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Author SHA1 Message Date
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
44e2b31afd test(okf): pin the two boundary classes the new carriers introduced 
Probed after 1.3.0 landed, on advisor challenge. Both came back clean --
these pin them so they cannot regress silently.

1. A `- ` item whose text begins with a YAML indicator AND carries a `": "`
   could in principle route into the block-mapping path with a
   half-validated key instead of into `_reject_dangerous_value`. It does
   not: `&anchor id` fails `_KEY_RE` on the key side, so the item falls
   through intact and raises on the indicator. One row each for & * ! %
   backtick, plus the merge key inside an entry.

2. `_consume_block_mapping` ends at a blank line and at column zero, and
   hands an index back to `_consume_block_list`, which hands one back to
   `_parse_flat`. A line orphaned by that boundary -- a `resource:` left
   over from a mapping that closed early -- must RAISE, not be dropped. A
   pointer that vanishes rather than failing is this repo's failure class,
   so it gets a test rather than a probe. Plus the return-index contract:
   a top-level key after a multi-entry list is neither swallowed nor
   re-read as an item.

868 green (was 859), 130/130 classes. Test-only; no source change.
 2026-09-02 17:26:08 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
a965e8ac5b feat(okf): sources becomes expressible, and the parent key is what admits resource 
Order 20260902T150716Z from .claude -- a K5 blocker in the OKF programme.
`parse_frontmatter` rejected `sources` in every form the spec and its
producers actually use. Measured 02.09 by two consumers independently:
`sources: [{ id: a, resource: x }]` raised on the `[` indicator (one entry
as well as two), and the block sequence of block mappings -- SPEC.md 5.1's
OWN example -- raised "nested mappings are not supported". `resource` is
REQUIRED within a `sources` entry, so the whole provenance family was
unwritable and a bundle written the way the spec documents it was refused.

Measured against the spec before coding, not reasoned: 5.1's example block
is the canonical carrier for a REQUIRED field and 11.1 defines conformance
as parseable frontmatter, so refusing it refuses a conformant bundle. Both
carriers now parse to the same list of dicts.

The load-bearing change is not the carrier, it is WHO admits `resource`.
1.2.0 left it off the allowlist arguing the parser could not tell
`sources[].resource` (5.1, a citation) from `executor.resource` /
`attester.resource` (10, a pointer to code to be run -- the door-C route
closed in 1.1.0). That premise was false: the owning key is in scope at
every call site and was simply never threaded through. It is threaded now,
so the discrimination is structural, and door C stays shut through EVERY
carrier including the two this adds -- pinned by a new test that drives
`executor`/`attester` through all four.

Refusal stays the default elsewhere. A flow sequence of plain scalars
(`tags: [a, b]`) still raises: the sequence carrier is opened for the flow
mapping element and nothing else. A `sources` entry admits scalar leaves
only, so 5.1's optional PER-ENTRY `usage_window` is refused -- no nesting
past depth 1 is a security property and it was not spent here; registered
as a conformance gap rather than left as an oversight. A block list may not
mix scalars and mappings, because a consumer reading `entry.get("id")` over
one gets an AttributeError off the first str.

New residual registered: `sources[].resource` is scanned as text (T1) but
never URL-validated. T3's https allowlist cannot reach it without
over-blocking conformant bundles -- 5.1 permits bundle-relative paths and
scope descriptors, and the producers' own golden emits `resource: fixture`.
A consumer that dereferences it must call `validate_resource_url` itself.

Suite 834 -> 859 green. 25 new rows; four pre-existing rows changed because
this release changed the behaviour they pinned, two of them renamed since
their names asserted the old invariant (`exactly_one_route_to_a_mapping`,
`two_keys_per_item_is_where_the_block_list_hard_rejects`). Not "unchanged".
130/130 classes, 6/6 gaps hold, 44 -> 45 limitations, ReDoS 0/152 (the
sweep adds no evidence here -- this change adds no regex and the splitting
is linear). Six version surfaces bumped by hand, no sed. Re-measured alone
after the bump.

No exported surface changed; no detector behaviour and no calibration
changed.
 2026-09-02 17:21:26 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
0184df9ed9 docs(limits): tags and description block the whole OKF corpus before sources is even read 
Measured 08-23 (order 20260823T161935Z): the line-flat frontmatter parser has
no sequence-value type at all, so tags rejects 53/53 upstream concepts
regardless of flow or block form, and description's folded-scalar continuation
misreads as a nested mapping in 29/53. Independent of both the mapping-form
gap and the sources block-form gap already documented here -- closing either
moves nothing on this corpus. 43 -> 44 items; README count moved with it. No
code change, no release.
 2026-08-25 08:27:22 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
9aeceb02c0 release: 1.2.0 -- the OKF mapping-form fix becomes pinnable 
Order 20260823T175853Z from .claude: commit 5870483 (the G3 nine-key
allowlist fix) was untagged -- llm-ingestion-okf measured 4/9 concepts
through Doer C on it, blocked from 8/9 only by the absence of a
pinnable tag, on a suite already green (595/596) at that commit.

Six live version surfaces bumped by hand (no sed -- provenance is
never bumped): pyproject.toml, __init__.__version__, README badge +
Status + the pinned pip install tag, docs/BRIEF.md, docs/ADOPTION-BRIEF.md
Status, and CLAUDE.md. ADOPTION-BRIEF's snapshot line moves with it:
129/129 -> 130/130 classes, 802 -> 834 passing (the new row is the
off-allowlist-key coverage case added by the G3 fix itself).

NOT bumped, matching the 1.1.0 precedent: every "closed in 1.1.0" /
"the 1.1.0 defect" reference across CHANGELOG.md, CLAUDE.md,
docs/LIMITATIONS.md, docs/redos-sweep.py, src/llm_ingestion_guard/okf.py
and tests/ names a historical baseline, not the current version --
rewriting those would erase what they document. docs/BRIEF.md's
GuardLLM v1.1.0 reference is a third party's version, untouched.

Re-measured after the bump, alone: 834 passed, 130/130 classes, 6/6
gaps hold, 43 limitations, ReDoS sweep 0/152 candidates flagged.

No exported surface changed; no detector behaviour and no calibration
changed. Pure release action -- no functional code touched.
 2026-08-23 20:13:50 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
58704834b6 feat(okf): the mapping class gets one expressible form, typed and allowlisted 
OKF v0.2 writes its whole trust and provenance layer as mappings, and T2 gave
the mapping class no expressible form. A consumer measured 0 of 53 upstream
concepts through the gate on 0.3.4, 1.0.0 and 1.1.0. That was a contract
collision, not a calibration setting: SPEC.md @ 62432a09 uses flow mappings in
its own 5.1/5.2 examples, and 11 carries a hard MUST for consumers ("MUST treat
a bare `verified` mapping as a one-element list") that presupposes they parse.

Admitted: a flow mapping, as a value or as a block-list item, whose every key is
on a nine-name allowlist and whose every leaf is a plain scalar run through the
unchanged dangerous-value and mapping-construct predicates. The form is safe
because the allowlist inspects every key -- the blanket refusal was the
enforcement, not the point.

Refused, each on its own rule and ground-truthed against PyYAML 6.0.3: a key off
the allowlist, a nested collection, a quoted leaf, a duplicate key, an empty or
unclosed mapping, trailing junk, and {a:b} (which PyYAML reads as the KEY a:b).
A refused mapping still raises rather than degrading into a string, so the 1.1.0
type-confusion defect is not reopened, and the block, dotted and inline-colon
routes still raise.

`resource` is deliberately off the allowlist though SPEC.md 5.1 names it inside
a `sources` entry: it is a pointer rather than a label and the only key T3
exists for, so admitting it would let `executor: { resource: skills/run.md }`
carry an executable-code pointer through in typed clothes -- the door-C route
closed in 1.1.0. It costs nothing today, because the conformant carrier for
sources[].resource is a block sequence of block mappings, which stays refused.

Mapping leaves are scanned like every other frontmatter value (T1). Coverage
matrix 130/130 (new row: the off-allowlist key). No exported surface, detector
behaviour or calibration changed.
 2026-08-21 21:04:51 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
7cb4553301 docs(llms): add llms.txt per org D2b decision (21.08) 
Minimal file: H1 project name, one-line blockquote summary, and the
install command copied verbatim from README's first code block —
llms.txt cites the README's start command, never replaces it.
 2026-08-21 11:24:00 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
01f6f382c4 test(docs): pin docs/redos-sweep.py under test.py's contract 
It was the only docs/ measurement script without a row here, and this
repo just made it load-bearing for two published LIMITATIONS.md numbers
(the 1.5 ms floor, the 2.6 flag ratio). Pins structure only, per the
sweep's own docstring: the suite clock (not a reimplemented wall clock),
the constants against the doc's prose, and the 152-pattern/11-table
collector count. Never pins a timing outcome -- that would be red
several runs in twenty.
 2026-08-20 23:10:25 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
74656123f9 docs(redos): the sweep now measures on the clock its own numbers justify 
docs/redos-sweep.py timed on time.monotonic() while every ReDoS bound in the
suite had moved to process CPU time, so the 1.5 ms sensitivity floor and the
"~23 s at the cap" figure in docs/LIMITATIONS.md were produced by a different
instrument than the bounds they support. The script imports scan_seconds now.

Re-derived on that instrument, the floor came back UNCHANGED at 1.5 ms. Twelve
full runs of all 2585 arms: median ratio 1.95-2.03 in every size bucket above
50 us, but two-point excursions past the 2.6 threshold survive at every
magnitude (p99 2.9-3.3 even above 1 ms). Flagged arms per run by floor: 6.9 at
0.5 ms, 1.1 at 1.0 ms, 0.33 at 1.5 ms. Four arms flagged across the twelve runs,
each in exactly one; six arms that have ever flagged re-measure at exponent
0.97-1.09 over six doublings, at most 1.2 s at the cap. Descheduling was never
what made this sweep noisy -- a ratio from two points is.

Measured before publishing and it cost a correction: an earlier draft of this
change said the sweep "reports 0 candidates". The next run reported 2. Nine of
twelve instrumented runs are clean and eight consecutive shipped-script runs
under load flagged 0-3, so neither a clean run nor a flagged one is evidence
on its own -- the doc says that now.

Also corrects the pattern count in the same bullet: 150 -> 152, the script's
own printed total. The 0.3.4 CHANGELOG entry keeps its 150 as a snapshot.

No exported surface, no detector behaviour, no calibration touched.
802 passed, 129/129 classes, 6/6 gaps, 43 limitations, gitleaks clean.
 2026-08-18 16:56:01 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
4472f209a4 docs(limits): seven shipped behaviours were only in the code, and one of them was written down wrong 
TRACK 2. All seven were tested and released; none had a line in
docs/LIMITATIONS.md. Written where each belongs topically, not appended.
36 -> 43 items; README count moved with it. No code change, no release.

- The carrier split LOOSENS a lone anchor, not only tightens. Measured as
  shipped: <a href="https://ext.example/p"> alone is active:raw-html-link at
  MEDIUM -> quarantine_review on PRESET_USER_UPLOAD (warn on trusted); through
  0.6.1 it was HIGH -> fail_secure. An <img src> to the same host is untouched.
  Only the tightening direction had been documented.
- The no-URL narrowing's name set is a judgement about affordance no test can
  derive. A name wrongly placed in _URL_AFFORDANCE_TAGS goes silently inert,
  and no corpus can catch it: what it produces is an absence.
- hybrid-xss:script-tag and active:raw-html do not match the same strings.
  <script src="a<b"> raises active:raw-html and NO XSS label -- the lexicon's
  [^><] is the 0.3.3 ReDoS fix, HTML_TAG_RE consumes quoted runs atomically.
  Disposition never moves; the label does, so that id is not a script census.
- A green ReDoS row is evidence only if seen red, and three rows never were.
  Corrected while writing: the third row is
  test_gate_is_bounded_on_the_long_attribute_arm, killed by 0.7.0's own
  narrowing (separation 1.0x, 0.028s, no findings) -- not active-url-attr-value,
  which is a payload-design rule, not a dead row.
- Every suite bound runs on process CPU time (tests/redos_clock.py); the
  residual is that a BLOCKING hang would hang the suite. docs/redos-sweep.py
  still times on time.monotonic(), so the published 1.5ms floor at N=8000 and
  the "~23s at the cap" figure come from a different instrument than the bounds
  they justify. Not re-derived; stated as not directly comparable.
- Under DEFAULT_ACTION_MAP the assessment axis adds exactly one judgement over
  the disposition (NONE vs LOW). Consequence for this document: the published
  FP rates are a risk statement only while NONE+LOW are the WARN pre-image.
- The ZWJ context test is one predicate on two surfaces, and the symbol is
  private -- output imports sanitize's _is_joiner_in_emoji_sequence, so a
  consumer importing it pins a name 1.x does not promise.

Verified: 802 passed, 129/129 classes, 6/6 gaps hold, grep -c '^- \*\*' = 43,
and the doc scanned for stray format characters (one U+200D remains, the
pre-existing composed emoji -- an accidental U+200C of my own was removed).
 2026-08-17 12:15:00 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
2b03b8d643 docs(security): add contact email, https scheme on Forgejo URL 
Scorecard Security-Policy scored 4/10: no email address, bare
git.fromaitochitta.com URL without scheme. Both are worth 6 of 10 points
per Scorecard 5.5.0's model. Repo-specific policy text kept as-is.
 2026-08-16 21:15:10 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
246e1fc1d3 docs(readme): add table of contents 
ORDRE 32, AAA+ B-axis round 2.
 2026-08-16 16:16:57 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
45c2b06315 docs: "warn, clean" is graded, never cleaned bytes -- measured at okf's door 
okf measured that 0.7.0's no-URL narrowing dispositions four raw-HTML
carrier forms (<a aria-label>, bare </a>, <Frame>, <video />) to warn
with no active-content finding -- verified here directly against
screen_output(..., PRESET_USER_UPLOAD), which returns the library's own
"clean: no findings" reason string (disposition.py:264). At their door
(llm-ingestion-okf 0.7.0), warn is the persist floor (inbox.py:139/323),
and their adapter forwards the original extracted text because
screen_output never hands back sanitized bytes -- defanging is a
separate, deliberate neutralize() call. So the same four forms land
written into the bundle, carrier present verbatim. Named per operator
decision; CHANGELOG.md's "35 limitations" and GATE-G-v1.md's counts are
dated snapshots of past states and are left as measured, not bumped.

35 -> 36: README.md's summary line is the only other live count.
 2026-08-13 23:24:38 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
869f9058f7 docs: the fix closed a type confusion, not pointer-smuggling as a class 
Both the LIMITATIONS bullet and the 1.1.0 CHANGELOG entry said "both now
FAIL_SECURE at T2, before the allowlist is reached" and stopped there. True,
and stronger than what shipped: the old bullet's closing clause about T3's
scope went out with the rewrite, so the text read as though a pointer can no
longer reach the consumer tree through frontmatter.

Measured, not reasoned:

  attester: attesters/sql_equality.py   -> WARN          (unchanged)
  resource: attesters/sql_equality.py   -> FAIL_SECURE   (unchanged)

T3 inspects `resource` and nothing else, so an honest string under another key
rides through exactly as before -- scanned under T1 like any other frontmatter
value, but never allowlisted. That is by design and is not what 1.1.0 changed.
Restored in both places.

Also corrects the row arithmetic: 13 added and 3 retired, not "11 added, 1
retired". Net +10 and 802 were measured and are right; the parenthetical was
not, and 2400 != 2401 is a locked convention here.

Tag v1.1.0 does not move: the code is correct, the prose about it was not.
802 passed, 35 limitations, :43 still the bullet's anchor line.
 2026-08-13 23:05:52 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
ca4f97c8c9 release: 1.1.0 -- the first behaviour change shipped under the freeze 
Six live version surfaces bumped by hand (no sed -- provenance is never
bumped): pyproject.toml, __init__.__version__, README badge + Status + the
pinned pip install tag, docs/BRIEF.md, docs/ADOPTION-BRIEF.md Status, and
CLAUDE.md. ADOPTION-BRIEF's test count 792 -> 802.

NOT bumped, and deliberately: SECURITY.md's two `1.0.0` references name the
freeze BASELINE, not the current version -- "a payload that disposes WARN on
1.0.0 may dispose FAIL_SECURE on a later 1.x" is the promise this release
instantiates, so rewriting it to 1.1.0 would erase what it promised. The
GATE-G and PLAN-v1 numbers are the 1.0.0 gate record. The Forge repo
description carries no version (verified against the API last session).

This is the case SECURITY.md and the 1.0.0 CHANGELOG entry described in
advance: the exported surface is frozen, detection behaviour is not. No
exported name moved. A document that disposed WARN on 1.0.0 may dispose
FAIL_SECURE here; a consumer whose frontmatter carries an unquoted ": " in a
value will see those concepts refused at import, and quoting it parses.

