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chore(release): v8.1.2 — node_modules and plugin dir foreign, posture credit honest

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Version sync: package.json, .claude-plugin/plugin.json, README badge +
Recent versions row, CLAUDE.md header + v8.1.2 highlights, CHANGELOG
[8.1.2]. The own-working-tree header and CHANGELOG no longer claim that
node_modules and the plugin dir are the only install locations foreign
code lands in (independent review: Python venv, vendor/ still own) —
listed as Known open instead.

Gates on the staged tree: suite 2328 / 2322 pass / 0 fail / 6 skipped,
hooks 370/0, golden 109/7/4 61/61, av-surface 6/6, claude plugin
validate pass (1 known CLAUDE.md warning).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-09-22 21:39:19 +02:00
commit 0bc4c8a6be
Signed by: ktg
SSH key fingerprint: SHA256:JakMjO6FTBBzN0Bhfj9saOoEjaFxlSdYuZQQpM/lF9Q
6 changed files with 70 additions and 10 deletions
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4
CLAUDE.md
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@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
# LLM Security Plugin (v8.1.1)
# LLM Security Plugin (v8.1.2)
Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 frameworks: OWASP LLM Top 10, Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI, 2026 edition), Skills Top 10 (AST), MCP Top 10, AI Agent Traps (DeepMind). 2250+ unit, integration, and end-to-end tests (`tests/e2e/` covers the multi-hook attack chain, multi-session state simulation, and the full scan-orchestrator pipeline); mutation-testing coverage not published.
Release notes for v7.0.0 → v7.8.2: see `docs/version-history.md` — read on demand.
**v8.1.2 highlights** — Patch closing both v8.1.1 known-open items; detection tables, golden baseline and hooks untouched. "Own working tree" (`scanners/lib/own-working-tree.mjs`) is additionally foreign when the path from cwd to the target has a `node_modules` segment (only the part below cwd counts — a package you `cd`'d into is own) or when the target lies under Claude Code's plugin dir (`$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/plugins`, default `~/.claude/plugins`; foreign even from inside it). PM rule (order 20260922T192716Z), chosen over a general "no `.git` of its own" rule, which would shut out plain subdirs of the own repo (`tests/lib/own-working-tree.test.mjs`, `tests/scanners/foreign-under-cwd-scope.test.mjs`). posture-scanner's NIST Govern credit for `policy.json` now requires `isOwnWorkingTree(projectRoot)` (`tests/scanners/posture-policy-scope.test.mjs`). Known open: a `git archive` export / unpacked tarball under cwd, and install locations the rule does not name (Python venv site-packages, composer/bundler `vendor/`, skills in a git-tracked `~/.claude`), still count as own; the plugin-dir check knows one config dir. Kept on purpose (safe direction): an own worktree under the repo and a case-mismatched target path are foreign. 2328 tests.
**v8.1.1 highlights** — Patch closing the v8.1.0 follow-up list; detection tables, golden baseline and hooks untouched. "Own working tree" (`scanners/lib/own-working-tree.mjs`) now also requires the target to share cwd's git root (nearest `.git`, dir or file; none for both), so a clone, submodule or worktree *under* cwd is foreign and its `.llm-security-ignore` / `policy.json` / custom SIG rules are ignored — closes v8.1.0's known-open item (`tests/lib/own-working-tree.test.mjs`, `tests/scanners/nested-clone-scope.test.mjs`). `ci.failOn` / `ci.compact` from `policy.json` got a real test (the old one never read the policy). README and `.llm-security-ignore` no longer state self-scan counts that drift per commit (git-forensics' 50-commit window). `/security scan` description names the accepted URLs. Known open: a target with no `.git` of its own (`node_modules/`, plugin-cache copy, tarball export) under cwd still counts as own. Windows/Defender quarantine remains **not measured** (no Windows machine). 2306 tests.
**v8.1.0 highlights** — Antivirus surface: a Windows user can clone and install without Defender quarantining a file, and detection is unchanged. No payload sits on disk as a file that would run it — test fixtures (signature, memory-poisoning, trigger, `ast-scan/*.py`) are built in a temp dir at test time from split strings/rot13, the malicious-skill demo and `poisoned-claude-md` ship as encoded archives (`materialize.mjs`), zero-width test lines use `String.fromCodePoint`; sha256 of every removed file asserted. Gate: `tests/av-surface.test.mjs`, probes (a)/(a2) SIG payloads, (b) base64→shell command, (c) Tag/zero-width outside the conformance corpus, (d) malicious trees on disk, (e) runnable literals in session-loaded files. Skill-scanner detection lists moved from `agents/skill-scanner-agent.md` to `knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md` § Detection Rules (a quarantined agent file breaks the plugin). README § Antivirus false positives (restore, report, sparse checkout; no exclusions recommended). Scope fixes: `.llm-security-ignore` and `.llm-security/policy.json` (incl. `sig.custom_rules_path`, `ast.python_path`, `ci.failOn`) are honoured only for the caller's own working tree (`scanners/lib/own-working-tree.mjs`: target = cwd or below, never under tmpdir) — a foreign target's file is ignored with one stderr line. `git-clone.mjs` accepts HTTPS on any host. Signature tables and golden baseline untouched. Known open: a foreign clone *under* cwd still counts as own tree. 2286 tests.