7 +117,7 @@ def sanitize(text: str, source: Source = Source.INPUT) -> SanitizeResult:
     cleaned = "".join(kept) if (zero_width or bidi or tag_cps) else text
 
     # Span carriers.
-    cleaned, n_comments = _HTML_COMMENT_RE.subn("", cleaned)
+    cleaned, n_comments = _strip_html_comments(cleaned)
     cleaned, n_data = _DATA_URI_RE.subn("", cleaned)
 
     if zero_width: