scanners/lib/git-clone.mjs accepted only github.com, so the README's
Forgejo example (and /security scan on any Forgejo, Codeberg or self-hosted
URL) failed validation; scan.md and plugin-audit.md also routed only
https://github.com/ to the clone path.
Chose generic HTTPS over adding one host to an allowlist because there is
no documented security reason for the host check. Read before choosing:
git log --follow (import + E12 only), the file's comments, CHANGELOG v2.4.0
("GitHub repo URL support", feature framing), security-hardening-guide §2
and §7 (the sandbox is the defence against filter/smudge drivers), and
review-2026-06-20, which lists "vsix-fetch (HTTPS host allowlist)" as a
protection but no host check for git-clone. What protects a clone is the
OS sandbox, GIT_SANDBOX_CONFIG and GIT_SANDBOX_ENV, for every host alike.
Measured: with GIT_SANDBOX_ENV, git reads 0 config lines outside a repo;
without it, osxkeychain comes from Xcode's system gitconfig. So no stored
credential is offered to an unknown host.
The shape stays strict: https only, no userinfo, host starts and ends
alphanumeric (no leading -), optional port, exactly owner/repo, no query
or fragment. SSH stays GitHub-only: ssh uses the user's own keys and
~/.ssh/config, which the git environment does not isolate.
Tests (red first): Forgejo and any-host accept 2 failing -> green; guards
for http, userinfo, leading -, extra path, query, ext:: and file:: and
non-GitHub SSH hold. The old "rejects non-GitHub URL" case still passes
(it has no owner/repo) and is renamed to say so. Regex timed linear
(< 1 ms at 200k chars). Live: a sandboxed clone of
https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-security.git exits 0 at 5208420,
cleaned up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
35359b7d8c