llm-security/docs
Kjell Tore Guttormsen bbada84e9f refactor(llm-security): build the SIG ruleset from vendored commons (malware-signatures 0.1.0)
Fifth and last consumer swap of v8 Phase 5 step 4. The seven known-bad-identity
signatures stop living in knowledge/signatures.json and are built from the
vendored commons artifact signatures/malware-signatures.json instead.

Measured before the swap over all seven positions -- id, family, severity,
pattern, description, provenance, key order, and recompilation identity under
the engine's unconditional `i` flag: zero divergences over 56 checks, in order.
The commons copy was extracted from this repository's own file at b0de0ca and
had not drifted.

knowledge/signatures.json is REMOVED rather than left in place. Keeping it would
have left two files spelling one table with nothing gating the drift, and its
golden `file:` pin would have gone on passing while pinning bytes no scanner
reads -- a gate reporting success without running. The pin is replaced by a
walked-module anchor over SIGNATURE_RULES, which is strictly stronger: the pin
covered the bytes on disk, the walk covers what `new RegExp` made of them.
Golden diff was exactly that and nothing else: 7 ADDED, 1 REMOVED, 0 CHANGED
(102/7/5 -> 109/7/4), each added source verified equal to the recompiled commons
pattern.

compileRules() moves into the new lib module and is exported, so the built-in
ruleset and the operator's sig.custom_rules_path path keep one implementation
rather than two copies of the defaulting logic.

Coverage by construction, not by memory: the probe table in the scanner test is
asserted against the LOADED ruleset, so a rule commons adds cannot arrive
without an end-to-end probe. Mutation of the vendored JSON fires in three
directions -- under-match (xmrig alternative dropped) reddens two scanner tests
plus golden; over-match (webshell rule widened to a bare `shell`) reddens the
clean-fixture false-positive probe plus golden; reorder reddens the declared-
order test plus golden.

Loud failure is contract: an unresolvable commons writes one line to stderr
rather than silently disabling known-malware detection, and never throws.

Suite 2247 / 2241 pass / 6 skipped / 0 fail. suite-counts.json untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0151x4FVg9Mn55C2LvHLpHKo
2026-08-13 21:28:14 +02:00
..
plans docs(llm-security): research brief + URL-support plan for ide-scan 2026-04-17 18:47:01 +02:00
ci-cd-guide.md feat(llm-security)!: v8 Phase 3 complete - riskScoreV1, posture heuristic, docs 2026-08-09 10:25:03 +02:00
critical-review-2026-04-20.md docs(llm-security): add critical review 2026-04-20 (v7.0.0 adversarial audit) 2026-04-19 23:27:52 +02:00
defense-philosophy.md chore: WIP marketplace doc adjustments across plugins 2026-05-18 12:04:02 +02:00
review-2026-06-20.md docs: add full-depth plugin review (2026-06-20) 2026-06-20 09:14:11 +02:00
scanner-reference.md refactor(llm-security): build the SIG ruleset from vendored commons (malware-signatures 0.1.0) 2026-08-13 21:28:14 +02:00
security-fix-brief-2026-06-20.md docs: security fix brief for next session — F-1 RCE + F-2/F-3 sinks 2026-06-20 09:23:19 +02:00
security-hardening-guide.md feat(llm-security)!: v8 Phase 3 complete - riskScoreV1, posture heuristic, docs 2026-08-09 10:25:03 +02:00
version-history.md chore(llm-security): v7.8.3 — docs consistency + version bump (#8,#44,#45,#46,#47) 2026-07-18 10:50:50 +02:00