1
0
Fork 0
llm-ingestion-pipeline-secu.../tests
Kjell Tore Guttormsen b90233481a feat(active-content,okf): bound the last two detection surfaces
`scan_active_content` called directly and `okf.link_graph` were the two surfaces
still reading attacker-supplied text with no cap — the first reached by an
adapter that wants the active-content classes alone, the second running a
`findall` over every body in a bundle. Both are detection-shaped, so they
truncate and flag rather than raise the way the transform surfaces do: what a
detector shortens is its own coverage, not the caller's content.

Truncation is only honest if it is visible, so neither goes quiet: the scanner
emits `active:oversize-input` (LLM10), and `link_graph` records
`(from_id, body_length)` in `LinkGraphResult.truncated` — the field that lets a
caller tell "no links past here" from "no links read past here".

Reached through `scan_output`, the text is already under that surface's cap and
`max_scan_chars` is now passed down, so the flag is raised once, there.
2026-08-10 14:48:54 +02:00
..
inbox_frontend.py feat(okf): scan reserved index.md/log.md in mode-b import, not path-reject (review MAJOR #2) 2026-07-15 06:43:50 +02:00
test_active_content.py feat(active-content,okf): bound the last two detection surfaces 2026-08-10 14:48:54 +02:00
test_calibration.py fix(output): 19 quadratic regex runs on the output path, worst ~5.7h at the cap 2026-07-31 18:31:58 +02:00
test_contract.py fix(security): harden 5 adversarial-review findings (M1/M2/M3 + m4/m6) via TDD 2026-07-05 10:45:05 +02:00
test_corpus.py fix(calibration): grade active content on URL shape, not construct type 2026-07-25 15:36:02 +02:00
test_coverage_matrix.py test(coverage): runnable threat-coverage matrix (real-case validation gate) 2026-07-15 11:20:22 +02:00
test_disposition.py fix(calibration): grade active content on URL shape, not construct type 2026-07-25 15:36:02 +02:00
test_entropy.py fix(security): harden 5 adversarial-review findings (M1/M2/M3 + m4/m6) via TDD 2026-07-05 10:45:05 +02:00
test_fence.py feat(fence): randomized unspoofable delimiter + attacker marker-strip (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 18:23:35 +02:00
test_grounding.py feat(grounding): SourceGroundingCheck protocol + pass-through default — the semantic-poisoning seam (TDD) [skip-docs] 2026-07-04 22:44:41 +02:00
test_input_cap.py docs(readme,limitations): stop advertising a version that was not chosen 2026-08-02 21:21:21 +02:00
test_lexicon.py fix(lexicon): two quadratic patterns, reachable through the output gate too 2026-07-31 21:50:51 +02:00
test_neutralize.py fix(sanitize,okf,active_content): three quadratic patterns, two on the input path 2026-08-01 20:06:36 +02:00
test_okf.py feat(active-content,okf): bound the last two detection surfaces 2026-08-10 14:48:54 +02:00
test_okf_inbox_uploads.py feat(inbox): .xlsx extraction — formula gate, hidden sheets, cell comments (stage 2h) 2026-07-07 07:41:00 +02:00
test_okf_showcase.py feat(okf): scan reserved index.md/log.md in mode-b import, not path-reject (review MAJOR #2) 2026-07-15 06:43:50 +02:00
test_output.py fix(sanitize,okf,active_content): three quadratic patterns, two on the input path 2026-08-01 20:06:36 +02:00
test_report.py feat: scaffold package + report and sanitize modules (TDD) 2026-07-04 09:24:20 +02:00
test_sanitize.py fix(sanitize,okf,active_content): three quadratic patterns, two on the input path 2026-08-01 20:06:36 +02:00
test_showcase.py feat(guard): active-content detector wired into the output gate (review MAJOR #1) 2026-07-15 06:11:33 +02:00
test_url_shape_doc.py docs(url-shape): make the rule reconstructable, and record what three corpora measured 2026-07-27 08:56:24 +02:00
test_wiring.py docs(limitations): bound two URL-shape false positives with field measurements 2026-07-25 20:56:14 +02:00