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llm-ingestion-pipeline-secu.../src/llm_ingestion_guard/neutralize.py
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 736f370cfb fix(active-content): raw-html graded two inert shapes HIGH, and the fix moved a second surface
`is_active_tag`'s URL-attribute branch was a presence test: any element carrying
`href=`/`src=`/`action=` graded HIGH regardless of where the URL pointed. An MDX
`<Card href="/en/agent-sdk/quickstart">` reaches no attacker-controlled host, and
neither does APIM policy XML's `<set-header>`. It now requires an external target
-- the rule the markdown paths have applied since 0.3.1. `<base>` left the active
name set in the same change: HTML's `<base>` has its whole affordance in an `href`
the attribute branch still catches, and APIM's attribute-less `<base />` is inert.

Measured before and after in ONE session against one corpus state, because two of
the three corpora are living and a split would mix this with re-harvest drift:

  reference-corpus  389 docs   133 -> 108   (ceiling 107)
  vendor-harvest    187 docs   100 ->  98   (ceiling  62)
  generated-notes   550 docs    90 ->  88   (ceiling  49)

96% of the achievable reduction in reference-corpus, 5% in the wiki corpora. The
two classes had to be measured TOGETHER -- alone they free 3 and 13 documents,
together 25, because a document carrying one usually carries the other.

The second surface: `neutralize` imported `is_active_tag` by name, so this would
have silently narrowed the opt-in mutator too -- and no test discriminated the two
halves, since every `neutralize:raw-html` payload stays active under any narrowing
considered. That test is written first here. The predicates are now separate
symbols; the mutator keeps defanging anything, because over-defanging is auditable
and blocks nothing while under-defanging hands a human a live construct.

Behaviour change: a document whose only finding was one of these classes now WARNs
instead of holding. Detection is unchanged -- 128/128 classes, 6/6 gaps hold.

Self-safety: reading an attribute VALUE needs a pattern the presence test lacks. It
reuses the same literal alternation so no new run shape enters the table; its
`_REDOS_PAYLOADS` row denies the `=` the pattern requires, since a unit supplying it
matches at once and never exercises the run (the lexicon's `script-tag` row is the
cautionary case). 0.031-0.046s across five attack shapes at 100_000 chars against a
2.0s bound; `docs/redos-sweep.py` reports 0 candidates of 152. An attribute the
presence test saw but the value parser cannot read counts as external -- fail secure.

`docs/rawhtml-census.py` gains a PRODUCTION row that re-measures the shipped
predicate rather than a hypothesis, so a published number and the code cannot drift
apart unnoticed. README's limitation count moves 34 -> 33.

