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Author SHA1 Message Date
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
bae94aacaf feat(injection): E3 — rot13 layer for comment-block injection
Adds rot13 to the variantSet built in scanForInjection(), so
imperative phrases hidden as rot13 inside code comments still hit
the existing CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM pattern arrays.

normalizeForScan() already covers base64, hex, URL, and HTML decoding
in a 3-iteration loop — those are NOT duplicated here. rot13 is the
only genuinely new variant: it is its own inverse and not part of any
NIST/Unicode normalization spec, so it has to be applied explicitly.

Threshold: only inputs >40 chars enter the rot13 pass, to suppress
false positives on accidental letter-shifts in tokens, ids, and short
identifiers. Variants are deduplicated against the existing set so
matchers do not run twice.

3 new tests in injection-patterns.test.mjs (rot13 detection, sub-40
char suppression, plaintext path still green). Total 168 tests pass.

Closes E3 in critical-review-2026-04-20.md.
2026-04-30 15:21:03 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
a1b2bf7304 fix(injection): E16 ASCII fast-path + UNI-003 expectation update (v7.2.0)
Two follow-up fixes after E16 + E17 landed:

1. foldHomoglyphs ASCII fast-path
   - scanForInjection calls foldHomoglyphs on every scan (raw + normalized).
   - Pre-fix: NFKC normalization runs unconditionally, even on pure
     ASCII inputs where it's a no-op.
   - Result: benchmark.test.mjs timed out at 120s on the full suite.
   - Fix: charCodeAt sweep for >=128, short-circuit return s when
     all ASCII. NFKC and HOMOGLYPH_MAP iteration only run when
     non-ASCII chars are present (the actual attack case).
   - Verified: benchmark.test.mjs passes within timeout.

2. Attack-scenario UNI-003 expectation
   - Pre-E16: "Homoglyph Cyrillic-Latin mixing" payload triggered only
     a MEDIUM "obfuscation present" advisory (exit 0, stdout match
     "MEDIUM").
   - Post-E16: the same payload is folded to Latin BEFORE pattern
     matching, so it now matches CRITICAL "ignore previous instructions"
     and blocks (exit 2).
   - This is the intended v7.2.0 behavior — not a regression. Updated
     expectation: exit_code 2, stdout_match "block". Renamed scenario
     to "now blocked via E16 fold, v7.2.0".

Suite: pre-compact-scan flake remains (perf-budget under load,
passes isolated). All other tests green.
2026-04-29 14:44:41 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
b191ce6da3 feat(injection): E16 — homoglyph NFKC fold before every pattern match
Critical-review §4 E16 finding: pre-v7.2.0 homoglyph normalization fired
ONLY for the MEDIUM-advisory "obfuscation present" signal. Pattern
matchers in scanForInjection compared against raw + decoded variants
only — they did NOT compare against a fold-normalized variant. As a
result, "ignоre previous instructions" (Cyrillic о, U+043E) bypassed
the CRITICAL "ignore previous" pattern.

Two coordinated edits:

scanners/lib/string-utils.mjs
- Adds HOMOGLYPH_MAP (frozen) — surgical Cyrillic/Greek → Latin map.
  ~25 entries focused on injection-vocabulary letters
  (a, e, o, c, p, x, y, i, j, s, l, A, E, O, C, P, X, Y, T).
- Adds foldHomoglyphs(s) — pipeline: NFKC → apply HOMOGLYPH_MAP.
  NFKC handles Mathematical Alphanumeric (U+1D400 block), fullwidth
  Latin (U+FF21 block), ligatures, width variants.

Excluded by design from HOMOGLYPH_MAP:
- Latin Extended (æ, ø, å, é, è, ñ, ü, ö, ä, ç, ß, þ, ð) — legitimate
  Norwegian/German/French/Spanish letters. Map them and we false-positive
  on every non-English source file.
- Greek letters not visually overlapping (β, γ, δ, ...)
- Cyrillic letters not visually overlapping (б, г, д, ж, ...)

scanners/lib/injection-patterns.mjs
- scanForInjection now builds a 4-variant set: raw, normalized,
  folded(raw), folded(normalized). Set deduplication skips redundant
  identical variants. Existing dedup-by-label (seenLabels Set) prevents
  double-counts when the same pattern matches in multiple variants.
- foldHomoglyphs added to the imports.

Tests: +27 cases in tests/lib/string-utils-homoglyph.test.mjs:
- 6 Cyrillic → Latin (lowercase, uppercase, multiple substitutions,
  Palochka U+04CF)
- 3 Greek → Latin
- 2 NFKC normalization (Math Bold, Fullwidth)
- 8 preserves-non-confusable (Norwegian æøå, German umlauts, French
  accents, Spanish ñ, emoji, CJK, Arabic/Hebrew)
- 3 edge cases (empty, null/undefined, idempotency)
- 5 scanForInjection integration (Cyrillic ignore, Cyrillic Assistant,
  Norwegian non-trigger, benign "ignore" comment, mixed Cyrillic+Greek)

Test-development found: U+1D5DC is "I" not "A" (test pin caught my
codepoint mistake — fixed during dev).

