15 changed files with 94 additions and 1281 deletions
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@ -5,119 +5,9 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
-## [1.3.0] — 2026-09-02
+## [Unreleased]
-### Added — the `sources` provenance family becomes expressible in both spec carriers
+Nothing yet.
 `okf.parse_frontmatter` rejected `sources` in every form the OKF spec and its
 producers actually use. Measured 2026-09-02 by two consumers independently:
 `sources: [{ id: a, resource: x }]` raised on the `[` indicator (with one entry
 as with two), and the block sequence of block mappings — SPEC.md §5.1's *own*
 example — raised `"nested mappings are not supported"`. `resource` is REQUIRED
 within a `sources` entry (§5.1), so the whole provenance family was unwritable,
 and a bundle written the way the spec documents it was refused.
 Admitted now, both parsing to the same value (a list of dicts):
 ```yaml
 sources: [{ id: a, resource: https://e.com/a }]
 sources:
  - id: a
    resource: https://e.com/a
 ```
 **`resource` is allowlisted inside a `sources` entry and nowhere else.** 1.2.0
 left it off the allowlist on the argument that the parser could not tell
 `sources[].resource` (§5.1, a citation) from `executor.resource` /
 `attester.resource` (§10, a pointer to code to be run — the door-C route closed
 in 1.1.0). That premise was false: the owning key is in scope at every call
 site and was simply never threaded through. It is threaded now, so the
 discrimination is structural rather than a judgement about the value, and
 `executor: [{ resource: skills/run.md }]` and `attester:\n  - resource: …` are
 refused on the allowlist through *every* carrier, including the two this adds.
 Refusal stays the default everywhere else. A flow sequence of plain scalars
 (`tags: [a, b]`) still raises — the sequence carrier is opened for the flow
 mapping element and nothing else. A `sources` entry still admits scalar leaves
 only, so SPEC §5.1's optional *per-entry* `usage_window` (a mapping inside a
 mapping) is refused: no nesting past depth 1 is a security property, and it was
 not spent here. Registered as a conformance gap in `docs/LIMITATIONS.md`. A
 block list may not mix scalar items and mappings. Off-allowlist keys, anchors,
 aliases, tags, duplicate keys and unclosed collections raise as before, and a
 refused mapping still raises rather than degrading into a string.
 **New residual, registered:** `sources[].resource` is scanned as text (T1) but
 never validated as a URL. T3's https allowlist cannot be extended to it without
 over-blocking conformant bundles — §5.1 permits a bundle-relative path or a
 scope descriptor a consumer cannot follow at all. A consumer that dereferences
 it must call `okf.validate_resource_url` itself.
 No exported surface changed and no detector behaviour or calibration changed.
 Suite 834 → 868 (34 new rows, plus four pre-existing rows updated where this
 release changed the behaviour they pinned); 130/130 classes, 6/6 documented
 gaps hold, 45 limitations, ReDoS sweep 0/152 candidates flagged.
 ## [1.2.0] — 2026-08-23
 ### Added — OKF frontmatter can express one mapping form: typed and allowlisted
 `okf.parse_frontmatter` gave the mapping *class* no expressible form at all. OKF
 v0.2 writes its whole trust and provenance layer as mappings — SPEC.md @
 `62432a09` uses flow form in its own §5.1/§5.2 examples, and §11 carries a hard
 MUST for consumers ("MUST treat a bare `verified` mapping as a one-element
 list") that presupposes they parse. A consumer measured **0 of 53** upstream
 concepts through the gate on 0.3.4, 1.0.0 and 1.1.0. That was a contract
 collision, not a calibration setting: no threshold would have moved it.
 Admitted now: a flow mapping (`generated: { by: x, at: y }`), as a value or as a
 block-list item, whose every key is on a nine-name allowlist (`by`, `at`, `from`,
 `to`, `id`, `title`, `author`, `usage_count`, `last_modified`) and whose every
 leaf is a plain scalar run through the *unchanged* dangerous-value and
 mapping-construct predicates.
 The form is additive and refusal stays the default. A key off the allowlist, a
 nested collection, a quoted leaf, a duplicate key, an empty or unclosed mapping,
 and `{a:b}` (which PyYAML 6.0.3 reads as the *key* `a:b`) all raise, and a
 refused mapping still raises rather than degrading into a string — the 1.1.0
 defect is not reopened. Nested-block (`k:\n  sub: v`), dotted (`k.sub: v`) and
 inline-second-colon (`k: sub: v`) routes to a mapping still raise, each on its
 own rule.
 **`resource` is deliberately off the allowlist**, though SPEC.md §5.1 names it
 inside a `sources` entry. It is a pointer rather than a label and the only key
 T3 exists for: admitting it would let `executor: { resource: skills/run.md }`
 carry an executable-code pointer through in typed clothes, which is the door-C
 route closed in 1.1.0. It costs nothing today — the conformant carrier for
 `sources[].resource` is a block sequence of block mappings, which this form does
 not admit either way.
 Mapping leaves are scanned like every other frontmatter value (T1), so an
 injection parked in `generated: { by: ... }` reaches `scan_output`. Coverage
 matrix: 130 classes, up from 129 (the new row is the off-allowlist key).
 No exported surface changed; no detector behaviour and no calibration changed.
 ### Changed — the ReDoS sweep now measures on the same clock as the bounds it justifies
 `docs/redos-sweep.py` timed on `time.monotonic()` while every ReDoS bound in the
 suite moved to process CPU time (`tests/redos_clock.py`), so the 1.5 ms
 sensitivity floor and the "~23 s at the cap" figure published in
 `docs/LIMITATIONS.md` came from a different instrument than the bounds they
 support. The script now imports `scan_seconds` rather than timing itself.
 The floor was re-derived on that instrument and **stayed at 1.5 ms**: over twelve
 full runs of all 2585 arms the median ratio is 1.95-2.03 in every size bucket
 above 50 µs, but two-point excursions past the 2.6 flag threshold persist at every
 magnitude (p99 ratio 2.9-3.3 even above 1 ms) — 6.9 flagged arms per run at a
 0.5 ms floor, 1.1 at 1.0 ms, 0.33 at 1.5 ms. Descheduling was never what made this
 sweep noisy; a ratio computed from two points is. Four arms flagged across those
 twelve runs, each in exactly one of them, and six arms that have ever flagged
 re-measure at exponent 0.97-1.09 over six doublings — at most 1.2 s at the
 1 000 000-char cap. The pattern count the script prints is 152, not the 150 of the
 0.3.4 entry below; `docs/LIMITATIONS.md` now carries the current number.
 No exported surface, no detector behaviour and no calibration changed.
 ## [1.1.0] — 2026-08-13
@ -143,12 +33,6 @@ while closing it**, and is the reason this release names two routes rather than
 Neither shape is conformant OKF — a well-formed bundle does not produce them; a
 malformed or hostile one can.
 **What closed is the type confusion, not pointer-smuggling as a class.** T3 still
 inspects `resource` and nothing else, so an honest string under another key rides
 through exactly as before: `attester: attesters/sql_equality.py` is WARN, while
 the same path under `resource:` FAIL_SECUREs. The string is still scanned like any
 other frontmatter value under T1. Nothing about that changed here.
 **The boundary is where YAML puts it**, ground-truthed against PyYAML 6.0.3 rather
 than reasoned: `": "` and a trailing `":"` are exactly the two shapes where a plain
 scalar becomes a mapping, and they are refused. A colon carrying neither a space nor
@ -162,10 +46,8 @@ here — the `1.0.0` entry says exactly this is a fix, not a break. A consumer w
 bundles carry an unquoted `": "` in a frontmatter value will now see those concepts
 refused at import; quote the value, and it parses.
-Suite 792 → **802**: 13 rows added (4 rejected shapes, 7 admitted ones, 2 through
+Suite 792 → **802** (11 rows added, 1 retired). 129/129 classes, 6/6 documented
-`import_bundle`), 3 retired (the two that pinned the defect, and the one-key row
+gaps, 35 limitations — all unchanged.
 in the block-list table). 129/129 classes, 6/6 documented gaps, 35 limitations —
 all unchanged.
 ## [1.0.0] — 2026-08-13
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@ -11,27 +11,11 @@ framework-agnostisk kode.
 Referanse-implementasjon: `claude-code-llm-wiki` Stage B (`tools/wiki_ingest/`).
 Lexikon-seed: `injection-patterns.mjs` fra `llm-security`-pluginen.
-Repoet er på **v1.3.0** — den eksporterte Python-surfacen er frosset under semver
+Repoet er på **v1.1.0** — den eksporterte Python-surfacen er frosset under semver
 (deteksjonsatferd er det IKKE; kalibrering flytter seg i 1.x). Stdlib-kjernen er
 bygget og testet (15 moduler +
 topp-nivå wiring, showcase + korpus), inkl. OKF-adapter og aktivt-innhold-
-detektor (EchoLeak-klassen) i output-gaten. OKF-frontmatterens mapping-klasse
+detektor (EchoLeak-klassen) i output-gaten. Mode-b `import_bundle` skanner
 har **fire** uttrykkbare bærere (G3 21.08, G30 02.09): flow-mapping som verdi
 og som blokkliste-element, flow-sekvens av flow-mappinger, og blokk-sekvens av
 blokk-mappinger (SPEC §5.1s egen form). HVER nøkkel i alle fire står på
 allowlisten og hvert blad er en ren skalar. Formen er trygg fordi allowlisten
 inspiserer hver nøkkel; det blanke avslaget var håndhevelsen, ikke poenget.
 **`resource` er allowlistet KUN inne i en `sources`-oppføring** — foreldre-
 nøkkelen avgjør, så `executor`/`attester` sin `resource` (§10, dør C) avvises
 gjennom hver eneste bærer. 1.2.0s begrunnelse for å utelate den (parseren
 manglet foreldre-kontekst) var målt feil: konteksten var der, den var bare
 aldri tredd gjennom. Topp-nivå blokk-mapping, dotted- og inline-kolon-rutene
 raiser fortsatt, flow-sekvens av rene skalarer (`tags: [a, b]`) raiser, en
 blokkliste kan ikke blande skalarer og mappinger, og en avvist mapping raiser —
 den degraderer aldri til en streng (1.1.0-defekten). `sources[].resource`
 URL-valideres ALDRI (T3 ser kun topp-nivå `resource`) — §5.1 tillater
 bundle-relative stier og scope-beskrivelser, så en https-gate ville over-blokkert
 konforme bundles; konsumenten må selv kalle `validate_resource_url`. Mode-b `import_bundle` skanner
 reserverte strukturfiler (`index.md`/`log.md`) i mottatte bundles i stedet for å
 path-avvise dem; upload-front-end beholder shadow-reject (`allow_reserved=False`).
 Output-gatens decode-and-rescan mater dekodet base64-klartekst gjennom BÅDE lexicon
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 Write-time defensive layer for Python pipelines that persist LLM output: sanitize, fence, tool-less quarantined transform, capability isolation, scan before persist, fail-secure.
-![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-1.3.0-blue)
+![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-1.1.0-blue)
 ![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-stable-brightgreen)
 ![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10%2B-purple)
 ![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-lightgrey)
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ at write time, never assumed from the format. Any pipeline ingesting external da
 into an agent-read store has this shape; an OKF wiki is its canonical form — which
 is why the guard ships a first-class OKF adapter (below).
-**Status:** `v1.3.0`. The stdlib-only core — its detector, contract, and
+**Status:** `v1.1.0`. The stdlib-only core — its detector, contract, and
 OKF-adapter modules plus the top-level wiring — is built and tested, exercised by
 an end-to-end showcase and adversarial + false-positive corpora. The exported
 Python surface is now frozen under semver: nothing exported is removed, renamed or
@ -41,24 +41,12 @@ given a different meaning without a `2.0.0`. **Detection behaviour is not frozen
 severities, thresholds and lexicon entries are calibration and move in `1.x`. There
 are real limitations, stated plainly below; read them.