Re-measured after the bump, alone: 802 passed, 129/129 classes, 6/6 gaps hold,
35 limitations.
 2026-08-13 22:58:36 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
da30211bc7 fix(okf): a mapping construct no longer degrades into a string, and there were two routes 
T2 gives the mapping class no expressible form by design. Two routes escaped
that by parsing "successfully" into the wrong TYPE instead of raising:

  sources:\n  - uri: https://e.com/a   -> the string 'uri: https://e.com/a'
  attester: resource: attesters/x.py   -> the string 'resource: attesters/x.py'

Only the first was documented (LIMITATIONS.md:43). The inline second colon was
found by measurement while closing it -- a real YAML parser refuses that line
outright, ours accepted it. Shipping the list half alone would have left a
LIMITATIONS rewrite that overclaims.

Same consequence either way: a pointer parked in a degraded mapping rides
through in a key the `resource` allowlist never inspects, and mode-b
import_bundle wrote the merged concept verbatim (WARN). Both now FAIL_SECURE at
T2, before the allowlist is reached.

The boundary is where YAML puts it, ground-truthed against PyYAML 6.0.3 rather
than reasoned: ": " and a trailing ":" are exactly the two shapes where a plain
scalar becomes a mapping. A colon carrying neither a space nor a line end opens
no mapping -- domain:security and https://e.com:8443/a still parse -- and a
quoted scalar is still a scalar. Over-blocking a conformant bundle is itself a
failure mode, so the seven admitted shapes get rows of their own.

Iron Law: the four rejected rows and both import_bundle rows were written
first and seen red (7 failures, each DID NOT RAISE) before okf.py was touched.

Suite 792 -> 802. LIMITATIONS stays at 35: the bullet is reworded, not
retired -- the restricted grammar is still a limitation, the silent misparse
is no longer part of it.
 2026-08-13 22:58:27 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
6cd4694613 docs(plan): Session G landed, D4's rationale lives where the promise does, and the ninth surface was verified not bumped 
Three durability gaps from the release, none of which block anything.

1. Session G had no LANDET marker. Every other landed session carries one
   with its sha and tag; the release that froze the surface did not.

2. D4's rationale existed only in STATE.md, which is LOCAL-ONLY and gets
   overwritten every session. The consumer-promise section says in its own
   words that promises live in this file and not in STATE, 'fordi STATE er
   LOCAL-ONLY' -- so a decision NOT to fire one belongs here too. A future
   session reading promise 1 would otherwise find no notification and no
   reason, which is indistinguishable from having forgotten it. The
   counter-reading is recorded with it: the wording ('enhver endring')
   pointed the other way, and it is a real argument, not a strawman.

3. 98ebc07's message says 'Nine current-state surfaces bumped by hand'.
   Eight were bumped. The ninth is the Forge description, which carries no
   version string and so was structurally invisible to the 421-hit sweep --
   the same blind-spot class as the status badge and Development Status.
   Verified against the Forgejo API instead: 178 codepoints, no version, no
   'alpha'. It needed no change, but 'verified' is not 'bumped' and a pushed
   commit message cannot be amended.
 2026-08-13 22:45:11 +02:00
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162
CHANGELOG.md
View file

@ -5,9 +5,167 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html). and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
## [Unreleased] ## [1.3.0] — 2026-09-02
Nothing yet. ### Added — the `sources` provenance family becomes expressible in both spec carriers
`okf.parse_frontmatter` rejected `sources` in every form the OKF spec and its
producers actually use. Measured 2026-09-02 by two consumers independently:
`sources: [{ id: a, resource: x }]` raised on the `[` indicator (with one entry
as with two), and the block sequence of block mappings — SPEC.md §5.1's *own*
example — raised `"nested mappings are not supported"`. `resource` is REQUIRED
within a `sources` entry (§5.1), so the whole provenance family was unwritable,
and a bundle written the way the spec documents it was refused.
Admitted now, both parsing to the same value (a list of dicts):
```yaml
sources: [{ id: a, resource: https://e.com/a }]
sources:
- id: a
resource: https://e.com/a
```
**`resource` is allowlisted inside a `sources` entry and nowhere else.** 1.2.0
left it off the allowlist on the argument that the parser could not tell
`sources[].resource` (§5.1, a citation) from `executor.resource` /
`attester.resource` (§10, a pointer to code to be run — the door-C route closed
in 1.1.0). That premise was false: the owning key is in scope at every call
site and was simply never threaded through. It is threaded now, so the
discrimination is structural rather than a judgement about the value, and
`executor: [{ resource: skills/run.md }]` and `attester:\n - resource: …` are
refused on the allowlist through *every* carrier, including the two this adds.
Refusal stays the default everywhere else. A flow sequence of plain scalars
(`tags: [a, b]`) still raises — the sequence carrier is opened for the flow
mapping element and nothing else. A `sources` entry still admits scalar leaves
only, so SPEC §5.1's optional *per-entry* `usage_window` (a mapping inside a
mapping) is refused: no nesting past depth 1 is a security property, and it was
not spent here. Registered as a conformance gap in `docs/LIMITATIONS.md`. A
block list may not mix scalar items and mappings. Off-allowlist keys, anchors,
aliases, tags, duplicate keys and unclosed collections raise as before, and a
refused mapping still raises rather than degrading into a string.
**New residual, registered:** `sources[].resource` is scanned as text (T1) but
never validated as a URL. T3's https allowlist cannot be extended to it without
over-blocking conformant bundles — §5.1 permits a bundle-relative path or a
scope descriptor a consumer cannot follow at all. A consumer that dereferences
it must call `okf.validate_resource_url` itself.
No exported surface changed and no detector behaviour or calibration changed.
Suite 834 → 868 (34 new rows, plus four pre-existing rows updated where this
release changed the behaviour they pinned); 130/130 classes, 6/6 documented
gaps hold, 45 limitations, ReDoS sweep 0/152 candidates flagged.
## [1.2.0] — 2026-08-23
### Added — OKF frontmatter can express one mapping form: typed and allowlisted
`okf.parse_frontmatter` gave the mapping *class* no expressible form at all. OKF
v0.2 writes its whole trust and provenance layer as mappings — SPEC.md @
`62432a09` uses flow form in its own §5.1/§5.2 examples, and §11 carries a hard
MUST for consumers ("MUST treat a bare `verified` mapping as a one-element
list") that presupposes they parse. A consumer measured **0 of 53** upstream
concepts through the gate on 0.3.4, 1.0.0 and 1.1.0. That was a contract
collision, not a calibration setting: no threshold would have moved it.
Admitted now: a flow mapping (`generated: { by: x, at: y }`), as a value or as a
block-list item, whose every key is on a nine-name allowlist (`by`, `at`, `from`,
`to`, `id`, `title`, `author`, `usage_count`, `last_modified`) and whose every
leaf is a plain scalar run through the *unchanged* dangerous-value and
mapping-construct predicates.
The form is additive and refusal stays the default. A key off the allowlist, a
nested collection, a quoted leaf, a duplicate key, an empty or unclosed mapping,
and `{a:b}` (which PyYAML 6.0.3 reads as the *key* `a:b`) all raise, and a
refused mapping still raises rather than degrading into a string — the 1.1.0
defect is not reopened. Nested-block (`k:\n sub: v`), dotted (`k.sub: v`) and
inline-second-colon (`k: sub: v`) routes to a mapping still raise, each on its
own rule.
**`resource` is deliberately off the allowlist**, though SPEC.md §5.1 names it
inside a `sources` entry. It is a pointer rather than a label and the only key
T3 exists for: admitting it would let `executor: { resource: skills/run.md }`
carry an executable-code pointer through in typed clothes, which is the door-C
route closed in 1.1.0. It costs nothing today — the conformant carrier for
`sources[].resource` is a block sequence of block mappings, which this form does
not admit either way.
Mapping leaves are scanned like every other frontmatter value (T1), so an
injection parked in `generated: { by: ... }` reaches `scan_output`. Coverage
matrix: 130 classes, up from 129 (the new row is the off-allowlist key).
No exported surface changed; no detector behaviour and no calibration changed.
### Changed — the ReDoS sweep now measures on the same clock as the bounds it justifies
`docs/redos-sweep.py` timed on `time.monotonic()` while every ReDoS bound in the
suite moved to process CPU time (`tests/redos_clock.py`), so the 1.5 ms
sensitivity floor and the "~23 s at the cap" figure published in
`docs/LIMITATIONS.md` came from a different instrument than the bounds they
support. The script now imports `scan_seconds` rather than timing itself.
The floor was re-derived on that instrument and **stayed at 1.5 ms**: over twelve
full runs of all 2585 arms the median ratio is 1.95-2.03 in every size bucket
above 50 µs, but two-point excursions past the 2.6 flag threshold persist at every
magnitude (p99 ratio 2.9-3.3 even above 1 ms) — 6.9 flagged arms per run at a
0.5 ms floor, 1.1 at 1.0 ms, 0.33 at 1.5 ms. Descheduling was never what made this
sweep noisy; a ratio computed from two points is. Four arms flagged across those
twelve runs, each in exactly one of them, and six arms that have ever flagged
re-measure at exponent 0.97-1.09 over six doublings — at most 1.2 s at the
1 000 000-char cap. The pattern count the script prints is 152, not the 150 of the
0.3.4 entry below; `docs/LIMITATIONS.md` now carries the current number.
No exported surface, no detector behaviour and no calibration changed.
## [1.1.0] — 2026-08-13
### Fixed — a mapping construct in OKF frontmatter no longer degrades into a string
`okf.parse_frontmatter` gives the mapping *class* no expressible form by design
(T2). Two routes escaped that: they parsed "successfully" into the wrong **type**
instead of raising. Both are closed, and both now `FAIL_SECURE` through
`okf.import_bundle` (door C).
| route | was | now |
|---|---|---|
| `sources:`<br>` - uri: https://e.com/a` | string `'uri: https://e.com/a'` — WARN | `OKFFrontmatterError` — FAIL_SECURE |
| `sources:`<br>` - uri:` | string `'uri:'` — WARN | `OKFFrontmatterError` — FAIL_SECURE |
| `attester: resource: attesters/x.py` | string `'resource: attesters/x.py'` — WARN | `OKFFrontmatterError` — FAIL_SECURE |
The security consequence was the same in each: a pointer parked in a degraded
mapping rides through in a key the `resource` allowlist never inspects, and mode-b
`import_bundle` writes the merged concept verbatim. The first route was documented
at `docs/LIMITATIONS.md:43`; the inline second colon was **found by measurement
while closing it**, and is the reason this release names two routes rather than one.
Neither shape is conformant OKF — a well-formed bundle does not produce them; a
malformed or hostile one can.
**What closed is the type confusion, not pointer-smuggling as a class.** T3 still
inspects `resource` and nothing else, so an honest string under another key rides
through exactly as before: `attester: attesters/sql_equality.py` is WARN, while
the same path under `resource:` FAIL_SECUREs. The string is still scanned like any
other frontmatter value under T1. Nothing about that changed here.
**The boundary is where YAML puts it**, ground-truthed against PyYAML 6.0.3 rather
than reasoned: `": "` and a trailing `":"` are exactly the two shapes where a plain
scalar becomes a mapping, and they are refused. A colon carrying neither a space nor
a line end opens no mapping — `domain:security` and `https://e.com:8443/a` still
parse — and a quoted scalar (`- "uri: x"`) is still a scalar. Quotes are retained
rather than stripped; that divergence from YAML is unchanged and now pinned.
**This is a behaviour change inside the freeze, not a break of it.** No exported
name moved. A document that disposed `WARN` on `1.0.0` may dispose `FAIL_SECURE`
here — the `1.0.0` entry says exactly this is a fix, not a break. A consumer whose
bundles carry an unquoted `": "` in a frontmatter value will now see those concepts
refused at import; quote the value, and it parses.
Suite 792 → **802**: 13 rows added (4 rejected shapes, 7 admitted ones, 2 through
`import_bundle`), 3 retired (the two that pinned the defect, and the one-key row
in the block-list table). 129/129 classes, 6/6 documented gaps, 35 limitations —
all unchanged.
## [1.0.0] — 2026-08-13 ## [1.0.0] — 2026-08-13

20
CLAUDE.md
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@ -11,11 +11,27 @@ framework-agnostisk kode.
Referanse-implementasjon: `claude-code-llm-wiki` Stage B (`tools/wiki_ingest/`). Referanse-implementasjon: `claude-code-llm-wiki` Stage B (`tools/wiki_ingest/`).
Lexikon-seed: `injection-patterns.mjs` fra `llm-security`-pluginen. Lexikon-seed: `injection-patterns.mjs` fra `llm-security`-pluginen.
Repoet er på **v1.0.0** — den eksporterte Python-surfacen er frosset under semver Repoet er på **v1.3.0** — den eksporterte Python-surfacen er frosset under semver
(deteksjonsatferd er det IKKE; kalibrering flytter seg i 1.x). Stdlib-kjernen er (deteksjonsatferd er det IKKE; kalibrering flytter seg i 1.x). Stdlib-kjernen er
bygget og testet (15 moduler + bygget og testet (15 moduler +
topp-nivå wiring, showcase + korpus), inkl. OKF-adapter og aktivt-innhold- topp-nivå wiring, showcase + korpus), inkl. OKF-adapter og aktivt-innhold-
detektor (EchoLeak-klassen) i output-gaten. Mode-b `import_bundle` skanner detektor (EchoLeak-klassen) i output-gaten. OKF-frontmatterens mapping-klasse
har **fire** uttrykkbare bærere (G3 21.08, G30 02.09): flow-mapping som verdi
og som blokkliste-element, flow-sekvens av flow-mappinger, og blokk-sekvens av
blokk-mappinger (SPEC §5.1s egen form). HVER nøkkel i alle fire står på
allowlisten og hvert blad er en ren skalar. Formen er trygg fordi allowlisten
inspiserer hver nøkkel; det blanke avslaget var håndhevelsen, ikke poenget.
**`resource` er allowlistet KUN inne i en `sources`-oppføring** — foreldre-
nøkkelen avgjør, så `executor`/`attester` sin `resource` (§10, dør C) avvises
gjennom hver eneste bærer. 1.2.0s begrunnelse for å utelate den (parseren
manglet foreldre-kontekst) var målt feil: konteksten var der, den var bare
aldri tredd gjennom. Topp-nivå blokk-mapping, dotted- og inline-kolon-rutene
raiser fortsatt, flow-sekvens av rene skalarer (`tags: [a, b]`) raiser, en
blokkliste kan ikke blande skalarer og mappinger, og en avvist mapping raiser —
den degraderer aldri til en streng (1.1.0-defekten). `sources[].resource`
URL-valideres ALDRI (T3 ser kun topp-nivå `resource`) — §5.1 tillater
bundle-relative stier og scope-beskrivelser, så en https-gate ville over-blokkert
konforme bundles; konsumenten må selv kalle `validate_resource_url`. Mode-b `import_bundle` skanner
reserverte strukturfiler (`index.md`/`log.md`) i mottatte bundles i stedet for å reserverte strukturfiler (`index.md`/`log.md`) i mottatte bundles i stedet for å
path-avvise dem; upload-front-end beholder shadow-reject (`allow_reserved=False`). path-avvise dem; upload-front-end beholder shadow-reject (`allow_reserved=False`).
Output-gatens decode-and-rescan mater dekodet base64-klartekst gjennom BÅDE lexicon Output-gatens decode-and-rescan mater dekodet base64-klartekst gjennom BÅDE lexicon