Suite: 1617 → 1644 (+27). All green.
2026-04-29 14:22:05 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
bab1eb300b feat(unicode): E1 — extend hidden-Unicode detection to PUA-A and PUA-B
Critical-review §4 E1 finding: pre-v7.2.0 the Unicode-stego detector
(`containsUnicodeTags`) covered only U+E0001-E007F (Tag block). Private
Use Areas — also invisible in most terminals and surviving normalization
— were not detected. Attackers could encode payloads in PUA codepoints
that pass through `scanForInjection` undetected.

Coverage extended to:
- U+E0001-E007F  Unicode Tag block       (existing — DeepMind kat. 1)
- U+F0000-FFFFD  Supplementary PUA-A      (NEW — E1)
- U+100000-10FFFD Supplementary PUA-B     (NEW — E1)

Detection-only for PUA: PUA characters have NO standard ASCII mapping,
so `decodeUnicodeTags` leaves them unchanged. Detection alone is
sufficient — `scanForInjection` emits HIGH on any presence, regardless
of decoded content.

Function name `containsUnicodeTags` preserved for back-compat. All
existing call sites (injection-patterns.mjs:259, etc.) work unchanged.
Semantically the function is now "containsHiddenUnicode".

Tests: +21 cases in tests/lib/string-utils-hidden-unicode.test.mjs:
- 5 Tag-block regression guards
- 4 PUA-A range cases (start, just-inside, end, buried-in-ASCII)
- 3 PUA-B range cases
- 5 boundary cases (gap U+E0080-EFFFF, U+10FFFE noncharacter, emoji,
  CJK, Latin Extended — all must be FALSE)
- 4 decodeUnicodeTags passthrough cases (PUA-A unchanged, PUA-B
  unchanged, Tag block still decodes, mixed Tag+PUA)

Suite: 1596 → 1617 (+21). All green.
2026-04-29 14:18:49 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
d65bb70347 fix(dep): B7 — token-overlap typosquat heuristic alongside Levenshtein
Critical-review §2 B7 finding: pure Levenshtein <=2 misses the most common
modern typosquat pattern — popular-name + token-injection suffix. Examples:
  lodash → lodash-utils    (edit distance 6, not flagged pre-B7)
  react  → react-helper    (edit distance 7, not flagged pre-B7)
  express → express-wrapper (edit distance 8, not flagged pre-B7)

Three coordinated edits:

scanners/lib/string-utils.mjs
- Adds tokenize(name): string[]    splits on -/_, lowercases
- Adds tokenOverlap(a, b): number  intersection.size / min(|a|,|b|)
- Adds TYPOSQUAT_SUSPICIOUS_TOKENS frozen list of common typosquat
  suffixes. Excludes language-extension tokens (js, jsx, ts, tsx) — the
  v7.0.0 allowlist contains `tsx` as a legit package and including the
  same token in the suspicious set creates a contradiction. Caught by
  the new allowlist-intersection-guard test. Also excludes 'pro'
  (legitimate edition marker).

scanners/dep-auditor.mjs + scanners/supply-chain-recheck.mjs
- New checkTyposquatTokenOverlap() helper — fires AFTER Levenshtein 1/2
  branches, only when:
    1. popular package's tokens ⊆ declared name's tokens (strict superset)
    2. declared name has at least one suspicious suffix
    3. popular package is in topCutoff window
  All three conditions required — conservative by design. Allowlist
  precedence preserved (existing 22 npm + 13 PyPI entries always pass).
  MEDIUM severity, NOT block. New finding title prefix:
  "Possible typosquatting via token-overlap".

Tests: +21 cases across two new files
- tests/lib/string-utils-tokens.test.mjs (15) — tokenize, tokenOverlap,
  TYPOSQUAT_SUSPICIOUS_TOKENS frozen contract, allowlist-intersection
  guard (caught the tsx conflict on first run)
- tests/scanners/dep-token-overlap.test.mjs (7) — integration via
  in-memory tmpdir fixtures: lodash-utils flagged, react-helper flagged,
  express-wrapper flagged, lodash exact NOT flagged, allowlist tools
  (knip/tsx/nx/rimraf) NOT flagged, react-router-dom (no suspicious
  suffix) NOT flagged, react itself (equal token set, not superset)
  NOT flagged.

Existing dep.test.mjs and supply-chain-recheck.test.mjs unchanged —
all green (149 → 149 regression guard).

Suite: 1570 → 1591 (+21). All green.
2026-04-29 14:10:53 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
f153f969a0 feat(ultraplan-local): v1.6.0 — /ultraresearch-local deep research command
Add /ultraresearch-local for structured research combining local codebase
analysis with external knowledge via parallel agent swarms. Produces research
briefs with triangulation, confidence ratings, and source quality assessment.

New command: /ultraresearch-local with modes --quick, --local, --external, --fg.
New agents: research-orchestrator (opus), docs-researcher, community-researcher,
security-researcher, contrarian-researcher, gemini-bridge (all sonnet).
New template: research-brief-template.md.

Integration: --research flag in /ultraplan-local accepts pre-built research
briefs (up to 3), enriches the interview and exploration phases. Planning
orchestrator cross-references brief findings during synthesis.

Design principle: Context Engineering — right information to right agent at
right time. Research briefs are structured artifacts in the pipeline:
ultraresearch → brief → ultraplan --research → plan → ultraexecute.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 08:58:35 +02:00