 ## Table of Contents
 - [Install](#install)
 - [Quickstart — the two bookends](#quickstart--the-two-bookends)
 - [OKF / LLM-wiki support (shipped)](#okf--llm-wiki-support-shipped)
 - [What it protects against](#what-it-protects-against)
 - [The reusable contract (adopt-this checklist)](#the-reusable-contract-adopt-this-checklist)
 - [Known limitations](#known-limitations)
 - [Non-goals](#non-goals)
 - [Design & threat model](#design--threat-model)
 - [License](#license)
 ## Install
 Not on PyPI. The guard is distributed from its Forgejo origin — pin a release tag:
 ```bash
-pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v1.3.0"
+pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v1.1.0"
 ```
 The `open/` mirror is anonymously readable, so CI needs no deploy key, token, or
@ -165,15 +153,7 @@ Per-concept gates: **path / reserved-name** (rejects `..` traversal and reserved
 reject-by-default loader that refuses anchors, aliases, and explicit tags *by
 construction*, so a billion-laughs alias expansion or a `!!python/object` coercion
 cannot occur (it is deliberately **not** a general YAML engine, whose own features
-are the attack surface). The one mapping form it accepts is OKF v0.2's flow
+are the attack surface); **`resource` https-allowlist** (hard-rejects
 mapping — `generated: { by: x, at: y }`, `verified: { … }` bare or listed,
 `usage_window: { from: …, to: … }` — admitted key-by-key against a nine-name
 allowlist (`by`, `at`, `from`, `to`, `id`, `title`, `author`, `usage_count`,
 `last_modified`) with plain-scalar leaves only. A key off that list, a nested
 collection or a duplicate key is refused, and `resource` is deliberately not on
 it; the block, dotted and inline-colon routes to a mapping still raise. See
 [LIMITATIONS](docs/LIMITATIONS.md) for what that admits and what it still walls
 off (a `sources` block list of mappings is still refused); **`resource` https-allowlist** (hard-rejects
 `data:`/`javascript:`/`file:` before commit — a reject-gate, not defang);
 **whole-concept scan** (frontmatter *values* + body through `scan_output`);
 **cross-link graph** (surfaces dangling targets, the dormant-injection signal, and
@ -187,7 +167,7 @@ driven by a **live payload** in the coverage matrix — run it to watch all 134
 in your own environment:
 ```bash
-python -m llm_ingestion_guard.coverage    # 130/130 classes; exit 0 = all as documented
+python -m llm_ingestion_guard.coverage    # 129/129 classes; exit 0 = all as documented
 ```
 | Anchor | Attack classes it stops (representative) |
@ -269,7 +249,7 @@ a green scan means safe content. The highest-impact items:
  two of the three corpora are living, so the cells are not rewritten in place.
  Method and before/after: [`docs/rawhtml-census.py`](docs/rawhtml-census.py).
-**Full list — 45 items, each with the mechanism, plus the out-of-scope boundary:**
+**Full list — 35 items, each with the mechanism, plus the out-of-scope boundary:**
 [`docs/LIMITATIONS.md`](docs/LIMITATIONS.md). Several carry field measurements from
 consumer corpora, including the false positives the URL-shape rule actually produces.
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@ -25,12 +25,12 @@ you happened to observe.
 **Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.** Public disclosure before a fix
 gives an attacker a window against every downstream consumer.
-Instead, report it privately to <security@fromaitochitta.com> — mark the subject
+Instead, report it **privately** to the maintainer via the canonical repository on
-`SECURITY`.
+Forgejo:
- Canonical repository: https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security
+- Repository: `git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security`
- Alternatively, contact the maintainer directly through that Forgejo instance
+- Contact the maintainer directly through that Forgejo instance (private message /
-  (private message / maintainer contact) and mark the subject `SECURITY`.
+  maintainer contact) and mark the subject `SECURITY`.
 Please include:
--- a/docs/ADOPTION-BRIEF.md
+++ b/docs/ADOPTION-BRIEF.md
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 especially one converging on Google's Open Knowledge Format (OKF v0.1) — and needs
 to decide **when** and **where** to add a write-time ingestion guard.
-**Status of the guard:** `v1.3.0`. Stdlib-only core, framework-agnostic. The
+**Status of the guard:** `v1.1.0`. Stdlib-only core, framework-agnostic. The
 exported Python surface is frozen under semver — nothing exported is removed,
 renamed or given a different meaning without a `2.0.0`. Detection behaviour is
 *not* frozen: severities, thresholds and lexicon entries are calibration and move
@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ live payload:
 python -m llm_ingestion_guard.coverage    # exit 0 = all as documented
 ```
-As of `v1.3.0`: **130 / 130 defended classes demonstrated (recall 100%)** and **6 /
+As of `v1.1.0`: **129 / 129 defended classes demonstrated (recall 100%)** and **6 /
 6 documented gaps still hold** (a *closed* gap fails the test, forcing a doc
-update). The matrix is the single source of truth for the test suite (**868
+update). The matrix is the single source of truth for the test suite (**802
 passing**), which also asserts total recall, that every lexicon pattern has a
 case (so the matrix cannot fall behind the lexicon), the full LLM02 secret-egress
 set, and the container-layer front-end (CSV formula-injection, zip-slip/bomb,
--- a/docs/BRIEF.md
+++ b/docs/BRIEF.md
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 **A reusable, minimal, dependency-light defensive layer for LLM *ingestion*
 pipelines — the write-time siblings of query-time chatbot guardrails.**
-Status: implemented — v1.3.0, exported surface frozen under semver. This document defines what the repo contains
+Status: implemented — v1.1.0, exported surface frozen under semver. This document defines what the repo contains
 and why; the stdlib-only core is built and tested (see `README.md` for usage and
 `docs/PLAN.md` for the build order).
--- a/docs/LIMITATIONS.md
+++ b/docs/LIMITATIONS.md
@ -40,31 +40,16 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
  (an injection in a directory listing is caught) rather than path-rejecting the
  conformant bundle. A front-end materialising individual uploads keeps the opposite
  rule (`allow_reserved=False`): a reserved basename is a listing-shadow and refused.
- **OKF frontmatter is a restricted grammar: a mapping is expressible through
+- **OKF frontmatter is a restricted grammar: the mapping class has no expressible
-  four carriers, all of them key-allowlisted.** Gate T2 accepts a line-oriented
+  form.** Gate T2 accepts a line-oriented subset deliberately — full YAML is a larger
-  subset deliberately — full YAML is a larger parse-attack surface than a
+  parse-attack surface than a write-time gate needs. Nested mappings and flow
-  write-time gate needs. The admitted carriers are the flow mapping as a value
+  collections (`[a, b]`, `{k: v}`) are *rejected outright*, which fails secure.
-  (`generated: { by: x, at: y }`), the flow mapping as a block-list item, the
+  **All four routes to a mapping fail, each on a different rule** — flow (`{k: v}`)
-  flow *sequence* of flow mappings (`sources: [{ id: a, resource: x }]`) and the
+  on the disallowed value-start indicator, block (`k:\n  sub: v`) on the
-  block sequence of block mappings (SPEC.md §5.1's own form). **The routes that
+  nested-mapping check, dotted keys (`k.sub: v`) on the key pattern, and the inline
-  still fail, each on a different rule:** a top-level block *mapping*
+  second colon (`k: sub: v`) on the mapping-construct check — so the mapping *class*
-  (`k:\n  sub: v`) on the nested-mapping check, dotted keys (`k.sub: v`) on the
+  has no expressible form, rather than one form being preferable to another. What
-  key pattern, the inline second colon (`k: sub: v`) on the mapping-construct
+  survives is scalars and flat lists of strings. **Two of those routes used to
  check, and a flow sequence of plain *scalars* (`tags: [a, b]`) on the `[`
  indicator — the sequence carrier is opened for the mapping element and nothing
  else. **Every carrier is admitted only when every key is on an allowlist**
  (`by`, `at`, `from`, `to`, `id`, `title`, `author`, `usage_count`,
  `last_modified` — the keys SPEC.md @ `62432a09` §5.1/§5.2 names inside a mapping,
  plus `resource` and `usage_window` *under `sources` only*, see below)
  and every leaf is a plain scalar, itself run through the same value predicates as a
  top-level scalar. Nested collections, quoted leaves, duplicate keys, an empty or
  unclosed mapping, and `{a:b}` (which PyYAML 6.0.3 reads as the *key* `a:b`, not as
  a scalar) all raise. The form is expressible, never trusted: the allowlist
  inspects every key, which is the property that carried the security when the
  blanket refusal was doing the enforcing. **A block list may not mix scalar items
  and mappings** — YAML permits it, but a consumer iterating `sources` and reading
  `entry.get("id")` gets an `AttributeError` off the first `str`. What else
  survives is scalars and flat lists of strings. **Two routes used to
  degrade into a string instead of failing, and that defect is closed in `1.1.0`**:
  a block-sequence item carrying exactly one key (`sources:\n  - uri: https://e.com/a`
  yielded the *string* `'uri: https://e.com/a'`) and the inline second colon
@ -72,13 +57,7 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
  outright). Both parsed "successfully" into the wrong *type*, and a pointer parked
  in one rode through in a key the `resource` allowlist never inspects — mode-b
  `import_bundle` returned WARN and wrote the merged concept verbatim. Both now
-  FAIL_SECURE at T2, before the allowlist is reached. **What closed is the type
+  FAIL_SECURE at T2, before the allowlist is reached. **The boundary is where YAML
  confusion, not pointer-smuggling as a class:** T3 still inspects `resource` and
  nothing else, so an honest *string* under another key rides through exactly as
  before — `attester: attesters/sql_equality.py` is WARN, while the same path
  under `resource:` FAIL_SECUREs. That is by design (the string is scanned like
  any other frontmatter value under T1) and it is not what `1.1.0` changed.
  **The boundary is where YAML
  puts it**, ground-truthed against PyYAML 6.0.3: `": "` and a trailing `":"` open a
  mapping and are refused; a colon carrying neither a space nor a line end
  (`domain:security`, `https://e.com:8443/a`) does not and still parses, as does a
@ -89,58 +68,13 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
  door A/B persist path, so frontmatter that fails secure on import passes
  `screen_output` unremarked. The grammar therefore bounds what a consumer can *receive*,
  never what a producer can *emit*. Verified identical on 0.2.0 and 0.3.1.
- **`sources` passes in both of its spec carriers; the per-entry `usage_window`
+- **Consequence: an OKF v0.2 concept cannot traverse the external-import path.** Both
-  does not.** The wall used to be total: both of v0.2's backward-breaking migration
+  of v0.2's backward-breaking migration targets are nested — `timestamp` → `generated.at`,
-  targets are mappings — `timestamp` → `generated.at`, and body `# Citations` → a
+  and body `# Citations` → a `sources` block list of mappings — so a conformant v0.2
-  `sources` block list of mappings — and a consumer measured **0 of 53** upstream
+  concept fails secure at the frontmatter gate. This is the correct direction but it is
-  concepts through the gate. `generated.at` stopped being a wall in `1.2.0`;
+  a compatibility wall, not a policy: v0.2 support requires a deliberate parse-safety
-  `sources` stopped being one in `1.3.0`, which admits both the block sequence of
+  decision about widening the grammar, and the dangling-or-substituted `executor`/
-  block mappings (SPEC.md §5.1's own example) and the flow sequence of flow
+  `attester` pointer question only becomes live once that decision is made.
  mappings (the form the OKF producers emit, measured 2026-09-02 by two consumers
  independently). **`resource` is allowlisted inside a `sources` entry and nowhere
  else.** `1.2.0` left it off on the argument that the parser could not tell
  `sources[].resource` (§5.1, a citation) from `executor.resource` / `attester.resource`
  (§10, a pointer to code to be run — door C). That premise was measured false: the
  owning key is in scope at every call site and was simply never threaded through.