32
README.md
View file

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Write-time defensive layer for Python pipelines that persist LLM output: sanitize, fence, tool-less quarantined transform, capability isolation, scan before persist, fail-secure. Write-time defensive layer for Python pipelines that persist LLM output: sanitize, fence, tool-less quarantined transform, capability isolation, scan before persist, fail-secure.
![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-1.0.0-blue) ![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-1.3.0-blue)
![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-stable-brightgreen) ![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-stable-brightgreen)
![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10%2B-purple) ![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10%2B-purple)
![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-lightgrey) ![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-lightgrey)
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ at write time, never assumed from the format. Any pipeline ingesting external da
into an agent-read store has this shape; an OKF wiki is its canonical form — which into an agent-read store has this shape; an OKF wiki is its canonical form — which
is why the guard ships a first-class OKF adapter (below). is why the guard ships a first-class OKF adapter (below).
**Status:** `v1.0.0`. The stdlib-only core — its detector, contract, and **Status:** `v1.3.0`. The stdlib-only core — its detector, contract, and
OKF-adapter modules plus the top-level wiring — is built and tested, exercised by OKF-adapter modules plus the top-level wiring — is built and tested, exercised by
an end-to-end showcase and adversarial + false-positive corpora. The exported an end-to-end showcase and adversarial + false-positive corpora. The exported
Python surface is now frozen under semver: nothing exported is removed, renamed or Python surface is now frozen under semver: nothing exported is removed, renamed or
@ -41,12 +41,24 @@ given a different meaning without a `2.0.0`. **Detection behaviour is not frozen
severities, thresholds and lexicon entries are calibration and move in `1.x`. There severities, thresholds and lexicon entries are calibration and move in `1.x`. There
are real limitations, stated plainly below; read them. are real limitations, stated plainly below; read them.
## Table of Contents
- [Install](#install)
- [Quickstart — the two bookends](#quickstart--the-two-bookends)
- [OKF / LLM-wiki support (shipped)](#okf--llm-wiki-support-shipped)
- [What it protects against](#what-it-protects-against)
- [The reusable contract (adopt-this checklist)](#the-reusable-contract-adopt-this-checklist)
- [Known limitations](#known-limitations)
- [Non-goals](#non-goals)
- [Design & threat model](#design--threat-model)
- [License](#license)
## Install ## Install
Not on PyPI. The guard is distributed from its Forgejo origin — pin a release tag: Not on PyPI. The guard is distributed from its Forgejo origin — pin a release tag:
```bash ```bash
pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v1.0.0" pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v1.3.0"
``` ```
The `open/` mirror is anonymously readable, so CI needs no deploy key, token, or The `open/` mirror is anonymously readable, so CI needs no deploy key, token, or
@ -153,7 +165,15 @@ Per-concept gates: **path / reserved-name** (rejects `..` traversal and reserved
reject-by-default loader that refuses anchors, aliases, and explicit tags *by reject-by-default loader that refuses anchors, aliases, and explicit tags *by
construction*, so a billion-laughs alias expansion or a `!!python/object` coercion construction*, so a billion-laughs alias expansion or a `!!python/object` coercion
cannot occur (it is deliberately **not** a general YAML engine, whose own features cannot occur (it is deliberately **not** a general YAML engine, whose own features
are the attack surface); **`resource` https-allowlist** (hard-rejects are the attack surface). The one mapping form it accepts is OKF v0.2's flow
mapping — `generated: { by: x, at: y }`, `verified: { … }` bare or listed,
`usage_window: { from: …, to: … }` — admitted key-by-key against a nine-name
allowlist (`by`, `at`, `from`, `to`, `id`, `title`, `author`, `usage_count`,
`last_modified`) with plain-scalar leaves only. A key off that list, a nested
collection or a duplicate key is refused, and `resource` is deliberately not on
it; the block, dotted and inline-colon routes to a mapping still raise. See
[LIMITATIONS](docs/LIMITATIONS.md) for what that admits and what it still walls
off (a `sources` block list of mappings is still refused); **`resource` https-allowlist** (hard-rejects
`data:`/`javascript:`/`file:` before commit — a reject-gate, not defang); `data:`/`javascript:`/`file:` before commit — a reject-gate, not defang);
**whole-concept scan** (frontmatter *values* + body through `scan_output`); **whole-concept scan** (frontmatter *values* + body through `scan_output`);
**cross-link graph** (surfaces dangling targets, the dormant-injection signal, and **cross-link graph** (surfaces dangling targets, the dormant-injection signal, and
@ -167,7 +187,7 @@ driven by a **live payload** in the coverage matrix — run it to watch all 134
in your own environment: in your own environment:
```bash ```bash
python -m llm_ingestion_guard.coverage # 129/129 classes; exit 0 = all as documented python -m llm_ingestion_guard.coverage # 130/130 classes; exit 0 = all as documented
``` ```
| Anchor | Attack classes it stops (representative) | | Anchor | Attack classes it stops (representative) |
@ -249,7 +269,7 @@ a green scan means safe content. The highest-impact items:
two of the three corpora are living, so the cells are not rewritten in place. two of the three corpora are living, so the cells are not rewritten in place.
Method and before/after: [`docs/rawhtml-census.py`](docs/rawhtml-census.py). Method and before/after: [`docs/rawhtml-census.py`](docs/rawhtml-census.py).
**Full list — 35 items, each with the mechanism, plus the out-of-scope boundary:** **Full list — 45 items, each with the mechanism, plus the out-of-scope boundary:**
[`docs/LIMITATIONS.md`](docs/LIMITATIONS.md). Several carry field measurements from [`docs/LIMITATIONS.md`](docs/LIMITATIONS.md). Several carry field measurements from
consumer corpora, including the false positives the URL-shape rule actually produces. consumer corpora, including the false positives the URL-shape rule actually produces.

10
SECURITY.md
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@ -25,12 +25,12 @@ you happened to observe.
**Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.** Public disclosure before a fix **Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.** Public disclosure before a fix
gives an attacker a window against every downstream consumer. gives an attacker a window against every downstream consumer.
Instead, report it **privately** to the maintainer via the canonical repository on Instead, report it privately to <security@fromaitochitta.com> — mark the subject
Forgejo: `SECURITY`.
- Repository: `git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security` - Canonical repository: https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security
- Contact the maintainer directly through that Forgejo instance (private message / - Alternatively, contact the maintainer directly through that Forgejo instance
maintainer contact) and mark the subject `SECURITY`. (private message / maintainer contact) and mark the subject `SECURITY`.
Please include: Please include:

