v8.1.0 AV surface, session S1. The three poisoned fixture trees (signature-scan/poisoned, memory-scan/poisoned-project, trigger-scan/poisoned) are deleted from disk and materialized into a temp dir by the new tests/helpers/payload-trees.mjs. SIG-matching strings are assembled from fragments, the zero-width carrier comes from String.fromCodePoint, and every file carries the sha256 of the retired on-disk bytes; tests/helpers/payload-trees.test.mjs asserts the materialized trees are byte-identical (mutation-checked: one changed byte fails it). Inline payload literals in signature-scanner, signature-scanner-custom-rules and e2e/scan-pipeline are fragmented the same way; the literal U+200B in attack-simulator, auto-cleaner-rce and auto-cleaner-traversal is replaced by String.fromCodePoint(0x200B). av-surface: a 3->0, a2 3->0, c 5->1, d 5->2, b 9->8 (webshell-b64 blob gone). What remains (c=1, d=2, b) is under examples/** or is (b), both S2. Suite 2261 / 2252 pass / 3 fail (av-surface b, c, d only) / 6 skip. Golden output identical before/after (109/7/4, 61/61). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
96 lines
4.1 KiB
JavaScript
96 lines
4.1 KiB
JavaScript
// auto-cleaner-traversal.test.mjs — Security regression for F-2 (HIGH, arbitrary file write).
|
|
//
|
|
// auto-cleaner's applyFixes() historically did `resolve(targetPath, f.file)` with no
|
|
// containment check, then wrote the modified content back to that path. `f.file` comes
|
|
// from findings JSON — untrusted scanned-repo filenames, or a fully attacker-chosen
|
|
// `--findings` file. A finding with `file: "../secret.txt"` therefore let the cleaner
|
|
// modify (overwrite) a file OUTSIDE the scanned tree.
|
|
//
|
|
// This test places an auto-fixable file outside the target dir and points an auto-tier
|
|
// finding at it via "../secret.txt". It must FAIL while the sink is uncontained (the
|
|
// outside file gets rewritten) and PASS once applyFixes refuses paths that escape the
|
|
// target (prefix containment), reporting them as skipped instead of writing.
|
|
|
|
import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
|
|
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
|
|
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
|
|
import { join } from 'node:path';
|
|
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
|
|
import { resetCounter } from '../../scanners/lib/output.mjs';
|
|
import { applyFixes } from '../../scanners/auto-cleaner.mjs';
|
|
|
|
const ZW = String.fromCodePoint(0x200B); // zero-width space — strip_zero_width will remove it
|
|
|
|
describe('auto-cleaner path-traversal regression (F-2)', () => {
|
|
it('refuses to write a finding whose file path escapes the target directory', async () => {
|
|
// root/ <- mkdtemp parent
|
|
// secret.txt <- the escape target, OUTSIDE the scanned tree
|
|
// scan-target/ <- the directory actually passed to the cleaner
|
|
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'auto-cleaner-traversal-'));
|
|
const target = join(root, 'scan-target');
|
|
const escape = join(root, 'secret.txt');
|
|
try {
|
|
mkdirSync(target, { recursive: true });
|
|
|
|
// The escape file carries a zero-width char so the (auto-tier) strip_zero_width
|
|
// op WOULD change it — proving a write actually reaches outside the tree if
|
|
// containment is missing.
|
|
const original = `secret${ZW}value\n`;
|
|
writeFileSync(escape, original, 'utf-8');
|
|
|
|
// Untrusted finding: classified 'auto' (UNI zero-width), file traverses up and out.
|
|
const findings = [{
|
|
id: 'TRAVERSAL-1',
|
|
scanner: 'UNI',
|
|
title: 'Zero-width characters detected',
|
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
file: '../secret.txt',
|
|
}];
|
|
|
|
resetCounter();
|
|
const { fixes } = await applyFixes(target, findings, /* dryRun */ false);
|
|
|
|
// The file outside the target must be byte-for-byte untouched.
|
|
assert.equal(
|
|
readFileSync(escape, 'utf-8'),
|
|
original,
|
|
'PATH TRAVERSAL: auto-cleaner rewrote a file outside the scanned target directory',
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// And the escaping finding must be surfaced as refused/skipped, never applied.
|
|
const escaped = fixes.find(f => f.file === '../secret.txt');
|
|
assert.ok(escaped, 'the escaping finding should be reported');
|
|
assert.notEqual(escaped.status, 'applied', 'escaping finding must not be applied');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('still applies fixes to files contained within the target directory', async () => {
|
|
const target = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'auto-cleaner-contained-'));
|
|
try {
|
|
const inside = join(target, 'inside.md');
|
|
writeFileSync(inside, `---\ntitle: x${ZW}y\n---\nbody\n`, 'utf-8');
|
|
|
|
const findings = [{
|
|
id: 'CONTAINED-1',
|
|
scanner: 'UNI',
|
|
title: 'Zero-width characters detected',
|
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
file: 'inside.md',
|
|
}];
|
|
|
|
resetCounter();
|
|
const { fixes } = await applyFixes(target, findings, /* dryRun */ false);
|
|
|
|
assert.ok(
|
|
!readFileSync(inside, 'utf-8').includes(ZW),
|
|
'contained file should have been cleaned',
|
|
);
|
|
const applied = fixes.find(f => f.file === 'inside.md' && f.status === 'applied');
|
|
assert.ok(applied, 'a contained auto-fix should be applied');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
rmSync(target, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|