  It is threaded now, so `executor: [{ resource: skills/run.md }]` and
  `attester:\n  - resource: …` are refused on the allowlist through *every* carrier,
  including the two this opened. **What stays refused: a `usage_window` inside a
  `sources` entry.** SPEC §5.1 permits it per entry ("A single entry MAY carry its
  own `usage_window`"), and it is a mapping inside a mapping — depth 2, which this
  parser admits at no key. A bundle using the per-entry override is refused; the
  shared sibling `usage_window` (the §5.1 example's own form) passes. This is a
  registered conformance gap, not an oversight: no-nesting-past-depth-1 is a
  security property, and spending it was not what the fix was for.
 - **`sources[].resource` is scanned as text but never validated as a URL.** T3's
  https allowlist inspects the *top-level* `resource` and nothing else. It cannot
  be extended to `sources` entries without over-blocking conformant bundles: SPEC
  §5.1 explicitly permits a bundle-relative path, a path into `references/`, or a
  scope descriptor a consumer cannot follow at all (the OKF producers' own golden
  bundle emits `resource: fixture`). So a `sources` entry may carry
  `file://`, `javascript:` or any other string; it goes through T1's scan like any
  other frontmatter value, and nothing else. **A consumer that dereferences
  `sources[].resource` must validate it itself** — `okf.validate_resource_url` is
  exported for exactly that. The dangling-or-substituted `executor`/`attester`
  pointer question stays out of reach separately: both are top-level block
  mappings, a carrier that is still refused.
 - **`tags` and `description` block the OKF import corpus universally, before the
  trust layer is even reached.** The line-flat frontmatter parser has no
  sequence-value type at all: `tags` is present in 53/53 upstream concept
  documents — 9/53 as a flow sequence (`[a, b, c]`, rejected on the `[`
  indicator) and 44/53 as a block sequence (`- a` / `- b`, rejected as
  `"malformed frontmatter line"`) — 100% rejection regardless of form.
  `description` is present in 53/53; 29/53 is a folded plain scalar continuing
  on an indented second line, which the parser has no continuation-line model
  for and misreads as `"nested mappings are not supported"` (the remaining
  24/53 are single-line and parse fine). Measured directly on the upstream
  reference bundles (`_okf-upstream/okf` @ `3fcbb9f`): removing `tags` alone
  lets 4/53 documents pass; removing both `tags` and `description` together
  (trust layer untouched) lets the same 4/53 pass, and all four then parse
  `generated` correctly as a mapping. **Independent of the mapping-form work
  above:** neither `1.2.0`'s flow mapping nor `1.3.0`'s `sources` carriers move
  anything on this corpus, because `tags`/`description` reject before `sources`
  is ever read. No sequence-value type or continuation-line model exists in the
  stdlib-only parser to close this with.
 - **A persist gate cannot cover execution risk.** OKF v0.2 introduces concepts whose
  purpose is to *name code to be run* (`runtime`, `executor.resource`,
  `attester.resource`). This library answers "is this safe to **store**"; executable
@ -364,21 +298,6 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
  `test_split_tightens_the_trusted_tier_when_both_carriers_are_present` constructs
  and pins. Read the zero as "not observed in any of the three populations, each
  counted against its own denominator", never as "cannot happen".
 - **The split also LOOSENS the upload door for a lone anchor — the direction it was
  built for, and the one with a residual worth naming.** Measured as shipped:
  `<a href="https://ext.example/p">t</a>` on its own emits one
  `active:raw-html-link` at MEDIUM and disposes `quarantine_review` under
  `PRESET_USER_UPLOAD` (`warn` under `PRESET_TRUSTED_SOURCE`); through 0.6.1 the
  same document graded HIGH and `fail_secure`d. An `<img src>` to the same host is
  untouched — `active:raw-html`, HIGH, `fail_secure`. So an anchor pointing at an
  attacker-controlled host, arriving on an untrusted upload, is now a human decision
  rather than a halt. The trade is deliberate and it removes an asymmetry that came
  from syntax rather than affordance: following an anchor needs a click, exactly like
  the markdown inline link that has graded MEDIUM since 0.3.1, so the same URL no
  longer grades two different ways depending on which syntax carries it. It is
  recorded here so 0.7.0's "frees N documents" is not read as free — what was freed
  is the click-required class, and MEDIUM is a real grade drop on the door where
  every finding is trust-escalated.
 - **Raw-HTML findings no longer count end tags, and that moved a published field.**
  Through 0.6.1 `</a>` was active by name on its own, so `count` ran roughly 1.6×
  the opening-tag total (measured on one corpus) and a start/end pair counted 2.
@ -387,44 +306,6 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
  every document carrying `</a>`, on a field whose meaning did not change. The
  finding count is unaffected: the class still collapses to one finding per class
  per document, and `count` was never a document count.
 - **Which tags the no-URL narrowing may render inert is a judgement about affordance,
  and no test in this repo can derive it.** `_URL_AFFORDANCE_TAGS` holds the nine
  names whose entire active affordance *is* the URL they name — `a`, `area`, `img`,
  `video`, `audio`, `source`, `track`, `frame`, `frameset` — so carrying no URL
  attribute they name no target and grade inert. Every other name in the active set
  stays active with no attributes at all, because it does something a URL cannot
  describe: `<script>` executes its body, `<style>` restyles, `<form>` submits. That
  boundary is asserted, not measured. A name placed in the set whose affordance does
  *not* reduce to its URL would go silently invisible, and no corpus can catch it,
  because what it produces is an absence — the census counts findings, and a tag that
  stopped firing contributes nothing to count. The fail-secure choice one branch
  further in holds the other way and is worth reading beside it: a URL attribute whose
  *value* this module cannot resolve keeps the tag active
  (`active_content.py:320-324`), a branch the three corpora exercise **0** times.
  That zero is empirical, so the predicate is written not to depend on it.
 - **"Clean" means *graded, no finding raised* — never *cleaned bytes* — and at one
  measured consumer's door, `warn` is the floor a document must clear to be
  persisted rather than rejected.** The word is the library's own: a WARN
  disposition with nothing to report carries the reason string `"clean: no
  findings"` (`disposition.py:264`), and this project has repeated that word in the
  tables it sends consumers. `screen_output` is a judgement API — its
  `DispositionResult` carries `assessment` / `disposition` / `max_severity` /
  `reasons`, with no sanitized-text field to read off it. Defanging lives in a
  separate, deliberate call — `neutralize` — that a caller must invoke itself;
  nothing upstream of that call transforms a byte. Measured against
  `llm-ingestion-okf`'s `0.7.0` pin (2026-08-13): `inbox.py:139` sets its persist
  floor to `warn`, and `inbox.py:323` persists anything carrying that disposition
  into the bundle; its adapter (`guard_adapter.py:70`) forwards the original
  extracted text, because nothing upstream ever handed it a transformed one. Four
  raw-HTML carrier forms the 0.7.0 no-URL narrowing grades inert — an
  `<a aria-label>` with no `href`, a bare `</a>`, `<Frame>`, `<video />` — verified
  here (`screen_output(..., PRESET_USER_UPLOAD)`) to dispose `warn, clean: no
  findings`; at that consumer's door the same four land written into the bundle,
  carrier present verbatim. Neither library is wrong: `screen_output` never
  promised transformed bytes, and the consumer never called `neutralize` for them.
  The gap is in reading "clean" as "sanitized" rather than "no finding raised" — a
  reading this project's own reports invite, and one that will mislead any caller
  that persists on `warn` without calling `neutralize` itself.
 - **Measured, document by document: a large minority of *benign* documents do not
  persist unattended at the upload door.** The bullets above bound single rules on
  single URLs. This one bounds the thing a consumer actually feels — how often an
@ -551,23 +432,6 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
  HIGH under a low-trust preset is `fail_secure`. Report-only means the text is
  never mutated — it does not mean the finding cannot block.
 - **The two labels a `<script>` tag raises come from patterns that do not match the
  same strings.** `hybrid-xss:script-tag` is `<script\b[^><]*>`; `active:raw-html`
  reads the same tag through `HTML_TAG_RE`, which consumes quoted attribute runs
  atomically and so tolerates both `<` and `>` inside a quoted value. The lexicon's
  `<` exclusion is not a modelling choice — it is the 0.3.3 ReDoS fix, and widening
  it back to `[^>]` restores a quadratic arm (the row below carries the numbers).
  Measured through both scanners: `<script src="a<b">` raises `active:raw-html` and
  **no** XSS label, while `<script data-t="a>b">` raises both, the lexicon's match
  simply ending at the quoted `>`. The disposition never moves — the raw-HTML branch
  grades `<script>` HIGH with no attributes at all, so every shape here still
  `fail_secure`s under `PRESET_USER_UPLOAD` — so what the divergence costs is the
  *label*: a consumer filtering findings on the XSS id sees a subset of the script
  tags the gate actually caught, and must not read that id as the gate's script-tag
  census. The residual is practically dead in prose (a `<` inside a script tag's
  quoted attribute region is not an ordinary shape) and is recorded because the
  asymmetry is invisible from either scanner alone.
 - **A connection-string password longer than 256 chars is not matched.** The
  password run in the `*-connstr` egress patterns is bounded by
  `MAX_CONNSTR_VALUE`; unbounded, it sits in front of a mandatory `@` and makes
@ -584,96 +448,24 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
  missed; on one preset it is held for review instead of halted.
 - **The ReDoS sweep has a measured sensitivity floor, not a clean bill of
-  health.** All 152 compiled patterns across all eleven regex-bearing modules are
+  health.** All 150 compiled patterns across all eleven regex-bearing modules are
  swept arm by arm — payloads synthesised per run from each pattern's own
  skeleton, so `[`, `[system]` and `[system](` are each probed separately rather
  than relying on generic units, and each pattern is timed in the call mode the
  production code uses (`.sub()`/`.finditer()` visit every start position where
  `.match()` cannot). Five patterns were quadratic across 0.3.3 and 0.3.4; all
  are fixed. But the sweep flags on *timing*, and it ignores measurements below a
-  1.5 ms noise floor at N=8000 — process CPU time, re-derived on that instrument
+  1.5 ms noise floor at N=8000. A quadratic arm sitting just under that floor
-  (see the clock bullet below) rather than inherited from the wall clock the
+  would still cost **up to ~23 s** at the 1 000 000-char cap. So the claim this
-  script used through 1.1.0. A quadratic arm sitting just under that floor would
+  sweep supports is "no arm worse than ~23 s at the cap", not "no quadratic arm
-  still cost **up to ~23 s** at the 1 000 000-char cap — that figure is arithmetic
+  remains". The method's blind spot is real and has now been demonstrated twice:
-  and not a measurement: a quadratic arm costs the square of the length ratio, and
+  a generic-payload pass found only one of 0.3.3's two patterns, and 0.3.2's
  1.5 ms × 125 × 125 is 23.4 s. So the claim this sweep supports is "no arm worse
  than ~23 s at the cap", not "no quadratic arm remains". The method's blind spot
  is real and has now been demonstrated twice: a generic-payload pass found only
  one of 0.3.3's two patterns, and 0.3.2's
  hand-written rows missed all three of 0.3.4's — including one on `sanitize`,
  the first thing every ingested document touches. **Two arm shapes the unit-
  repetition payloads cannot express** are pinned by hand as a result: a tag that
  *closes* around a long body, and a run of plain characters carrying no anchor
  at all.
 - **A green ReDoS row is evidence only if it has been seen red, and three rows in
  this suite had never been.** The class is not a bad bound but a payload that cannot
  reach the defect, and it leaves the row passing under the vulnerable form too. The
  sub-agent row is the clearest case: the seed's unbounded lazy run costs per *prefix
  match*, not per character — each start position where `spawn an agent that ` matches
  drives its own O(N) scan to end-of-string looking for a capability keyword the
  payload never supplies, so K prefix matches cost K×O(N), and the bounded
  `(?:\S+\s+){0,12}?` port caps each scan at 12 tokens for K×O(1). A payload that
  matches the prefix **once** and then pads pays a single lazy run and is linear
  however long the pad is — two earlier shapes did exactly that, and the row sat
  measured-dead at 1.2× until the payload was rebuilt as
  `"spawn an agent that " * 3000`. (The nesting an older comment blamed is a red
  herring: the inner `.*?` sits in an optional group, never a repeated one.) Measured
  through `scan_lexicon` with the seed form patched back in — exponent **1.92** against
  the shipped **1.01**, and **4.091s vs 0.190s** at 12 000 words, the seed breaking the
  2.0s bound outright. Two siblings were dead for different reasons.
