Kjell Tore Guttormsen f083cdad2e fix(llm-security): CRITICAL — command injection in auto-cleaner (v7.8.1) ... validateContent() syntax-checked .mjs/.js/.cjs candidates via execSync(`node --check "${tmpPath}"`), where tmpPath derives from the untrusted scanned-repo FILENAME. The F-2 guard checks path containment but never quotes or strips shell metacharacters, so a file named `x";<cmd>;".mjs` in a scanned repo turned `/security clean` (live is the documented default) into arbitrary command execution. Verified with a live PoC before the fix. - validateContent: spawnSync('node', ['--check', tmpPath]) — no shell. - CLI orchestrator fallback: same treatment (argv array, explicit status/error handling instead of execSync's throw-on-nonzero). - Belt (defense-in-depth): applyFixes now refuses findings whose `file` carries shell or control metacharacters, reported as skipped. - Regression tests cover both layers separately, so the belt cannot mask a re-introduced shell in the sink. node --test: 1865/1865 green (1863 + 2 new). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TcQyMTQfyrsAapaCMPxTtQ		2026-07-18 08:48:09 +02:00
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e2e	test(llm-security): add e2e suite proving framework works as coordinated system	2026-05-05 12:06:57 +02:00
fixtures	feat(llm-security): add AST Python-taint scanner with python3 fallback	2026-06-20 09:38:36 +02:00
helpers	test(llm-security): add JetBrains fixture tree + build helper	2026-04-18 10:49:49 +02:00
hooks	fix(llm-security): F-2/F-3 — contain path traversal + kill npm-view shell injection	2026-06-20 11:09:13 +02:00
lib	docs(claude-md): 8.10 — fix hooks count + add doc-consistency test for hook-table sync	2026-04-30 17:12:49 +02:00
scanners	fix(llm-security): CRITICAL — command injection in auto-cleaner (v7.8.1)	2026-07-18 08:48:09 +02:00