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feat(signatures): add the malware identity table, drawn from source not memory

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The last missing data file. Seven known-bad-identity signatures over four
families - webshell, reverse_shell, cryptominer, hacktool - reproduced
verbatim from llm-security/knowledge/signatures.json at b0de0ca, key order
included. The file was generated from the parsed source rather than typed,
and provenance pins the source's byte length (2494) and SHA-256 so the
claim is checkable rather than asserted.

Note the family spellings: reverse_shell with an underscore, and
cryptominer rather than miner. The working note this file was planned from
had both wrong. They are policy keys - the engine filters on them and
interpolates them into every finding title - so a rename is a breaking
change, which is exactly why the table was read instead of recalled.

The rules were the easy half. The substance is engine_behaviour_not_data,
which draws the line between the table and the runtime around it. No rule
carries a flags field, because the engine compiles every pattern with `i`
unconditionally at signature-scanner.mjs:48 - so a consumer compiling these
case-sensitively silently under-matches all seven, and the dialect block
records that where a reader will hit it. Also engine, not data: matching
against five decode variants rather than raw bytes, the enabled-families
policy filter, per-file rule dedup, custom-rule merging, and a loader that
defaults four missing fields instead of rejecting a rule.

Two limits are stated as evidence limits rather than left implied. Seven
signatures are not malware coverage; a clean SIG result is not "no
malware", and the seed runtime's own header calls the table deliberately
tight. And three of the seven match on names - xmrig, mimikatz,
meterpreter - so a document discussing those tools matches. The seed
runtime hides that by excluding knowledge/, tests/, docs/ and
node_modules/, which is scan scoping and does not travel with the table.

Verified: 7/7 rule objects field-identical to source including key order,
no non-ASCII bytes, all seven compile in Node bare, i and iu (21/21) and in
Python re (7/7). Charter guard clean - no executable code in the repository.

README and CHANGELOG updated: the file moves out of "planned, not in
v0.1.0" and out of "not included".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SNMcqrfNyoLRQ7qXUFZnb9
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-08-09 22:49:21 +02:00
commit 47760d2264
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README.md
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@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ and keeping it that small is the point.
| [`lexicon/injection-lexicon.json`](lexicon/injection-lexicon.json) | Prompt-injection pattern lexicon: 83 patterns in four **severity** families (`critical`, `high`, `medium`, `hybrid`), each with a stable `id` and per-runtime aliases. The thematic class (`override:`, `evasion:`, `hitl-trap:`, …) is the id prefix, not the family. |
| [`codepoints/carriers.json`](codepoints/carriers.json) | Invisible and deceptive carriers: zero-width characters, BIDI controls, Unicode Tag block ranges, and the homoglyph map. |
| [`signatures/secret-egress.json`](signatures/secret-egress.json) | Credential and token shapes that must never leave a machine, in a portable regex dialect. |
| `signatures/malware-signatures.json` | **Planned, not in v0.1.0.** Signature set for the malicious-code class (`SIG`). The seed data has not been delivered yet. |
| [`signatures/malware-signatures.json`](signatures/malware-signatures.json) | Known-bad **identity** for the malicious-code class (`SIG`): seven tight signatures over four families — PHP webshells, reverse shells, cryptominers, offensive tooling. Seven signatures are not malware coverage, and the file says so. |
| [`signatures/active-content.json`](signatures/active-content.json) | Active content that renders or fetches on its own — Markdown images, links, reference definitions and autolinks, `data:` URIs, active HTML. The EchoLeak class. |
| [`calibration/calibration.json`](calibration/calibration.json) | The numbers a detector must not invent: risk-score tier constants, verdict thresholds, risk-band cutoffs, posture grade thresholds. Transcribed from a prose summary, not differentially verified — the file says so itself. |
| [`mapping/owasp-map.json`](mapping/owasp-map.json) | Finding-id prefix → OWASP taxonomy entry (LLM / ASI / AST / MCP). |
| [`schema/finding.schema.json`](schema/finding.schema.json) | **Normative.** The finding contract, plus the SARIF and JSONL output profiles. |
| [`schema/finding.schema.json`](schema/finding.schema.json) | **Normative.** The finding contract — closed against its producer, ten properties — plus the SARIF output profile. The JSONL profile is recorded as `not applicable`, with the reason. |
| `spec/decode-pipeline.md` | **Planned, not in v0.1.0.** The decode order, in RFC 2119 language. Two runtimes that decode in different orders will disagree on identical input. Writing it needs the decode implementation, which is engine code and has not been supplied — and a normative spec guessed from a data dump would be worse than an absent one. |
| `conformance/` | **Planned, not in v0.1.0.** One directory per case: `input.txt` in, `expected.json` out. Ground truth. |
| [`docs/extraction-plan.md`](docs/extraction-plan.md) | Informative: where each file was seeded from, and what v0.1.0 promised. |