  `lexicon-script-tag` had to be given its own N=200 000: at the shared N=100 000 the
  vulnerable `[^>]` form measured only ~1.2–1.4s — under the 2.0s assert, so the row
  was green under both forms and proved nothing. And
  `test_gate_is_bounded_on_the_long_attribute_arm` was killed by **this repo's own
  narrowing**: 0.7.0 put `<a>` in `_URL_AFFORDANCE_TAGS`, so its `<a ` + 100k + `>`
  payload became inert and returned *before* the body ever reached the arm the row
  exists to guard — separation 1.0×, 0.028s and no findings, against 12.475s for the
  same payload carried by `<script `. The carrier was moved to `<script `, which is
  active by name with no attributes, so no future URL-shaped narrowing can hollow it
  out the same way. The general rule the three share: a payload must **deny** the
  literal the vulnerable run sits in front of — a unit that supplies it matches
  immediately and never exercises the run. **Nothing but hand measurement finds this
  class.** The row is green either way, so
  the suite cannot report its own blind spot, and every bound in it should be read as
  "verified red under the vulnerable form" only where a comment says it was.
 - **Every ReDoS bound in the suite is measured on process CPU time, and so is the
  sweep that sets the published sensitivity floor.** `tests/redos_clock.py` is the one
  clock all six test files import — `time.process_time()` — because a blowup is spent
  cycles while a loaded machine steals wall clock without adding any. On
  `time.monotonic()` two 0.7.0 rows failed at **2.24s / 3.66s** against a 2.0s bound
  while two census processes held the CPU, and passed 3/3 on an idle machine: they had
  been descheduled, not slowed. It lives in one module rather than five copies because
  `test_output.py::test_the_redos_clock_ignores_time_this_process_did_not_spend` pins
  one implementation, and four unpinned copies would be free to drift back to a wall
  clock with nothing going red. **What the CPU clock gives up, stated: a scan that
  BLOCKS forever burns no CPU, so it would hang the suite instead of failing it.**
  That is acceptable only because every scanner it measures is pure regex over an
  in-memory string, with no I/O and no locks — the last wall-clock holdout was retired
  by auditing its path for anything that could block, not by assumption, and a wall
  clock guarding a mode that cannot occur still charges the false-red premium
  (measured there at 21.6s against a 10.0s bound, on a scan that spent 7.6s). **The sweep
  now runs on the same clock, and closing that divergence bought no sensitivity.**
  `docs/redos-sweep.py` imports `scan_seconds` instead of timing on
  `time.monotonic()`, so the 1.5 ms floor at N=8000 and the "~23 s at the cap"
  figure above are finally in the same currency as the bounds they justify. What
  the move did *not* do is quiet the sweep, and the floor came back unchanged.
  Measured over **twelve full runs of all 2585 arms**: the median ratio sits at
  **1.95–2.03** in every size bucket above 50 µs — the whole surface measures
  linear — while two-point excursions past the 2.6 flag threshold survive at every
  magnitude, p99 ratio **2.9–3.3 even above 1 ms**. Flagged arms per run by floor:
  **6.9 at 0.5 ms, 1.1 at 1.0 ms, 0.33 at 1.5 ms** (0–2 per run), so 1.5 ms is
  still the knee. Descheduling was never what made this sweep noisy — a ratio
  computed from two points is. Four distinct arms flagged at the shipped floor
  across those twelve runs, **each in exactly one of them**, and nine of the twelve
  runs were clean; eight consecutive runs of the shipped script immediately after a
  full test run flagged 0–3 arms each, so machine load still moves the count even
  on a CPU clock. Six flagged arms re-measured over six doublings give exponent
  **0.97–1.09** and at most 1.2 s at the 1 000 000-char cap. **A single clean run
  of this sweep is therefore not evidence either** — and neither is a single
  flagged one.
 - **Every surface now bounds its input, but not all of them the same way.**
  `sanitize`, `fence` and `neutralize` raise `OversizeInputError` above
  `MAX_INPUT_CHARS` (1 000 000) rather than returning a partially transformed
@ -736,23 +528,6 @@ fails the test, forcing this doc to be updated:
  names the outward fetch whatever severity it carries — and must not infer
  "nothing was seen" from a low `Severity`.
 - **Under the default action map the assessment axis carries exactly one judgement
  the disposition does not.** `DEFAULT_ACTION_MAP` sends `NONE` and `LOW` to `WARN`,
  `ELEVATED` to `QUARANTINE_REVIEW` and `SEVERE` to `FAIL_SECURE` — the last two 1:1.
  So for any document that carries a finding at all, `assessment` is a relabelling of
  `disposition` and nothing more; the only thing it adds is *clean* versus *findings
  present, none dispositive in this context*, which 0.4.0 rendered identically. That
  collapse is the point (the map is what keeps the separation additive, so a caller
  ignoring the new axis sees no change), and it is also the limitation: reading
  `assessment` buys a consumer nothing until it supplies its own `action_map` or needs
  the clean/low distinction. **The second consequence is on this document.** The
  published false-positive rates are counts of documents *disposed non-WARN*, and they
  are a statement about assessed risk only while `NONE` + `LOW` are exactly the WARN
  pre-image. `tests/test_corpus.py::test_the_published_fp_metric_is_a_risk_statement`
  pins that equivalence — but it pins it for `DEFAULT_ACTION_MAP`. A caller running its
  own map makes "disposed non-WARN" a different claim from the one measured here, with
  nothing in either repo failing to say so.
 - **A ZWJ hidden between two emoji is exempt, and ZWNJ's own false-positive
  class is untouched.** U+200D composes emoji (👩‍💻 is WOMAN + ZWJ + PERSONAL
  COMPUTER), so testing it on codepoint membership alone flagged *and stripped*
@ -771,22 +546,6 @@ fails the test, forcing this doc to be updated:
  not pictographic) and no corpus is available here to verify it against, so it
  is parked as a known false-positive class rather than guessed at.
 - **That context test is one predicate on two surfaces, and the symbol carrying it is
  private.** `sanitize` owns `_is_joiner_in_emoji_sequence`; `output` imports it
  (`output.py:74`) instead of restating it, because the same defect had to be fixed on
  both surfaces and a split would let the input side stop flagging while the output
  side kept hard-blocking — or the reverse, which is how a carrier reaches a persisted
  artifact after passing the input gate. The agreement is pinned by
  `tests/test_output.py::test_output_zwj_narrowing_matches_the_sanitize_side`, which
  asserts `stripped == flagged` across six shapes — half-context on either side, a
  leading and a trailing joiner, one genuine in-sequence joiner, and a word split.
  Two things that pin does not give. The six shapes are hand-written rather than
  drawn from a corpus, so everywhere outside them
  the surfaces agree by *shared implementation*, not by test — which is the stronger
  guarantee only for as long as the import survives. And the leading underscore means
  the predicate is **not** part of the surface frozen under semver: a consumer that
  imports it is pinning a private name 1.x makes no promise about.
 ## Out-of-scope (documented boundary)
 Embedding/vector-layer defenses (OWASP LLM08, downstream of persist); multimodal
--- a/docs/redos-sweep.py
+++ b/docs/redos-sweep.py
@ -37,30 +37,17 @@ import importlib
 import json
 import re
 import sys
 import time
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
-ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+SRC = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "src" / "llm_ingestion_guard"
 SRC = ROOT / "src" / "llm_ingestion_guard"
 sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC.parent))
 sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "tests"))
 from llm_ingestion_guard.lexicon import load_lexicon  # noqa: E402
 from redos_clock import scan_seconds  # noqa: E402
 N1, N2 = 4_000, 8_000
 RATIO_FLAG = 2.6
 # RE-DERIVED on the CPU clock, not inherited from the wall clock this script used
 # through 1.1.0. The clock move fixed false REDS in the suite's bounds; it bought
 # this sweep no sensitivity. Over twelve full runs (2585 arms each) the median
 # ratio is 1.95-2.03 in every size bucket above 50 us -- the whole surface
 # measures linear -- yet two-point excursions past RATIO_FLAG survive at every
 # magnitude (p99 ratio 2.9-3.3 even above 1 ms). Flagged arms per run by floor:
 # 6.9 at 0.5 ms, 1.1 at 1.0 ms, 0.33 at 1.5 ms. The knee is here. Four arms
 # flagged across those twelve runs, each in exactly ONE of them, and six arms
 # that have ever flagged re-measure at exponent 0.97-1.09 over six doublings.
 # Descheduling was never what made this sweep noisy -- a two-point ratio is, so
 # read a clean run and a flagged run with the same suspicion.
 NOISE_FLOOR = 0.0015
 HARD_CAP = 20.0
@ -147,35 +134,21 @@ def build(unit: str, n: int) -> str:
 def t(rx: re.Pattern[str], text: str, mode: str = "search") -> float:
-    """Time one scan of ``text`` in the mode the production code actually uses.
+    """Time one scan of ``text`` in the mode the production code actually uses."""
    On the SAME clock every ReDoS bound in the suite is measured against --
    ``tests/redos_clock.py``, process CPU time -- imported rather than restated
    here, for the reason that module gives: a blowup is spent cycles, and a
    loaded machine steals wall clock without adding any. Until 1.1.0 this timed
    on ``time.monotonic()``, which made the floor below and the cap figure
    derived from it numbers from a different instrument than the bounds they
    justify. The closure is built BEFORE the clock starts, so only the scan is
    charged.
    """
    mode = mode.rstrip("*")
    start = time.monotonic()
    if mode == "finditer":
-        def scan(s: str) -> None:
+        for _ in rx.finditer(text):
            for _ in rx.finditer(s):
            pass
    elif mode == "sub":
-        def scan(s: str) -> None:
+        rx.sub("", text)
            rx.sub("", s)
    elif mode == "match":
-        def scan(s: str) -> None:
+        rx.match(text)
            rx.match(s)
    elif mode == "fullmatch":
-        def scan(s: str) -> None:
+        rx.fullmatch(text)
            rx.fullmatch(s)
    else:
-        def scan(s: str) -> None:
+        rx.search(text)
-            rx.search(s)
+    return time.monotonic() - start
    return scan_seconds(scan, text)
 # --- targets ----------------------------------------------------------------
--- a/llms.txt
+++ b/llms.txt
@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 # llm-ingestion-guard
 > Write-time defensive layer for Python pipelines that persist LLM output: sanitize, fence, tool-less quarantined transform, capability isolation, scan before persist, fail-secure.
 ```bash
 pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v1.1.0"
 ```
--- a/pyproject.toml
+++ b/pyproject.toml
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 [project]
 name = "llm-ingestion-guard"
-version = "1.3.0"
+version = "1.1.0"
 description = "Write-time defensive layer for Python pipelines that persist LLM output: sanitize, fence, tool-less quarantined transform, capability isolation, scan before persist, fail-secure."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
--- a/src/llm_ingestion_guard/init.py
+++ b/src/llm_ingestion_guard/init.py
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ from .grounding import (
 )
 from . import okf
-__version__ = "1.3.0"
+__version__ = "1.1.0"
 # --- §6 bookends: the two library-side halves around the transform ---------
--- a/src/llm_ingestion_guard/coverage.py
+++ b/src/llm_ingestion_guard/coverage.py
@ -542,11 +542,8 @@ def _build_cases() -> list[Case]:
                    lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter("---\nkey:\n  nested: x\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"),
        _raise_case("okf", "T2 frontmatter block scalar", "OKFFrontmatterError",
                    lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter("---\ndesc: |\n  block\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"),
-        _raise_case("okf", "T2 frontmatter flow sequence", "OKFFrontmatterError",
+        _raise_case("okf", "T2 frontmatter flow collection", "OKFFrontmatterError",
                    lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter("---\ntags: [a, b]\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"),
        _raise_case("okf", "T2 mapping key off the allowlist", "OKFFrontmatterError",
                    lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter(
                        "---\ngenerated: { by: a, tool: shell }\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"),
        _raise_case("okf", "T3 resource non-https (http)", "OKFResourceError",
                    lambda: okf.validate_resource_url("http://insecure.test/x"), owasp="LLM05"),
        _raise_case("okf", "T3 resource data: scheme", "OKFResourceError",
--- a/src/llm_ingestion_guard/okf.py
+++ b/src/llm_ingestion_guard/okf.py
@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ and feeds scannable text regions into the existing ``sanitize`` / ``scan_output`
 T2 — frontmatter parse-safety gate. ``parse_frontmatter`` is a *strict,
 reject-by-default* loader for the minimal OKF frontmatter subset: flat
-``key: value`` scalars, block ``- item`` lists, and one typed, allowlisted
+``key: value`` scalars plus block ``- item`` lists. Every construct the
 mapping form (``{ by: x, at: y }`` — see :func:`_parse_flow_mapping`). Every construct the
 "block anchor/alias DoS + dangerous type coercion" requirement names is refused
 *by construction* — you cannot suffer a billion-laughs alias expansion or a
 ``!!python/object`` coercion if anchors, aliases and explicit tags are rejected
@ -17,9 +16,7 @@ philosophy, the frontmatter analogue of the ``resource`` reject-gate (T3).