6
docs/ADOPTION-BRIEF.md
View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
especially one converging on Google's Open Knowledge Format (OKF v0.1) — and needs especially one converging on Google's Open Knowledge Format (OKF v0.1) — and needs
to decide **when** and **where** to add a write-time ingestion guard. to decide **when** and **where** to add a write-time ingestion guard.
**Status of the guard:** `v1.0.0`. Stdlib-only core, framework-agnostic. The **Status of the guard:** `v1.3.0`. Stdlib-only core, framework-agnostic. The
exported Python surface is frozen under semver — nothing exported is removed, exported Python surface is frozen under semver — nothing exported is removed,
renamed or given a different meaning without a `2.0.0`. Detection behaviour is renamed or given a different meaning without a `2.0.0`. Detection behaviour is
*not* frozen: severities, thresholds and lexicon entries are calibration and move *not* frozen: severities, thresholds and lexicon entries are calibration and move
@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ live payload:
python -m llm_ingestion_guard.coverage # exit 0 = all as documented python -m llm_ingestion_guard.coverage # exit 0 = all as documented
``` ```
As of `v1.0.0`: **129 / 129 defended classes demonstrated (recall 100%)** and **6 / As of `v1.3.0`: **130 / 130 defended classes demonstrated (recall 100%)** and **6 /
6 documented gaps still hold** (a *closed* gap fails the test, forcing a doc 6 documented gaps still hold** (a *closed* gap fails the test, forcing a doc
update). The matrix is the single source of truth for the test suite (**792 update). The matrix is the single source of truth for the test suite (**868
passing**), which also asserts total recall, that every lexicon pattern has a passing**), which also asserts total recall, that every lexicon pattern has a
case (so the matrix cannot fall behind the lexicon), the full LLM02 secret-egress case (so the matrix cannot fall behind the lexicon), the full LLM02 secret-egress
set, and the container-layer front-end (CSV formula-injection, zip-slip/bomb, set, and the container-layer front-end (CSV formula-injection, zip-slip/bomb,

2
docs/BRIEF.md
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
**A reusable, minimal, dependency-light defensive layer for LLM *ingestion* **A reusable, minimal, dependency-light defensive layer for LLM *ingestion*
pipelines — the write-time siblings of query-time chatbot guardrails.** pipelines — the write-time siblings of query-time chatbot guardrails.**
Status: implemented — v1.0.0, exported surface frozen under semver. This document defines what the repo contains Status: implemented — v1.3.0, exported surface frozen under semver. This document defines what the repo contains
and why; the stdlib-only core is built and tested (see `README.md` for usage and and why; the stdlib-only core is built and tested (see `README.md` for usage and
`docs/PLAN.md` for the build order). `docs/PLAN.md` for the build order).

310
docs/LIMITATIONS.md
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@ -40,38 +40,107 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
(an injection in a directory listing is caught) rather than path-rejecting the (an injection in a directory listing is caught) rather than path-rejecting the
conformant bundle. A front-end materialising individual uploads keeps the opposite conformant bundle. A front-end materialising individual uploads keeps the opposite
rule (`allow_reserved=False`): a reserved basename is a listing-shadow and refused. rule (`allow_reserved=False`): a reserved basename is a listing-shadow and refused.
- **OKF frontmatter is a restricted grammar, and a one-key block-sequence item is - **OKF frontmatter is a restricted grammar: a mapping is expressible through
silently misparsed.** Gate T2 accepts a line-oriented subset deliberately — full four carriers, all of them key-allowlisted.** Gate T2 accepts a line-oriented
YAML is a larger parse-attack surface than a write-time gate needs. Nested mappings subset deliberately — full YAML is a larger parse-attack surface than a
and flow collections (`[a, b]`, `{k: v}`) are *rejected outright*, which fails write-time gate needs. The admitted carriers are the flow mapping as a value
secure. **All three routes to a mapping fail, each on a different rule** — flow (`generated: { by: x, at: y }`), the flow mapping as a block-list item, the
(`{k: v}`) on the disallowed value-start indicator, block (`k:\n sub: v`) on the flow *sequence* of flow mappings (`sources: [{ id: a, resource: x }]`) and the
nested-mapping check, and dotted keys (`k.sub: v`) on the key pattern — so the block sequence of block mappings (SPEC.md §5.1's own form). **The routes that
mapping *class* has no expressible form, rather than one form being preferable to still fail, each on a different rule:** a top-level block *mapping*
another. What survives is scalars and flat lists of strings. The defect is between (`k:\n sub: v`) on the nested-mapping check, dotted keys (`k.sub: v`) on the
those two outcomes: a block sequence whose items carry key pattern, the inline second colon (`k: sub: v`) on the mapping-construct
exactly **one** key parses "successfully" into the wrong type — check, and a flow sequence of plain *scalars* (`tags: [a, b]`) on the `[`
`sources:\n - uri: https://e.com/a` yields the **string** `'uri: https://e.com/a'`, indicator — the sequence carrier is opened for the mapping element and nothing
not a mapping, while the same list with two keys per item hard-rejects. A pointer else. **Every carrier is admitted only when every key is on an allowlist**
can therefore ride through in a key the `resource` allowlist never inspects (`by`, `at`, `from`, `to`, `id`, `title`, `author`, `usage_count`,
(`attester:\n - resource: attesters/sql_equality.py` → WARN), whereas a top-level `last_modified` — the keys SPEC.md @ `62432a09` §5.1/§5.2 names inside a mapping,
`resource:` with a relative path correctly fails secure. The shape is not conformant plus `resource` and `usage_window` *under `sources` only*, see below)
OKF, so a well-formed bundle will not produce it; a malformed or hostile one can, and and every leaf is a plain scalar, itself run through the same value predicates as a
mode-b `import_bundle` writes the merged concept verbatim. Note the three block-list top-level scalar. Nested collections, quoted leaves, duplicate keys, an empty or
shapes are *not* one case: flat scalars parse correctly, one key per item misparses unclosed mapping, and `{a:b}` (which PyYAML 6.0.3 reads as the *key* `a:b`, not as
silently, two keys per item hard-rejects. a scalar) all raise. The form is expressible, never trusted: the allowlist
inspects every key, which is the property that carried the security when the
blanket refusal was doing the enforcing. **A block list may not mix scalar items
and mappings** — YAML permits it, but a consumer iterating `sources` and reading
`entry.get("id")` gets an `AttributeError` off the first `str`. What else
survives is scalars and flat lists of strings. **Two routes used to
degrade into a string instead of failing, and that defect is closed in `1.1.0`**:
a block-sequence item carrying exactly one key (`sources:\n - uri: https://e.com/a`
yielded the *string* `'uri: https://e.com/a'`) and the inline second colon
(`attester: resource: attesters/sql_equality.py`, which a real YAML parser refuses
outright). Both parsed "successfully" into the wrong *type*, and a pointer parked
in one rode through in a key the `resource` allowlist never inspects — mode-b
`import_bundle` returned WARN and wrote the merged concept verbatim. Both now
FAIL_SECURE at T2, before the allowlist is reached. **What closed is the type
confusion, not pointer-smuggling as a class:** T3 still inspects `resource` and
nothing else, so an honest *string* under another key rides through exactly as
before — `attester: attesters/sql_equality.py` is WARN, while the same path
under `resource:` FAIL_SECUREs. That is by design (the string is scanned like
any other frontmatter value under T1) and it is not what `1.1.0` changed.
**The boundary is where YAML
puts it**, ground-truthed against PyYAML 6.0.3: `": "` and a trailing `":"` open a
mapping and are refused; a colon carrying neither a space nor a line end
(`domain:security`, `https://e.com:8443/a`) does not and still parses, as does a
quoted scalar (`- "uri: x"`). Quotes are retained rather than stripped — a
divergence from YAML that remains, pinned in `tests/test_okf.py`.
- **T2 constrains import, not emission.** The frontmatter grammar runs on - **T2 constrains import, not emission.** The frontmatter grammar runs on
`okf.import_bundle` (door C) only — `parse_frontmatter` is referenced nowhere in the `okf.import_bundle` (door C) only — `parse_frontmatter` is referenced nowhere in the
door A/B persist path, so frontmatter that fails secure on import passes door A/B persist path, so frontmatter that fails secure on import passes
`screen_output` unremarked. The grammar therefore bounds what a consumer can *receive*, `screen_output` unremarked. The grammar therefore bounds what a consumer can *receive*,
never what a producer can *emit*. Verified identical on 0.2.0 and 0.3.1. never what a producer can *emit*. Verified identical on 0.2.0 and 0.3.1.
- **Consequence: an OKF v0.2 concept cannot traverse the external-import path.** Both - **`sources` passes in both of its spec carriers; the per-entry `usage_window`
of v0.2's backward-breaking migration targets are nested — `timestamp` → `generated.at`, does not.** The wall used to be total: both of v0.2's backward-breaking migration
and body `# Citations` → a `sources` block list of mappings — so a conformant v0.2 targets are mappings — `timestamp` → `generated.at`, and body `# Citations` → a
concept fails secure at the frontmatter gate. This is the correct direction but it is `sources` block list of mappings — and a consumer measured **0 of 53** upstream
a compatibility wall, not a policy: v0.2 support requires a deliberate parse-safety concepts through the gate. `generated.at` stopped being a wall in `1.2.0`;
decision about widening the grammar, and the dangling-or-substituted `executor`/ `sources` stopped being one in `1.3.0`, which admits both the block sequence of
`attester` pointer question only becomes live once that decision is made. block mappings (SPEC.md §5.1's own example) and the flow sequence of flow
mappings (the form the OKF producers emit, measured 2026-09-02 by two consumers
independently). **`resource` is allowlisted inside a `sources` entry and nowhere
else.** `1.2.0` left it off on the argument that the parser could not tell
`sources[].resource` (§5.1, a citation) from `executor.resource` / `attester.resource`
(§10, a pointer to code to be run — door C). That premise was measured false: the
owning key is in scope at every call site and was simply never threaded through.
It is threaded now, so `executor: [{ resource: skills/run.md }]` and
`attester:\n - resource: …` are refused on the allowlist through *every* carrier,
including the two this opened. **What stays refused: a `usage_window` inside a
`sources` entry.** SPEC §5.1 permits it per entry ("A single entry MAY carry its
own `usage_window`"), and it is a mapping inside a mapping — depth 2, which this
parser admits at no key. A bundle using the per-entry override is refused; the
shared sibling `usage_window` (the §5.1 example's own form) passes. This is a
registered conformance gap, not an oversight: no-nesting-past-depth-1 is a
security property, and spending it was not what the fix was for.
- **`sources[].resource` is scanned as text but never validated as a URL.** T3's
https allowlist inspects the *top-level* `resource` and nothing else. It cannot
be extended to `sources` entries without over-blocking conformant bundles: SPEC
§5.1 explicitly permits a bundle-relative path, a path into `references/`, or a
scope descriptor a consumer cannot follow at all (the OKF producers' own golden
bundle emits `resource: fixture`). So a `sources` entry may carry
`file://`, `javascript:` or any other string; it goes through T1's scan like any
other frontmatter value, and nothing else. **A consumer that dereferences
`sources[].resource` must validate it itself** — `okf.validate_resource_url` is
exported for exactly that. The dangling-or-substituted `executor`/`attester`
pointer question stays out of reach separately: both are top-level block
mappings, a carrier that is still refused.
- **`tags` and `description` block the OKF import corpus universally, before the
trust layer is even reached.** The line-flat frontmatter parser has no
sequence-value type at all: `tags` is present in 53/53 upstream concept
documents — 9/53 as a flow sequence (`[a, b, c]`, rejected on the `[`
indicator) and 44/53 as a block sequence (`- a` / `- b`, rejected as
`"malformed frontmatter line"`) — 100% rejection regardless of form.
`description` is present in 53/53; 29/53 is a folded plain scalar continuing
on an indented second line, which the parser has no continuation-line model
for and misreads as `"nested mappings are not supported"` (the remaining
24/53 are single-line and parse fine). Measured directly on the upstream
reference bundles (`_okf-upstream/okf` @ `3fcbb9f`): removing `tags` alone
lets 4/53 documents pass; removing both `tags` and `description` together
(trust layer untouched) lets the same 4/53 pass, and all four then parse
`generated` correctly as a mapping. **Independent of the mapping-form work
above:** neither `1.2.0`'s flow mapping nor `1.3.0`'s `sources` carriers move
anything on this corpus, because `tags`/`description` reject before `sources`
is ever read. No sequence-value type or continuation-line model exists in the
stdlib-only parser to close this with.
- **A persist gate cannot cover execution risk.** OKF v0.2 introduces concepts whose - **A persist gate cannot cover execution risk.** OKF v0.2 introduces concepts whose
purpose is to *name code to be run* (`runtime`, `executor.resource`, purpose is to *name code to be run* (`runtime`, `executor.resource`,
`attester.resource`). This library answers "is this safe to **store**"; executable `attester.resource`). This library answers "is this safe to **store**"; executable
@ -295,6 +364,21 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
`test_split_tightens_the_trusted_tier_when_both_carriers_are_present` constructs `test_split_tightens_the_trusted_tier_when_both_carriers_are_present` constructs
and pins. Read the zero as "not observed in any of the three populations, each and pins. Read the zero as "not observed in any of the three populations, each
counted against its own denominator", never as "cannot happen". counted against its own denominator", never as "cannot happen".
- **The split also LOOSENS the upload door for a lone anchor — the direction it was
built for, and the one with a residual worth naming.** Measured as shipped:
`<a href="https://ext.example/p">t</a>` on its own emits one
`active:raw-html-link` at MEDIUM and disposes `quarantine_review` under
`PRESET_USER_UPLOAD` (`warn` under `PRESET_TRUSTED_SOURCE`); through 0.6.1 the
same document graded HIGH and `fail_secure`d. An `<img src>` to the same host is
untouched — `active:raw-html`, HIGH, `fail_secure`. So an anchor pointing at an
attacker-controlled host, arriving on an untrusted upload, is now a human decision
rather than a halt. The trade is deliberate and it removes an asymmetry that came
from syntax rather than affordance: following an anchor needs a click, exactly like
the markdown inline link that has graded MEDIUM since 0.3.1, so the same URL no
longer grades two different ways depending on which syntax carries it. It is
recorded here so 0.7.0's "frees N documents" is not read as free — what was freed
is the click-required class, and MEDIUM is a real grade drop on the door where
every finding is trust-escalated.
- **Raw-HTML findings no longer count end tags, and that moved a published field.** - **Raw-HTML findings no longer count end tags, and that moved a published field.**
Through 0.6.1 `</a>` was active by name on its own, so `count` ran roughly 1.6× Through 0.6.1 `</a>` was active by name on its own, so `count` ran roughly 1.6×
the opening-tag total (measured on one corpus) and a start/end pair counted 2. the opening-tag total (measured on one corpus) and a start/end pair counted 2.
@ -303,6 +387,44 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
every document carrying `</a>`, on a field whose meaning did not change. The every document carrying `</a>`, on a field whose meaning did not change. The
finding count is unaffected: the class still collapses to one finding per class finding count is unaffected: the class still collapses to one finding per class
per document, and `count` was never a document count. per document, and `count` was never a document count.
- **Which tags the no-URL narrowing may render inert is a judgement about affordance,
and no test in this repo can derive it.** `_URL_AFFORDANCE_TAGS` holds the nine
names whose entire active affordance *is* the URL they name — `a`, `area`, `img`,
`video`, `audio`, `source`, `track`, `frame`, `frameset` — so carrying no URL
attribute they name no target and grade inert. Every other name in the active set
stays active with no attributes at all, because it does something a URL cannot
describe: `<script>` executes its body, `<style>` restyles, `<form>` submits. That
boundary is asserted, not measured. A name placed in the set whose affordance does
*not* reduce to its URL would go silently invisible, and no corpus can catch it,
because what it produces is an absence — the census counts findings, and a tag that
stopped firing contributes nothing to count. The fail-secure choice one branch
further in holds the other way and is worth reading beside it: a URL attribute whose
*value* this module cannot resolve keeps the tag active
(`active_content.py:320-324`), a branch the three corpora exercise **0** times.
That zero is empirical, so the predicate is written not to depend on it.
- **"Clean" means *graded, no finding raised* — never *cleaned bytes* — and at one
measured consumer's door, `warn` is the floor a document must clear to be
persisted rather than rejected.** The word is the library's own: a WARN
disposition with nothing to report carries the reason string `"clean: no
findings"` (`disposition.py:264`), and this project has repeated that word in the
tables it sends consumers. `screen_output` is a judgement API — its
`DispositionResult` carries `assessment` / `disposition` / `max_severity` /
`reasons`, with no sanitized-text field to read off it. Defanging lives in a
separate, deliberate call — `neutralize` — that a caller must invoke itself;
nothing upstream of that call transforms a byte. Measured against
`llm-ingestion-okf`'s `0.7.0` pin (2026-08-13): `inbox.py:139` sets its persist
floor to `warn`, and `inbox.py:323` persists anything carrying that disposition
into the bundle; its adapter (`guard_adapter.py:70`) forwards the original
extracted text, because nothing upstream ever handed it a transformed one. Four
raw-HTML carrier forms the 0.7.0 no-URL narrowing grades inert — an
`<a aria-label>` with no `href`, a bare `</a>`, `<Frame>`, `<video />` — verified
here (`screen_output(..., PRESET_USER_UPLOAD)`) to dispose `warn, clean: no
findings`; at that consumer's door the same four land written into the bundle,
carrier present verbatim. Neither library is wrong: `screen_output` never
promised transformed bytes, and the consumer never called `neutralize` for them.
The gap is in reading "clean" as "sanitized" rather than "no finding raised" — a
reading this project's own reports invite, and one that will mislead any caller
that persists on `warn` without calling `neutralize` itself.
