# Honest limitations

Conceding these plainly is itself a control — it prevents the false assurance that
a green scan means safe content. The README carries a summary of the highest-impact
items; this is the full list, each with the mechanism.

- **Structural unsolvability at the text layer.** Pattern/lexicon detection is
  bypassable in isolation; character-injection and novel phrasings evade it. The
  *contract* (tool-less transform, capability isolation, fail-secure) carries the
  security — the lexicon is defense-in-depth, not a wall.
- **A lone HIGH finding in trusted prose disposes to WARN, not quarantine.**
  Under `PRESET_TRUSTED_SOURCE`, trust-scaling downgrades a single HIGH to WARN,
  and one HIGH is not "compound" (escalation needs ≥2 findings at MEDIUM+). So a
  HIGH injection reproduced verbatim under a *trusted* policy persists with a WARN.
  This is by design: if your "trusted" sources can carry attacker-influenced text,
  run them as untrusted (or add a quarantine floor).
- **The quarantine floor fires at MEDIUM+, and is a no-op under the shipped upload
  preset.** Through 0.3.0 `quarantine_default` floored *any* finding to
  QUARANTINE_REVIEW. That premise ("a finding is the exception") broke when the
  active-content detector made every ordinary markdown link a finding, so 0.3.1
  raised the floor to MEDIUM+. Under `PRESET_USER_UPLOAD` (untrusted) a MEDIUM
  already escalates on trust alone, so the floor still changes no outcome there; it
  is live only for a caller-defined *trusted* policy that opts into
  `quarantine_default`. Documented so the preset is not over-read: a LOW finding on
  an upload now disposes WARN.
- **Semantic / factual poisoning is invisible** to lexicon + entropy: a false claim
  in clean prose carries no suspicious token. **Highest impact for a wiki.** The
  `grounding` module ships only a `SourceGroundingCheck` *seam* — the deterministic
  core does not judge semantics; a `[judge]` implementation must be plugged in.
- **Adversarial-ML evasion** can survive normalization; **tokenizer mismatch**
  between scanner and model leaves gaps. **Latent / dormant memory poisoning** is
  not judgeable at write time.
- **Dormant / broken-link injection** in a linked corpus (e.g. an OKF bundle): a
  link to a not-yet-existing target passes a per-concept write-time scan clean — the
  payload is planted later, when that target is written. `link_graph` surfaces the
  *dangling* edge as the signal, but catching the payload needs cross-write re-scan
  over time (the caller's disposition call).
- **OKF reserved files (`index.md` / `log.md`).** In a *received* bundle these are
  legitimate structure, so mode-b `import_bundle` scans their body and frontmatter
  (an injection in a directory listing is caught) rather than path-rejecting the
  conformant bundle. A front-end materialising individual uploads keeps the opposite
  rule (`allow_reserved=False`): a reserved basename is a listing-shadow and refused.
- **A document that *describes* attacks is a false positive.** Content documenting
  prompt-injection payloads (security notes, this project's own corpus) trips
  carrier-strip / fail-secure. At the text layer "*about* an attack" and "*carrying*
  an attack" are indistinguishable; such content needs a deliberate, explicitly
  escaped path, never a silent allow.
- **Bilingual text trips the Cyrillic/Latin homoglyph rule.**
  `homoglyph:cyrillic-latin-mix` (MEDIUM) flags a Latin letter adjacent to a
  Cyrillic look-alike, so genuine bilingual prose → MEDIUM → under untrusted →
  QUARANTINE_REVIEW — a real false positive for an inbox that expects multilingual
  content. A calibration fix is pending.
- **Insider in-place edits** by a trusted author are out of the untrusted-content
  threat model.
- **Text-only.** The core is `text -> findings`: it parses no files (no
  `pypdf`/`python-docx`/archive deps). Extract text first, then scan it with the
  high-untrust upload provenance. OCR-embedded instructions and multimodal stego are
  out of scope beyond the sanitizer's character-layer stripping.
- **Uploaded files: only the *extracted text* is scanned.** The dev-scoped OKF
  inbox showcase (`tests/test_okf_inbox_uploads.py` + `tests/inbox_frontend.py`;
  parsers in the `[dev]` extra, never core `dependencies`) reads