 Deliberately NOT a general YAML parser. A security tool whose thesis is
 minimal-dependency should not pull in a full YAML engine whose own features
-(anchors, tags, merges) are the attack surface being defended against. The one
+(anchors, tags, merges) are the attack surface being defended against. Quoted
 mapping form it does admit is admitted key-by-key against an allowlist, not
 parsed generally: the mapping class is expressible, never trusted. Quoted
 scalars are kept verbatim (quotes included) rather than unquoted — the value is
 still scanned as text downstream, so an injection inside a quoted value is not
 lost; richer scalar forms are a future refinement, not a silent parse.
@ -65,49 +62,13 @@ _KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*$")
 # A plain OKF scalar cannot *begin* with a YAML structural indicator. Any value
 # starting with one signals an anchor (&), alias (*), explicit tag (!), block
 # scalar (|, >), flow collection ([ ] { }), directive (%) or reserved char
-# (@ `) — all outside the supported subset and all rejected. `{` and `[` are
+# (@ `) — all outside the supported subset and all rejected.
 # tried as the allowlisted mapping form (G3) and the flow sequence of them (G30)
 # FIRST; they reach this predicate only as a leaf inside one, where a nested
 # collection is refused before it can be read.
 _DANGEROUS_VALUE_STARTS = frozenset("&*!|>[]{}%@`")
 # A quoted scalar is a scalar in YAML however many colons it carries, so the
 # mapping check steps aside for one. The quotes are retained rather than
 # stripped — a pre-existing divergence, pinned in tests/test_okf.py.
 _QUOTE_STARTS = frozenset("\"'")
 # G3 - the one mapping form T2 can express (operator decision, 2026-08-21).
 # Every key inside a mapping must be on this allowlist: the form is safe because
 # the allowlist inspects each key, not because mappings became trusted. The keys
 # are the ones OKF v0.2 names inside a mapping - `by`/`at` (SPEC.md @ 62432a09
 # §5.2 `generated`/`verified`) and `from`/`to` (§5.1 `usage_window`), plus the
 # §5.1 `sources`-entry labels.
 _MAPPING_KEY_ALLOWLIST = frozenset({
    "by", "at", "from", "to", "id", "title", "author", "usage_count",
    "last_modified",
 })
 # G30 - the two §5.1 keys admitted inside a `sources` entry and NOWHERE else
 # (operator decision, 2026-09-02). `resource` is REQUIRED within a `sources`
 # entry, so leaving it off left the whole provenance family unwritable; but the
 # same field name in §10 (`executor.resource`, `attester.resource`) names run
 # instructions and code - the door-C route closed in 1.1.0. 1.2.0 argued the
 # parser could not tell the two apart without parent-key context it did not
 # have. That premise was false: the owning key is in scope at every call site
 # below, it was simply never threaded through. It is threaded now, so the
 # discrimination is structural rather than a judgement about the value.
 # `usage_window` is allowlisted here for accuracy of refusal - §5.1 permits it
 # per entry, and it is then refused on the depth rule (a mapping inside a
 # mapping, which this parser admits at no key) rather than refused as if the
 # key were unknown.
 _SOURCES_ENTRY_KEYS = frozenset({"resource", "usage_window"})
 def _allowed_mapping_keys(parent_key):
    """The mapping-key allowlist for a mapping owned by ``parent_key``."""
    if parent_key == "sources":
        return _MAPPING_KEY_ALLOWLIST | _SOURCES_ENTRY_KEYS
    return _MAPPING_KEY_ALLOWLIST
 class OKFError(Exception):
    """Base class for OKF adapter rejections."""
@ -145,10 +106,7 @@ def parse_frontmatter(document):
    Raises ``OKFFrontmatterError`` on an unterminated fence or any construct
    outside the minimal flat subset (anchors, aliases, explicit tags, merge
-    keys, block scalars, flow sequences, nested mappings). The single exception
+    keys, block scalars, flow collections, nested mappings).
    is the typed, allowlisted flow mapping (:func:`_parse_flow_mapping`), which
    parses into a ``dict`` of allowlisted keys with plain-scalar leaves — every
    other route to a mapping still raises.
    """
    lines = document.split("\n")
    if not lines or lines[0].strip() != _FENCE:
@ -191,29 +149,11 @@ def _scannable_regions(frontmatter, body):
    """The text regions of a concept that carry attacker-controlled content."""
    regions = [body]
    for value in frontmatter.values():
        regions.extend(_value_regions(value))
    return regions
 def _value_regions(value):
    """Every scannable leaf of one frontmatter value.
    A mapping value (G3) is a new *shape* on this surface, not a new exemption:
    its leaves are scanned exactly like a scalar or a list item, so an injection
    parked in ``generated: { by: ... }`` reaches ``scan_output`` like any other
    frontmatter text. The same holds for a *list* of mappings (G30, ``sources``),
    which this function already flattens through its list branch. Mapping *keys*
    are not scanned because they cannot carry attacker text - the allowlist
    admits a fixed, per-parent name set and nothing else.
    """
    if isinstance(value, dict):
        return [leaf for leaf in value.values() if leaf]
        if isinstance(value, list):
-        regions = []
+            regions.extend(value)
-        for item in value:
+        elif value:
-            regions.extend(_value_regions(item))
+            regions.append(value)
    return regions
    return [value] if value else []
 def validate_concept_path(path, *, allow_reserved=False):
@ -635,22 +575,10 @@ def _parse_flat(fm_lines):
            raise OKFFrontmatterError("invalid frontmatter key: %r" % key)
        if value == "":
-            items, i = _consume_block_list(fm_lines, i + 1, key)
+            items, i = _consume_block_list(fm_lines, i + 1)
            result[key] = items if items is not None else ""
            continue
        mapping = _parse_flow_mapping(value, key)
        if mapping is not None:
            result[key] = mapping
            i += 1
            continue
        sequence = _parse_flow_sequence(value, key)
        if sequence is not None:
            result[key] = sequence
            i += 1
            continue
        _reject_dangerous_value(value)
        _reject_mapping_construct(value)
        result[key] = value
@ -659,26 +587,14 @@ def _parse_flat(fm_lines):
    return result
-def _consume_block_list(fm_lines, start, parent_key=None):
+def _consume_block_list(fm_lines, start):
    """Consume ``  - item`` lines following a bare ``key:``.
-    Returns ``(items, next_index)`` - ``items`` is ``None`` (and ``next_index``
+    Returns ``(items, next_index)`` — ``items`` is ``None`` (and ``next_index``
    unchanged) when no list item follows, so the caller can treat the key as an
    empty scalar and let the next line trip the nested-structure guard.
    An item is one of three shapes, decided by the item text alone: a flow
    mapping (G3), a block mapping (G30 - an unquoted ``key: value`` opening a
    run of more-indented sibling entries, which is SPEC.md §5.1's own carrier
    for ``sources``), or a plain scalar. ``parent_key`` is the key that owns the
    list; it decides the mapping-key allowlist, which is how ``sources[].resource``
    is admitted while ``executor``/``attester`` ``resource`` stays refused.
    A list may not mix scalars and mappings. YAML permits it, but a consumer
    iterating ``sources`` and reading ``entry.get("id")`` gets an
    ``AttributeError`` off the first ``str`` - refusing is the cheaper failure.
    """
    items = []
    kinds = set()
    i = start
    n = len(fm_lines)
    while i < n:
@ -687,113 +603,19 @@ def _consume_block_list(fm_lines, start, parent_key=None):
        if stripped == "" or stripped.startswith("#"):
            i += 1
            continue
-        if not (raw[:1] in (" ", "\t") and stripped.startswith("- ")):
+        if raw[:1] in (" ", "\t") and stripped.startswith("- "):
            break
            item = stripped[2:].strip()
        mapping = _parse_flow_mapping(item, parent_key)
        if mapping is not None:
            items.append(mapping)
            kinds.add("mapping")
            i += 1
            continue
        entry = _block_mapping_entry(item)
        if entry is not None:
            mapping, i = _consume_block_mapping(fm_lines, i + 1, entry, parent_key)
            items.append(mapping)
            kinds.add("mapping")
            continue
            _reject_dangerous_value(item)
            _reject_mapping_construct(item)
            items.append(item)
        kinds.add("scalar")
            i += 1
-
+            continue
-    if len(kinds) > 1:
+        break
        raise OKFFrontmatterError(
            "a block list may not mix scalar items and mappings: %r" % (parent_key,)
        )
    if not items:
        return None, start
    return items, i
 def _block_mapping_entry(text):
    """Read ``text`` as one ``key: value`` block-mapping entry, or return ``None``.
    The trigger is deliberately the same shape ``_reject_mapping_construct``
    uses to *refuse* a scalar: an unquoted ``": "``. What changes in 1.3.0 is
    only what happens next - the entry is admitted key-by-key against the
    allowlist instead of refused wholesale. Every shape that is a scalar to
    PyYAML stays one here: a quoted item, a colon with no space
    (``domain:security``, ``https://e.com:8443/a``) and a trailing colon all
    return ``None`` and fall through to the unchanged scalar rules.
    """
    if not text or text[0] in _QUOTE_STARTS:
        return None
    key, sep, leaf = text.partition(": ")
    if not sep:
        return None
    key = key.strip()
    if not _KEY_RE.match(key):
        return None
    return key, leaf.strip()
 def _consume_block_mapping(fm_lines, start, first_entry, parent_key):
    """Consume the sibling entries of a block mapping opened by a ``- `` item.
    Returns ``(mapping, next_index)``. A sibling is an indented line that does
    not open a new list item; the run ends at a blank line, a comment, a new
    ``- `` item, or a line at column zero. Depth is capped at one by giving the
    leaves the *unchanged* scalar predicates: a nested collection opens with
    ``{`` or ``[`` and is refused by ``_reject_dangerous_value``, and a further
    block level is refused by ``_reject_mapping_construct``.
    """
    allowed = _allowed_mapping_keys(parent_key)
    mapping = {}
    _admit_mapping_entry(mapping, first_entry[0], first_entry[1], allowed, parent_key)
    i = start
    n = len(fm_lines)
    while i < n:
        raw = fm_lines[i]
        stripped = raw.strip()
        if stripped == "" or stripped.startswith("#"):
            break
        if raw[:1] not in (" ", "\t") or stripped.startswith("- "):
            break
        entry = _block_mapping_entry(stripped)
        if entry is None:
            _reject_dangerous_value(stripped)
            _reject_mapping_construct(stripped)
            raise OKFFrontmatterError(
                "a block-mapping entry must be 'key: value': %r" % (raw,)
            )
        _admit_mapping_entry(mapping, entry[0], entry[1], allowed, parent_key)
        i += 1
    return mapping, i
 def _admit_mapping_entry(mapping, key, leaf, allowed, parent_key):
    """Admit one mapping entry, or raise. The single gate both carriers pass."""
    if not _KEY_RE.match(key):
        raise OKFFrontmatterError("invalid mapping key: %r" % (key,))
    if key not in allowed:
        raise OKFFrontmatterError(
            "mapping key %r is not on the OKF mapping allowlist under %r"
            % (key, parent_key)
        )
    if key in mapping:
        raise OKFFrontmatterError("duplicate mapping key %r" % (key,))
    _reject_dangerous_value(leaf)
    _reject_mapping_construct(leaf)
    mapping[key] = leaf
 def _reject_dangerous_value(value):
    if value and value[0] in _DANGEROUS_VALUE_STARTS:
        raise OKFFrontmatterError(
@ -805,10 +627,8 @@ def _reject_dangerous_value(value):
 def _reject_mapping_construct(value):
    """Reject a scalar that YAML reads as a mapping rather than as a string.
