Advisor review on the prior commit (69cad7c) caught a real detection-kill vulnerability before push: reading `commons.root` from the SCANNED TARGET's .llm-security/policy.json let a hostile cloned repo redirect llm-security's own detection corpus to an attacker-supplied (empty) one, with graceful-empty fallback making the substitution silent — a substitutive override, unlike sig.custom_rules_path's additive one. Dropped the policy import entirely; commons location is this plugin's own concern, resolved only from __dirname or an explicit test/dev override, never from policy or the scan target. Also fixed two issues the review surfaced: - Default vendor path was repo-root `shared/`, which package.json's `files` allowlist (bin/, scanners/, knowledge/) would never publish — moved under scanners/commons/, inside the directory that actually ships. Same defect class as2fe2915(green dev checkout, empty detection tables once installed). - Cache keyed success/failure together, so the first caller's `fallback` shape (e.g. []) leaked to a second caller expecting a different shape ({}) on the same missing artifact. Cache now stores a load-failed sentinel and returns each caller's own fallback. Loaded artifacts are also deep-frozen, since the cache hands out one shared object by reference to every caller. New/changed tests cover all four: a simulated hostile-target policy file is ignored, the failure-cache no longer cross-contaminates fallback shapes, and mutating a loaded artifact throws. Golden baseline unchanged; full suite 2063/2063. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QAYkRaBXT6tmWXTQAi1ZBg
105 lines
4.6 KiB
JavaScript
105 lines
4.6 KiB
JavaScript
// commons-loader.mjs — Reads vendored llm-security-commons JSON artifacts.
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//
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// v8 Phase 5 step 2: this loader is built and unit-tested now, against a
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// local fixture, ahead of Phase 4 (llm-security-commons repo creation +
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// vendoring — see docs/commons-extraction-plan.local.md). Consumers
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// (injection-patterns.mjs, severity.mjs, string-utils.mjs, ...) switch from
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// hardcoded tables to this loader in Phase 5 step 4, table-by-table, behind
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// the golden gate.
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//
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// Modeled on signature-scanner.mjs's loadRules(): hooks run per-tool-call in
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// fresh zero-dep processes, so resolution must be a fast synchronous read of
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// the vendored copy, never network. Cached once per process. A
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// missing/unvendored commons dir degrades to the caller's fallback rather
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// than crashing a hook — the same graceful-empty contract loadRules() uses
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// for a missing knowledge/signatures.json.
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//
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// Deliberately NOT policy-driven, unlike loadCustomRules()'s
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// sig.custom_rules_path: this plugin scans untrusted cloned repos, and
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// `.llm-security/policy.json` lives in the *scanned target*. A
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// custom_rules_path override can only ever add findings a hostile target
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// supplies; a commons-root override would let that target *replace* this
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// plugin's own detection corpus wholesale, with graceful-empty fallback
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// making the substitution silent. The commons location is this plugin's own
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// concern, not the scan target's — so the only override is the explicit
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// `commonsRoot` option (tests, a local commons dev checkout), resolved from
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// this file's own location, never from policy or the scan target.
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//
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// Zero external dependencies — Node.js builtins only.
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import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { join, dirname } from 'node:path';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
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// Default vendored location: llm-security-commons is pulled in as a
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// pull-only subtree under scanners/, which is the only source directory
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// `package.json`'s `files` allowlist ships (bin/, scanners/, knowledge/ —
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// scripts/ and tests/ do not publish, and neither would a repo-root dir).
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const DEFAULT_COMMONS_ROOT = join(__dirname, '..', 'commons');
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// Cached parsed artifacts, keyed by resolved absolute file path. A failed
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// load caches this sentinel (not the caller's fallback value) so that two
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// callers requesting the same missing artifact with different fallback
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// shapes (`[]` vs `{}`) each still get their own fallback back, rather than
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// the first caller's shape leaking to the second.
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const _cache = new Map();
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const LOAD_FAILED = Symbol('commons-loader:load-failed');
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/** Recursively freeze a parsed JSON value so callers cannot mutate a shared cached table. */
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function deepFreeze(value) {
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if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && !Object.isFrozen(value)) {
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Object.freeze(value);
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for (const key of Object.keys(value)) deepFreeze(value[key]);
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}
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return value;
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}
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/**
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* Load and parse one commons JSON artifact.
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* Graceful fallback on any read/parse error — an unvendored, missing, or
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* invalid commons artifact must never crash a hook or scanner. The returned
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* value is deep-frozen: every caller shares the same cached object, so
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* mutating it would silently leak across callers/targets; freezing makes
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* that throw instead.
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*
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* @param {string} artifactPath - relative path under the commons root,
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* without the `.json` extension (e.g. `'lexicon/injection-lexicon'`).
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* @param {object} [opts]
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* @param {*} [opts.fallback] - value returned on any load/parse failure
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* (default: `null`). Callers pick the shape-appropriate empty value
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* (`[]`, `{}`, ...) the same way loadRules() falls back to `[]`.
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* @param {string} [opts.commonsRoot] - explicit commons root, overriding the
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* default vendored path (for tests and a local commons dev checkout).
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* @returns {*} Parsed, frozen JSON, or `opts.fallback` on failure.
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*/
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export function loadArtifact(artifactPath, opts = {}) {
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const { fallback = null, commonsRoot } = opts;
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const root = commonsRoot || DEFAULT_COMMONS_ROOT;
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const filePath = join(root, `${artifactPath}.json`);
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if (_cache.has(filePath)) {
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const cached = _cache.get(filePath);
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return cached === LOAD_FAILED ? fallback : cached;
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}
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let result;
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try {
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const raw = readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
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result = deepFreeze(JSON.parse(raw));
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} catch {
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_cache.set(filePath, LOAD_FAILED); // graceful: unvendored/missing/invalid -> caller's fallback
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return fallback;
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}
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_cache.set(filePath, result);
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return result;
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}
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/**
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* Reset the artifact cache (for testing only).
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*/
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export function _resetCacheForTest() {
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_cache.clear();
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}
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