727 passed (was 717).
2026-08-11 16:56:31 +02:00

174 lines
6.8 KiB
Python

"""neutralize — opt-in, pure defang of active content in model OUTPUT.
Query-time guardrails guard the answer; this guards the *persisted artifact*.
When model output is written to a wiki, doc, or knowledge base and later rendered,
active-content constructs become an exfiltration channel: a markdown image URL is
auto-fetched the moment the page renders, leaking whatever the attacker packed
into it — with no click. This is the EchoLeak class (CVE-2025-32711). Such
carriers are neither injection strings nor high-entropy blobs, so ``lexicon`` and
``entropy`` do not see them; neutralizing them is a distinct control (OWASP
LLM05 — Improper Output Handling).
Defang, don't delete. Each active construct is rewritten to an inert but still
human-auditable form: URLs get a non-resolvable scheme and bracketed dots
(``https://evil.com`` -> ``hxxps://evil[.]com``), and raw active HTML is escaped
so a renderer shows it as literal text instead of executing it. The visible
information survives review; only the machine-actionable affordance dies.
The pattern table this mutator rewrites is shared with the report-only detector
:func:`~llm_ingestion_guard.active_content.scan_active_content` and lives in
``active_content`` — detection feeds the standard gate; defanging stays the
separate, opt-in mutation below.
Two properties are load-bearing and mirror the sanitizer:
1. **Opt-in and separate.** Calling this function *is* the opt-in to mutate.
Detection elsewhere in the library stays report-only (design principles 3 & 4);
the report-only output gate (``output``) never rewrites. A caller that wants
findings without mutation reads ``result.report`` and discards ``result.text``.
2. **Byte-identical on clean input.** Output with no active construct is returned
unchanged with an empty report. Benign inline formatting (``<b>``, ``<em>``)
and prose containing stray ``<``, ``>``, ``[`` are left untouched.
Scope note (conceded, not hidden): this is a targeted defanger, not a full HTML
sanitizer. Text *between* escaped tags (e.g. a ``<script>`` body) is neutralized
as active content by escaping the tags, but bare URLs left in that residual text
stay visible; balanced-parenthesis link URLs are matched conservatively. The goal
is to kill the zero-click auto-fetch/execute affordance, not to rewrite every URL.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
from .active_content import (
AUTOLINK_RE,
DATA_URI_RE,
HTML_TAG_RE,
MD_IMAGE_RE,
MD_LINK_RE,
MD_REFDEF_RE,
URL_IN_TEXT_RE,
defang_url,
is_defangable_tag,
redact,
)
from .calibration import MAX_INPUT_CHARS
from .contract import assert_within_input_cap
from .report import Finding, Report, Severity, Source
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class NeutralizeResult:
"""The defanged text plus a report of every construct that was neutralized."""
text: str
report: Report
def neutralize(
text: str,
source: Source = Source.OUTPUT,
max_input_chars: int = MAX_INPUT_CHARS,
) -> NeutralizeResult:
"""Defang active-content constructs in ``text`` and report each class.
Rewrites markdown images/links, reference-link definitions, angle-bracket
autolinks, raw active HTML, and ``data:`` URIs into inert forms. Text with no
such construct is returned byte-identical with an empty report.
Raises :class:`~llm_ingestion_guard.contract.OversizeInputError` above
``max_input_chars``. A partially defanged artifact is the worst outcome
available here: it *looks* neutralized, and the live constructs are all in
the tail nobody re-reads.
"""
assert_within_input_cap(text, surface="neutralize", max_input_chars=max_input_chars)
report = Report()
out = text
def _flag(label: str, severity: Severity, count: int, evidence: str) -> None:
report.add(Finding(
label=label, severity=severity, source=source, detector="neutralize",
count=count, evidence=redact(evidence), owasp="LLM05",
))
# 1. Markdown images — the zero-click auto-fetch primitive (EchoLeak). Run
# first so the leading `!` is consumed before the inline-link pass.
img_ev: list[str] = []
def _img(m: re.Match[str]) -> str:
defanged = defang_url(m.group("url"))
img_ev.append(defanged)
return f'![{m.group("alt")}]({defanged}{m.group("title")})'
out, n_img = MD_IMAGE_RE.subn(_img, out)
if n_img:
_flag("neutralize:markdown-image", Severity.HIGH, n_img, img_ev[0])
# 2. Markdown inline links — clickable / prefetchable exfil target.
link_ev: list[str] = []
def _link(m: re.Match[str]) -> str:
defanged = defang_url(m.group("url"))
link_ev.append(defanged)
return f'[{m.group("text")}]({defanged}{m.group("title")})'
out, n_link = MD_LINK_RE.subn(_link, out)
if n_link:
_flag("neutralize:markdown-link", Severity.MEDIUM, n_link, link_ev[0])
# 3. Reference-style link definitions — the documented image-filter bypass.
ref_ev: list[str] = []
def _ref(m: re.Match[str]) -> str:
defanged = defang_url(m.group("url"))
ref_ev.append(defanged)
return m.group("pre") + defanged
out, n_ref = MD_REFDEF_RE.subn(_ref, out)
if n_ref:
_flag("neutralize:reference-link", Severity.MEDIUM, n_ref, ref_ev[0])
# 4. Angle-bracket autolinks.
auto_ev: list[str] = []
def _auto(m: re.Match[str]) -> str:
defanged = defang_url(m.group("url"))
auto_ev.append(defanged)
return f"<{defanged}>"
out, n_auto = AUTOLINK_RE.subn(_auto, out)
if n_auto:
_flag("neutralize:autolink", Severity.MEDIUM, n_auto, auto_ev[0])
# 5. Raw active HTML — escape so a renderer shows it as inert literal text.
html_state = {"count": 0, "ev": ""}
def _html(m: re.Match[str]) -> str:
tag = m.group(0)
if not is_defangable_tag(m.group("name"), m.group("attrs") or ""):
return tag
html_state["count"] += 1
if not html_state["ev"]:
html_state["ev"] = tag
inert = URL_IN_TEXT_RE.sub(lambda u: defang_url(u.group(0)), tag)
return inert.replace("<", "&lt;").replace(">", "&gt;")
out = HTML_TAG_RE.sub(_html, out)
if html_state["count"]:
_flag("neutralize:raw-html", Severity.HIGH, html_state["count"], html_state["ev"])
# 6. Standalone `data:` URIs left in prose (those inside constructs above are
# already defanged; the literal `data:` colon is gone, so no double count).
data_ev: list[str] = []
def _data(m: re.Match[str]) -> str:
defanged = defang_url(m.group(0))
data_ev.append(defanged)
return defanged
out, n_data = DATA_URI_RE.subn(_data, out)
if n_data:
_flag("neutralize:data-uri", Severity.HIGH, n_data, data_ev[0])
return NeutralizeResult(text=out, report=report)