- **Measured, document by document: a large minority of *benign* documents do not - **Measured, document by document: a large minority of *benign* documents do not
persist unattended at the upload door.** The bullets above bound single rules on persist unattended at the upload door.** The bullets above bound single rules on
single URLs. This one bounds the thing a consumer actually feels — how often an single URLs. This one bounds the thing a consumer actually feels — how often an
@ -429,6 +551,23 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
HIGH under a low-trust preset is `fail_secure`. Report-only means the text is HIGH under a low-trust preset is `fail_secure`. Report-only means the text is
never mutated — it does not mean the finding cannot block. never mutated — it does not mean the finding cannot block.
- **The two labels a `<script>` tag raises come from patterns that do not match the
same strings.** `hybrid-xss:script-tag` is `<script\b[^><]*>`; `active:raw-html`
reads the same tag through `HTML_TAG_RE`, which consumes quoted attribute runs
atomically and so tolerates both `<` and `>` inside a quoted value. The lexicon's
`<` exclusion is not a modelling choice — it is the 0.3.3 ReDoS fix, and widening
it back to `[^>]` restores a quadratic arm (the row below carries the numbers).
Measured through both scanners: `<script src="a<b">` raises `active:raw-html` and
**no** XSS label, while `<script data-t="a>b">` raises both, the lexicon's match
simply ending at the quoted `>`. The disposition never moves — the raw-HTML branch
grades `<script>` HIGH with no attributes at all, so every shape here still
`fail_secure`s under `PRESET_USER_UPLOAD` — so what the divergence costs is the
*label*: a consumer filtering findings on the XSS id sees a subset of the script
tags the gate actually caught, and must not read that id as the gate's script-tag
census. The residual is practically dead in prose (a `<` inside a script tag's
quoted attribute region is not an ordinary shape) and is recorded because the
asymmetry is invisible from either scanner alone.
- **A connection-string password longer than 256 chars is not matched.** The - **A connection-string password longer than 256 chars is not matched.** The
password run in the `*-connstr` egress patterns is bounded by password run in the `*-connstr` egress patterns is bounded by
`MAX_CONNSTR_VALUE`; unbounded, it sits in front of a mandatory `@` and makes `MAX_CONNSTR_VALUE`; unbounded, it sits in front of a mandatory `@` and makes
@ -445,24 +584,96 @@ items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.
missed; on one preset it is held for review instead of halted. missed; on one preset it is held for review instead of halted.
- **The ReDoS sweep has a measured sensitivity floor, not a clean bill of - **The ReDoS sweep has a measured sensitivity floor, not a clean bill of
health.** All 150 compiled patterns across all eleven regex-bearing modules are health.** All 152 compiled patterns across all eleven regex-bearing modules are
swept arm by arm — payloads synthesised per run from each pattern's own swept arm by arm — payloads synthesised per run from each pattern's own
skeleton, so `[`, `[system]` and `[system](` are each probed separately rather skeleton, so `[`, `[system]` and `[system](` are each probed separately rather
than relying on generic units, and each pattern is timed in the call mode the than relying on generic units, and each pattern is timed in the call mode the
production code uses (`.sub()`/`.finditer()` visit every start position where production code uses (`.sub()`/`.finditer()` visit every start position where
`.match()` cannot). Five patterns were quadratic across 0.3.3 and 0.3.4; all `.match()` cannot). Five patterns were quadratic across 0.3.3 and 0.3.4; all
are fixed. But the sweep flags on *timing*, and it ignores measurements below a are fixed. But the sweep flags on *timing*, and it ignores measurements below a
1.5 ms noise floor at N=8000. A quadratic arm sitting just under that floor 1.5 ms noise floor at N=8000 — process CPU time, re-derived on that instrument
would still cost **up to ~23 s** at the 1 000 000-char cap. So the claim this (see the clock bullet below) rather than inherited from the wall clock the
sweep supports is "no arm worse than ~23 s at the cap", not "no quadratic arm script used through 1.1.0. A quadratic arm sitting just under that floor would
remains". The method's blind spot is real and has now been demonstrated twice: still cost **up to ~23 s** at the 1 000 000-char cap — that figure is arithmetic
a generic-payload pass found only one of 0.3.3's two patterns, and 0.3.2's and not a measurement: a quadratic arm costs the square of the length ratio, and
1.5 ms × 125 × 125 is 23.4 s. So the claim this sweep supports is "no arm worse
than ~23 s at the cap", not "no quadratic arm remains". The method's blind spot
is real and has now been demonstrated twice: a generic-payload pass found only
one of 0.3.3's two patterns, and 0.3.2's
hand-written rows missed all three of 0.3.4's — including one on `sanitize`, hand-written rows missed all three of 0.3.4's — including one on `sanitize`,
the first thing every ingested document touches. **Two arm shapes the unit- the first thing every ingested document touches. **Two arm shapes the unit-
repetition payloads cannot express** are pinned by hand as a result: a tag that repetition payloads cannot express** are pinned by hand as a result: a tag that
*closes* around a long body, and a run of plain characters carrying no anchor *closes* around a long body, and a run of plain characters carrying no anchor
at all. at all.
- **A green ReDoS row is evidence only if it has been seen red, and three rows in
this suite had never been.** The class is not a bad bound but a payload that cannot
reach the defect, and it leaves the row passing under the vulnerable form too. The
sub-agent row is the clearest case: the seed's unbounded lazy run costs per *prefix
match*, not per character — each start position where `spawn an agent that ` matches
drives its own O(N) scan to end-of-string looking for a capability keyword the
payload never supplies, so K prefix matches cost K×O(N), and the bounded
`(?:\S+\s+){0,12}?` port caps each scan at 12 tokens for K×O(1). A payload that
matches the prefix **once** and then pads pays a single lazy run and is linear
however long the pad is — two earlier shapes did exactly that, and the row sat
measured-dead at 1.2× until the payload was rebuilt as
`"spawn an agent that " * 3000`. (The nesting an older comment blamed is a red
herring: the inner `.*?` sits in an optional group, never a repeated one.) Measured
through `scan_lexicon` with the seed form patched back in — exponent **1.92** against
the shipped **1.01**, and **4.091s vs 0.190s** at 12 000 words, the seed breaking the
2.0s bound outright. Two siblings were dead for different reasons.
`lexicon-script-tag` had to be given its own N=200 000: at the shared N=100 000 the
vulnerable `[^>]` form measured only ~1.2–1.4s — under the 2.0s assert, so the row
was green under both forms and proved nothing. And
`test_gate_is_bounded_on_the_long_attribute_arm` was killed by **this repo's own
narrowing**: 0.7.0 put `<a>` in `_URL_AFFORDANCE_TAGS`, so its `<a ` + 100k + `>`
payload became inert and returned *before* the body ever reached the arm the row
exists to guard — separation 1.0×, 0.028s and no findings, against 12.475s for the
same payload carried by `<script `. The carrier was moved to `<script `, which is
active by name with no attributes, so no future URL-shaped narrowing can hollow it
out the same way. The general rule the three share: a payload must **deny** the
literal the vulnerable run sits in front of — a unit that supplies it matches
immediately and never exercises the run. **Nothing but hand measurement finds this
class.** The row is green either way, so
the suite cannot report its own blind spot, and every bound in it should be read as
"verified red under the vulnerable form" only where a comment says it was.
- **Every ReDoS bound in the suite is measured on process CPU time, and so is the
sweep that sets the published sensitivity floor.** `tests/redos_clock.py` is the one
clock all six test files import — `time.process_time()` — because a blowup is spent
cycles while a loaded machine steals wall clock without adding any. On
`time.monotonic()` two 0.7.0 rows failed at **2.24s / 3.66s** against a 2.0s bound
while two census processes held the CPU, and passed 3/3 on an idle machine: they had
been descheduled, not slowed. It lives in one module rather than five copies because
`test_output.py::test_the_redos_clock_ignores_time_this_process_did_not_spend` pins
one implementation, and four unpinned copies would be free to drift back to a wall
clock with nothing going red. **What the CPU clock gives up, stated: a scan that
BLOCKS forever burns no CPU, so it would hang the suite instead of failing it.**
That is acceptable only because every scanner it measures is pure regex over an
in-memory string, with no I/O and no locks — the last wall-clock holdout was retired
by auditing its path for anything that could block, not by assumption, and a wall
clock guarding a mode that cannot occur still charges the false-red premium
(measured there at 21.6s against a 10.0s bound, on a scan that spent 7.6s). **The sweep
now runs on the same clock, and closing that divergence bought no sensitivity.**
`docs/redos-sweep.py` imports `scan_seconds` instead of timing on
`time.monotonic()`, so the 1.5 ms floor at N=8000 and the "~23 s at the cap"
figure above are finally in the same currency as the bounds they justify. What
the move did *not* do is quiet the sweep, and the floor came back unchanged.
Measured over **twelve full runs of all 2585 arms**: the median ratio sits at
**1.95–2.03** in every size bucket above 50 µs — the whole surface measures
linear — while two-point excursions past the 2.6 flag threshold survive at every
magnitude, p99 ratio **2.9–3.3 even above 1 ms**. Flagged arms per run by floor:
**6.9 at 0.5 ms, 1.1 at 1.0 ms, 0.33 at 1.5 ms** (0–2 per run), so 1.5 ms is
still the knee. Descheduling was never what made this sweep noisy — a ratio
computed from two points is. Four distinct arms flagged at the shipped floor
across those twelve runs, **each in exactly one of them**, and nine of the twelve
runs were clean; eight consecutive runs of the shipped script immediately after a
full test run flagged 0–3 arms each, so machine load still moves the count even
on a CPU clock. Six flagged arms re-measured over six doublings give exponent
**0.97–1.09** and at most 1.2 s at the 1 000 000-char cap. **A single clean run
of this sweep is therefore not evidence either** — and neither is a single
flagged one.
- **Every surface now bounds its input, but not all of them the same way.** - **Every surface now bounds its input, but not all of them the same way.**
`sanitize`, `fence` and `neutralize` raise `OversizeInputError` above `sanitize`, `fence` and `neutralize` raise `OversizeInputError` above
`MAX_INPUT_CHARS` (1 000 000) rather than returning a partially transformed `MAX_INPUT_CHARS` (1 000 000) rather than returning a partially transformed
@ -525,6 +736,23 @@ fails the test, forcing this doc to be updated:
names the outward fetch whatever severity it carries — and must not infer names the outward fetch whatever severity it carries — and must not infer
"nothing was seen" from a low `Severity`. "nothing was seen" from a low `Severity`.
- **Under the default action map the assessment axis carries exactly one judgement
the disposition does not.** `DEFAULT_ACTION_MAP` sends `NONE` and `LOW` to `WARN`,
`ELEVATED` to `QUARANTINE_REVIEW` and `SEVERE` to `FAIL_SECURE` — the last two 1:1.
So for any document that carries a finding at all, `assessment` is a relabelling of
`disposition` and nothing more; the only thing it adds is *clean* versus *findings
present, none dispositive in this context*, which 0.4.0 rendered identically. That
collapse is the point (the map is what keeps the separation additive, so a caller
ignoring the new axis sees no change), and it is also the limitation: reading
`assessment` buys a consumer nothing until it supplies its own `action_map` or needs
the clean/low distinction. **The second consequence is on this document.** The
published false-positive rates are counts of documents *disposed non-WARN*, and they
are a statement about assessed risk only while `NONE` + `LOW` are exactly the WARN
pre-image. `tests/test_corpus.py::test_the_published_fp_metric_is_a_risk_statement`
pins that equivalence — but it pins it for `DEFAULT_ACTION_MAP`. A caller running its
own map makes "disposed non-WARN" a different claim from the one measured here, with
nothing in either repo failing to say so.
- **A ZWJ hidden between two emoji is exempt, and ZWNJ's own false-positive - **A ZWJ hidden between two emoji is exempt, and ZWNJ's own false-positive
class is untouched.** U+200D composes emoji (👩‍💻 is WOMAN + ZWJ + PERSONAL class is untouched.** U+200D composes emoji (👩‍💻 is WOMAN + ZWJ + PERSONAL
COMPUTER), so testing it on codepoint membership alone flagged *and stripped* COMPUTER), so testing it on codepoint membership alone flagged *and stripped*
@ -543,6 +771,22 @@ fails the test, forcing this doc to be updated:
not pictographic) and no corpus is available here to verify it against, so it not pictographic) and no corpus is available here to verify it against, so it
is parked as a known false-positive class rather than guessed at. is parked as a known false-positive class rather than guessed at.
- **That context test is one predicate on two surfaces, and the symbol carrying it is
private.** `sanitize` owns `_is_joiner_in_emoji_sequence`; `output` imports it
(`output.py:74`) instead of restating it, because the same defect had to be fixed on
both surfaces and a split would let the input side stop flagging while the output
side kept hard-blocking — or the reverse, which is how a carrier reaches a persisted
artifact after passing the input gate. The agreement is pinned by
`tests/test_output.py::test_output_zwj_narrowing_matches_the_sanitize_side`, which
asserts `stripped == flagged` across six shapes — half-context on either side, a
leading and a trailing joiner, one genuine in-sequence joiner, and a word split.
Two things that pin does not give. The six shapes are hand-written rather than
drawn from a corpus, so everywhere outside them
the surfaces agree by *shared implementation*, not by test — which is the stronger
guarantee only for as long as the import survives. And the leading underscore means
the predicate is **not** part of the surface frozen under semver: a consumer that
imports it is pinning a private name 1.x makes no promise about.
## Out-of-scope (documented boundary) ## Out-of-scope (documented boundary)
Embedding/vector-layer defenses (OWASP LLM08, downstream of persist); multimodal Embedding/vector-layer defenses (OWASP LLM08, downstream of persist); multimodal

25
docs/PLAN-v1.md
View file

@ -228,7 +228,18 @@ Nøkkelantakelser (+ test) · Verifisering. Testkommando alltid:
→ +N grønne; `python -c "import tomllib,pathlib; d=tomllib.loads(pathlib.Path('pyproject.toml').read_text()); assert d['project']['dependencies']==[] and 'pypdf' in ' '.join(d['project']['optional-dependencies']['dev'])"` → exit 0. → +N grønne; `python -c "import tomllib,pathlib; d=tomllib.loads(pathlib.Path('pyproject.toml').read_text()); assert d['project']['dependencies']==[] and 'pypdf' in ' '.join(d['project']['optional-dependencies']['dev'])"` → exit 0.
- **Avhengigheter:** uavhengig; kan gjøres når som helst før G. - **Avhengigheter:** uavhengig; kan gjøres når som helst før G.
### Session G — v1.0 freeze + release *(FRYSER Python-surfacen — Node-prereq)* ### Session G — v1.0 freeze + release *(LANDET 2026-08-13)*
> **LANDET — `98ebc07`, tag `v1.0.0` pushet.** D1–D6 i `docs/GATE-G-v1.md` §6 tatt av
> operatøren: frys på 0.7.0 (D2 i), `:492`/`:460`/`:88` konsedert i 1.x (D3/D5,
> `e9d8fb2`), varslingsplikten fyrte ikke (D4 — begrunnelse over ved løfte 1),
> `active_tag_class` er IKKE en pinnbar shape (D6). **Åtte flater bumpet for hånd;
> den niende — Forge-beskrivelsen — ble VERIFISERT mot API-et og trengte ingen
> endring** (178 kodepunkter, ingen versjon, ingen «alpha»). Klassifiseringssveipet
> (421 treff) og `git show 98ebc07:README.md` kjørte begge FØR taggen, i den
> rekkefølgen; anonym `pip install …@v1.0.0` i rent venv etter. Sveipet fant to
> flater lista under ikke navnga: READMEs status-**badge** og ADOPTION-BRIEFs
> testtall (`791` mot 792). 792 tester, 129/129, 6/6.
- **Mål:** shippe v1.0.0; fryse den offentlige surfacen som porten oversetter. - **Mål:** shippe v1.0.0; fryse den offentlige surfacen som porten oversetter.
- **Scope-grense:** ingen ny feature. Kun versjons-bump, CHANGELOG, tag, push. - **Scope-grense:** ingen ny feature. Kun versjons-bump, CHANGELOG, tag, push.
@ -428,6 +439,18 @@ ikke en preferanse.**
og bygger på 0.3.1-formen; en stille re-stramming lander som produksjonsincident hos og bygger på 0.3.1-formen; en stille re-stramming lander som produksjonsincident hos
dem, ikke som en release-note. Gjelder også 0.4.0: akse-separasjonen skal endre dem, ikke som en release-note. Gjelder også 0.4.0: akse-separasjonen skal endre
DISPOSISJON, ikke graderingen — viser det seg feil under scoping, fyrer løftet. DISPOSISJON, ikke graderingen — viser det seg feil under scoping, fyrer løftet.
> **D4, avgjort av operatøren 2026-08-13 ved v1.0-frysen: løftet fyrte IKKE av
> rå-HTML-bevegelsen 0.3.1→0.7.0, og intet etterskuddsvarsel gikk ut.**
> Begrunnelsen styrer, ikke ordlyden. Løftets formål er navngitt i teksten over:
> en stille re-**stramming** lander som produksjonsincident hos dem. Alle fire
> ordinære markdown-former er målt IDENTISKE 0.3.1 vs 0.7.0 (WARN/LOW, før/etter i
> samme økt, `docs/GATE-G-v1.md` §4); de fire radene som flyttet seg LØSNET alle
> (`<a href>` HIGH→MEDIUM, `<a aria-label>` og `</a>` HIGH→rent, ZWJ-emoji
> HIGH→rent). En løsning kan ikke produsere incidenten løftet finnes for å hindre.
> **Ordlyden («enhver endring») pekte motsatt vei, og det er den reelle
> motforestillingen** — hadde den styrt, var varselet uteblitt i tre utgivelser.
> Nedtegnet her, ikke i `STATE.md`, nettopp av grunnen seksjonen selv oppgir: et
> fravær uten begrunnelse er ikke til å skille fra at vi glemte det.
2. **Relativ-mål-asymmetrien** (relative lenker/bilder i en OKF-bundle flagges ikke) — 2. **Relativ-mål-asymmetrien** (relative lenker/bilder i en OKF-bundle flagges ikke) —
lukkes den, får `llm-ingestion-okf` varsel **før** det shippes. Den er en Door lukkes den, får `llm-ingestion-okf` varsel **før** det shippes. Den er en Door
C-egenskap, ikke et guard-gap: et merget konsept skrives VERBATIM, så vi reparerer C-egenskap, ikke et guard-gap: et merget konsept skrives VERBATIM, så vi reparerer

49
docs/redos-sweep.py
View file

@ -37,17 +37,30 @@ import importlib
import json import json
import re import re
import sys import sys
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path from pathlib import Path
SRC = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "src" / "llm_ingestion_guard" ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
SRC = ROOT / "src" / "llm_ingestion_guard"
sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC.parent)) sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC.parent))
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "tests"))
from llm_ingestion_guard.lexicon import load_lexicon # noqa: E402 from llm_ingestion_guard.lexicon import load_lexicon # noqa: E402
from redos_clock import scan_seconds # noqa: E402
N1, N2 = 4_000, 8_000 N1, N2 = 4_000, 8_000
RATIO_FLAG = 2.6 RATIO_FLAG = 2.6
