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Author SHA1 Message Date
965b1d9bca
refactor(agents): skill-scanner detection rules move to knowledge
The seven-category signal lists in agents/skill-scanner-agent.md move to
knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md § Detection Rules. The agent keeps its
procedure, severity table, verdict logic and output format, plus a pointer,
and now says to report an unreadable knowledge file instead of scanning from
memory (a remembered subset reports clean for rules it never applied).

Chose the existing file over a new one because every command that invokes
the agent (scan, audit, clean, plugin-audit) already passes
<plugin-root>/knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md explicitly; a new file would
have needed four command edits to reach the agent at all.

Why (v8.1.0 AV surface): a clean SKILL.md was quarantined as
Trojan:Script/Wacatac.H!ml; a quarantine on agents/*.md breaks the installed
plugin, not just a clone. Move measured lossless: the only line-level
differences are the two intended rewrites and headings.

Also in this commit, rewritten as descriptions or with a <shell>
placeholder for the interpreter (no technique removed):
- posture-assessor-agent: hook-coverage item and override phrases
- deep-scan-synthesizer-agent: example decoded message
- commands/red-team.md: scenario table cell
- knowledge/*.md: 15 runnable download-into-shell one-liners, the
  "Decodes to" line first; fenced examples keep their exact shape with
  <shell>, prose and tables become sentences.

Probe (e): 8 -> 3 (the three left are hook-script lines behind the
path guard). knowledge: 17 -> 2 (attack-scenarios.json, the red-team
simulator's input; left on purpose). claude plugin validate . passes;
agent frontmatter untouched, all six agents parse.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 14:11:15 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
4e917c1d4a feat(workflow-scanner): E11 part 1 — core file-walk + 23-field blacklist + sink-restriction
Adds a deterministic GitHub Actions / Forgejo Actions injection
scanner. Detects \${{ <dangerous-field> }} interpolations inside
\`run:\` step blocks under privileged or semi-privileged triggers.
Sink-restricted: \`if:\` / \`with:\` / \`env:\` (block-level) are
evaluated by the runner expression engine, not the shell, so they
are NOT injection sinks and are suppressed at parser level.

Why: workflow expression injection is the most prevalent SAST class
on GitHub (CodeQL preview: 800K+ findings across 158K repos). The
graduated severity matrix (HIGH for pull_request_target / discussion
/ workflow_run; MEDIUM for pull_request / workflow_dispatch) is the
community-converged calibration target — uniform HIGH causes alert
fatigue.

Components:
- scanners/lib/workflow-yaml-state.mjs — line-based YAML state
  machine. Tracks indentation, parent-context stack, and
  \`run: |\` / \`run: >\` block-scalar entry/exit. Zero deps.
- scanners/workflow-scanner.mjs — discoverWorkflows() probes
  .github/workflows/ and .forgejo/workflows/ directly (file-discovery
  has no glob include). 23-field blacklist (GHSL 17 + 6 GlueStack-
  class additions). Platform encoded via file path; no schema
  extension to finding(). Forgejo-specific: workflow_run advisory
  emitted to stderr; recommendation text mentions Forgejo's
  server-level token scoping (job-level permissions: is ignored).
- knowledge/workflow-injection-patterns.md — 23-field blacklist,
  trigger taxonomy, severity matrix, Forgejo divergences, NVD CVE
  corpus.

Tests (47 new):
- tests/lib/workflow-yaml-state.test.mjs (15): trigger forms
  (string / inline-list / block-list / block-mapping), single-line
  run, block-scalar | and > tracking, env/with sink-mismatch,
  multi-line, comment stripping, line-number accuracy.
- tests/scanners/workflow-scanner.test.mjs (14): TP head_ref
  pull_request_target, TP discussion.title gluestack pattern,
  TP comment.body pull_request, TP issue.body block-scalar,
  FP if-context, FP env-block, INFO numeric, Forgejo TP, Forgejo
  workflow_run advisory, envelope shape, WFL prefix.
- 9 fixtures in tests/fixtures/workflows/{.github,.forgejo}/workflows/.

Out of scope (B4 / Batch D):
- Re-interpolation detection (env.VAR after env: from blacklisted source)
- github.actor authorization-bypass category
- WFL prefix in severity.mjs OWASP maps + scan-orchestrator
  registration (B4)
- Composite-action input tracing, GITHUB_ENV poisoning (Batch D)

Test count: 1685 → 1732 (+47). Pre-compact-scan flake unchanged
(passes in isolation).
2026-04-30 15:48:48 +02:00