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feat(llm-security)!: v8 Phase 3 complete - riskScoreV1, posture heuristic, docs

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Closes Phase 3 (B11) of the v8.0.0 plan. Three parts, all with the failing
test written first.

riskScoreV1 removed. scanners/lib/severity.mjs drops riskScoreV1() and its
SEVERITY_WEIGHTS_V1 table - @deprecated since v7.0.0, kept for diff/comparison,
zero callers in code or tests (re-verified, not taken from the plan). The v1
weights are recorded in CHANGELOG so an old score stays re-derivable. riskScore
(v2) is untouched; a test pins that one critical still lands in the 70-95 tier
and that 50 lows score below it, which is exactly the case v1 collapsed to 100.

Posture category 12 no longer keys off an identifier name. The check was
/TRIFECTA_MODE/i over the session-guard source, which measured what a constant
was CALLED rather than whether enforcement was configurable. With the env-var
gone, that regex would have dropped every correctly-migrated project from PASS
to PARTIAL - the gate punishing the migration it exists to encourage. It now
matches getPolicyValue('trifecta', 'mode', ...) and still accepts a pre-v8
vendored guard reading the old env-var, because a third-party project carries
its own hook copy and is equally configurable either way; the evidence line
says which of the two was found. The PARTIAL finding recommended setting an
env-var that v8 ignores; it now names the policy key. The grade-a fixture hook
moves to the policy-era form.

Two never-implemented env-vars deleted from the docs. LLM_SECURITY_SCR_OFFLINE
(ci-cd-guide) and LLM_SECURITY_OFFLINE (supply-chain-attack example) were
documented as OSV.dev / npm-audit kill-switches. No code has ever read either -
verified by grep across scanners, hooks and scripts, which finds them only in
markdown. A promised kill-switch that does nothing is worse than a documented
absence: it is trusted precisely when the run is meant to be air-gapped. The
docs now say there is none and that egress must be blocked at the network
layer. The LLM_SECURITY_AUDIT_* wildcard is narrowed to the one real key.

Docs. Migration section in README + CHANGELOG with the env-var -> policy-key
table, the detection commands (env + shell rc + .envrc + workflows), and the
explicit warning that a removed variable is now INERT rather than an error -
which is the failure mode that loses a project its configuration silently. The
hardening-guide env table splits into surviving vars and a removed-vars
migration table; its "promote to block" runbook named two variables that no
longer exist. Also swept: CLAUDE.md hook table, scanner-reference, ci-cd-guide,
both lethal-trifecta example docs, mitigation-matrix, injection-research.

Test counts in README/CLAUDE.md synced 2034 -> 2045.

Suite 2045 tests, 0 fail (2039 + 4 posture-trifecta + 2 riskScoreV1). The two
known parallel-load flakes did not recur this run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BB4vXvwvtW4dxbPRd6vsez
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-08-09 10:25:03 +02:00
commit fdec4b36ad
16 changed files with 333 additions and 62 deletions
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6
CLAUDE.md
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# LLM Security Plugin (v7.8.3)
Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 frameworks: OWASP LLM Top 10, Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI, 2026 edition), Skills Top 10 (AST), MCP Top 10, AI Agent Traps (DeepMind). 2034+ unit, integration, and end-to-end tests (`tests/e2e/` covers the multi-hook attack chain, multi-session state simulation, and the full scan-orchestrator pipeline); mutation-testing coverage not published.
Security scanning, auditing, and threat modeling for Claude Code projects. 5 frameworks: OWASP LLM Top 10, Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI, 2026 edition), Skills Top 10 (AST), MCP Top 10, AI Agent Traps (DeepMind). 2045+ unit, integration, and end-to-end tests (`tests/e2e/` covers the multi-hook attack chain, multi-session state simulation, and the full scan-orchestrator pipeline); mutation-testing coverage not published.
Release notes for v7.0.0 → v7.8.2: see `docs/version-history.md` — read on demand.
@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ Release notes for v7.0.0 → v7.8.2: see `docs/version-history.md` — read on d
| Script | Event | Matcher | Purpose |
|--------|-------|---------|---------|
| `pre-prompt-inject-scan.mjs` | UserPromptSubmit | — | Block prompt injection, warn on manipulation (incl. oversight evasion, HTML obfuscation, MEDIUM advisory for leetspeak/homoglyphs/zero-width/multi-lang). Unicode Tag steganography detection. Mode: `LLM_SECURITY_INJECTION_MODE=block\|warn\|off` |
| `pre-prompt-inject-scan.mjs` | UserPromptSubmit | — | Block prompt injection, warn on manipulation (incl. oversight evasion, HTML obfuscation, MEDIUM advisory for leetspeak/homoglyphs/zero-width/multi-lang). Unicode Tag steganography detection. Mode: policy key `injection.mode` = `block\|warn\|off` |
| `pre-edit-secrets.mjs` | PreToolUse | `Edit\|Write` | Block credentials in files |
| `pre-bash-destructive.mjs` | PreToolUse | `Bash` | Block rm -rf, curl\|sh, fork bombs, eval. Bash evasion normalization (T1-T6 via `bash-normalize.mjs`) — defense-in-depth |
| `pre-install-supply-chain.mjs` | PreToolUse | `Bash` | Block compromised packages across ALL ecosystems. Bash evasion normalization before gate matching |
| `pre-write-pathguard.mjs` | PreToolUse | `Edit\|Write` | Block writes to .env, .ssh/, .aws/, credentials, settings |
| `post-mcp-verify.mjs` | PostToolUse | — (all) | Injection scan on ALL tool output. MCP per-update drift + cumulative drift vs sticky baseline (E14, v7.3.0). Per-tool volume tracking |
| `post-session-guard.mjs` | PostToolUse | — (all) | Runtime trifecta detection (Rule of Two). Sliding window + long-horizon. Behavioral drift (Jensen-Shannon). Mode: `LLM_SECURITY_TRIFECTA_MODE=block\|warn\|off` (default: warn) |
| `post-session-guard.mjs` | PostToolUse | — (all) | Runtime trifecta detection (Rule of Two). Sliding window + long-horizon. Behavioral drift (Jensen-Shannon). Mode: policy key `trifecta.mode` = `block\|warn\|off` (default: warn) |
| `update-check.mjs` | UserPromptSubmit | — | Checks for newer versions (max 1x/24h, cached). Disable: `LLM_SECURITY_UPDATE_CHECK=off` |
| `pre-compact-scan.mjs` | PreCompact | — | Scan transcript for injection + credentials before context compaction. Reads at most last 512 KB. Mode: `LLM_SECURITY_PRECOMPACT_MODE=block\|warn\|off` (default: warn) |