v8.1.0 S2. security-assessment.md (two blobs, one split, plus the decoded exfil command) and the base64 pipe-to-shell one-liner in knowledge/skill-threat-patterns.md now describe the payload rather than reproduce it. The entropy path-suppression test builds its 84-char blob from 12-char fragments, so no contiguous decodable blob sits on disk. av-surface: b 5->0. a=0 a2=0 b=0 c=0 d=0 - the probe is green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| evil-project-health.archive.json | ||
| expected-findings.md | ||
| materialize.mjs | ||
| README.md | ||
| run-demo.sh | ||
| security-assessment.md | ||
Malicious Skill Demo
WARNING: This is a security test fixture, NOT a real plugin. All "malicious" patterns are intentionally planted for scanner testing.
What Is This?
A fake Claude Code plugin called "Project Health Dashboard" that looks legitimate but contains security threats across every category the LLM Security plugin can detect. It serves as:
- Showcase — demonstrates what the 7 deterministic scanners + 5 LLM agents can find
- Regression test — verifiable fixture for scanner development
- Educational resource — real attack patterns in a safe, contained context
Embedded Threat Categories
| Scanner | Threats | Files |
|---|---|---|
| UNI (Unicode) | Zero-width chars, Unicode Tags steganography, BIDI overrides, Cyrillic homoglyphs | SKILL.fixture.md, health-check-agent.fixture.md |
| ENT (Entropy) | Base64-encoded payloads, high-entropy credentials | SKILL.fixture.md, telemetry.mjs |
| PRM (Permissions) | Purpose-vs-tools mismatch, ghost hooks, haiku on sensitive agent, overprivileged | health.fixture.md, health-check-agent.fixture.md, hooks.fixture.json |
| DEP (Dependencies) | 6 typosquatting packages, malicious install scripts, unpinned versions | package.json |
| TNT (Taint) | 6 source-to-sink data flows (env→fetch, req.body→exec, input→eval) | telemetry.mjs |
| GIT (Forensics) | (Minimal — new directory, no git history) | — |
| NET (Network) | ngrok, webhook.site, requestbin, pipedream, pastebin, bit.ly, IP-based URLs | SKILL.fixture.md, telemetry.mjs, health.fixture.md |
LLM Agent Detection (Skill Scanner)
All 7 threat categories from the skill-scanner-agent are represented in SKILL.md:
- Prompt Injection — HTML comments with
<!-- AGENT: ... -->, spoofed# SYSTEM:headers - Data Exfiltration —
printenv | base64,curl -X POSTto external endpoints - Privilege Escalation — instructions to modify hooks/ and settings.json
- Scope Creep — reads from ~/.ssh/, ~/.aws/, ~/.npmrc
- Hidden Instructions — Unicode Tags steganography, base64-encoded commands, invisible lines
- Toolchain Manipulation — typosquatting package installs in prerequisites
- Persistence — crontab, ~/.zshrc modification, LaunchAgent creation
How to Run
Quick: Deterministic Scanners Only
cd plugins/llm-security
./examples/malicious-skill-demo/run-demo.sh
The demo plugin is not stored in the repository as files: antivirus products (Windows
Defender among them) quarantine a tree like this on clone. It lives encoded in
evil-project-health.archive.json and is written to a temp directory when you need it.
run-demo.sh does that for you and deletes it afterwards.
Or directly — materialize first, then scan the printed path:
DEMO="$(node examples/malicious-skill-demo/materialize.mjs)"
node scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs "$DEMO"
rm -rf "$(dirname "$DEMO")" # when you are done
Expected: BLOCK verdict, 44 findings (measured 2026-09-22). The temp directory has no git
history, so the git-forensics scanner reports skipped.
Full: LLM-Enhanced Deep Scan
Materialize as above, then:
/security scan <printed path> --deep
This runs both the deterministic scanners AND the LLM agents (skill-scanner, mcp-scanner).
Safety
- No actual secrets, tokens, or credentials are in these files
- No real malicious code is executable — URLs are fake/non-functional
- The package.json typosquatting packages don't exist or are harmless names
- Install scripts reference non-existent domains
- The tree is stored encoded (rot13 text, non-ASCII characters as codepoint numbers) and only exists as files in a temp directory while you use it
- Discoverable files use
.fixture.{md,json}suffix to prevent Claude Code's plugin loader from picking them up during recursive tree-walking
Security Assessment
A full combined security assessment (LLM skill scanner + 7 deterministic scanners) is available at security-assessment.md. This is real scanner output, not just expected findings:
- 85 total findings (24 Critical, 24 High, 20 Medium, 6 Low, 11 Info)
- Verdict: BLOCK 100/100 — both scanning layers independently maxed the risk score
- All 8 scanners active (1 LLM + 7 deterministic)
- Includes executive summary, per-scanner breakdown, combined verdict, recommendations, and methodology
Expected Findings
See expected-findings.md for the deterministic scanner catalog of ~50 expected findings with scanner, severity, file, and description.