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Kjell Tore Guttormsen d1bff6047d measure(fp): the upload door costs a human on 16-53% of benign documents
Every field measurement this repo had published was per URL. None answered
what a consumer actually feels: how often does an ordinary document fail to
persist unattended? Three benign populations, each against its own
denominator, run through screen_output under PRESET_USER_UPLOAD and counted
at document granularity:

  vendor-harvest    98 of 185 (53.0%) non-WARN -- 64 fail-secure, 34 held
  generated-notes   88 of 547 (16.1%) non-WARN -- 61 fail-secure, 27 held
  reference-corpus 133 of 389 (34.2%) non-WARN -- 80 fail-secure, 53 held

The number is bad and ships as measured; PLAN-v1 committed to that in advance
("et roedt FP-resultat er like verdifullt"). The response is a documented
limitation, not a recalibration: moving the grading fires the locked
linkedin-studio notification promise, and the drivers are residuals
LIMITATIONS already concedes. Counted at each document's worst severity,
active:raw-html -- the MDX-component over-reach -- is a top driver in 52 of
vendor-harvest's 98 and 53 of generated-notes' 88; about ten per population
are genuinely injection-shaped text, which security-adjacent documentation
honestly contains.

Method traps closed rather than stepped in:

- The unit is in the number. Document-level rates are NOT comparable to the
  URL-level 16/16, 28/28, 149/1694 above them, and the three rows are not
  summable -- the 2400 != 2401 defect class one level up.
- The gate is the strict one. The trusted door WARNs every non-CRITICAL
  finding, so it would have handed back a beautiful, meaningless near-zero;
  it is printed as a footnote and labelled structurally blind.
- "not WARN" is only a risk statement while the default action map sends
  exactly NONE and LOW to WARN. action_map became a supported override last
  commit, so the equivalence is pinned in the suite and the sweep aborts if
  it breaks.
- Ground truth for benign is provenance, not inspection, and says so.
- The populations are disjoint as documents but not independent as content:
  184 of generated-notes' 547 are same-named derivatives of vendor-harvest.
  Measured, not assumed, and the two rows read as one observation.

Also fixed: tests/test_wiring.py credited a consumer's capture store with
35 of 35 query-carrying URLs. That consumer retracted the number the next day
and re-measured 28 of 28 on the same 81-URL corpus. LIMITATIONS was corrected
then; the comment was not, so a retracted figure has been sitting beside a
live one since 07-27.

717 tests (was 716, none changed), coverage matrix 128/128 with 6/6 gaps
holding, every population swept twice with identical counts.
2026-08-10 21:32:56 +02:00
..
inbox_frontend.py feat(okf): scan reserved index.md/log.md in mode-b import, not path-reject (review MAJOR #2) 2026-07-15 06:43:50 +02:00
test_active_content.py feat(active-content,okf): bound the last two detection surfaces 2026-08-10 14:48:54 +02:00
test_calibration.py fix(output): 19 quadratic regex runs on the output path, worst ~5.7h at the cap 2026-07-31 18:31:58 +02:00
test_contract.py fix(security): harden 5 adversarial-review findings (M1/M2/M3 + m4/m6) via TDD 2026-07-05 10:45:05 +02:00
test_corpus.py measure(fp): the upload door costs a human on 16-53% of benign documents 2026-08-10 21:32:56 +02:00
test_coverage_matrix.py test(coverage): runnable threat-coverage matrix (real-case validation gate) 2026-07-15 11:20:22 +02:00
test_disposition.py docs(plan): kill the pointer that sent this session to the wrong section 2026-08-10 21:01:19 +02:00
test_entropy.py fix(security): harden 5 adversarial-review findings (M1/M2/M3 + m4/m6) via TDD 2026-07-05 10:45:05 +02:00
test_fence.py feat(fence): randomized unspoofable delimiter + attacker marker-strip (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 18:23:35 +02:00
test_grounding.py feat(grounding): SourceGroundingCheck protocol + pass-through default — the semantic-poisoning seam (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 22:44:41 +02:00
test_input_cap.py docs(readme,limitations): stop advertising a version that was not chosen 2026-08-02 21:21:21 +02:00
test_lexicon.py fix(lexicon): two quadratic patterns, reachable through the output gate too 2026-07-31 21:50:51 +02:00
test_neutralize.py fix(sanitize,okf,active_content): three quadratic patterns, two on the input path 2026-08-01 20:06:36 +02:00
test_okf.py feat(active-content,okf): bound the last two detection surfaces 2026-08-10 14:48:54 +02:00
test_okf_inbox_uploads.py feat(inbox): .xlsx extraction — formula gate, hidden sheets, cell comments (stage 2h) 2026-07-07 07:41:00 +02:00
test_okf_showcase.py feat(okf): scan reserved index.md/log.md in mode-b import, not path-reject (review MAJOR #2) 2026-07-15 06:43:50 +02:00
test_output.py fix(sanitize,okf,active_content): three quadratic patterns, two on the input path 2026-08-01 20:06:36 +02:00
test_report.py feat: scaffold package + report and sanitize modules (TDD) 2026-07-04 09:24:20 +02:00
test_sanitize.py fix(sanitize,okf,active_content): three quadratic patterns, two on the input path 2026-08-01 20:06:36 +02:00
test_showcase.py feat(guard): active-content detector wired into the output gate (review MAJOR #1) 2026-07-15 06:11:33 +02:00
test_url_shape_doc.py docs(url-shape): make the rule reconstructable, and record what three corpora measured 2026-07-27 08:56:24 +02:00
test_wiring.py measure(fp): the upload door costs a human on 16-53% of benign documents 2026-08-10 21:32:56 +02:00