llm-ingestion-pipeline-secu.../tests
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 9b75bf0bb7 feat(contract): tool-less + credential-allowlist + env-scoping quarantine asserters (TDD) [skip-docs]
Module 9 of the build order — the differentiator. Where the other modules
detect and report, these are pure functions that ENFORCE an invariant and
raise: the write-time analogue of runtime least-privilege. They harden the
call a pipeline makes around its quarantined transform; the library makes no
model call itself.

Three asserts, matching the reusable-contract checklist (BRIEF §6 steps 3-4):
- assert_tool_less(request): the model request carries no tool surface —
  tools/functions/tool_choice/function_call/mcp_servers, populated. Covers
  both Anthropic and OpenAI request shapes; empty/None is genuinely tool-less.
- assert_credential_allowlist(env, allowed): the process env holds no
  credential beyond this stage's allowlist (subset = least-privilege; the
  enrichment stage sees only the model key, never the publish credential).
- scoped_env(env, allowed): the isolation primitive — strips off-allowlist
  credentials, keeps PATH etc.; the assert then passes by construction.

Generalized from claude-code-llm-wiki tools/wiki_ingest/enrich.py
assert_quarantine (a pipeline-specific gate) into framework-agnostic pieces.
Two deliberate safety choices inherited from the reference: credential
detection is name-based (env VALUES are never read — value-scanning is the
output module's job); and a raised ContractViolation names only the offending
KEY, never a value, so it is safe to route to an alert channel (minimal-alert,
BRIEF §6 step 8). CREDENTIAL_NAME_RE ported verbatim from the proven reference.

23 new tests; 161 green total.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HyRCQMocjZ6SmSQ6JidJ2k
2026-07-04 20:44:20 +02:00
..
test_contract.py feat(contract): tool-less + credential-allowlist + env-scoping quarantine asserters (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 20:44:20 +02:00
test_disposition.py feat(disposition): source-trust + provenance gate — WARN|QUARANTINE|FAIL_SECURE, compound + fail-closed (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 20:34:32 +02:00
test_entropy.py feat(entropy): high-entropy/encoded-blob detection with decode-and-rescan (TDD) 2026-07-04 09:43:24 +02:00
test_fence.py feat(fence): randomized unspoofable delimiter + attacker marker-strip (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 18:23:35 +02:00
test_lexicon.py feat(lexicon): JSON injection lexicon + variant-set scan (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 17:20:21 +02:00
test_neutralize.py feat(neutralize): opt-in pure defang of active-content output (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 18:55:12 +02:00
test_output.py feat(output): report-only OUTPUT gate — compose + secret egress (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 20:18:46 +02:00
test_report.py feat: scaffold package + report and sanitize modules (TDD) 2026-07-04 09:24:20 +02:00
test_sanitize.py feat: scaffold package + report and sanitize modules (TDD) 2026-07-04 09:24:20 +02:00