# RE-DERIVED on the CPU clock, not inherited from the wall clock this script used
# through 1.1.0. The clock move fixed false REDS in the suite's bounds; it bought
# this sweep no sensitivity. Over twelve full runs (2585 arms each) the median
# ratio is 1.95-2.03 in every size bucket above 50 us -- the whole surface
# measures linear -- yet two-point excursions past RATIO_FLAG survive at every
# magnitude (p99 ratio 2.9-3.3 even above 1 ms). Flagged arms per run by floor:
# 6.9 at 0.5 ms, 1.1 at 1.0 ms, 0.33 at 1.5 ms. The knee is here. Four arms
# flagged across those twelve runs, each in exactly ONE of them, and six arms
# that have ever flagged re-measure at exponent 0.97-1.09 over six doublings.
# Descheduling was never what made this sweep noisy -- a two-point ratio is, so
# read a clean run and a flagged run with the same suspicion.
NOISE_FLOOR = 0.0015 NOISE_FLOOR = 0.0015
HARD_CAP = 20.0 HARD_CAP = 20.0
@ -134,21 +147,35 @@ def build(unit: str, n: int) -> str:
def t(rx: re.Pattern[str], text: str, mode: str = "search") -> float: def t(rx: re.Pattern[str], text: str, mode: str = "search") -> float:
"""Time one scan of ``text`` in the mode the production code actually uses.""" """Time one scan of ``text`` in the mode the production code actually uses.
On the SAME clock every ReDoS bound in the suite is measured against --
``tests/redos_clock.py``, process CPU time -- imported rather than restated
here, for the reason that module gives: a blowup is spent cycles, and a
loaded machine steals wall clock without adding any. Until 1.1.0 this timed
on ``time.monotonic()``, which made the floor below and the cap figure
derived from it numbers from a different instrument than the bounds they
justify. The closure is built BEFORE the clock starts, so only the scan is
charged.
"""
mode = mode.rstrip("*") mode = mode.rstrip("*")
start = time.monotonic()
if mode == "finditer": if mode == "finditer":
for _ in rx.finditer(text): def scan(s: str) -> None:
pass for _ in rx.finditer(s):
pass
elif mode == "sub": elif mode == "sub":
rx.sub("", text) def scan(s: str) -> None:
rx.sub("", s)
elif mode == "match": elif mode == "match":
rx.match(text) def scan(s: str) -> None:
rx.match(s)
elif mode == "fullmatch": elif mode == "fullmatch":
rx.fullmatch(text) def scan(s: str) -> None:
rx.fullmatch(s)
else: else:
rx.search(text) def scan(s: str) -> None:
return time.monotonic() - start rx.search(s)
return scan_seconds(scan, text)
# --- targets ---------------------------------------------------------------- # --- targets ----------------------------------------------------------------

7
llms.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
# llm-ingestion-guard
> Write-time defensive layer for Python pipelines that persist LLM output: sanitize, fence, tool-less quarantined transform, capability isolation, scan before persist, fail-secure.
```bash
pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v1.1.0"
```

2
pyproject.toml
View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
[project] [project]
name = "llm-ingestion-guard" name = "llm-ingestion-guard"
version = "1.0.0" version = "1.3.0"
description = "Write-time defensive layer for Python pipelines that persist LLM output: sanitize, fence, tool-less quarantined transform, capability isolation, scan before persist, fail-secure." description = "Write-time defensive layer for Python pipelines that persist LLM output: sanitize, fence, tool-less quarantined transform, capability isolation, scan before persist, fail-secure."
readme = "README.md" readme = "README.md"
requires-python = ">=3.10" requires-python = ">=3.10"

2
src/llm_ingestion_guard/__init__.py
View file

@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ from .grounding import (
) )
from . import okf from . import okf
__version__ = "1.0.0" __version__ = "1.3.0"
# --- §6 bookends: the two library-side halves around the transform --------- # --- §6 bookends: the two library-side halves around the transform ---------

5
src/llm_ingestion_guard/coverage.py
View file

@ -542,8 +542,11 @@ def _build_cases() -> list[Case]:
lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter("---\nkey:\n nested: x\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"), lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter("---\nkey:\n nested: x\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"),
_raise_case("okf", "T2 frontmatter block scalar", "OKFFrontmatterError", _raise_case("okf", "T2 frontmatter block scalar", "OKFFrontmatterError",
lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter("---\ndesc: |\n block\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"), lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter("---\ndesc: |\n block\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"),
_raise_case("okf", "T2 frontmatter flow collection", "OKFFrontmatterError", _raise_case("okf", "T2 frontmatter flow sequence", "OKFFrontmatterError",
lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter("---\ntags: [a, b]\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"), lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter("---\ntags: [a, b]\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"),
_raise_case("okf", "T2 mapping key off the allowlist", "OKFFrontmatterError",
lambda: okf.parse_frontmatter(
"---\ngenerated: { by: a, tool: shell }\n---\nbody\n"), owasp="LLM10"),
_raise_case("okf", "T3 resource non-https (http)", "OKFResourceError", _raise_case("okf", "T3 resource non-https (http)", "OKFResourceError",
lambda: okf.validate_resource_url("http://insecure.test/x"), owasp="LLM05"), lambda: okf.validate_resource_url("http://insecure.test/x"), owasp="LLM05"),
_raise_case("okf", "T3 resource data: scheme", "OKFResourceError", _raise_case("okf", "T3 resource data: scheme", "OKFResourceError",

389
src/llm_ingestion_guard/okf.py
View file

@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ and feeds scannable text regions into the existing ``sanitize`` / ``scan_output`
T2 — frontmatter parse-safety gate. ``parse_frontmatter`` is a *strict, T2 — frontmatter parse-safety gate. ``parse_frontmatter`` is a *strict,
reject-by-default* loader for the minimal OKF frontmatter subset: flat reject-by-default* loader for the minimal OKF frontmatter subset: flat
``key: value`` scalars plus block ``- item`` lists. Every construct the ``key: value`` scalars, block ``- item`` lists, and one typed, allowlisted
mapping form (``{ by: x, at: y }`` — see :func:`_parse_flow_mapping`). Every construct the
"block anchor/alias DoS + dangerous type coercion" requirement names is refused "block anchor/alias DoS + dangerous type coercion" requirement names is refused
*by construction* — you cannot suffer a billion-laughs alias expansion or a *by construction* — you cannot suffer a billion-laughs alias expansion or a
``!!python/object`` coercion if anchors, aliases and explicit tags are rejected ``!!python/object`` coercion if anchors, aliases and explicit tags are rejected
@ -16,7 +17,9 @@ philosophy, the frontmatter analogue of the ``resource`` reject-gate (T3).
Deliberately NOT a general YAML parser. A security tool whose thesis is Deliberately NOT a general YAML parser. A security tool whose thesis is
minimal-dependency should not pull in a full YAML engine whose own features minimal-dependency should not pull in a full YAML engine whose own features
(anchors, tags, merges) are the attack surface being defended against. Quoted (anchors, tags, merges) are the attack surface being defended against. The one
mapping form it does admit is admitted key-by-key against an allowlist, not
parsed generally: the mapping class is expressible, never trusted. Quoted
scalars are kept verbatim (quotes included) rather than unquoted — the value is scalars are kept verbatim (quotes included) rather than unquoted — the value is
still scanned as text downstream, so an injection inside a quoted value is not still scanned as text downstream, so an injection inside a quoted value is not
lost; richer scalar forms are a future refinement, not a silent parse. lost; richer scalar forms are a future refinement, not a silent parse.
@ -62,8 +65,48 @@ _KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*$")
# A plain OKF scalar cannot *begin* with a YAML structural indicator. Any value # A plain OKF scalar cannot *begin* with a YAML structural indicator. Any value
# starting with one signals an anchor (&), alias (*), explicit tag (!), block # starting with one signals an anchor (&), alias (*), explicit tag (!), block
# scalar (|, >), flow collection ([ ] { }), directive (%) or reserved char # scalar (|, >), flow collection ([ ] { }), directive (%) or reserved char
# (@ `) — all outside the supported subset and all rejected. # (@ `) — all outside the supported subset and all rejected. `{` and `[` are
# tried as the allowlisted mapping form (G3) and the flow sequence of them (G30)
# FIRST; they reach this predicate only as a leaf inside one, where a nested
# collection is refused before it can be read.
_DANGEROUS_VALUE_STARTS = frozenset("&*!|>[]{}%@`") _DANGEROUS_VALUE_STARTS = frozenset("&*!|>[]{}%@`")
# A quoted scalar is a scalar in YAML however many colons it carries, so the
# mapping check steps aside for one. The quotes are retained rather than
# stripped — a pre-existing divergence, pinned in tests/test_okf.py.
_QUOTE_STARTS = frozenset("\"'")
# G3 - the one mapping form T2 can express (operator decision, 2026-08-21).
# Every key inside a mapping must be on this allowlist: the form is safe because
# the allowlist inspects each key, not because mappings became trusted. The keys
# are the ones OKF v0.2 names inside a mapping - `by`/`at` (SPEC.md @ 62432a09
# §5.2 `generated`/`verified`) and `from`/`to` (§5.1 `usage_window`), plus the
# §5.1 `sources`-entry labels.
_MAPPING_KEY_ALLOWLIST = frozenset({
"by", "at", "from", "to", "id", "title", "author", "usage_count",
"last_modified",
})
# G30 - the two §5.1 keys admitted inside a `sources` entry and NOWHERE else
# (operator decision, 2026-09-02). `resource` is REQUIRED within a `sources`
# entry, so leaving it off left the whole provenance family unwritable; but the
# same field name in §10 (`executor.resource`, `attester.resource`) names run
# instructions and code - the door-C route closed in 1.1.0. 1.2.0 argued the
# parser could not tell the two apart without parent-key context it did not
# have. That premise was false: the owning key is in scope at every call site
# below, it was simply never threaded through. It is threaded now, so the
# discrimination is structural rather than a judgement about the value.
# `usage_window` is allowlisted here for accuracy of refusal - §5.1 permits it
# per entry, and it is then refused on the depth rule (a mapping inside a
# mapping, which this parser admits at no key) rather than refused as if the
# key were unknown.
_SOURCES_ENTRY_KEYS = frozenset({"resource", "usage_window"})
def _allowed_mapping_keys(parent_key):
"""The mapping-key allowlist for a mapping owned by ``parent_key``."""
if parent_key == "sources":
return _MAPPING_KEY_ALLOWLIST | _SOURCES_ENTRY_KEYS
return _MAPPING_KEY_ALLOWLIST
class OKFError(Exception): class OKFError(Exception):
@ -102,7 +145,10 @@ def parse_frontmatter(document):
Raises ``OKFFrontmatterError`` on an unterminated fence or any construct Raises ``OKFFrontmatterError`` on an unterminated fence or any construct
outside the minimal flat subset (anchors, aliases, explicit tags, merge outside the minimal flat subset (anchors, aliases, explicit tags, merge
keys, block scalars, flow collections, nested mappings). keys, block scalars, flow sequences, nested mappings). The single exception
is the typed, allowlisted flow mapping (:func:`_parse_flow_mapping`), which
parses into a ``dict`` of allowlisted keys with plain-scalar leaves — every
other route to a mapping still raises.
""" """
lines = document.split("\n") lines = document.split("\n")
if not lines or lines[0].strip() != _FENCE: if not lines or lines[0].strip() != _FENCE:
@ -145,13 +191,31 @@ def _scannable_regions(frontmatter, body):
"""The text regions of a concept that carry attacker-controlled content.""" """The text regions of a concept that carry attacker-controlled content."""
regions = [body] regions = [body]
for value in frontmatter.values(): for value in frontmatter.values():
if isinstance(value, list): regions.extend(_value_regions(value))
regions.extend(value)
elif value:
regions.append(value)
return regions return regions
def _value_regions(value):
"""Every scannable leaf of one frontmatter value.
A mapping value (G3) is a new *shape* on this surface, not a new exemption:
its leaves are scanned exactly like a scalar or a list item, so an injection
parked in ``generated: { by: ... }`` reaches ``scan_output`` like any other
frontmatter text. The same holds for a *list* of mappings (G30, ``sources``),
which this function already flattens through its list branch. Mapping *keys*
are not scanned because they cannot carry attacker text - the allowlist
admits a fixed, per-parent name set and nothing else.
"""
if isinstance(value, dict):
return [leaf for leaf in value.values() if leaf]
if isinstance(value, list):
regions = []
for item in value:
regions.extend(_value_regions(item))
return regions
return [value] if value else []
def validate_concept_path(path, *, allow_reserved=False): def validate_concept_path(path, *, allow_reserved=False):
"""Validate a bundle-relative concept path and return its concept-ID. """Validate a bundle-relative concept path and return its concept-ID.
@ -571,25 +635,50 @@ def _parse_flat(fm_lines):
raise OKFFrontmatterError("invalid frontmatter key: %r" % key) raise OKFFrontmatterError("invalid frontmatter key: %r" % key)
if value == "": if value == "":
items, i = _consume_block_list(fm_lines, i + 1) items, i = _consume_block_list(fm_lines, i + 1, key)
result[key] = items if items is not None else "" result[key] = items if items is not None else ""
continue continue
mapping = _parse_flow_mapping(value, key)
if mapping is not None:
result[key] = mapping
i += 1
continue
sequence = _parse_flow_sequence(value, key)
if sequence is not None:
result[key] = sequence
i += 1
continue
_reject_dangerous_value(value) _reject_dangerous_value(value)
_reject_mapping_construct(value)
result[key] = value result[key] = value
i += 1 i += 1
return result return result
def _consume_block_list(fm_lines, start): def _consume_block_list(fm_lines, start, parent_key=None):
"""Consume `` - item`` lines following a bare ``key:``. """Consume `` - item`` lines following a bare ``key:``.
Returns ``(items, next_index)`` — ``items`` is ``None`` (and ``next_index`` Returns ``(items, next_index)`` - ``items`` is ``None`` (and ``next_index``
unchanged) when no list item follows, so the caller can treat the key as an unchanged) when no list item follows, so the caller can treat the key as an
empty scalar and let the next line trip the nested-structure guard. empty scalar and let the next line trip the nested-structure guard.
An item is one of three shapes, decided by the item text alone: a flow
mapping (G3), a block mapping (G30 - an unquoted ``key: value`` opening a
run of more-indented sibling entries, which is SPEC.md §5.1's own carrier
for ``sources``), or a plain scalar. ``parent_key`` is the key that owns the
list; it decides the mapping-key allowlist, which is how ``sources[].resource``
is admitted while ``executor``/``attester`` ``resource`` stays refused.
A list may not mix scalars and mappings. YAML permits it, but a consumer
iterating ``sources`` and reading ``entry.get("id")`` gets an
``AttributeError`` off the first ``str`` - refusing is the cheaper failure.
""" """
items = [] items = []
kinds = set()
i = start i = start
n = len(fm_lines) n = len(fm_lines)
while i < n: while i < n:
@ -598,21 +687,289 @@ def _consume_block_list(fm_lines, start):
if stripped == "" or stripped.startswith("#"): if stripped == "" or stripped.startswith("#"):
i += 1 i += 1
continue continue
if raw[:1] in (" ", "\t") and stripped.startswith("- "): if not (raw[:1] in (" ", "\t") and stripped.startswith("- ")):
item = stripped[2:].strip() break
_reject_dangerous_value(item)
items.append(item) item = stripped[2:].strip()
mapping = _parse_flow_mapping(item, parent_key)
if mapping is not None:
items.append(mapping)
kinds.add("mapping")
i += 1 i += 1
continue continue
break
entry = _block_mapping_entry(item)
if entry is not None:
mapping, i = _consume_block_mapping(fm_lines, i + 1, entry, parent_key)
items.append(mapping)
kinds.add("mapping")
continue
_reject_dangerous_value(item)
_reject_mapping_construct(item)
items.append(item)
kinds.add("scalar")
i += 1
if len(kinds) > 1:
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"a block list may not mix scalar items and mappings: %r" % (parent_key,)
)
if not items: if not items:
return None, start return None, start
return items, i return items, i
def _block_mapping_entry(text):
"""Read ``text`` as one ``key: value`` block-mapping entry, or return ``None``.
The trigger is deliberately the same shape ``_reject_mapping_construct``
uses to *refuse* a scalar: an unquoted ``": "``. What changes in 1.3.0 is
only what happens next - the entry is admitted key-by-key against the
allowlist instead of refused wholesale. Every shape that is a scalar to
PyYAML stays one here: a quoted item, a colon with no space
(``domain:security``, ``https://e.com:8443/a``) and a trailing colon all
return ``None`` and fall through to the unchanged scalar rules.
"""
if not text or text[0] in _QUOTE_STARTS:
return None
key, sep, leaf = text.partition(": ")
if not sep:
return None
key = key.strip()
if not _KEY_RE.match(key):
return None
return key, leaf.strip()
def _consume_block_mapping(fm_lines, start, first_entry, parent_key):
"""Consume the sibling entries of a block mapping opened by a ``- `` item.
Returns ``(mapping, next_index)``. A sibling is an indented line that does
not open a new list item; the run ends at a blank line, a comment, a new
``- `` item, or a line at column zero. Depth is capped at one by giving the
leaves the *unchanged* scalar predicates: a nested collection opens with
``{`` or ``[`` and is refused by ``_reject_dangerous_value``, and a further
block level is refused by ``_reject_mapping_construct``.
"""
allowed = _allowed_mapping_keys(parent_key)
mapping = {}
_admit_mapping_entry(mapping, first_entry[0], first_entry[1], allowed, parent_key)
i = start
n = len(fm_lines)
while i < n:
raw = fm_lines[i]
stripped = raw.strip()
if stripped == "" or stripped.startswith("#"):
break
if raw[:1] not in (" ", "\t") or stripped.startswith("- "):
break
entry = _block_mapping_entry(stripped)
if entry is None:
_reject_dangerous_value(stripped)
_reject_mapping_construct(stripped)
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"a block-mapping entry must be 'key: value': %r" % (raw,)
)
_admit_mapping_entry(mapping, entry[0], entry[1], allowed, parent_key)
i += 1
return mapping, i
def _admit_mapping_entry(mapping, key, leaf, allowed, parent_key):
"""Admit one mapping entry, or raise. The single gate both carriers pass."""
if not _KEY_RE.match(key):
raise OKFFrontmatterError("invalid mapping key: %r" % (key,))
if key not in allowed:
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"mapping key %r is not on the OKF mapping allowlist under %r"
% (key, parent_key)
)
if key in mapping:
raise OKFFrontmatterError("duplicate mapping key %r" % (key,))
_reject_dangerous_value(leaf)
_reject_mapping_construct(leaf)
mapping[key] = leaf
def _reject_dangerous_value(value): def _reject_dangerous_value(value):
if value and value[0] in _DANGEROUS_VALUE_STARTS: if value and value[0] in _DANGEROUS_VALUE_STARTS:
raise OKFFrontmatterError( raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"value begins with a disallowed YAML indicator %r: %r" "value begins with a disallowed YAML indicator %r: %r"
% (value[0], value) % (value[0], value)
) )
def _reject_mapping_construct(value):
"""Reject a scalar that YAML reads as a mapping rather than as a string.
