validateContent() syntax-checked .mjs/.js/.cjs candidates via
execSync(`node --check "${tmpPath}"`), where tmpPath derives from the
untrusted scanned-repo FILENAME. The F-2 guard checks path containment
but never quotes or strips shell metacharacters, so a file named
`x";<cmd>;".mjs` in a scanned repo turned `/security clean` (live is the
documented default) into arbitrary command execution. Verified with a
live PoC before the fix.
- validateContent: spawnSync('node', ['--check', tmpPath]) — no shell.
- CLI orchestrator fallback: same treatment (argv array, explicit
status/error handling instead of execSync's throw-on-nonzero).
- Belt (defense-in-depth): applyFixes now refuses findings whose `file`
carries shell or control metacharacters, reported as skipped.
- Regression tests cover both layers separately, so the belt cannot mask
a re-introduced shell in the sink.
node --test: 1865/1865 green (1863 + 2 new).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TcQyMTQfyrsAapaCMPxTtQ
Session B of the security-fix track. Both sinks trusted untrusted strings at a
filesystem/subprocess boundary; same fix family as F-1.
F-2 (HIGH, arbitrary file write) — scanners/auto-cleaner.mjs: applyFixes() did
resolve(targetPath, f.file) with no containment, then wrote the cleaned content
back. f.file is untrusted (scanned-repo filenames, or a fully attacker-chosen
--findings file), so file: "../../.claude/settings.json" let the cleaner modify
files OUTSIDE the scanned tree. Add a prefix-containment check before grouping:
absPath must equal targetPath or start with targetPath + sep, else the finding
is refused and reported as skipped. (Documented residual gap: prefix containment
does not stop a symlink inside the tree pointing out — noted inline.)
F-3 (HIGH, command injection, pre-confirmation) — hooks/scripts/
pre-install-supply-chain.mjs: inspectNpmPackage ran execSafe(`npm view ${spec}
--json`), a shell string. spec derives from package tokens parsed out of the
scanned Bash command, so a metachar-bearing token reached the shell on
PreToolUse(Bash) — BEFORE the install, so it ran even if the user then denied
the command. Switch to spawnSync('npm', ['view', spec, '--json']) (no shell);
spec is passed as one argv element. The static `npm audit --json` execSafe call
is left as-is (no interpolation).
TDD (repro -> red -> green):
- tests/scanners/auto-cleaner-traversal.test.mjs: a "../secret.txt" finding must
not rewrite the outside file; contained files still get cleaned.
- tests/hooks/supply-chain-injection.test.mjs: `npm install $(>/abs/PWNED)`
(redirect-only $(...) survives normalizeBashExpansion + the whitespace split)
must not create the sentinel.
Closing gates: full node --test suite 1863/0 (was 1860; +3); gitleaks clean;
F-1 regression re-run GREEN (sink still closed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3s6WnubSSrFjAQTLQdVbG
Add /ultraresearch-local for structured research combining local codebase
analysis with external knowledge via parallel agent swarms. Produces research
briefs with triangulation, confidence ratings, and source quality assessment.
New command: /ultraresearch-local with modes --quick, --local, --external, --fg.
New agents: research-orchestrator (opus), docs-researcher, community-researcher,
security-researcher, contrarian-researcher, gemini-bridge (all sonnet).
New template: research-brief-template.md.
Integration: --research flag in /ultraplan-local accepts pre-built research
briefs (up to 3), enriches the interview and exploration phases. Planning
orchestrator cross-references brief findings during synthesis.
Design principle: Context Engineering — right information to right agent at
right time. Research briefs are structured artifacts in the pipeline:
ultraresearch → brief → ultraplan --research → plan → ultraexecute.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
