chore(llm-security): v7.8.2 — security patch release
Bumps package.json, .claude-plugin/plugin.json and the README badge to 7.8.2; adds the release entry to CHANGELOG.md, docs/version-history.md, the README recent-versions table and the CLAUDE.md highlights block. Also fixes test pollution introduced with the ide-extension regression suite: its temp roots used an `llmsec-jb-plugin-` prefix, and jetbrains-parser.test.mjs asserts globally that no `llmsec-jb-*` directory survives anywhere in tmpdir. The shared prefix made that assertion fail depending on test order — it passed on the first full run and failed on the next. Prefix is now `llmsec-nullmanifest-`. npm test: 1901/1901 green, three consecutive runs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TcQyMTQfyrsAapaCMPxTtQ
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*AI-generated: all code produced by Claude Code through dialog-driven development. [Full disclosure →](../../README.md#ai-generated-code-disclosure)*
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@ -628,6 +628,7 @@ demonstrations — each with `README.md`, fixture, run script, and
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| Version | Date | Highlights |
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|---------|------|------------|
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| **7.8.2** | 2026-07-18 | **Silent-failure fixes from the completion review (HIGH).** Five defects, four sharing one failure mode: the check reported success without running. `hooks/scripts/pre-bash-destructive.mjs` did not block `rm -rf /` or `rm -rf ~` — the target alternation ended in a `\b` that cannot hold after a non-word character, so the bare forms the rule is named for fell through to WARN (exit 0, command executed) while `/etc` and `$HOME` blocked normally. `scanners/entropy-scanner.mjs` matched its test/fixture suppression against the **absolute** path, so any ancestor directory named `test`/`spec`/`fixture`/`mock` silenced every finding in the target and still returned status `ok`. `scanners/ide-extension-scanner.mjs` guarded only `parseVSCodeExtension`'s bare-`null` failure signal, not `parseIntelliJPlugin`'s truthy `{ manifest: null }`, so any malformed JetBrains plugin threw a TypeError that escaped `mapConcurrent`'s unguarded `Promise.all` and aborted the scan of every other extension. `scanners/content-extractor.mjs` detected obfuscated injections but did not remove them: a decoded-only `match[0]` never occurs in the raw text, so the literal replace was a no-op and the payload reached the LLM agent verbatim through `sanitized_content` — removal is now line-level, with unattributable multi-line payloads flagged `unstripped`. `scanners/lib/ide-extension-parser.mjs` emptied any plugin.xml field containing a character reference above `0x10FFFF`. No feature changes. 1901 tests, 0 fail. |
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| **7.8.1** | 2026-07-18 | **Auto-cleaner command-injection fix (CRITICAL).** `scanners/auto-cleaner.mjs` syntax-checked candidate `.mjs`/`.js`/`.cjs` content via ``execSync(`node --check "${tmpPath}"`)``, where `tmpPath` derives from the untrusted scanned-repo **filename**. The v7.8.0 F-2 guard checks path containment but does not strip or quote shell metacharacters, so a file named ``x";<command>;".mjs`` closes the interpolated quote and injects a command — and `/security clean` runs live by default, making a hostile repository sufficient for arbitrary local command execution. Reproduced with a live PoC before the fix. Both subprocess sites (syntax check + the CLI scan-orchestrator fallback) now use `spawnSync` with an argv array, so no shell parses a path. Defense-in-depth: `applyFixes()` refuses findings whose `file` carries shell/control metacharacters, reported as `skipped`. Regression coverage is split across both layers so the guard cannot mask a re-introduced shell in the sink. No feature changes. 1865 tests, 0 fail. |
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| **7.8.0** | 2026-06-20 | **TRG/SIG/AST deep-scan scanners.** Three new deterministic deep-scan scanners targeting the skills/agents attack surface, each with its own finding prefix, OWASP/AST mapping, policy block, and graceful-skip behaviour. **TRG** (`scanners/trigger-scanner.mjs`) inspects command/agent/skill `name` + `description` frontmatter for activation-surface abuse: `TRG-shadow` (name collides with a built-in and intercepts it), `TRG-baiting` (maximally-activating phrases that bait indiscriminate invocation), `TRG-broad` (generic name + universal-applicability claim); descriptions pass the decode pipeline first so obfuscated baiting still trips (LLM06/AST04). **SIG** (`scanners/signature-scanner.mjs`) is a pure-Node known-malware *identity* engine (webshells, reverse shells, cryptominers, hacktools) that tests each signature against both raw bytes and the decode pipeline (base64/hex/url/entity/unicode, homoglyph fold, rot13), so obfuscated known-malware a byte-matcher misses is still caught; rules ship in `knowledge/signatures.json` (LLM03/LLM02). **AST** (`scanners/ast-taint-scanner.mjs`) shells out to a PARSE-ONLY `python3` helper (`scanners/lib/py-ast-taint.py`) for variable-level, scope-aware Python taint analysis — higher recall than the ~70% regex `taint-tracer.mjs` — and falls back to the regex tracer when `python3` is unavailable, so the scan never hard-fails; the helper only `ast.parse`s the target and never executes it (LLM01/LLM02/AST02). Built behind a security-fix gate (F-1/F-2/F-3 shell-injection + path-traversal fixes landed first). 1863 tests, 0 fail. |
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| **7.7.2** | 2026-05-19 | **Language consistency pass.** Norwegian had crept into surface text across v7.5-v7.7. Per the `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md` convention (English for code and documentation, Norwegian for dialog only), this release translates: the HTML Report-step appended by all 18 skill commands, the canonical CLI renderer `scripts/lib/report-renderers.mjs` (display strings + JS comments), the playground UI strings, the `skill-scanner-agent` and `mcp-scanner-agent` system prompts, the Recent versions table and playground architecture prose in this README, the v7.7.x highlights in `CLAUDE.md`, and the llm-security entries in the marketplace root `README.md` + `CLAUDE.md`, plus six table cells in `docs/scanner-reference.md`. Demo-state fixture content for the `dft-komplett-demo` project (intentional Norwegian persona) and regex alternations that match Norwegian-language report markdown (`/^high\|^høy/`, `/resolution\|løsning/`) were preserved. No scanner, hook, or behavior changes — purely surface text. |
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