T2 gives the mapping *class* exactly one expressible form, the typed
allowlisted flow mapping (G3); the nested-block and dotted-key routes still
raise, and this predicate is what keeps them raising — both at the top level
and on a leaf *inside* an admitted mapping. Two routes used to escape by degrading
into a string instead: a block-sequence item carrying exactly one key
(``- uri: x``), and an inline second colon (``attester: resource: x``).
Both parsed "successfully" into the wrong *type*, and a pointer parked in
one rode through in a key the ``resource`` allowlist never inspects.
``": "`` and a trailing ``":"`` are exactly the two shapes where a plain
scalar stops being one — ground-truthed against PyYAML 6.0.3, which reads
``- uri: x`` as ``[{'uri': 'x'}]``, ``- uri:`` as ``[{'uri': None}]``, and
refuses ``k: sub: v`` outright. A colon carrying neither a space nor a line
end opens no mapping (``domain:security``, ``https://e.com:8443/a``) and is
left alone, as is a quoted scalar — over-blocking a conformant bundle is
itself a failure mode.
"""
if not value or value[0] in _QUOTE_STARTS:
return
if ": " in value or value.endswith(":"):
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"a mapping is not expressible in OKF frontmatter: %r" % (value,)
)
def _parse_flow_mapping(value, parent_key=None):
"""Parse ``{ key: value, ... }`` into a typed dict, or refuse it (G3).
Returns ``None`` when ``value`` does not open a flow mapping, so the caller
falls through to the unchanged scalar rules. Otherwise the value either
parses into a ``dict`` of allowlisted keys with plain-scalar leaves, or
raises - it never degrades into a string, which is the defect closed in
1.1.0 and not reopened here.
Why the mapping class needed *a* form at all: OKF v0.2 writes its whole
trust and provenance layer as mappings, and SPEC.md @ ``62432a09`` uses flow
form in its own examples (§5.1 ``usage_window``, §5.2 ``generated`` /
``verified``). §11 goes further than "should": a consumer *MUST* treat a
bare ``verified`` mapping as a one-element list - a rule that presupposes
the mapping parses. With no form, 0 of 53 upstream concepts reached the
gate, and no threshold would have changed that.
Why this form is safe: the allowlist inspects **every key**, which is the
property that actually carried the security in T2 - the blanket refusal was
the enforcement, not the point. Admitted, ground-truthed against PyYAML
6.0.3:
- one flow mapping per value, closed on the same line (``{ a: b }``);
- keys on :data:`_MAPPING_KEY_ALLOWLIST` and matching ``_KEY_RE``, no
duplicates - PyYAML resolves a duplicate last-wins, which is a way to
show one claim and mean another;
- plain-scalar leaves only, each run through the *unchanged*
``_reject_dangerous_value`` / ``_reject_mapping_construct`` predicates, so
a leaf can no more open an anchor, a tag or a nested mapping than a
top-level scalar can.
Refused, each on its own rule: nested collections (``{ a: { b: c } }``,
``{ a: [1] }``), quoted leaves, an empty mapping, an unclosed or
trailing-junk value (``{ a: b } x``, which PyYAML also refuses), a key
outside the allowlist, and ``{a:b}`` - which PyYAML reads as the *key*
``a:b``, not as a scalar, and which the required ``": "`` separator catches.
Two deliberate divergences from PyYAML, both toward refusal: a quoted leaf
(``{ title: 'a, b' }``) and a trailing comment (``{ a: b } # note``) are
conformant YAML that this rejects. Splitting quoted commas correctly needs a
quote state machine whose failure mode is *accepting* something YAML would
refuse; refusing is the cheaper side to be wrong on, and the keys that
plausibly need a comma (``title``, ``author``) only occur inside ``sources``
entries, whose block-sequence carrier is refused anyway.
"""
if not value or value[0] != "{":
return None
if not value.endswith("}"):
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"a flow mapping must be closed by '}' on the same line: %r" % (value,)
)
inner = value[1:-1].strip()
if inner.endswith(","): # a trailing comma is legal YAML; one, and only one
inner = inner[:-1].strip()
if not inner:
raise OKFFrontmatterError("an empty flow mapping carries nothing: %r" % (value,))
for char in "{}[]":
if char in inner:
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"a flow mapping admits scalar leaves only, not %r: %r" % (char, value)
)
for quote in _QUOTE_STARTS:
if quote in inner:
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"a quoted scalar inside a flow mapping is not a supported form: %r"
% (value,)
)
allowed = _allowed_mapping_keys(parent_key)
mapping = {}
for entry in inner.split(","):
entry = entry.strip()
key, sep, leaf = entry.partition(": ")
if not sep:
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"a flow-mapping entry must be 'key: value': %r" % (entry,)
)
_admit_mapping_entry(mapping, key.strip(), leaf.strip(), allowed, parent_key)
return mapping
def _parse_flow_sequence(value, parent_key=None):
"""Parse ``[{ ... }, { ... }]`` into a list of typed dicts, or refuse it (G30).
Returns ``None`` when ``value`` does not open a flow sequence, so the caller
falls through to the unchanged scalar rules - where ``[`` is still a
disallowed indicator. This carrier is opened for the flow-mapping element
and nothing else: it is the form the OKF producers emit for ``sources``
(measured 02.09 against llm-ingestion-okf's golden bundle, where a
one-element sequence raised on the ``[`` just as a two-element one did).
A flow sequence of plain *scalars* (``tags: [a, b, c]``) stays refused. It
is a different shape with its own quoting and comma-splitting problem, whose
failure mode would be accepting something YAML reads differently - and the
block-sequence carrier already covers it for every consumer measured so far.
Elements are split on ``}`` rather than on commas, which is sound precisely
because ``_parse_flow_mapping`` admits no nested collection: a ``}`` inside
an element cannot occur, so the first ``}`` after ``{`` always closes it.
Anything between elements that is not a separating comma is refused, which
is what makes trailing junk and a mixed sequence fail rather than parse.
"""
if not value or value[0] != "[":
return None
if not value.endswith("]"):
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"a flow sequence must be closed by ']' on the same line: %r" % (value,)
)
inner = value[1:-1].strip()
if not inner:
raise OKFFrontmatterError("an empty flow sequence carries nothing: %r" % (value,))
items = []
i = 0
n = len(inner)
while True:
while i < n and inner[i] in " \t":
i += 1
if i >= n:
break
if inner[i] != "{":
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"a flow sequence admits flow mappings only: %r" % (value,)
)
close = inner.find("}", i)
if close == -1:
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"an unclosed flow mapping inside a flow sequence: %r" % (value,)
)
items.append(_parse_flow_mapping(inner[i:close + 1], parent_key))
i = close + 1
while i < n and inner[i] in " \t":
i += 1
if i >= n:
break
if inner[i] != ",":
raise OKFFrontmatterError(
"trailing junk after a flow-sequence element: %r" % (value,)
)
i += 1
return items

36
tests/test_docs_measurement_scripts.py
View file

@ -28,10 +28,12 @@ from pathlib import Path
import pytest import pytest
import redos_clock
from llm_ingestion_guard import Disposition, PRESET_USER_UPLOAD, Risk, screen_output from llm_ingestion_guard import Disposition, PRESET_USER_UPLOAD, Risk, screen_output
from llm_ingestion_guard import active_content as ac from llm_ingestion_guard import active_content as ac
_DOCS = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "docs" _DOCS = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "docs"
_LIMITATIONS = _DOCS / "LIMITATIONS.md"
def _load(filename: str): def _load(filename: str):
@ -41,6 +43,7 @@ def _load(filename: str):
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path)
assert spec and spec.loader, f"cannot load {path}" assert spec and spec.loader, f"cannot load {path}"
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
sys.modules[name] = module # @dataclass resolves its own module via sys.modules
spec.loader.exec_module(module) spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module return module
@ -49,6 +52,7 @@ def _load(filename: str):
# script's import list fails the whole file loudly instead of one quiet test. # script's import list fails the whole file loudly instead of one quiet test.
fp_sweep = _load("fp-sweep.py") fp_sweep = _load("fp-sweep.py")
census = _load("rawhtml-census.py") census = _load("rawhtml-census.py")
redos_sweep = _load("redos-sweep.py")
# --- docs/fp-sweep.py -------------------------------------------------------- # --- docs/fp-sweep.py --------------------------------------------------------
@ -245,6 +249,38 @@ def test_census_production_row_equals_its_shipped_candidate(name, attrs):
assert candidate(name, attrs) == ac.active_tag_class(name, attrs) assert candidate(name, attrs) == ac.active_tag_class(name, attrs)
# --- docs/redos-sweep.py ------------------------------------------------------
def test_redos_sweep_times_on_the_suite_clock_not_a_reimplementation():
# Until 1.1.0 this script timed on `time.monotonic()`, a different instrument
# than every ReDoS bound in the suite. `t()` must call the shared
# `scan_seconds` — imported, not restated — and the module must not import
# `time` itself, else a drift back to a wall clock would go unnoticed here.
assert redos_sweep.scan_seconds is redos_clock.scan_seconds
assert not hasattr(redos_sweep, "time"), "module must not import time itself"
def test_redos_sweep_floor_and_flag_match_the_published_numbers():
# docs/LIMITATIONS.md publishes the 1.5 ms floor and the 2.6 flag ratio this
# script derives from twelve full runs. Pin both sides: the constants, and
# that the doc still states the same numbers — either drifting alone is a bug.
assert redos_sweep.NOISE_FLOOR == 0.0015
assert redos_sweep.RATIO_FLAG == 2.6
text = _LIMITATIONS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert "1.5 ms noise floor" in text
assert "2.6 flag threshold" in text
def test_redos_sweep_collector_covers_152_patterns_across_11_tables():
# The count docs/LIMITATIONS.md carries as "all 152 compiled patterns across
# all eleven regex-bearing modules". A pattern added or removed in `src/`
# without re-measuring would drift the doc's claim silently otherwise.
assert len(redos_sweep.TABLES) == 11
total = sum(len(collect()) for collect in redos_sweep.TABLES.values())
assert total == 152
# --- both scripts: the argument-less contract -------------------------------- # --- both scripts: the argument-less contract --------------------------------

502
tests/test_okf.py
View file

@ -548,7 +548,10 @@ _V02_REJECTED = [
("generated (nested)", "generated:\n at: 2026-07-26T10:00:00Z\n"), ("generated (nested)", "generated:\n at: 2026-07-26T10:00:00Z\n"),
("executor (nested)", "executor:\n resource: skills/run-on-bq.md\n"), ("executor (nested)", "executor:\n resource: skills/run-on-bq.md\n"),
("attester (nested)", "attester:\n resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"), ("attester (nested)", "attester:\n resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
("sources (block list of mappings)", # The carrier is admitted as of 1.3.0 (G30); this row now measures the KEY
# SET - `uri`/`kind` are producer-invented, not SPEC §5.1 - and stays red for
# that reason. SPEC's own §5.1 keys parse; see the G30 block at the foot.
("sources (block list, off-allowlist keys)",
"sources:\n - uri: https://e.com/a\n kind: doc\n"), "sources:\n - uri: https://e.com/a\n kind: doc\n"),
("flow sequence", "tags: [a, b, c]\n"), ("flow sequence", "tags: [a, b, c]\n"),
("flow mapping", "executor: {resource: skills/run.md}\n"), ("flow mapping", "executor: {resource: skills/run.md}\n"),
@ -577,15 +580,61 @@ def test_v02_flat_frontmatter_still_parses(cid, fm):
assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")[0]["id"] == "x" assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")[0]["id"] == "x"
def test_one_key_block_sequence_item_is_misparsed_as_a_string(): # --- the type-confusion defect, closed in 1.1.0 (2026-08-13) ----------------
# The documented defect: two keys per item hard-reject (loud, safe), but ONE key # Was: a mapping construct that the restricted grammar cannot represent degraded
# parses "successfully" into the wrong type. A consumer reading # into a STRING instead of failing. Two routes did this, not the one documented.
# frontmatter["sources"][0].get("uri") gets a string, not a mapping. # Ground-truthed against PyYAML 6.0.3: every shape below that we now reject is a
fm, _ = parse_frontmatter( # shape a real YAML parser reads as a MAPPING (or refuses outright), and every
"---\nid: x\nsources:\n - uri: https://e.com/a\n---\n\nbody\n" # shape we still admit is one PyYAML reads as a plain scalar.
)
assert fm["sources"] == ["uri: https://e.com/a"], "shape changed — update LIMITATIONS.md" _DEGRADED_TO_STRING = [
assert not isinstance(fm["sources"][0], dict) # (id, frontmatter, what PyYAML 6.0.3 makes of it)
# Still red after G30 opened the block-mapping carrier: `uri` is not a §5.1
# key, so the item is refused by the allowlist instead of by the grammar.
("one key per item", "sources:\n - uri: https://e.com/a\n", "[{'uri': ...}]"),
("item, trailing colon", "sources:\n - uri:\n", "[{'uri': None}]"),
("inline double colon", "attester: resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n", "parse error"),
("top value, trailing colon", "description: see below:\n", "parse error"),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm,yaml_reads_as", _DEGRADED_TO_STRING,
ids=[c[0] for c in _DEGRADED_TO_STRING])
def test_a_mapping_construct_never_degrades_into_a_string(cid, fm, yaml_reads_as):
# None of these shapes is the one form T2 admits (G3, the allowlisted flow
# mapping) — so each must RAISE, never parse "successfully" into the wrong
# type. A consumer reading frontmatter["sources"][0].get("uri") must not be
# handed a str, and that holds whether the mapping class has no expressible
# form or one.
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
_STILL_SCALARS = [
# PyYAML reads every one of these as a plain scalar: the colon carries no
# space and no line end, so it never opens a mapping. Over-blocking a
# conformant bundle is itself a failure mode (brief principle 5).
("colon, no space", "tags:\n - domain:security\n", "tags", ["domain:security"]),
("url item", "sources:\n - https://e.com/a\n", "sources", ["https://e.com/a"]),
("url item with port", "sources:\n - https://e.com:8443/a\n", "sources",
["https://e.com:8443/a"]),
("url value with port", "resource: https://e.com:8443/a\n", "resource",
"https://e.com:8443/a"),
("double-quoted item", 'sources:\n - "uri: https://e.com/a"\n', "sources",
['"uri: https://e.com/a"']),
("single-quoted item", "sources:\n - 'uri: https://e.com/a'\n", "sources",
["'uri: https://e.com/a'"]),
("quoted top value", 'description: "Note: careful"\n', "description",
'"Note: careful"'),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm,key,expected", _STILL_SCALARS,
ids=[c[0] for c in _STILL_SCALARS])
def test_scalars_that_merely_contain_a_colon_still_parse(cid, fm, key, expected):
# Quotes are retained rather than stripped — a pre-existing divergence from
# YAML, pinned here so closing the mapping hole is not read as fixing it.
assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")[0][key] == expected
def test_relative_resource_pointer_fails_the_allowlist(): def test_relative_resource_pointer_fails_the_allowlist():
@ -595,42 +644,54 @@ def test_relative_resource_pointer_fails_the_allowlist():
validate_resource_url(pointer) validate_resource_url(pointer)
def test_pointer_in_one_key_sequence_reaches_the_consumer_tree(): @pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,carrier", [
# The security-relevant consequence of the misparse above: the pointer never ("block sequence", "attester:\n - resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
# touches the top-level `resource` key, so the https allowlist never inspects it ("inline double colon", "attester: resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
# and door C admits the concept. Not conformant OKF — a well-formed bundle will ])
# not produce this shape — but mode-b writes the merged concept verbatim. def test_pointer_in_a_degraded_mapping_no_longer_reaches_the_consumer_tree(cid, carrier):
doc = ("---\nid: x\ntype: Attested Computation\n" # The security-relevant consequence, closed at door C. Both carriers put the
"attester:\n - resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n---\n\nbody\n") # pointer in a key the https allowlist never inspects, so while the shape
# parsed, mode-b wrote the merged concept verbatim. It now fails secure at T2,
# before the allowlist is even reached.
doc = f"---\nid: x\ntype: Attested Computation\n{carrier}---\n\nbody\n"
result = import_bundle({"computations/x.md": doc}) result = import_bundle({"computations/x.md": doc})
assert result.disposition is Disposition.WARN, "hole closed — update LIMITATIONS.md" assert result.disposition is Disposition.FAIL_SECURE, "hole reopened — see LIMITATIONS.md"
def test_every_route_to_a_mapping_fails_on_a_different_rule(): def test_the_expressible_mapping_routes_are_the_ones_the_allowlist_inspects():
# The v0.2 wall is not a choice between two forms where one is better: ALL three # Was `test_exactly_one_route_to_a_mapping_is_expressible` (1.2.0), and before
# ways to express a mapping fail, each on its own rule, so the mapping *class* has # that ALL FOUR routes failed so the mapping *class* had no expressible form.
# no expressible form through T2. v0.2's `generated` IS a mapping (`by` required # There are four expressible carriers as of 1.3.0 - flow mapping as a value,
# when present), so it cannot be expressed at all. # flow mapping as a list item, flow sequence of flow mappings, block sequence
# of block mappings - and the criterion that admits them is unchanged: each
# hands the allowlist every key. The routes below stay shut for the same
# reason, each on its own rule: a top-level block MAPPING (not a sequence),
# a dotted key, and an inline second colon give the allowlist nothing to
# inspect.
assert parse_frontmatter("---\nid: x\ngenerated: { by: x, at: y }\n---\n\nbody\n")[0][
"generated"] == {"by": "x", "at": "y"}
routes = { routes = {
"flow": "generated: { by: x, at: y }\n",
"block": "generated:\n by: x\n", "block": "generated:\n by: x\n",
"dotted": "generated.by: x\n", "dotted": "generated.by: x\n",
"inline": "generated: by: x\n",
} }
errors = {} errors = {}
for name, fm in routes.items(): for name, fm in routes.items():
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc: with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n") parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
errors[name] = str(exc.value) errors[name] = str(exc.value)
assert "indicator" in errors["flow"]
assert "nested mappings" in errors["block"] assert "nested mappings" in errors["block"]
assert "key" in errors["dotted"] assert "key" in errors["dotted"]
assert "mapping" in errors["inline"]
assert len(set(errors.values())) == 3, "routes must fail distinctly, not collapse" assert len(set(errors.values())) == 3, "routes must fail distinctly, not collapse"
_BLOCK_LIST_ITEM_SHAPES = [ _BLOCK_LIST_ITEM_SHAPES = [
# A consumer called all three "the sources block list"; the parser does not. # A consumer called all three "the sources block list"; the parser does not.
# The one-key-per-item row lived here until 1.1.0, admitted as the string
# "id: a"; it now hard-rejects with the two-key row (_DEGRADED_TO_STRING).
("flat scalars", "sources:\n - file://x\n - file://y\n", ["file://x", "file://y"]), ("flat scalars", "sources:\n - file://x\n - file://y\n", ["file://x", "file://y"]),
("one key per item", "sources:\n - id: a\n", ["id: a"]), # silent misparse