-    T2 gives the mapping *class* exactly one expressible form, the typed
+    T2 gives the mapping *class* no expressible form — flow, nested-block and
-    allowlisted flow mapping (G3); the nested-block and dotted-key routes still
+    dotted-key routes all raise. Two routes used to escape that by degrading
    raise, and this predicate is what keeps them raising — both at the top level
    and on a leaf *inside* an admitted mapping. Two routes used to escape by degrading
    into a string instead: a block-sequence item carrying exactly one key
    (``- uri: x``), and an inline second colon (``attester: resource: x``).
    Both parsed "successfully" into the wrong *type*, and a pointer parked in
@ -828,148 +648,3 @@ def _reject_mapping_construct(value):
        raise OKFFrontmatterError(
            "a mapping is not expressible in OKF frontmatter: %r" % (value,)
        )
 def _parse_flow_mapping(value, parent_key=None):
    """Parse ``{ key: value, ... }`` into a typed dict, or refuse it (G3).
    Returns ``None`` when ``value`` does not open a flow mapping, so the caller
    falls through to the unchanged scalar rules. Otherwise the value either
    parses into a ``dict`` of allowlisted keys with plain-scalar leaves, or
    raises - it never degrades into a string, which is the defect closed in
    1.1.0 and not reopened here.
    Why the mapping class needed *a* form at all: OKF v0.2 writes its whole
    trust and provenance layer as mappings, and SPEC.md @ ``62432a09`` uses flow
    form in its own examples (§5.1 ``usage_window``, §5.2 ``generated`` /
    ``verified``). §11 goes further than "should": a consumer *MUST* treat a
    bare ``verified`` mapping as a one-element list - a rule that presupposes
    the mapping parses. With no form, 0 of 53 upstream concepts reached the
    gate, and no threshold would have changed that.
    Why this form is safe: the allowlist inspects **every key**, which is the
    property that actually carried the security in T2 - the blanket refusal was
    the enforcement, not the point. Admitted, ground-truthed against PyYAML
    6.0.3:
    - one flow mapping per value, closed on the same line (``{ a: b }``);
    - keys on :data:`_MAPPING_KEY_ALLOWLIST` and matching ``_KEY_RE``, no
      duplicates - PyYAML resolves a duplicate last-wins, which is a way to
      show one claim and mean another;
    - plain-scalar leaves only, each run through the *unchanged*
      ``_reject_dangerous_value`` / ``_reject_mapping_construct`` predicates, so
      a leaf can no more open an anchor, a tag or a nested mapping than a
      top-level scalar can.
    Refused, each on its own rule: nested collections (``{ a: { b: c } }``,
    ``{ a: [1] }``), quoted leaves, an empty mapping, an unclosed or
    trailing-junk value (``{ a: b } x``, which PyYAML also refuses), a key
    outside the allowlist, and ``{a:b}`` - which PyYAML reads as the *key*
    ``a:b``, not as a scalar, and which the required ``": "`` separator catches.
    Two deliberate divergences from PyYAML, both toward refusal: a quoted leaf
    (``{ title: 'a, b' }``) and a trailing comment (``{ a: b } # note``) are
    conformant YAML that this rejects. Splitting quoted commas correctly needs a
    quote state machine whose failure mode is *accepting* something YAML would
    refuse; refusing is the cheaper side to be wrong on, and the keys that
    plausibly need a comma (``title``, ``author``) only occur inside ``sources``
    entries, whose block-sequence carrier is refused anyway.
    """
    if not value or value[0] != "{":
        return None
    if not value.endswith("}"):
        raise OKFFrontmatterError(
            "a flow mapping must be closed by '}' on the same line: %r" % (value,)
        )
    inner = value[1:-1].strip()
    if inner.endswith(","):  # a trailing comma is legal YAML; one, and only one
        inner = inner[:-1].strip()
    if not inner:
        raise OKFFrontmatterError("an empty flow mapping carries nothing: %r" % (value,))
    for char in "{}[]":
        if char in inner:
            raise OKFFrontmatterError(
                "a flow mapping admits scalar leaves only, not %r: %r" % (char, value)
            )
    for quote in _QUOTE_STARTS:
        if quote in inner:
            raise OKFFrontmatterError(
                "a quoted scalar inside a flow mapping is not a supported form: %r"
                % (value,)
            )
    allowed = _allowed_mapping_keys(parent_key)
    mapping = {}
    for entry in inner.split(","):
        entry = entry.strip()
        key, sep, leaf = entry.partition(": ")
        if not sep:
            raise OKFFrontmatterError(
                "a flow-mapping entry must be 'key: value': %r" % (entry,)
            )
        _admit_mapping_entry(mapping, key.strip(), leaf.strip(), allowed, parent_key)
    return mapping
 def _parse_flow_sequence(value, parent_key=None):
    """Parse ``[{ ... }, { ... }]`` into a list of typed dicts, or refuse it (G30).
    Returns ``None`` when ``value`` does not open a flow sequence, so the caller
    falls through to the unchanged scalar rules - where ``[`` is still a
    disallowed indicator. This carrier is opened for the flow-mapping element
    and nothing else: it is the form the OKF producers emit for ``sources``
    (measured 02.09 against llm-ingestion-okf's golden bundle, where a
    one-element sequence raised on the ``[`` just as a two-element one did).
    A flow sequence of plain *scalars* (``tags: [a, b, c]``) stays refused. It
    is a different shape with its own quoting and comma-splitting problem, whose
    failure mode would be accepting something YAML reads differently - and the
    block-sequence carrier already covers it for every consumer measured so far.
    Elements are split on ``}`` rather than on commas, which is sound precisely
    because ``_parse_flow_mapping`` admits no nested collection: a ``}`` inside
    an element cannot occur, so the first ``}`` after ``{`` always closes it.
    Anything between elements that is not a separating comma is refused, which
    is what makes trailing junk and a mixed sequence fail rather than parse.
    """
    if not value or value[0] != "[":
        return None
    if not value.endswith("]"):
        raise OKFFrontmatterError(
            "a flow sequence must be closed by ']' on the same line: %r" % (value,)
        )
    inner = value[1:-1].strip()
    if not inner:
        raise OKFFrontmatterError("an empty flow sequence carries nothing: %r" % (value,))
    items = []
    i = 0
    n = len(inner)
    while True:
        while i < n and inner[i] in " \t":
            i += 1
        if i >= n:
            break
        if inner[i] != "{":
            raise OKFFrontmatterError(
                "a flow sequence admits flow mappings only: %r" % (value,)
            )
        close = inner.find("}", i)
        if close == -1:
            raise OKFFrontmatterError(
                "an unclosed flow mapping inside a flow sequence: %r" % (value,)
            )
        items.append(_parse_flow_mapping(inner[i:close + 1], parent_key))
        i = close + 1
        while i < n and inner[i] in " \t":
            i += 1
        if i >= n:
            break
        if inner[i] != ",":
            raise OKFFrontmatterError(
                "trailing junk after a flow-sequence element: %r" % (value,)
            )
        i += 1
    return items
--- a/tests/test_docs_measurement_scripts.py
+++ b/tests/test_docs_measurement_scripts.py
@ -28,12 +28,10 @@ from pathlib import Path
 import pytest
 import redos_clock
 from llm_ingestion_guard import Disposition, PRESET_USER_UPLOAD, Risk, screen_output
 from llm_ingestion_guard import active_content as ac
 _DOCS = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "docs"
 _LIMITATIONS = _DOCS / "LIMITATIONS.md"
 def _load(filename: str):
@ -43,7 +41,6 @@ def _load(filename: str):
    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path)
    assert spec and spec.loader, f"cannot load {path}"
    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
    sys.modules[name] = module  # @dataclass resolves its own module via sys.modules
    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
    return module
@ -52,7 +49,6 @@ def _load(filename: str):
 # script's import list fails the whole file loudly instead of one quiet test.
 fp_sweep = _load("fp-sweep.py")
 census = _load("rawhtml-census.py")
 redos_sweep = _load("redos-sweep.py")
 # --- docs/fp-sweep.py --------------------------------------------------------
@ -249,38 +245,6 @@ def test_census_production_row_equals_its_shipped_candidate(name, attrs):
    assert candidate(name, attrs) == ac.active_tag_class(name, attrs)
 # --- docs/redos-sweep.py ------------------------------------------------------
 def test_redos_sweep_times_on_the_suite_clock_not_a_reimplementation():
    # Until 1.1.0 this script timed on `time.monotonic()`, a different instrument
    # than every ReDoS bound in the suite. `t()` must call the shared
    # `scan_seconds` — imported, not restated — and the module must not import
    # `time` itself, else a drift back to a wall clock would go unnoticed here.
    assert redos_sweep.scan_seconds is redos_clock.scan_seconds
    assert not hasattr(redos_sweep, "time"), "module must not import time itself"
 def test_redos_sweep_floor_and_flag_match_the_published_numbers():
    # docs/LIMITATIONS.md publishes the 1.5 ms floor and the 2.6 flag ratio this
    # script derives from twelve full runs. Pin both sides: the constants, and
    # that the doc still states the same numbers — either drifting alone is a bug.
    assert redos_sweep.NOISE_FLOOR == 0.0015
    assert redos_sweep.RATIO_FLAG == 2.6
    text = _LIMITATIONS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
    assert "1.5 ms noise floor" in text
    assert "2.6 flag threshold" in text
 def test_redos_sweep_collector_covers_152_patterns_across_11_tables():
    # The count docs/LIMITATIONS.md carries as "all 152 compiled patterns across
    # all eleven regex-bearing modules". A pattern added or removed in `src/`
    # without re-measuring would drift the doc's claim silently otherwise.
    assert len(redos_sweep.TABLES) == 11
    total = sum(len(collect()) for collect in redos_sweep.TABLES.values())
    assert total == 152
 # --- both scripts: the argument-less contract --------------------------------
--- a/tests/test_okf.py
+++ b/tests/test_okf.py
@ -548,10 +548,7 @@ _V02_REJECTED = [
    ("generated (nested)", "generated:\n  at: 2026-07-26T10:00:00Z\n"),
    ("executor (nested)", "executor:\n  resource: skills/run-on-bq.md\n"),
    ("attester (nested)", "attester:\n  resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
-    # The carrier is admitted as of 1.3.0 (G30); this row now measures the KEY
+    ("sources (block list of mappings)",
    # SET - `uri`/`kind` are producer-invented, not SPEC §5.1 - and stays red for
    # that reason. SPEC's own §5.1 keys parse; see the G30 block at the foot.
    ("sources (block list, off-allowlist keys)",
     "sources:\n  - uri: https://e.com/a\n    kind: doc\n"),
    ("flow sequence", "tags: [a, b, c]\n"),
    ("flow mapping", "executor: {resource: skills/run.md}\n"),
@ -589,8 +586,6 @@ def test_v02_flat_frontmatter_still_parses(cid, fm):
 _DEGRADED_TO_STRING = [
    # (id, frontmatter, what PyYAML 6.0.3 makes of it)
    # Still red after G30 opened the block-mapping carrier: `uri` is not a §5.1
    # key, so the item is refused by the allowlist instead of by the grammar.
    ("one key per item", "sources:\n  - uri: https://e.com/a\n", "[{'uri': ...}]"),
    ("item, trailing colon", "sources:\n  - uri:\n", "[{'uri': None}]"),
    ("inline double colon", "attester: resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n", "parse error"),
@ -601,11 +596,9 @@ _DEGRADED_TO_STRING = [
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm,yaml_reads_as", _DEGRADED_TO_STRING,
                         ids=[c[0] for c in _DEGRADED_TO_STRING])
 def test_a_mapping_construct_never_degrades_into_a_string(cid, fm, yaml_reads_as):
-    # None of these shapes is the one form T2 admits (G3, the allowlisted flow
+    # The mapping *class* has no expressible form through T2 — so a mapping
-    # mapping) — so each must RAISE, never parse "successfully" into the wrong
+    # construct must RAISE, never parse "successfully" into the wrong type. A
-    # type. A consumer reading frontmatter["sources"][0].get("uri") must not be
+    # consumer reading frontmatter["sources"][0].get("uri") must not be handed a str.
