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3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
31aa2b4943
test(llm-security): build poisoned fixtures at test time, never on disk
v8.1.0 AV surface, session S1. The three poisoned fixture trees
(signature-scan/poisoned, memory-scan/poisoned-project, trigger-scan/poisoned)
are deleted from disk and materialized into a temp dir by the new
tests/helpers/payload-trees.mjs. SIG-matching strings are assembled from
fragments, the zero-width carrier comes from String.fromCodePoint, and every
file carries the sha256 of the retired on-disk bytes;
tests/helpers/payload-trees.test.mjs asserts the materialized trees are
byte-identical (mutation-checked: one changed byte fails it).

Inline payload literals in signature-scanner, signature-scanner-custom-rules
and e2e/scan-pipeline are fragmented the same way; the literal U+200B in
attack-simulator, auto-cleaner-rce and auto-cleaner-traversal is replaced by
String.fromCodePoint(0x200B).

av-surface: a 3->0, a2 3->0, c 5->1, d 5->2, b 9->8 (webshell-b64 blob gone).
What remains (c=1, d=2, b) is under examples/** or is (b), both S2.
Suite 2261 / 2252 pass / 3 fail (av-surface b, c, d only) / 6 skip.
Golden output identical before/after (109/7/4, 61/61).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 13:07:38 +02:00
f926071348 fix(llm-security): compileRules coerces a non-string pattern instead of dropping the rule
new RegExp(pattern, 'i') never throws when pattern is a truthy non-string
(e.g. an object) — it ToString-coerces it first. The truthy-only guard
(`!rule.pattern`) let such a rule through as a real, compiled RegExp,
bypassing the try/catch meant to drop malformed rules. Worse than a silent
drop: `new RegExp("[object Object]", "i")` is parsed as a character class
over o/b/j/e/c/t/space, so the "dropped" rule instead becomes a
near-universal false-positive matcher. Same path for the built-in
commons-backed ruleset and the operator's sig.custom_rules_path (both
route through compileRules).

Fix: require typeof rule.pattern === 'string' before compiling. Verified
the golden dump pins no rule that exists only because of this coercion —
it regenerates byte-identically after the fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019iWrdLSVgRhgPzTB29rQGD
2026-08-13 21:51:10 +02:00
21c6c2b534 fix(llm-security): normalization/discovery evasion + SIG embedded-base64 & custom rules (#21,#23,#30,#36,#42,#52,#55)
#21 the bash normalizer decoded only \xHH, leaving ANSI-C octal/\u/\U forms literal so canonical rm/curl never surfaced; now decodes all three. #23 file-discovery keyed on extname so .env.local/.env.example (extname .local/.example) were silently skipped; now matches multi-part suffixes. #42 a legitimate leading UTF-8 BOM was flagged HIGH (and the tool's own auto-cleaner refused to strip it); pos-0 BOM now excepted. #52 collapseLetterSpacing used a literal space, letting multi-space/tab spacing evade; now [ \t]+. #55 redact(_,60,0) did slice(-0) and leaked the whole unredacted URL; showEnd===0 now means no tail.

#30 embedded base64 (const x = "<base64>") never satisfied the whole-string decode, so the SIG identity engine never saw it; added decodeEmbeddedBase64 as an OPT-IN param on normalizeForScan (default off — appending a decoded copy would double-count per-match findings, e.g. content-extractor's injection scan) and enabled it only in signature-scanner, which dedups variants. #36 signature-scanner ignored the documented sig.custom_rules_path policy option; now loads+merges custom rules through the same family filter. Suite 2004/0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TcQyMTQfyrsAapaCMPxTtQ
2026-07-18 10:35:56 +02:00