  `.txt`/`.md`/`.csv`/`.docx`/`.pptx`/`.xlsx`, folders and `.zip`, materializes an
  OKF bundle, then guards it. What survives extraction is **out of scope**:
  macros, OLE/embedded objects, OCR-needing images, font/render stego, encrypted
  files — the binary layer needs a separate scanner. The front-end owns the
  container threats it *can* see (zip-slip → path gate, zip-bomb → size cap, symlink
  refusal, CSV/XLSX formula-lead cells). **`.pdf` is a deliberate concession:** a
  top-level `.pdf` is *refused as unsupported* rather than half-scanned (a PDF parser
  is disproportionate for a dev showcase, and the OCR/stego it would smuggle is
  already out of scope). One known gap: the numeric `-`/`+` CSV false positive (a
  typed XLSX numeric cell does not trip it).
- **Lexicon findings are deduplicated by pattern id** — `count=1` and the first
  offset are reported, so a class matched across several channels collapses to one
  finding at its first location: a deliberate readability tradeoff.
- **Active-content severity grades on URL shape, so a pure *beacon* is only LOW.**
  Since 0.3.1 a URL that merely names a remote document (bare path, no query, no
  userinfo, no percent-escapes, no opaque segment) is LOW, and only a URL that can
  move bytes outward keeps HIGH/MEDIUM. The deliberate hole: `![x](https://
  evil.test/pixel.png)` on an attacker-controlled host still *fetches* when a
  renderer touches it, leaking reader IP, user-agent and timing. Grading the fetch
  itself would re-block every ordinary document, which is precisely the 0.3.0
  regression this replaced — so beaconing is conceded, not covered.
- **Short opaque URL segments slip through the same grading.** Opacity is decided by
  `entropy`'s primitives: base64 that decodes to text (≥20 chars), a hex id
  (≥32 chars), or Shannon entropy ≥4.4 at ≥24 chars. A shorter payload segment —
  `https://evil.test/aGVsbG8gd29ybGQ` — cannot be told from a name, because entropy
  is bounded by `log2(length)` at short lengths. Mitigation in depth, not in this
  detector: a literal credential in a URL is still caught by the LLM02 egress
  patterns in the same `scan_output` pass, whatever severity the carrier gets.
- **Percent-escapes count as data-carrying — a `%20` in a path is a false positive.**
  An ordinary link with an encoded space grades as carrying and reaches
  QUARANTINE_REVIEW / FAIL_SECURE on an untrusted upload. Obfuscated encoding is a
  core exfil primitive and the ambiguous case is put on the review side deliberately;
  it is listed here because it is the same *class* of over-block that 0.3.1 fixed,
  in a rarer shape, and it is the first thing to re-measure against a real corpus.
- **URL fragments are not graded.** A fragment is never sent to the server, so it
  cannot carry data to the host a renderer auto-fetches, and `…/overview#section` is
  the most common shape in real documentation. The residual: a *clicked* link to an
  attacker-controlled page can have its `location.hash` read by that page's script,
  so a fragment payload on a link (not an image) is uncovered.
- **Secret egress: base64-wrapped is caught, hex-wrapped is not.** The output gate
  decodes base64 blobs and re-scans the plaintext, so a base64-*wrapped* secret
  surfaces as `decoded:egress:*`. `entropy` exposes decoded plaintext for base64
  only, so hex (and other encodings, or nested wraps) is a deliberate boundary —
  decode the transport layer first if you need it scanned.

## The six documented gaps (tracked by the coverage matrix)

These are asserted to *still hold* by `tests/test_coverage_matrix.py` — a closed gap
fails the test, forcing this doc to be updated:

1. **Hex-wrapped secret egress** — `entropy` decodes base64 only (above).
2. **Semantic / factual poisoning** — invisible to token analysis (above).
3. **A lone HIGH in trusted prose → WARN** — the §4.7 trust-scaling design (above).
4. **Lexicon dedup (`count=1`)** — first offset only, by design (above).
5. **Pure beaconing** — a bare-path remote image on a hostile host is LOW (above).
6. **Short opaque URL segment (<24 chars)** — below what entropy can resolve (above).

## Out-of-scope (documented boundary)

Embedding/vector-layer defenses (OWASP LLM08, downstream of persist); multimodal
steganography; query-time / runtime guardrails; semantic factuality verification.