("single-element", "verified:\n - human:ktg\n", ["human:ktg"]), ("single-element", "verified:\n - human:ktg\n", ["human:ktg"]),
] ]
@ -642,17 +703,33 @@ def test_block_lists_admitted_by_item_shape(cid, fm, expected):
assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")[0][key] == expected assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")[0][key] == expected
def test_two_keys_per_item_is_where_the_block_list_hard_rejects(): def test_the_block_list_rejects_on_the_key_set_not_on_arity():
# Was `test_two_keys_per_item_is_where_the_block_list_hard_rejects`: a
# two-key item was refused because the block mapping had no expressible form
# at all. G30 gives it one (SPEC.md §5.1's own carrier), so arity is no
# longer the boundary - the key set is. The same two-key item parses when its
# keys are §5.1's, and still raises when one of them is not.
parsed = parse_frontmatter(
"---\nid: x\nsources:\n - id: a\n resource: file://x\n---\n\nbody\n"
)[0]
assert parsed["sources"] == [{"id": "a", "resource": "file://x"}]
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError): with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter( parse_frontmatter(
"---\nid: x\nsources:\n - id: a\n resource: file://x\n---\n\nbody\n" "---\nid: x\nsources:\n - id: a\n uri: file://x\n---\n\nbody\n"
) )
@pytest.mark.parametrize("fm", [ @pytest.mark.parametrize("fm", [
"generated: { by: x, at: y }\n", "sources: [{ id: a }]\n", "tags: [a, b]\n", # The flow row carries a key OFF the G3 allowlist: the shape is admitted, the
# key is not, so this stays a T2 rejection and the door A/B half still holds.
# The two `sources` rows that lived here until 1.3.0 now PARSE - that is the
# G30 fix, not a weakening of this property. Their replacements are the same
# carriers with a key off the allowlist, so the row still measures what it
# says: the shape is admitted, the key set is not.
"generated: { by: x, tool: y }\n", "sources: [{ id: a, uri: u }]\n", "tags: [a, b]\n",
"generated:\n by: x\n", "generated.by: x\n", "generated:\n by: x\n", "generated.by: x\n",
"sources:\n - id: a\n resource: file://x\n", "sources:\n - id: a\n uri: file://x\n",
"executor: [{ resource: skills/run.md }]\n",
]) ])
def test_t2_constrains_import_not_emission(fm): def test_t2_constrains_import_not_emission(fm):
# T2 runs on door C only. The same frontmatter that FAIL_SECUREs through # T2 runs on door C only. The same frontmatter that FAIL_SECUREs through
@ -690,3 +767,368 @@ def test_link_extraction_survives_the_redos_fix():
assert extract_link_targets("see [x](./a.md) and [y](/b.md)") == ["./a.md", "/b.md"] assert extract_link_targets("see [x](./a.md) and [y](/b.md)") == ["./a.md", "/b.md"]
assert extract_link_targets("[a b](./c.md)") == ["./c.md"] assert extract_link_targets("[a b](./c.md)") == ["./c.md"]
assert extract_link_targets("text [![img](./i.png)](./t.md)") == ["./i.png"] assert extract_link_targets("text [![img](./i.png)](./t.md)") == ["./i.png"]
# --- G3: the typed, allowlisted mapping form (2026-08-21) --------------------
# Door 1 of three (operator decision, 2026-08-21). The mapping *class* had no
# expressible form, and OKF v0.2 writes its whole trust and provenance layer as
# mappings — SPEC.md @ 62432a09 §5.2 uses flow form in its own examples, and §11
# carries a hard MUST that presupposes they parse ("consumers MUST treat a bare
# `verified` mapping as a one-element list"). A consumer measured 0 of 53
# upstream concepts through the gate. This admits ONE shape: a flow mapping whose
# every key is on the allowlist and whose every leaf is a plain scalar.
def test_spec_flow_mapping_parses_into_a_typed_mapping():
# SPEC.md §5.2, verbatim. This is the red test: it must fail before the form
# exists and pass after, with a real dict — never a degraded string.
doc = (
"---\ntype: table\n"
"generated: { by: reference_agent/gemini-2.5-pro, at: 2026-06-20T22:53:05Z }\n"
"---\nbody\n"
)
assert parse_frontmatter(doc)[0]["generated"] == {
"by": "reference_agent/gemini-2.5-pro",
"at": "2026-06-20T22:53:05Z",
}
def test_spec_bare_verified_mapping_parses():
# SPEC.md §5.2's bare form, which §11 turns into a hard MUST for consumers
# ("MUST treat a bare `verified` mapping as a one-element list") - a rule that
# cannot be obeyed by a consumer that cannot parse the mapping.
doc = "---\ntype: table\nverified: { by: human:ahormati, at: 2026-06-25T09:00:00Z }\n---\nb\n"
assert parse_frontmatter(doc)[0]["verified"] == {
"by": "human:ahormati", "at": "2026-06-25T09:00:00Z"}
def test_spec_verified_list_of_flow_mappings_parses():
# §5.2's list form. This is the SAME typed form in list position, not the
# block-sequence-with-one-key route (`- uri: x`), which stays shut below.
doc = (
"---\ntype: table\nverified:\n"
" - { by: human:ahormati, at: 2026-06-25T09:00:00Z }\n"
" - { by: process:finance-nightly, at: 2026-06-26T02:00:00Z }\n"
"---\nbody\n"
)
assert parse_frontmatter(doc)[0]["verified"] == [
{"by": "human:ahormati", "at": "2026-06-25T09:00:00Z"},
{"by": "process:finance-nightly", "at": "2026-06-26T02:00:00Z"},
]
def test_spec_usage_window_parses():
doc = "---\ntype: table\nusage_window: { from: 2026-06-01T00:00:00Z, to: 2026-06-30T00:00:00Z }\n---\nb\n"
assert parse_frontmatter(doc)[0]["usage_window"] == {
"from": "2026-06-01T00:00:00Z", "to": "2026-06-30T00:00:00Z"}
def test_an_unknown_key_inside_a_mapping_is_still_rejected():
# The rejection side of the allowlist. Without this test the allowlist could
# silently grow to "anything" - or be emptied - and nothing would fail.
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
parse_frontmatter("---\nid: x\ngenerated: { by: a, tool: shell }\n---\n\nbody\n")
assert "allowlist" in str(exc.value)
def test_the_allowlist_is_not_empty_and_admits_only_the_spec_keys():
# Both directions of the same guard: a shrunk allowlist breaks the first
# assertion, a widened one the second.
for key in ("by", "at", "from", "to", "id", "title", "author", "usage_count",
"last_modified"):
assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\nk: {{ {key}: v }}\n---\n\nb\n")[0]["k"] == {key: "v"}
for key in ("resource", "executor", "attester", "runtime", "command", "uri"):
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\nk: {{ {key}: v }}\n---\n\nb\n")
_FLOW_REJECTED = [
# (id, value, what PyYAML 6.0.3 makes of it)
("nested mapping", "{ by: { at: x } }", "a nested mapping"),
("nested sequence", "{ by: [a, b] }", "a sequence leaf"),
("anchor leaf", "{ by: &a x }", "an anchor definition, silently"),
("tag leaf", "{ by: !!python/object:os.system x }", "refused outright"),
("block scalar leaf", "{ by: | }", "a scanner error"),
("nested colon leaf", "{ by: sub: v }", "refused outright"),
("no space after colon", "{by:x}", "the KEY 'by:x', not a scalar"),
("quoted leaf", "{ title: 'a, b' }", "a scalar - we refuse, deliberately"),
("empty mapping", "{}", "an empty mapping"),
("empty leaf", "{ by: }", "None"),
("unclosed", "{ by: x", "a parse error"),
("trailing junk", "{ by: x } more", "a parse error"),
("duplicate key", "{ by: a, by: b }", "last-wins, silently"),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,value,yaml_reads_as", _FLOW_REJECTED,
ids=[c[0] for c in _FLOW_REJECTED])
def test_the_mapping_form_admits_scalar_leaves_on_allowlisted_keys_only(cid, value, yaml_reads_as):
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\ngenerated: {value}\n---\n\nbody\n")
def test_a_rejected_mapping_never_degrades_into_a_string():
# The 1.1.0 defect, re-asserted against the NEW form: a refused mapping must
# raise, not arrive as a str a consumer will .get() a key out of.
for value in ("{ by: { at: x } }", "{ tool: shell }", "{ by: x"):
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter(f"---\nid: x\ngenerated: {value}\n---\n\nbody\n")
def test_the_admitted_mapping_is_a_dict_not_a_string():
value = parse_frontmatter("---\nid: x\ngenerated: { by: a, at: b }\n---\n\nb\n")[0]["generated"]
assert isinstance(value, dict), "a typed form that arrives as a str is the 1.1.0 defect"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
("block sequence, one key", "attester:\n - resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
("inline second colon", "attester: resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
("block mapping", "attester:\n resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
("flow mapping, pointer key", "attester: { resource: attesters/sql_equality.py }\n"),
])
def test_the_pointer_routes_stay_shut(cid, fm):
# G3 is additive: none of the routes that put an executable-code pointer in a
# key the https allowlist never inspects is reopened. The fourth row is why
# `resource` is off the allowlist - the form would otherwise have carried the
# door-C pointer through in typed clothes instead of degraded ones.
doc = f"---\nid: x\ntype: Attested Computation\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n"
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter(doc)
assert import_bundle({"computations/x.md": doc}).disposition is Disposition.FAIL_SECURE
def test_injection_in_a_mapping_leaf_is_caught_by_the_scan():
# T1 is not weakened by the new shape: a mapping leaf is scanned exactly like a
# scalar value or a list item. A typed form that parses but is not scanned would
# be a hole, not a fix.
doc = f"---\ntype: table\ngenerated: {{ by: {_INJECTION} }}\n---\nclean body\n"
assert scan_concept(doc).found is True
def test_injection_in_a_listed_mapping_leaf_is_caught_by_the_scan():
doc = f"---\ntype: table\nverified:\n - {{ by: {_INJECTION} }}\n---\nclean body\n"
assert scan_concept(doc).found is True
def test_a_conformant_v02_trust_layer_now_reaches_the_gate():
# The measured consequence: a consumer reported 0 of 53 upstream concepts through
# the gate, because every one of them carries §5.2 trust frontmatter.
doc = (
"---\n"
"type: table\n"
"title: Users\n"
"resource: https://example.com/users\n"
"generated: { by: reference_agent/gemini-2.5-pro, at: 2026-06-20T22:53:05Z }\n"
"verified: { by: human:ahormati, at: 2026-06-25T09:00:00Z }\n"
"usage_window: { from: 2026-06-01T00:00:00Z, to: 2026-06-30T00:00:00Z }\n"
"---\nThe users table.\n"
)
result = import_bundle({"tables/users.md": doc})
assert result.disposition is Disposition.WARN
assert result.concepts[0].error is None
# --- G30: the `sources` provenance layer becomes reachable (2026-09-02) ------
# Door 2. G3 gave the mapping *class* one expressible form but left `sources`
# unreachable: SPEC.md §5.1 writes an entry as a MAPPING carrying a REQUIRED
# `resource`, so neither of the two carriers the spec and the producers actually
# use could parse. Measured 02.09 by two consumers independently -- a flow
# sequence of flow mappings raised on the `[` indicator, a block sequence of
# block mappings raised "nested mappings are not supported".
#
# Why `resource` is admissible now when 1.2.0 argued it was not: the old
# argument was that the parser could not tell `sources[].resource` (§5.1, a
# citation) from `executor.resource` (§10, a code pointer). That premise was
# false -- the owning key is in scope at every call site, it was simply never
# threaded through. `resource` is allowlisted for `sources` entries ONLY, so
# the door-C routes above stay shut on the same input.
_SPEC_51_BLOCK = (
"sources:\n"
" - id: ga4-schema\n"
" resource: https://developers.google.com/analytics/bigquery/export-schema\n"
" title: GA4 BigQuery Export schema\n"
" author: team:ga4-docs\n"
" usage_count: 5000\n"
" last_modified: 2026-05-30T00:00:00Z\n"
)
def test_spec_sources_block_sequence_of_block_mappings_parses():
# SPEC.md §5.1's own example block, verbatim. It is the spec's canonical
# carrier for a REQUIRED field, so §11.1 ("parseable YAML frontmatter") makes
# a bundle written this way conformant -- refusing it refuses a conformant
# bundle, which is the failure mode G3 was opened to end.
fm, _ = parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{_SPEC_51_BLOCK}---\n\nbody\n")
assert fm["sources"] == [{
"id": "ga4-schema",
"resource": "https://developers.google.com/analytics/bigquery/export-schema",
"title": "GA4 BigQuery Export schema",
"author": "team:ga4-docs",
"usage_count": "5000",
"last_modified": "2026-05-30T00:00:00Z",
}]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm,expected", [
("one entry",
"sources: [{ id: golden-v0-2-sales, resource: fixture }]\n",
[{"id": "golden-v0-2-sales", "resource": "fixture"}]),
("two entries",
"sources: [{ id: a, resource: https://e.com/a }, { id: b, resource: https://e.com/b }]\n",
[{"id": "a", "resource": "https://e.com/a"},
{"id": "b", "resource": "https://e.com/b"}]),
])
def test_sources_flow_sequence_of_flow_mappings_parses(cid, fm, expected):
# The form the producer emits today (llm-ingestion-okf's golden
# expected-bundle/ingest-sales.md, measured 02.09). One entry raised too, so
# this is not an arity bug: the `[` indicator refused the carrier outright.
assert parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")[0]["sources"] == expected
def test_the_two_sources_carriers_parse_to_the_same_value():
block = parse_frontmatter(
"---\ntype: t\nsources:\n - id: a\n resource: https://e.com/a\n---\n\nb\n")[0]
flow = parse_frontmatter(
"---\ntype: t\nsources: [{ id: a, resource: https://e.com/a }]\n---\n\nb\n")[0]
assert block["sources"] == flow["sources"] == [{"id": "a", "resource": "https://e.com/a"}]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
("unknown key, flow", "sources: [{ id: a, uri: https://e.com/a }]\n"),
("unknown key, block", "sources:\n - id: a\n uri: https://e.com/a\n"),
("unknown key, flow value", "sources: { id: a, kind: doc }\n"),
])
def test_an_unknown_key_in_a_sources_entry_is_still_rejected(cid, fm):
# The negative control. The carrier is admitted; the key set is not. A
# producer-invented key gets no free ride on the new shape.
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
assert "allowlist" in str(exc.value)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
("executor, block sequence", "executor:\n - resource: skills/run-on-bq.md\n"),
("executor, flow sequence", "executor: [{ resource: skills/run-on-bq.md }]\n"),
("attester, flow sequence", "attester: [{ resource: attesters/sql_equality.py }]\n"),
("attester, block sequence", "attester:\n - resource: attesters/sql_equality.py\n"),
])
def test_resource_is_allowlisted_for_sources_entries_only(cid, fm):
# The whole reason `resource` can be admitted at all: the owning key decides.
# §10's `executor.resource` / `attester.resource` name run instructions and
# code -- door C -- and stay refused through EVERY carrier, including the two
# this change opens for `sources`.
doc = f"---\nid: x\ntype: Attested Computation\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n"
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
parse_frontmatter(doc)
assert "allowlist" in str(exc.value)
assert import_bundle({"computations/x.md": doc}).disposition is Disposition.FAIL_SECURE
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
# SPEC §5.1: "A single entry MAY carry its own `usage_window`". That is a
# mapping inside a mapping -- depth 2 -- and stays refused: no nesting deeper
# than one is a security property this change does not spend. Registered as a
# conformance gap in docs/LIMITATIONS.md, not as an oversight.
("per-entry usage_window, flow",
"sources: [{ id: a, usage_window: { from: x, to: y } }]\n"),
("per-entry usage_window, block",
"sources:\n - id: a\n usage_window: { from: x, to: y }\n"),
# A sequence inside an entry is the same depth violation.
("nested sequence", "sources: [{ id: a, title: [x, y] }]\n"),
])
def test_a_sources_entry_admits_scalar_leaves_only(cid, fm):
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
("scalar then mapping", "sources:\n - https://e.com/a\n - id: b\n title: B\n"),
("mapping then scalar", "sources:\n - id: a\n title: A\n - https://e.com/b\n"),
])
def test_a_block_list_may_not_mix_scalars_and_mappings(cid, fm):
# A consumer that reads `entry.get("id")` over the list crashes on the str.
# One list, one item type -- refuse rather than hand back a mixed tree.
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError) as exc:
parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
assert "mix" in str(exc.value)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
("flow sequence of scalars", "tags: [a, b, c]\n"),
("empty flow sequence", "sources: []\n"),
("flow sequence, unclosed", "sources: [{ id: a }\n"),
("flow sequence, trailing junk", "sources: [{ id: a }] x\n"),
("flow sequence, mixed", "sources: [{ id: a }, plain]\n"),
("flow sequence, nested sequence", "sources: [[ id ]]\n"),
])
def test_the_flow_sequence_admits_flow_mappings_only(cid, fm):
# The sequence carrier is opened for the mapping form and nothing else. A
# flow sequence of plain scalars stays refused -- it is a separate shape with
# its own quoting and splitting problems, and no measured consumer needs it.
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: table\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
def test_injection_in_a_sources_entry_leaf_is_caught_by_the_scan():
# T1 over the new shape: every leaf of every entry reaches scan_output.
doc = f"---\ntype: table\nsources: [{{ id: a, title: {_INJECTION} }}]\n---\nclean\n"
assert scan_concept(doc).found is True
doc_block = f"---\ntype: table\nsources:\n - id: a\n title: {_INJECTION}\n---\nclean\n"
assert scan_concept(doc_block).found is True
def test_the_producer_golden_now_passes_the_gate():
# llm-ingestion-okf's expected-bundle/ingest-sales.md, the K5 blocker.
doc = (
"---\n"
"type: dataset\n"
"title: Regional Sales\n"
"source_system: golden-v0-2-sales\n"
"ingested_at: 2026-07-16T12:00:00Z\n"
"generated: { by: process:okf-ingest, at: 2026-07-16T12:00:00Z }\n"
"sources: [{ id: golden-v0-2-sales, resource: fixture }]\n"
"---\n\n| region | units |\n| --- | --- |\n| nord | 412 |\n"
)
result = import_bundle({"datasets/sales.md": doc})
assert result.disposition is Disposition.WARN
assert result.concepts[0].error is None
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
# A `- ` item whose text begins with a YAML indicator AND carries a `": "`
# must fall through to the scalar predicates, not into the block-mapping
# route with a half-validated key. Each of these fails `_KEY_RE` on the key
# side, so `_reject_dangerous_value` gets the item intact.
("anchor", "sources:\n - &anchor id: a\n"),
("alias", "sources:\n - *anchor id: a\n"),
("tag", "sources:\n - !!str id: a\n"),
("directive", "sources:\n - %YAML id: a\n"),
("reserved", "sources:\n - `x id: a\n"),
("merge key", "sources:\n - id: a\n <<: *base\n"),
])
def test_an_indicator_in_a_block_item_is_refused_before_the_mapping_route(cid, fm):
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: t\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cid,fm", [
# The block mapping ends at a blank line and at a line in column zero. Both
# hand control back with an index that must not skip or re-read a line: a
# dangling `resource:` line left over from a mapping that closed early must
# RAISE, never be silently dropped -- a pointer that vanishes rather than
# failing is exactly this repo's failure class.
("blank line inside the mapping", "sources:\n - id: a\n\n resource: b\n"),
("top-level key interleaved", "sources:\n - id: a\ntags: x\n resource: b\n"),
])
def test_a_line_orphaned_by_the_mapping_boundary_raises_rather_than_vanishing(cid, fm):
with pytest.raises(OKFFrontmatterError):
parse_frontmatter(f"---\ntype: t\n{fm}---\n\nbody\n")
def test_the_block_list_hands_back_an_index_that_resumes_at_the_next_key():
# The return-index contract: a top-level key following a multi-entry block
# list is neither swallowed by the list nor re-read as a list item.
fm, _ = parse_frontmatter(
"---\ntype: t\nsources:\n - id: a\n resource: b\n - id: c\ntitle: T\n---\n\nbody\n")
assert fm == {"type": "t", "sources": [{"id": "a", "resource": "b"}, {"id": "c"}],
"title": "T"}