    # handed a str, and that holds whether the mapping class has no expressible
    # form or one.
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
        parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
@ -658,20 +651,13 @@ def test_pointer_in_a_degraded_mapping_no_longer_reaches_the_consumer_tree(cid,
    assert result.disposition is Disposition.FAIL_SECURE, "hole reopened — see LIMITATIONS.md"
-def test_the_expressible_mapping_routes_are_the_ones_the_allowlist_inspects():
+def test_every_route_to_a_mapping_fails_on_a_different_rule():
-    # Was `test_exactly_one_route_to_a_mapping_is_expressible` (1.2.0), and before
+    # The v0.2 wall is not a choice between two forms where one is better: ALL three
-    # that ALL FOUR routes failed so the mapping *class* had no expressible form.
+    # ways to express a mapping fail, each on its own rule, so the mapping *class* has
-    # There are four expressible carriers as of 1.3.0 - flow mapping as a value,
+    # no expressible form through T2. v0.2's `generated` IS a mapping (`by` required
-    # flow mapping as a list item, flow sequence of flow mappings, block sequence
+    # when present), so it cannot be expressed at all.
    # of block mappings - and the criterion that admits them is unchanged: each
    # hands the allowlist every key. The routes below stay shut for the same
    # reason, each on its own rule: a top-level block MAPPING (not a sequence),
    # a dotted key, and an inline second colon give the allowlist nothing to
    # inspect.
    assert parse_frontmatter("---\nid: x\ngenerated: { by: x, at: y }\n---\n\nbody\n")[0][
        "generated"] == {"by": "x", "at": "y"}
    routes = {
        "flow":   "generated: { by: x, at: y }\n",
        "block":  "generated:\n  by: x\n",
        "dotted": "generated.by: x\n",
        "inline": "generated: by: x\n",
@ -681,10 +667,11 @@ def test_the_expressible_mapping_routes_are_the_ones_the_allowlist_inspects():
        with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
            parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
        errors[name] = str(exc.value)
    assert "indicator" in errors["flow"]
    assert "nested mappings" in errors["block"]
    assert "key" in errors["dotted"]
    assert "mapping" in errors["inline"]
-    assert len(set(errors.values())) == 3, "routes must fail distinctly, not collapse"
+    assert len(set(errors.values())) == 4, "routes must fail distinctly, not collapse"
 _BLOCK_LIST_ITEM_SHAPES = [
@ -703,33 +690,17 @@ def test_block_lists_admitted_by_item_shape(cid, fm, expected):
    assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")[0][key] == expected
-def test_the_block_list_rejects_on_the_key_set_not_on_arity():
+def test_two_keys_per_item_is_where_the_block_list_hard_rejects():
    # Was `test_two_keys_per_item_is_where_the_block_list_hard_rejects`: a
    # two-key item was refused because the block mapping had no expressible form
    # at all. G30 gives it one (SPEC.md §5.1's own carrier), so arity is no
    # longer the boundary - the key set is. The same two-key item parses when its
    # keys are §5.1's, and still raises when one of them is not.
    parsed = parse_frontmatter(
        "---\nid: x\nsources:\n  - id: a\n    resource: file://x\n---\n\nbody\n"
    )[0]
    assert parsed["sources"] == [{"id": "a", "resource": "file://x"}]
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
        parse_frontmatter(
-            "---\nid: x\nsources:\n  - id: a\n    uri: file://x\n---\n\nbody\n"
+            "---\nid: x\nsources:\n  - id: a\n    resource: file://x\n---\n\nbody\n"
        )
@pytest.mark.parametrize("fm", [
-    # The flow row carries a key OFF the G3 allowlist: the shape is admitted, the
+    "generated: { by: x, at: y }\n", "sources: [{ id: a }]\n", "tags: [a, b]\n",
    # key is not, so this stays a T2 rejection and the door A/B half still holds.
    # The two `sources` rows that lived here until 1.3.0 now PARSE - that is the
    # G30 fix, not a weakening of this property. Their replacements are the same
    # carriers with a key off the allowlist, so the row still measures what it
    # says: the shape is admitted, the key set is not.
    "generated: { by: x, tool: y }\n", "sources: [{ id: a, uri: u }]\n", "tags: [a, b]\n",
    "generated:\n  by: x\n", "generated.by: x\n",
-    "sources:\n  - id: a\n    uri: file://x\n",
+    "sources:\n  - id: a\n    resource: file://x\n",
    "executor: [{ resource: skills/run.md }]\n",
 ])
 def test_t2_constrains_import_not_emission(fm):
    # T2 runs on door C only. The same frontmatter that FAIL_SECUREs through
@ -767,368 +738,3 @@ def test_link_extraction_survives_the_redos_fix():
    assert extract_link_targets("see [x](./a.md) and [y](/b.md)") == ["./a.md", "/b.md"]
    assert extract_link_targets("[a b](./c.md)") == ["./c.md"]
    assert extract_link_targets("text [![img](./i.png)](./t.md)") == ["./i.png"]
 # --- G3: the typed, allowlisted mapping form (2026-08-21) --------------------
 # Door 1 of three (operator decision, 2026-08-21). The mapping *class* had no
 # expressible form, and OKF v0.2 writes its whole trust and provenance layer as
 # mappings — SPEC.md @ 62432a09 §5.2 uses flow form in its own examples, and §11
 # carries a hard MUST that presupposes they parse ("consumers MUST treat a bare
 # `verified` mapping as a one-element list"). A consumer measured 0 of 53
 # upstream concepts through the gate. This admits ONE shape: a flow mapping whose
 # every key is on the allowlist and whose every leaf is a plain scalar.
 def test_spec_flow_mapping_parses_into_a_typed_mapping():
    # SPEC.md §5.2, verbatim. This is the red test: it must fail before the form
    # exists and pass after, with a real dict — never a degraded string.
    doc = (
        "---\ntype: table\n"
        "generated: { by: reference_agent/gemini-2.5-pro, at: 2026-06-20T22:53:05Z }\n"
        "---\nbody\n"
    )
    assert parse_frontmatter(doc)[0]["generated"] == {
        "by": "reference_agent/gemini-2.5-pro",
        "at": "2026-06-20T22:53:05Z",
    }
 def test_spec_bare_verified_mapping_parses():
    # SPEC.md §5.2's bare form, which §11 turns into a hard MUST for consumers
    # ("MUST treat a bare `verified` mapping as a one-element list") - a rule that
    # cannot be obeyed by a consumer that cannot parse the mapping.
    doc = "---\ntype: table\nverified: { by: human:ahormati, at: 2026-06-25T09:00:00Z }\n---\nb\n"
    assert parse_frontmatter(doc)[0]["verified"] == {
        "by": "human:ahormati", "at": "2026-06-25T09:00:00Z"}
 def test_spec_verified_list_of_flow_mappings_parses():
    # §5.2's list form. This is the SAME typed form in list position, not the
    # block-sequence-with-one-key route (`- uri: x`), which stays shut below.
    doc = (
        "---\ntype: table\nverified:\n"
        "  - { by: human:ahormati, at: 2026-06-25T09:00:00Z }\n"
        "  - { by: process:finance-nightly, at: 2026-06-26T02:00:00Z }\n"
        "---\nbody\n"
    )
    assert parse_frontmatter(doc)[0]["verified"] == [
        {"by": "human:ahormati", "at": "2026-06-25T09:00:00Z"},
        {"by": "process:finance-nightly", "at": "2026-06-26T02:00:00Z"},
    ]
 def test_spec_usage_window_parses():
    doc = "---\ntype: table\nusage_window: { from: 2026-06-01T00:00:00Z, to: 2026-06-30T00:00:00Z }\n---\nb\n"
    assert parse_frontmatter(doc)[0]["usage_window"] == {
        "from": "2026-06-01T00:00:00Z", "to": "2026-06-30T00:00:00Z"}
 def test_an_unknown_key_inside_a_mapping_is_still_rejected():
    # The rejection side of the allowlist. Without this test the allowlist could
    # silently grow to "anything" - or be emptied - and nothing would fail.
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
        parse_frontmatter("---\nid: x\ngenerated: { by: a, tool: shell }\n---\n\nbody\n")
    assert "allowlist" in str(exc.value)
 def test_the_allowlist_is_not_empty_and_admits_only_the_spec_keys():
    # Both directions of the same guard: a shrunk allowlist breaks the first
    # assertion, a widened one the second.
    for key in ("by", "at", "from", "to", "id", "title", "author", "usage_count",
                "last_modified"):
        assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\nk: {{ {key}: v }}\n---\n\nb\n")[0]["k"] == {key: "v"}
    for key in ("resource", "executor", "attester", "runtime", "command", "uri"):
        with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
            parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\nk: {{ {key}: v }}\n---\n\nb\n")
 _FLOW_REJECTED = [
    # (id, value, what PyYAML 6.0.3 makes of it)
    ("nested mapping", "{ by: { at: x } }", "a nested mapping"),
    ("nested sequence", "{ by: [a, b] }", "a sequence leaf"),
    ("anchor leaf", "{ by: &a x }", "an anchor definition, silently"),
    ("tag leaf", "{ by: !!python/object:os.system x }", "refused outright"),
    ("block scalar leaf", "{ by: | }", "a scanner error"),
    ("nested colon leaf", "{ by: sub: v }", "refused outright"),
    ("no space after colon", "{by:x}", "the KEY 'by:x', not a scalar"),
    ("quoted leaf", "{ title: 'a, b' }", "a scalar - we refuse, deliberately"),
    ("empty mapping", "{}", "an empty mapping"),
    ("empty leaf", "{ by: }", "None"),
    ("unclosed", "{ by: x", "a parse error"),
    ("trailing junk", "{ by: x } more", "a parse error"),
    ("duplicate key", "{ by: a, by: b }", "last-wins, silently"),
 ]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,value,yaml_reads_as", _FLOW_REJECTED,
                         ids=[c[0] for c in _FLOW_REJECTED])
 def test_the_mapping_form_admits_scalar_leaves_on_allowlisted_keys_only(cid, value, yaml_reads_as):
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
        parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\ngenerated: {value}\n---\n\nbody\n")
 def test_a_rejected_mapping_never_degrades_into_a_string():
    # The 1.1.0 defect, re-asserted against the NEW form: a refused mapping must
    # raise, not arrive as a str a consumer will .get() a key out of.
    for value in ("{ by: { at: x } }", "{ tool: shell }", "{ by: x"):
        with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
            parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\ngenerated: {value}\n---\n\nbody\n")
 def test_the_admitted_mapping_is_a_dict_not_a_string():
    value = parse_frontmatter("---\nid: x\ngenerated: { by: a, at: b }\n---\n\nb\n")[0]["generated"]
    assert isinstance(value, dict), "a typed form that arrives as a str is the 1.1.0 defect"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
    ("block sequence, one key", "attester:\n  - resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
    ("inline second colon", "attester: resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
    ("block mapping", "attester:\n  resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
    ("flow mapping, pointer key", "attester: { resource: attesters/sql_equality.py }\n"),
 ])
 def test_the_pointer_routes_stay_shut(cid, fm):
    # G3 is additive: none of the routes that put an executable-code pointer in a
    # key the https allowlist never inspects is reopened. The fourth row is why
    # `resource` is off the allowlist - the form would otherwise have carried the
    # door-C pointer through in typed clothes instead of degraded ones.
    doc = f"---\nid: x\ntype: Attested Computation\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n"
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
        parse_frontmatter(doc)
    assert import_bundle({"computations/x.md": doc}).disposition is Disposition.FAIL_SECURE
 def test_injection_in_a_mapping_leaf_is_caught_by_the_scan():
    # T1 is not weakened by the new shape: a mapping leaf is scanned exactly like a
    # scalar value or a list item. A typed form that parses but is not scanned would
    # be a hole, not a fix.
    doc = f"---\ntype: table\ngenerated: {{ by: {_INJECTION} }}\n---\nclean body\n"
    assert scan_concept(doc).found is True
 def test_injection_in_a_listed_mapping_leaf_is_caught_by_the_scan():
    doc = f"---\ntype: table\nverified:\n  - {{ by: {_INJECTION} }}\n---\nclean body\n"
    assert scan_concept(doc).found is True
 def test_a_conformant_v02_trust_layer_now_reaches_the_gate():
    # The measured consequence: a consumer reported 0 of 53 upstream concepts through
    # the gate, because every one of them carries §5.2 trust frontmatter.
    doc = (
        "---\n"
        "type: table\n"
        "title: Users\n"
        "resource: https://example.com/users\n"
        "generated: { by: reference_agent/gemini-2.5-pro, at: 2026-06-20T22:53:05Z }\n"
        "verified: { by: human:ahormati, at: 2026-06-25T09:00:00Z }\n"
        "usage_window: { from: 2026-06-01T00:00:00Z, to: 2026-06-30T00:00:00Z }\n"
        "---\nThe users table.\n"
    )
    result = import_bundle({"tables/users.md": doc})
    assert result.disposition is Disposition.WARN
    assert result.concepts[0].error is None
 # --- G30: the `sources` provenance layer becomes reachable (2026-09-02) ------
 # Door 2. G3 gave the mapping *class* one expressible form but left `sources`
 # unreachable: SPEC.md §5.1 writes an entry as a MAPPING carrying a REQUIRED
 # `resource`, so neither of the two carriers the spec and the producers actually
 # use could parse. Measured 02.09 by two consumers independently -- a flow
 # sequence of flow mappings raised on the `[` indicator, a block sequence of
 # block mappings raised "nested mappings are not supported".
 #
 # Why `resource` is admissible now when 1.2.0 argued it was not: the old
 # argument was that the parser could not tell `sources[].resource` (§5.1, a
 # citation) from `executor.resource` (§10, a code pointer). That premise was
 # false -- the owning key is in scope at every call site, it was simply never
 # threaded through. `resource` is allowlisted for `sources` entries ONLY, so
 # the door-C routes above stay shut on the same input.
 _SPEC_51_BLOCK = (
    "sources:\n"
    "  - id: ga4-schema\n"
    "    resource: https://developers.google.com/analytics/bigquery/export-schema\n"
    "    title: GA4 BigQuery Export schema\n"
    "    author: team:ga4-docs\n"
    "    usage_count: 5000\n"
    "    last_modified: 2026-05-30T00:00:00Z\n"
 )
 def test_spec_sources_block_sequence_of_block_mappings_parses():
    # SPEC.md §5.1's own example block, verbatim. It is the spec's canonical
    # carrier for a REQUIRED field, so §11.1 ("parseable YAML frontmatter") makes
    # a bundle written this way conformant -- refusing it refuses a conformant
    # bundle, which is the failure mode G3 was opened to end.
    fm, _ = parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{_SPEC_51_BLOCK}---\n\nbody\n")
    assert fm["sources"] == [{
        "id": "ga4-schema",
        "resource": "https://developers.google.com/analytics/bigquery/export-schema",
        "title": "GA4 BigQuery Export schema",
        "author": "team:ga4-docs",
        "usage_count": "5000",
        "last_modified": "2026-05-30T00:00:00Z",
    }]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm,expected", [
    ("one entry",
     "sources: [{ id: golden-v0-2-sales, resource: fixture }]\n",
     [{"id": "golden-v0-2-sales", "resource": "fixture"}]),
    ("two entries",
     "sources: [{ id: a, resource: https://e.com/a }, { id: b, resource: https://e.com/b }]\n",
     [{"id": "a", "resource": "https://e.com/a"},
      {"id": "b", "resource": "https://e.com/b"}]),
 ])
 def test_sources_flow_sequence_of_flow_mappings_parses(cid, fm, expected):
    # The form the producer emits today (llm-ingestion-okf's golden
    # expected-bundle/ingest-sales.md, measured 02.09). One entry raised too, so
    # this is not an arity bug: the `[` indicator refused the carrier outright.
    assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")[0]["sources"] == expected
 def test_the_two_sources_carriers_parse_to_the_same_value():
    block = parse_frontmatter(
        "---\ntype: t\nsources:\n  - id: a\n    resource: https://e.com/a\n---\n\nb\n")[0]
    flow = parse_frontmatter(
        "---\ntype: t\nsources: [{ id: a, resource: https://e.com/a }]\n---\n\nb\n")[0]
    assert block["sources"] == flow["sources"] == [{"id": "a", "resource": "https://e.com/a"}]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
    ("unknown key, flow", "sources: [{ id: a, uri: https://e.com/a }]\n"),
    ("unknown key, block", "sources:\n  - id: a\n    uri: https://e.com/a\n"),
    ("unknown key, flow value", "sources: { id: a, kind: doc }\n"),
 ])
 def test_an_unknown_key_in_a_sources_entry_is_still_rejected(cid, fm):
    # The negative control. The carrier is admitted; the key set is not. A
    # producer-invented key gets no free ride on the new shape.
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
        parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
    assert "allowlist" in str(exc.value)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
    ("executor, block sequence", "executor:\n  - resource: skills/run-on-bq.md\n"),
    ("executor, flow sequence", "executor: [{ resource: skills/run-on-bq.md }]\n"),
    ("attester, flow sequence", "attester: [{ resource: attesters/sql_equality.py }]\n"),
    ("attester, block sequence", "attester:\n  - resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
 ])
 def test_resource_is_allowlisted_for_sources_entries_only(cid, fm):
    # The whole reason `resource` can be admitted at all: the owning key decides.
    # §10's `executor.resource` / `attester.resource` name run instructions and
    # code -- door C -- and stay refused through EVERY carrier, including the two
    # this change opens for `sources`.
    doc = f"---\nid: x\ntype: Attested Computation\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n"
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
        parse_frontmatter(doc)
    assert "allowlist" in str(exc.value)
    assert import_bundle({"computations/x.md": doc}).disposition is Disposition.FAIL_SECURE
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
    # SPEC §5.1: "A single entry MAY carry its own `usage_window`". That is a
    # mapping inside a mapping -- depth 2 -- and stays refused: no nesting deeper
    # than one is a security property this change does not spend. Registered as a
    # conformance gap in docs/LIMITATIONS.md, not as an oversight.
    ("per-entry usage_window, flow",
     "sources: [{ id: a, usage_window: { from: x, to: y } }]\n"),
    ("per-entry usage_window, block",
     "sources:\n  - id: a\n    usage_window: { from: x, to: y }\n"),
    # A sequence inside an entry is the same depth violation.
    ("nested sequence", "sources: [{ id: a, title: [x, y] }]\n"),
 ])
 def test_a_sources_entry_admits_scalar_leaves_only(cid, fm):
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
        parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
    ("scalar then mapping", "sources:\n  - https://e.com/a\n  - id: b\n    title: B\n"),
    ("mapping then scalar", "sources:\n  - id: a\n    title: A\n  - https://e.com/b\n"),
 ])
 def test_a_block_list_may_not_mix_scalars_and_mappings(cid, fm):
    # A consumer that reads `entry.get("id")` over the list crashes on the str.
    # One list, one item type -- refuse rather than hand back a mixed tree.
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
        parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
    assert "mix" in str(exc.value)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
    ("flow sequence of scalars", "tags: [a, b, c]\n"),
    ("empty flow sequence", "sources: []\n"),
    ("flow sequence, unclosed", "sources: [{ id: a }\n"),
    ("flow sequence, trailing junk", "sources: [{ id: a }] x\n"),
    ("flow sequence, mixed", "sources: [{ id: a }, plain]\n"),
    ("flow sequence, nested sequence", "sources: [[ id ]]\n"),
 ])
 def test_the_flow_sequence_admits_flow_mappings_only(cid, fm):
    # The sequence carrier is opened for the mapping form and nothing else. A
    # flow sequence of plain scalars stays refused -- it is a separate shape with
    # its own quoting and splitting problems, and no measured consumer needs it.
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
        parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
 def test_injection_in_a_sources_entry_leaf_is_caught_by_the_scan():
    # T1 over the new shape: every leaf of every entry reaches scan_output.
    doc = f"---\ntype: table\nsources: [{{ id: a, title: {_INJECTION} }}]\n---\nclean\n"
    assert scan_concept(doc).found is True
    doc_block = f"---\ntype: table\nsources:\n  - id: a\n    title: {_INJECTION}\n---\nclean\n"
    assert scan_concept(doc_block).found is True
 def test_the_producer_golden_now_passes_the_gate():
    # llm-ingestion-okf's expected-bundle/ingest-sales.md, the K5 blocker.
    doc = (
        "---\n"
        "type: dataset\n"
        "title: Regional Sales\n"
        "source_system: golden-v0-2-sales\n"
        "ingested_at: 2026-07-16T12:00:00Z\n"
        "generated: { by: process:okf-ingest, at: 2026-07-16T12:00:00Z }\n"
        "sources: [{ id: golden-v0-2-sales, resource: fixture }]\n"
        "---\n\n| region | units |\n| --- | --- |\n| nord | 412 |\n"
    )
    result = import_bundle({"datasets/sales.md": doc})
    assert result.disposition is Disposition.WARN
    assert result.concepts[0].error is None
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
    # A `- ` item whose text begins with a YAML indicator AND carries a `": "`
    # must fall through to the scalar predicates, not into the block-mapping
    # route with a half-validated key. Each of these fails `_KEY_RE` on the key
    # side, so `_reject_dangerous_value` gets the item intact.
    ("anchor", "sources:\n  - &anchor id: a\n"),
    ("alias", "sources:\n  - *anchor id: a\n"),
    ("tag", "sources:\n  - !!str id: a\n"),
    ("directive", "sources:\n  - %YAML id: a\n"),
    ("reserved", "sources:\n  - `x id: a\n"),
    ("merge key", "sources:\n  - id: a\n    <<: *base\n"),
 ])
 def test_an_indicator_in_a_block_item_is_refused_before_the_mapping_route(cid, fm):
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
        parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: t\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
    # The block mapping ends at a blank line and at a line in column zero. Both
    # hand control back with an index that must not skip or re-read a line: a
    # dangling `resource:` line left over from a mapping that closed early must
    # RAISE, never be silently dropped -- a pointer that vanishes rather than
    # failing is exactly this repo's failure class.
    ("blank line inside the mapping", "sources:\n  - id: a\n\n    resource: b\n"),
    ("top-level key interleaved", "sources:\n  - id: a\ntags: x\n    resource: b\n"),
 ])
 def test_a_line_orphaned_by_the_mapping_boundary_raises_rather_than_vanishing(cid, fm):
    with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
        parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: t\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
 def test_the_block_list_hands_back_an_index_that_resumes_at_the_next_key():
    # The return-index contract: a top-level key following a multi-entry block
    # list is neither swallowed by the list nor re-read as a list item.
    fm, _ = parse_frontmatter(
        "---\ntype: t\nsources:\n  - id: a\n    resource: b\n  - id: c\ntitle: T\n---\n\nbody\n")
    assert fm == {"type": "t", "sources": [{"id": "a", "resource": "b"}, {"id": "c"}],
                  "title": "T"}